

KARL MARX

SELECTED WORKS

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME

I

Second English Edition


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
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Editor Second English Edition

I. B. LASKER



Karl Marx.



PUBLISHERS' NOTE

The present (second) English edition of Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, follows the latest Russian edition (State Publishing House of Political Literature, Moscow 1941).

The translations of the works herein included have been rechecked with the original documents kept in the archives of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow.

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
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KARL MARX

SELECTED WORKS

VOLUME I



Frederick Engels

KARL MARX¹

Karl Marx, the man who was the first to give socialism, and thereby the whole labour movement of our day, a scientific foundation, was born at Treves in 1818. He studied in Bonn and Berlin, at first taking up law, but he soon devoted himself exclusively to the study of history and philosophy, and in 1842 was on the point of becoming lecturer in philosophy when the political movement which had arisen since the death of Frederick William III directed the course of his life into a different channel. With his collaboration, the leaders of the Rhenish liberal bourgeoisie, Camphausen, Hanseemann, etc., had founded, in Cologne, the *Rheinische Zeitung* and in the autumn of 1842, Marx, whose criticism of the proceedings of the Rhenish provincial diet had excited very great attention, was put at the head of the paper. The *Rheinische Zeitung* naturally appeared under censorship, but the censorship could not cope with it.² The *Rheinische Zeitung* almost always got through the articles which mattered; the censor was first supplied with insignificant fodder for him to strike out, until he either gave way of himself or was compelled to give way by the threat that then the paper would not appear the next day. Ten newspapers with the same courage as the *Rheinische Zeitung* and whose publishers would have allowed a few hundred extra thalers to be expended on type-setting—and the censorship would have been made impossible in Germany already in 1843. But the German newspaper owners were petty minded, timid philistines and the

¹ This biographical sketch was originally published in the *Volkskalender* for 1878, issued in Brunswick.—Ed.

² The first censor of the *Rheinische Zeitung* was Police Councillor Dolleschall, the same man who once struck out an advertisement in the *Kölnische Zeitung* of the translation of Dante's *Divine Comedy* by Philaethes (later King John of Saxony) with the remark: One must not make a comedy of divine affairs. [Note by F. Engels.]

Rheinische Zeitung carried on the struggle alone. It wore out one censor after another; finally it came under a double censorship; after the first censorship the *Regierungspräsident*¹ had once more and finally to censor it. That also was of no avail. In the beginning of 1843, the government declared that it was impossible to keep this newspaper in check and suppressed it without more ado.

Marx, who in the meanwhile had married the sister of von Westphalen, later minister of the reaction, removed to Paris, and there, in conjunction with A. Ruge, published the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in which he opened the series of his socialist writings with a *Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* [A Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Law]. Further, together with F. Engels, *Die heilige Familie. Gegen Bruno Bauer und Konsorten* [The Holy Family. Against Bruno Bauer and Co.], a satirical criticism of one of the latest forms assumed by German philosophical idealism at that time.

The study of political economy and of the history of the Great French Revolution still allowed Marx time enough for occasional attacks on the Prussian government; the latter revenged itself in the spring of 1845 by securing from the Guizot ministry his expulsion from France—Herr Alexander von Humboldt is said to have acted as intermediary. Marx shifted his domicile to Brussels and he published there in French in 1847: *Misère de la Philosophie* [The Poverty of Philosophy], a criticism of Proudhon's *Philosophie de la Misère* [Philosophy of Poverty], and in 1848 *Discours sur le libre échange* [Discourse on Free Trade]. At the same time he made use of the opportunity to found a German workers' society in Brussels and so commenced practical agitation. The latter became still more important for him when he and his political friends in 1847 entered the secret *Communist League*, which had already been in existence for a number of years. Its whole structure was now radically changed; this confederacy, which previously was more or less conspiratorial, was transformed into a simple organization of communist propaganda, which was only secret because necessity compelled it to be so, the first organization of the German social-democratic party. The League existed wherever German workers' unions were to be found; in almost all of these unions in England, Belgium, France and Switzerland, and in very many of the unions in Germany, the

¹ *Regierungspräsident*: In Prussia, regional representative of the central executive.—Ed.

leading members belonged to the League and the share of the League in the incipient German labour movement was very considerable. Moreover, our League was the first which emphasized the international character of the whole labour movement and realized it in practice, which had Englishmen, Belgians, Hungarians, Poles, etc., as members and which organized international labour meetings, especially in London.

The transformation of the League took place at two Congresses held in 1847, the second of which resolved on the elaboration and publication of the fundamental principles of the Party in a manifesto to be drawn up by Marx and Engels. Thus arose the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, which appeared in 1848 shortly before the February Revolution and which has since been translated into almost all European languages.

The *Deutsche Brüsseler Zeitung*, in which Marx participated and which mercilessly exposed the blessings of the police régime of the fatherland, caused the Prussian government to try to effect Marx's expulsion once more, but in vain. When, however, the February Revolution resulted also in popular movements in Brussels, and a radical change in Belgium appeared to be imminent, the Belgian government arrested Marx without ceremony and deported him. In the meanwhile the French Provisional Government had sent him through Flocon¹ an invitation to return to Paris, and he accepted this call.

In Paris, he came out especially against the swindle, widespread among the Germans there, of forming the German workers in France into armed legions in order to carry the revolution and the republic into Germany. On the one hand, Germany had to make her revolution herself, and on the other hand, every revolutionary foreign legion formed in France was betrayed in advance by the Lamartines² of the Provisional Government to the government which was to be overthrown, as occurred in Belgium and Baden.

After the March Revolution, Marx went to Cologne and founded there the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, which was in existence from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849—the only paper which represented the standpoint of the proletariat within the democratic movement of the time, as shown in its unreserved championship of the Parisian June insurgents of 1848, which cost the paper almost

¹ Ferdinand Flocon (1800-66): Editor of the Paris newspaper *La Réforme*.—Ed.

² Alphonse de Lamartine (1790-1869): French poet and moderate republican politician; was foreign minister and virtual head of the Provisional Government formed in France after the triumph of the Revolution of February 1848.—Ed.

all its shareholders. In vain the *Kreuzzeitung* pointed to the "Chimborazo impudence" with which the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* attacked everything sacred, from the king and *Reichsverweser* [vice-regent of the realm] down to the gendarme, and that, too, in a Prussian garrison town with 8,000 troops at that time. In vain was the rage of the Rhenish liberal philistines, who had suddenly become reactionary. In vain was the paper suspended by martial law in Cologne for a lengthy period in the autumn of 1848. In vain the Reich Ministry of Justice in Frankfort denounced article after article to the Cologne Public Prosecutor in order that judicial proceedings should be taken. Under the very eyes of the Military Guard the paper went on being edited and printed, and its distribution and reputation increased with the vehemence of its attacks on the government and the bourgeoisie. When the Prussian *coup d'état* took place in November 1848, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* called at the head of each issue upon the people to refuse to pay taxes and to meet violence with violence. In the spring of 1849, both on this account and because of another article, it was prosecuted before a jury, but on both occasions it was acquitted. Finally, when the May risings of 1849 in Dresden and the Rhine province had been suppressed, and the Prussian campaign against the Baden-Palatinate rising had been inaugurated by the concentration and mobilization of considerable masses of troops, the government believed itself strong enough to suppress the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* by force. The last number—printed in red ink—appeared on May 19.

Marx again went to Paris, but only a few weeks after the demonstration of June 13, 1849, he was faced by the French government with the choice of either shifting his residence to Brittany or leaving France altogether. He preferred the latter and moved to London, where he has lived uninterruptedly ever since.

An attempt to continue to issue the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in the form of a review (in Hamburg, 1850) had to be given up after a while in view of the ever-increasing violence of the reaction. Immediately after the *coup d'état* in France in December 1851, Marx published: *Der 18. Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte* [*The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*], (Boston 1852; second edition, Hamburg 1869, shortly before the war). In 1853 he wrote: *Enthüllungen über den Kölner Communistenprozess* [*Revelations About the Cologne Communist Trial*] (first printed in Basle, later in Boston, and again recently in Leipzig).

After the condemnation of the members of the Communist

League in Cologne, Marx withdrew from political agitation and for ten years devoted himself on the one hand to the study of the rich treasures offered by the library of the British Museum in the sphere of political economy, and on the other hand to writing for the *New York Tribune*, which up to the outbreak of the American Civil War published not only contributions signed by him but also numerous leading articles on conditions in Europe and Asia from his pen. His attacks on Lord Palmerston, based on a detailed study of English official documents, were reprinted in London as pamphlets.

As the first fruit of his many years of study of economics, there appeared in 1859: *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie. Erstes Heft* [A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Part I] (Berlin, Duncker). This work contains the first coherent exposition of the Marxian theory of value, including the theory of money. During the Italian War, Marx (in the German newspaper *Das Volk*, appearing in London) attacked both Bonapartism, which was then pretending to be liberal and playing the part of liberator of the oppressed nationalities, and also the Prussian policy of the time, which under the cover of neutrality was seeking to fish in troubled waters. In this connection it was also necessary to attack Herr Karl Vogt, who at that time, on the commission of Prince Napoleon (Plon-Plon), and being in the pay of Louis Napoleon, was carrying on agitation for the neutrality, and indeed the sympathy, of Germany. When Vogt heaped upon him the most abominable, deliberately lying calumnies, Marx answered with: *Herr Vogt* (London, 1860), in which Vogt and other gentlemen of the imperialist sham democratic gang were exposed, and Vogt himself on the basis of both external and internal evidence was convicted of receiving bribes from the December empire. The confirmation came just ten years later: in the list of the Bonaparte hirelings, found in the Tuileries in 1870 and published by the September government, there was the following entry under the letter V: "Vogt—in August 1859 there were remitted to him—Fr. 40,000."

Finally, in 1867 there appeared in Hamburg: *Das Kapital, Kritik der politischen Oekonomie. Erster Band*. [*Capital, a Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production*, Volume I], Marx's chief work, which expounds the bases of his economic-socialist conceptions and the main features of his criticism of existing society, of the capitalist mode of production and its consequences. The second edition of this epoch-making work appeared in 1872; the author is engaged in the elaboration of the second volume.

Meanwhile the labour movement in various countries of Europe had so far regained strength that Marx could entertain the idea of realizing a long-cherished wish: the foundation of a Workers' Association embracing the most advanced countries of Europe and America, which would demonstrate bodily, so to speak, the international character of the socialist movement both to the workers themselves and to the bourgeois and the governments—for the encouragement and strengthening of the proletariat, for striking fear into the hearts of its enemies. A mass meeting in favour of Poland, which was just then again being crushed by Russia, held on September 28, 1864, in St. Martin's Hall in London, provided an occasion for bringing forward the matter, which was enthusiastically taken up. The *International Working Men's Association* was founded; a Provisional General Council, with its seat in London, was elected at the meeting, and Marx was the soul of this as of all subsequent General Councils up to the Hague Congress. He drafted almost every one of the documents issued by the General Council of the International, from the *Inaugural Address*, 1864, to the *Address on the Civil War in France, 1871*. To describe Marx's activity in the International is to write the history of this Association, which in any case still lives in the memory of European workers.

The fall of the Paris Commune put the International in an impossible position. It was thrust into the forefront of European history at a moment when it had everywhere been deprived of all possibility of successful practical action. The events which raised it to the position of the seventh Great Power simultaneously forbade it to mobilize its fighting forces and employ them in action, on pain of inevitable defeat and the setting back of the labour movement for decades. In addition, from various sides elements were pushing themselves forward that sought to exploit the suddenly enhanced fame of the Association for purposes of personal vanity or personal ambition, without understanding the real position of the International or without regard for it. A heroic decision had to be taken and it was again Marx who took it and who carried it through at the Hague Congress. In a solemn resolution, the International disclaimed all responsibility for the doings of the Bakunists,¹ who formed the central point of all those unreasonable and unsavoury elements. Then, in view of the impossibility of also meeting, in the face of the general reaction,

¹ *Bakunists*: followers of Michael Bakunin (1814-76), ideologist of anarchism and inveterate foe of Marxism.—Ed.

the increased demands which were being imposed upon it, and of maintaining its complete efficacy other than by a series of sacrifices which would have drained the labour movement of its life-blood—in view of this situation, the International withdrew from the stage for the time being by transferring the General Council to America. The results have proved how correct was this decision—which was at the time, and has been since, so often censured. On the one hand, it put a stop then and since to all attempts to make useless *putsches* in the name of the International, while on the other hand the continuing close intercourse between the socialist workers' parties of the various countries proved that the consciousness of the identity of interests and of the solidarity of the proletariat of all countries evoked by the International is able to find expression even without the bond of a formal international association, which for the moment had become a fetter.

After the Hague Congress, Marx at last found peace and leisure again for resuming his theoretical work, and it is to be hoped he will be able before long to have the second volume of *Capital* ready for the press.

Of the many important discoveries through which Marx has inscribed his name in the annals of science, we can here mention only two.

The first is the revolution brought about by him in the whole conception of world history. The whole previous view of history was based on the conception that the ultimate causes of all historical changes are to be looked for in the changing ideas of human beings, and that of all historical changes, political changes are the most important and are dominant in the whole of history. But the question was not asked as to whence the ideas come into men's minds and what the driving causes of the political changes are. Only upon the newer school of French, and partly also of English, historians had the conviction forced itself that, since the Middle Ages at least, the driving force in European history had been the struggle of the developing bourgeoisie with the feudal aristocracy for social and political domination. Now Marx has proved that the whole of previous history is a history of class struggles, that in all the diverse and complicated political struggles the only thing at issue has been the social and political rule of social classes, the maintenance of domination by older classes and the conquest of domination by newly arising classes. To what, however, do these classes owe their origin and their continued existence? They owe it to the particular material, physically sen-

sible conditions in which society at a given period produces and exchanges its means of subsistence. The feudal rule of the Middle Ages rested on the self-sufficient economy of small peasant communities which themselves produced almost all their requirements, in which there was almost no exchange and which received from the arms-bearing nobility protection from without and national or at least political cohesion. When the towns arose and with them separate handicraft industry and trade intercourse, at first internal and later international, the urban bourgeoisie developed and even during the Middle Ages achieved, in struggle with the nobility, its inclusion in the feudal order as a privileged estate as well. But with the discovery of the extra-European world, from the middle of the fifteenth century onwards, this bourgeoisie acquired a far more extensive sphere of trade and therewith a new stimulus for its industry; in the most important branches handicrafts were supplanted by manufacture, now on a factory scale, and this again was supplanted by large-scale industry, which became possible owing to the discoveries of the previous century, especially that of the steam-engine, and which in its turn reacted on trade by driving out the old handicraft labour in backward countries, and creating the present-day new means of communication, steam-engines, railways, electric telegraphy, in the more developed ones. Thus the bourgeoisie came more and more to combine social wealth and social power in its hands, while it still for a long period remained excluded from political power, which was in the hands of the nobility and the monarchy supported by the nobility. But at a certain stage—in France after the Great Revolution—it also conquered political power, and from then on became a ruling class over the proletariat and small peasants. From this point of view all the historical phenomena are explicable in the simplest possible way—with sufficient knowledge of the particular economic condition of society, which it is true is totally lacking in our professional historians, and in the same way the conceptions and ideas of each historical period are most simply to be explained from the economic conditions of life and from the social and political relations of the period, which are in turn determined by these economic conditions. History was for the first time placed on its real basis; the obvious but previously totally overlooked fact that men must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, therefore must *work*, before they can fight for domination, pursue politics, religion, philosophy, etc.—this obvious fact at last came into its historical rights.

This new conception of history, however, was of supreme significance for the socialist outlook. It showed that all previous history moved in class antagonisms and class struggles, that there have always existed ruling and ruled, exploiting and exploited classes, and that the great majority of mankind has always been condemned to arduous labour and little enjoyment. Why is this? Simply because in all earlier stages of development of mankind production was so little developed that the historical development could only proceed in this antagonistic form, that historical progress as a whole was dependent on the activity of a small privileged minority, while the great mass remained condemned to producing by their labour their own meagre means of subsistence and also the increasingly rich means of the privileged. But the same investigation of history, which in this way provides a natural and reasonable explanation of the previous class rule, otherwise only explicable from the wickedness of man, also leads to the realization that, in consequence of the so tremendously increased productive forces of the present time, even the last pretext has vanished for a division of mankind into rulers and ruled, exploiters and exploited, at least in the most advanced countries; that the ruling big bourgeoisie has fulfilled its historic mission, that it is no longer capable of the leadership of society and has even become a hindrance to the development of production, as the trade crises, and especially the last great collapse and the depressed condition of industry in all countries, have proved; that historical leadership has passed to the proletariat, a class which, owing to its whole position in society, can only free itself by abolishing altogether all class rule, all servitude and all exploitation; and that the social productive forces, which have outgrown the control of the bourgeoisie, are only waiting for the associated proletariat to take possession of them in order to bring about a state of things in which every member of society will be enabled to participate not only in production but also in the distribution and administration of social wealth, and which so increases the social productive forces and their yield by planned operation of the whole of production that the satisfaction of all reasonable needs will be assured for everyone to an ever-increasing degree.

The second important discovery of Marx's is the final elucidation of the relation between capital and labour, in other words, the demonstration how, within present society and under the existing capitalist mode of production, the exploitation of the worker

by the capitalist takes place. Ever since political economy had put forward the proposition that labour is the source of all wealth and of all value, the question became inevitable: "How is this then to be reconciled with the fact that the wage worker does not receive the whole sum of value created by his labour but has to surrender a part of it to the capitalist?" Both the bourgeois economists and the socialists exerted themselves to give a scientifically valid answer to this question, but in vain, until at last Marx came forward with the solution. This solution is as follows. The present-day capitalist mode of production presupposes the existence of two social classes: on the one hand that of the capitalists, who are in possession of the means of production and subsistence, and on the other hand that of the proletarians, who, being excluded from this possession, have only a single commodity for sale, their labour power, and who therefore have to sell this labour power of theirs in order to obtain possession of means of subsistence. The value of a commodity is, however, determined by the socially necessary quantity of labour embodied in its production, and therefore also in its reproduction; the value of the labour power of an average human being during a day, month or year is determined therefore by the quantity of labour embodied in the quantity of means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of this labour power during a day, month or year. Let us assume that the means of subsistence of a worker for one day require six hours of labour for their production or, what is the same thing, that the labour contained in them represents a quantity of labour of six hours; then the value of labour power for one day will be expressed in a sum of money which also embodies six hours of labour. Let us assume further that the capitalist who employs our worker pays him this sum in return, pays him, therefore, the full value of his labour power. If now the worker works six hours of the day for the capitalist, he has completely replaced the latter's outlay—six hours' labour for six hours' labour. But then there would be nothing in it for the capitalist, and the latter therefore looks at the matter quite differently. He says: "I have bought the labour power of this worker not for six hours but for a whole day," and accordingly he makes the worker work 8, 10, 12, 14 or more hours, according to circumstances, so that the product of the seventh, eighth and following hours is a product of unpaid labour and wanders, to begin with, into the pocket of the capitalist. Thus the worker in the service of the capitalist not only reproduces the value of his labour power, for which he receives pay, but

over and above that he also produces a *surplus value* which, appropriated in the first place by the capitalist, is in its further course divided according to definite economic laws among the whole capitalist class and forms the basic stock from which arise ground rent, profit, accumulation of capital, in short, all the wealth consumed or accumulated by the non-toiling classes. But this proved that the acquisition of riches by the present-day capitalists consists just as much in the appropriation of the unpaid labour of others as that of the slave owner or the feudal lord exploiting serf labour, and that all these forms of exploitation are only to be distinguished by the difference in manner and method by which the unpaid labour is appropriated. This, however, also removed the last justification for all the hypocritical phrases of the possessing classes to the effect that in the present social order right and justice, equality of rights and duties and a general harmony of interests prevail, and present-day bourgeois society no less than its predecessors was exposed as a grandiose institution for the exploitation of the huge majority of the people by a small, ever-diminishing minority.

Modern scientific socialism is based on these two important facts. In the second volume of *Capital* these and other hardly less important scientific discoveries concerning the capitalist system of society will be further developed, and thereby those aspects also of political economy not touched upon in the first volume will undergo revolutionization. May it be vouchsafed to Marx to be able soon to have it ready for the press.

Frederick Engels

SPEECH AT THE GRAVESIDE OF KARL MARX

(DELIVERED AT HIGHGATE CEMETERY, LONDON, MARCH 17, 1883¹)

On the 14th of March, at a quarter to three in the afternoon, the greatest living thinker ceased to think. He had been left alone for scarcely two minutes, and when we came back we found him in an armchair, peacefully gone to sleep—but forever.

An immeasurable loss has been sustained both by the militant proletariat of Europe and America, and by historical science, in the death of this man. The gap that has been left by the departure of this mighty spirit will soon enough make itself felt.

Just as Darwin discovered the law of evolution in organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of evolution in human history; he discovered the simple fact, hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat and drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion, etc.; and that therefore the production of the immediate material means of subsistence and consequently the degree of economic development attained by a given people or during a given epoch, form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions, the art and even the religious ideas of the people concerned have been evolved, and in the light of which these things must therefore be explained, instead of *vice versa* as had hitherto been the case.

But that is not all. Marx also discovered the special law of motion governing the present-day capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois society that this mode of production has created. The discovery of surplus value suddenly threw light on the problem, in trying to solve which all previous investigators, both bourgeois economists and socialist critics, had been groping in the dark.

Two such discoveries would be enough for one lifetime. Happy the man to whom it is granted to make even one such discovery.

¹ The speech, held in *English*, was translated by Engels himself (*Das Begräbnis von Karl Marx*) and published in the Zurich *Sozialdemokrat*, No. 13, March 22, 1883. The present English text is a retranslation from the German, Engels' English notes being consulted.—Ed.

But in every single field which Marx investigated—and he investigated very many fields, none of them superficially—in every field, even in that of mathematics, he made independent discoveries.

Such was the man of science. But this was not even half the man. Science was for Marx a historically dynamic, revolutionary force. However great the joy with which he welcomed a new discovery in some theoretical science whose practical application perhaps it was as yet quite impossible to envisage, he experienced quite another kind of joy when the discovery involved immediate revolutionary changes in industry and in historical development in general. For example, he followed closely the development of the discoveries made in the field of electricity and recently those of Marc Deprez.¹

For Marx was before all else a revolutionist. His real mission in life was to contribute in one way or another to the overthrow of capitalist society and of the state institutions which it had brought into being, to contribute to the liberation of the present-day proletariat, which *he* was the first to make conscious of its own position and its needs, of the conditions under which it could win its emancipation. Fighting was his element. And he fought with a passion, a tenacity and a success such as few could rival. His work on the first *Rheinische Zeitung* (1842), the *Paris Vorwärts* (1844), the *Brussels Deutsche Zeitung* (1847), the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (1848-49), the *New York Tribune* (1852-61), and in addition to these a host of militant pamphlets, work in unions in Paris, Brussels and London, and finally, crowning all, the formation of the International Working Men's Association²—this was indeed an achievement of which its founder might well have been proud even if he had done nothing else.

And consequently Marx was the best hated and most calumniated man of his time. Governments, both absolutist and republican, deported him from their territories. The bourgeoisie, whether conservative or extreme democrat, vied with one another in heaping slanders upon him. All this he brushed aside as though it were cobweb, ignoring it, answering only when necessity compelled him. And now he has died—beloved, revered and mourned by millions of revolutionary fellow-workers—from the mines of Siberia to California, in all parts of Europe and America—and I make bold to say that though he may have many opponents he has hardly one personal enemy.

His name will endure through the ages, and so also will his work!

¹ Marc Deprez (1843-1918): French physicist.—Ed.

² The First International.—Ed.

V. I. Lenin

KARL MARX¹

Karl Marx was born May 5, 1818, in the city of Treves (Rhenish Prussia). His father was a lawyer, a Jew, who in 1824 adopted Protestantism. The family was well-to-do, cultured, but not revolutionary. After graduating from the *gymnasium* in Treves, Marx entered university, first at Bonn and later at Berlin, where he studied jurisprudence and, chiefly, history and philosophy. He concluded his course in 1841, submitting his doctoral dissertation on the philosophy of Epicurus. In his views Marx at that time was still a Hegelian idealist. In Berlin he belonged to the circle of "Left Hegelians" (Bruno Bauer and others), who sought to draw atheistic and revolutionary conclusions from Hegel's philosophy.

After graduating from the university, Marx moved to Bonn, expecting to become a professor. But the reactionary policy of the government—which in 1832 deprived Ludwig Feuerbach of his chair and in 1836 refused to allow him to return to the university, and in 1841 forbade the young professor, Bruno Bauer, to lecture at Bonn—forced Marx to abandon the idea of pursuing an academic career. At that time the views of the Left Hegelians were developing very rapidly in Germany. Ludwig Feuerbach began to criticize theology, particularly so in 1836 and after, and to turn to materialism, which in 1841 gained the upper hand in his philosophy (*Das Wesen des Christentums* [*The Essence of Christianity*]); in 1843 his *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft* [*Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*] appeared. "One must himself have experienced the liberating effect" of these books, Engels subsequently wrote of these works of Feuerbach. "We [*i.e.*, the Left Hegelians, including Marx] all became at once Feuerbachians."² At that time some Rhenish radical bourgeois who had certain points in common with the Left Hegelians founded an opposition paper in Cologne, the *Rheinische Zeitung*—the first number

¹ This article was written between July and November 1914, and was originally published (abridged) in the seventh (1915) edition of the *Granat Encyclopædia*.—Ed.

² F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 364 of this volume.—Ed.

appeared on January 1, 1842. Marx and Bruno Bauer were invited to be the chief contributors. In October 1842 Marx became chief editor and removed from Bonn to Cologne. The revolutionary-democratic trend of the paper became more and more pronounced under Marx's editorship. The government first subjected the paper to double and triple censorship and then, on January 1, 1843, decided to suppress it altogether. Marx had to resign the editorship about that time, but his resignation did not save the paper, which was closed down in March 1843. Of the more important articles contributed by Marx to the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Engels notes, in addition to those indicated below (see *Bibliography*),¹ an article on the condition of the peasant wine-growers of the Moselle Valley. His journalistic activities convinced Marx that he was not sufficiently acquainted with political economy, and he zealously set out to study it.

In 1843, in Kreuznach, Marx married Jenny von Westphalen, a childhood friend to whom he had been engaged while still a student. His wife came from a reactionary family of the Prussian nobility. Her elder brother was Prussian Minister of the Interior at a most reactionary period, 1850-58. In the autumn of 1843 Marx went to Paris in order, together with Arnold Ruge (born 1802, died 1880; a Left Hegelian; in 1825-30, in prison; after 1848, a political exile; after 1866-70, a Bismarckian), to publish a radical magazine abroad. Only one issue of this magazine, *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, appeared. It was discontinued owing to the difficulty of secret distribution in Germany and to disagreements with Ruge. In his articles in this magazine Marx already appears as a revolutionist; he advocates the "merciless criticism of everything existing," and in particular the "criticism of arms," and appeals to the *masses* and to the *proletariat*.

In September 1844 Frederick Engels came to Paris for a few days, and from that time forth became Marx's closest friend. They both took a most active part in the then seething life of the revolutionary groups in Paris (of particular importance was Proudhon's doctrine, which Marx thoroughly demolished in his *Poverty of Philosophy*, 1847), and, vigorously combating the various doctrines of petty-bourgeois Socialism, worked out the theory and tactics of revolutionary *proletarian Socialism*, or Communism (Marxism). See Marx's works of this period, 1844-48, in the *Bibliography*. In 1845, on the insistent demand of the Prussian govern-

¹ I. e., the *Bibliography of Marxism*, which Lenin appended to the original article, but which, for lack of space, is omitted in this edition.—Ed.

ment, Marx was banished from Paris as a dangerous revolutionist. He removed to Brussels. In the spring of 1847 Marx and Engels joined a secret propaganda society called the Communist League, took a prominent part in the Second Congress of the League (London, November 1847), and at its request drew up the famous *Communist Manifesto*, which appeared in February 1848. With the clarity and brilliance of genius, this work outlines the new world-conception, consistent materialism, which also embraces the realm of social life, dialectics, the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, the theory of the class struggle and of the historic revolutionary role of the proletariat—the creator of the new, Communist society.

When the Revolution of February 1848 broke out, Marx was banished from Belgium. He returned to Paris, whence, after the March Revolution, he went to Germany, again to Cologne. There the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* appeared from June 1, 1848, to May 19, 1849; Marx was the chief editor. The new theory was brilliantly corroborated by the course of the revolutionary events of 1848-49, as it has been since corroborated by all proletarian and democratic movements of all countries in the world. The victorious counter-revolution first instituted court proceedings against Marx (he was acquitted on February 9, 1849) and then banished him from Germany (May 16, 1849). Marx first went to Paris, was again banished after the demonstration of June 13, 1849, and then went to London, where he lived to the day of his death.

His life as a political exile was a very hard one, as the correspondence between Marx and Engels (published in 1913)¹ clearly reveals. Marx and his family suffered dire poverty. Had it not been for Engels' constant and self-sacrificing financial support, Marx would not only have been unable to bring his work on *Capital* to a conclusion, but would have inevitably perished from want. Moreover, the prevailing doctrines and trends of petty-bourgeois Socialism, and of non-proletarian Socialism in general, forced Marx to carry on a continuous and merciless fight and sometimes to repel the most savage and monstrous personal attacks (*Herr Vogt*). Holding aloof from the circles of political exiles, Marx developed his materialist theory in a number of historic works (see *Bibliography*), devoting his efforts chiefly to the study of political economy. Marx revolutionized this science (see below, "The Marxian Doctrine") in his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) and *Capital* (Vol. I, 1867).

¹ Hereafter referred to as the *Briefwechsel* (Correspondence).—Ed.

The period of revival of the democratic movements at the end of the 'fifties and in the 'sixties recalled Marx to practical activity. In 1864 (September 28) the International Working Men's Association—the famous First International—was founded in London. Marx was the heart and soul of this organization; he was the author of its first Address and of a host of resolutions, declarations and manifestoes. By uniting the labour movement of various countries, by striving to direct into the channel of joint activity the various forms of non-proletarian, pre-Marxian Socialism (Mazzini, Proudhon, Bakunin, liberal trade unionism in England, Lassalleian vacillations to the Right in Germany, etc.), and by combating the theories of all these sects and schools, Marx hammered out a uniform tactic for the proletarian struggle of the working class in the various countries. After the fall of the Paris Commune (1871)—of which Marx gave such a profound, clear-cut, brilliant, *effective* and revolutionary analysis (*The Civil War in France*, 1871), and after the International was split by the Bakunists, the existence of that organization in Europe became impossible. After the Hague Congress of the International (1872) Marx had the General Council of the International transferred to New York. The First International had accomplished its historical role, and it made way for a period of immeasurably larger growth of the labour movement in all the countries of the world, a period, in fact, when the movement grew in *breadth* and when *mass* Socialist labour parties in individual national states were created.

His strenuous work in the International and his still more strenuous theoretical occupations completely undermined Marx's health. He continued his work on the reshaping of political economy and the completion of *Capital*, for which he collected a mass of new material and studied a number of languages (Russian, for instance); but ill-health prevented him from finishing *Capital*.

On December 2, 1881, his wife died. On March 14, 1883, Marx peacefully passed away in his armchair. He lies buried with his wife and Helene Demuth, their devoted servant, who was almost a member of the family, in the Highgate Cemetery, London.

THE MARXIAN DOCTRINE

Marxism is the system of the views and teachings of Marx. Marx was the genius who continued and completed the three main ideological currents of the nineteenth century, belonging to the three most advanced countries of mankind: classical German phi-

losophy, classical English political economy, and French Socialism together with French revolutionary doctrines in general. The remarkable consistency and integrity of Marx's views, acknowledged even by his opponents, views which in their totality constitute modern materialism and modern scientific Socialism, as the theory and program of the labour movement in all the civilized countries of the world, oblige us to present a brief outline of his world-conception in general before proceeding to the exposition of the principal content of Marxism, namely, Marx's economic doctrine.

PHILOSOPHICAL MATERIALISM

From 1844-45 on, when his views took shape, Marx was a materialist, in particular a follower of Ludwig Feuerbach, whose weak sides he even later considered to consist exclusively in the fact that his materialism was not consistent and comprehensive enough. Marx regarded the historic and "epoch-making" importance of Feuerbach to be that he had resolutely broken away from Hegelian idealism and had proclaimed materialism, which already "in the eighteenth century, especially in France, had been a struggle not only against the existing political institutions and against . . . religion and theology, but also . . . against all metaphysics" (in the sense of "intoxicated speculation" as distinct from "sober philosophy"). (*The Holy Family*, in the *Literarischer Nachlass*).

"To Hegel . . ." wrote Marx, "the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [creator] of the real world. . . . With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." (*Capital*, Vol. I, p. XXX; Author's Preface to the Second Edition.)

In full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it, Frederick Engels wrote in *Anti-Dühring* (which Marx read in manuscript):

"The unity of the world does not consist in its being. . . . The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved . . . by a long and tedious development of philosophy and natural science. . . ."¹ "*Motion is the mode of existence of matter*. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion," "motion without matter," "nor can there be. . . ."² "If the . . . question is raised: what then are thought and consciousness, and whence they come, it be-

¹ Herr Eugen Dühring's *Revolution in Science* (*Anti-Dühring*), Eng. ed., 1934, p. 54.—Ed.

² *Ibid.*, p. 71.—Ed.

comes apparent that they are products of the human brain and that man himself is a product of Nature, which has been developed in and along with its environment; whence it is self-evident that the products of the human brain, being in the last analysis also products of Nature, do not contradict the rest of Nature but are in correspondence with it."¹ "Hegel was an idealist, that is to say, the thoughts within his mind were to him not the more or less abstract images [*Abbilder*, reflections; Engels sometimes speaks of "imprints"] of real things and processes, but, on the contrary, things and their development were to him only the images made real of the 'Idea' existing somewhere or other already before the world existed."²

In his *Ludwig Feuerbach*—in which he expounds his and Marx's views on Feuerbach's philosophy, and which he sent to the press after re-reading an old manuscript written by Marx and himself in 1844-45 on Hegel, Feuerbach and the materialist conception of history—Frederick Engels writes:

"The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being, ... of spirit to nature. ... Which is primary, spirit or nature? ... The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other ... comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism."³

Any other use of the concepts of (philosophical) idealism and materialism leads only to confusion. Marx decidedly rejected not only idealism, always connected in one way or another with religion, but also the views, especially widespread in our day, of Hume and Kant, agnosticism, criticism, positivism in their various forms, regarding such a philosophy as a "reactionary" concession to idealism and at best a "shamefaced way of surreptitiously accepting materialism, while denying it before the world."⁴ On this question, see, in addition to the above-mentioned works of Engels and Marx, a letter of Marx to Engels dated December 12, 1868, in which Marx, referring to an utterance of the well-known naturalist Thomas Huxley that was "more materialistic" than usual, and to his recognition that "as long as we actually observe and think, we cannot possibly get away from materialism," at the same time reproaches him for leaving a "loophole" for agnosticism, for Humeism. It is especially important to note Marx's view on the relation

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.—Ed.

² *Ibid.*, p. 31.—Ed.

³ F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, pp. 366 and 367 of this volume.—Ed.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 368.—Ed.

between freedom and necessity: "Necessity is *blind* only in so far as it is not understood." "Freedom is the appreciation of necessity." (Engels, *Anti-Dühring*).¹ This means the recognition of objective law in nature and of the dialectical transformation of necessity into freedom (in the same manner as the transformation of the unknown, but knowable, "thing-in-itself" into the "thing-for-us," of the "essence of things" into "phenomena"). Marx and Engels considered the fundamental limitations of the "old" materialism, including the materialism of Feuerbach (and still more of the "vulgar" materialism of Büchner, Vogt and Moleschott), to be: (1) that this materialism was "predominantly mechanical," failing to take account of the latest developments of chemistry and biology (in our day it would be necessary to add: and of the electrical theory of matter); (2) that the old materialism was non-historical, non-dialectical (metaphysical, in the sense of anti-dialectical), and did not adhere consistently and comprehensively to the standpoint of development; (3) that it regarded the "human essence" abstractly and not as the "*ensemble*" of (concretely defined historical) "social relations," and therefore only "interpreted" the world, whereas the point is to "change" it; that is to say, it did not understand the importance of "revolutionary practical activity."

DIALECTICS

Hegelian dialectics, as the most comprehensive, the most rich in content, and the most profound doctrine of development, was regarded by Marx and Engels as the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy. They considered every other formulation of the principle of development, of evolution, one-sided and poor in content, and distorting and mutilating the real course of development (often proceeding by leaps, catastrophes and revolutions) in nature and in society.

"Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics [from the destruction of idealism, including Hegelianism] and apply it in the materialist conception of nature...² Nature is the test of dialectics, and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich [this was written before the discovery of radium, electrons, the transmutation of elements, etc.!] and daily increasing materials for this test, and has thus proved that in the last analysis nature's process is dialectical and not metaphysical."³

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 130.—Ed.

² *Anti-Dühring*, p. 15.—Ed.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.—Ed.

"The great basic thought," Engels writes, "that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made *things*, but as a complex of *processes*, in which the things apparently stable, no less than their mind-images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away...—this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of investigation are two different things."¹ "For it [dialectical philosophy] nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain."²

Thus, according to Marx, dialectics is "the science of the general laws of motion—both of the external world and of human thought."³

This, the revolutionary, side of Hegel's philosophy was adopted and developed by Marx. Dialectical materialism "no longer needs any philosophy standing above the other sciences."⁴ Of former philosophy there remains "the science of thought and its laws—formal logic and dialectics."⁵ And dialectics, as understood by Marx, and in conformity with Hegel, includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, or epistemology, which, too, must regard its subject matter historically, studying and generalizing the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from *non-knowledge* to knowledge.

Nowadays, the idea of development, of evolution, has penetrated the social consciousness almost in its entirety, but by different ways, not by way of the Hegelian philosophy. But as formulated by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel, this idea is far more comprehensive, far richer in content than the current idea of evolution. A development that seemingly, repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis ("negation of negation"), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line;—a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions;—"breaks in continuity";—the transformation of quantity into quality;—the inner impulses to development, im-

¹ *Ludwig Feuerbach*, pp. 384-85 of this volume.—*Ed.*

² *Ibid.*, pp. 359-60.—*Ed.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 384.—*Ed.*

⁴ *Anti-Dühring*, p. 32.—*Ed.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32.—*Ed.*

parted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society;—the interdependence and the closest, indissoluble connection of *all* sides of every phenomenon (while history constantly discloses ever new sides), a connection that provides a uniform, law-governed, universal process of motion—such are some of the features of dialectics as a richer (than the ordinary) doctrine of development. (See Marx's letter to Engels of January 8, 1868, in which he ridicules Stein's "wooden trichotomies," which it would be absurd to confuse with materialist dialectics.)

THE MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

Having realized the inconsistency, incompleteness, and one-sidedness of the old materialism, Marx became convinced of the necessity of "bringing the science of society . . . into harmony with the materialist foundation, and of reconstructing it thereupon."¹ Since materialism in general explains consciousness as the outcome of being, and not conversely, materialism as applied to the social life of mankind has to explain *social* consciousness as the outcome of *social* being.

"Technology," writes Marx (*Capital*, Vol. I), "discloses man's mode of dealing with nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them."²

In the preface to his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx gives an integral formulation of the fundamental principles of materialism as extended to human society and its history. in the following words:

"In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness

¹ Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 373 of this volume.—Ed.

² *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 367.

Marx's *Capital*, Vol. I, is quoted in this edition from either the English edition published in 1938 by Allen & Unwin Ltd., London or that published in 1939 by the International Publishers, New York.—Ed.

of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work before. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, æsthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness: on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production.... In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois modes of production as so many progressive epochs in the economic formation of society."¹ (See Marx's brief formulation in a letter to Engels dated July 7, 1866: "Our theory that the organization of labour is determined by the means of production.")

The discovery of the materialist conception of history, or rather, the consistent continuation, extension of materialism to the domain of social phenomena, removed two of the chief defects of earlier historical theories. In the first place, they at best examined only the ideological motives of the historical activity of human beings, without investigating what produced these motives, without grasping the objective laws governing the development of the system of social relations, and without discerning the roots of these relations in the degree of development of material production; in the second place it was precisely the activities of the *masses* of the population that the earlier theories did not cover, whereas historical materialism made it possible for the first time to study with the accuracy of the natural sciences the social conditions of the life of the masses and the changes in these conditions. Pre-Marxian "sociology" and historiography *at best* provided an accumulation of raw facts, collected at random, and a depiction of certain sides of the historical process. By examining the *ensemble* of all the opposing tendencies, by reducing them to precisely definable conditions of life and production of the various *classes* of society, by

¹ Marx, *Critique of Political Economy*, pp. 300-01 of this volume.—Ed.

discarding subjectivism and arbitrariness in the choice of various "leading" ideas or in their interpretation, and by disclosing that all ideas and all the various tendencies, without exception, have their *roots* in the condition of the material forces of production, Marxism pointed the way to an all-embracing and comprehensive study of the process of the genesis, development, and decline of social-economic formations. People make their own history. But what determines the motives of people, of the mass of people, that is; what gives rise to the clash of conflicting ideas and strivings; what is the ensemble of all these clashes of the whole mass of human societies; what are the objective conditions of production of material life that form the basis of all historical activity of men; what is the law of development of these conditions—to all this Marx drew attention and pointed out the way to a scientific study of history as a uniform and law-governed process in all its immense variety and contradictoriness.

THE CLASS STRUGGLE

That in any given society the strivings of some of its members conflict with the strivings of others, that social life is full of contradictions, that history discloses a struggle within nations and societies as well as between nations and societies, and, in addition, an alternation of periods of revolution and reaction, peace and war, stagnation and rapid progress or decline—are facts that are generally known. Marxism provided the clue which enables us to discover the laws governing this seeming labyrinth and chaos, namely, the theory of the class struggle. Only a study of the ensemble of strivings of all the members of a given society or group of societies can lead to a scientific definition of the result of these strivings. And the source of the conflict of strivings lies in the differences in the position and mode of life of the *classes* into which each society is divided.

"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles," wrote Marx in the *Communist Manifesto* (except the history of the primitive community—Engels added).

"Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes....

"The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.

"Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: It has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat."¹

Ever since the Great French Revolution, European history has very clearly revealed in a number of countries this real under-surface of events, the struggle of classes. And the Restoration period in France already produced a number of historians (Thierry, Guizot, Mignet, Thiers) who, generalizing from events, could not but recognize that the class struggle was the key to all French history. And the modern era—the era of the complete victory of the bourgeoisie, representative institutions, wide (if not universal) suffrage, a cheap, popular daily press, etc., the era of powerful and ever-expanding unions of workers and unions of employers, etc.—has revealed even more manifestly (though sometimes in a very one-sided, "peaceful," "constitutional" form) that the class struggle is the mainspring of events. The following passage from Marx's *Communist Manifesto* will show us what Marx required of social science in respect to an objective analysis of the position of each class in modern society in connection with an analysis of the conditions of development of each class:

"Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.

"The lower middle class: the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant—all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus defend not their present, but their future interests; they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat."²

In a number of historic works (see *Bibliography*), Marx has given us brilliant and profound examples of materialist histori-

¹ Marx-Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, pp. 110-11 of this volume.—Ed.

² *Ibid.*, p. 120.—Ed.

ography, of an analysis of the position of *each* individual class, and sometimes of various groups or strata within a class, showing plainly why and how "every class struggle is a political struggle."¹ The above-quoted passage is an illustration of what a complex network of social relations and *transitional* stages between one class and another, from the past to the future, Marx analyses in order to determine the resultant of historical development.

The most profound, comprehensive and detailed confirmation and application of Marx's theory is his economic doctrine.

MARX'S ECONOMIC DOCTRINE

"It is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society"² (that is to say, capitalist, bourgeois society), says Marx in the preface to *Capital*. The investigation of the relations of production in a given, historically defined society, in their genesis, development, and decline—such is the content of Marx's economic doctrine. In capitalist society it is the production of *commodities* that dominates, and Marx's analysis therefore begins with an analysis of the commodity.

VALUE

A commodity is, in the first place, a thing that satisfies a human want; in the second place, it is a thing that can be exchanged for another thing. The utility of a thing makes it a *use-value*. Exchange-value (or simply, value) presents itself first of all as a relation, as the proportion in which a certain number of use-values of one sort are exchanged for a certain number of use-values of another sort. Daily experience shows us that millions upon millions of such exchanges are constantly equating one with another every kind of use-value, even the most diverse and incomparable. Now, what is there in common between these various things, things constantly equated one with another in a definite system of social relations? What is common to them is that they are *products of labour*. In exchanging products people equate to one another the most diverse kinds of labour. The production of commodities is a system of social relations in which the single producers create diverse products (the social division of labour), and in which all these products are equated to one another in ex-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.—Ed.

² *Capital*, Vol. I, p. XIX.—Ed.

change. Consequently, what is common to all commodities is not the concrete labour of a definite branch of production, not labour of one particular kind, but *abstract* human labour—human labour in general. All the labour power of a given society, as represented in the sum total of values of all commodities, is one and the same human labour power; millions and millions of acts of exchange prove this. And, consequently, each particular commodity represents only a certain share of the *socially necessary* labour time. The magnitude of value is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour, or by the labour time that is socially necessary for the production of the given commodity, of the given use-value.

"...Whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless we do it."¹

As one of the earlier economists said, value is a relation between two persons; only he ought to have added: a relation screened by a material integument. We can understand what value is only when we consider it from the standpoint of the system of social relations of production of one particular historical formation of society, relations, moreover, which manifest themselves in the mass phenomenon of exchange, a phenomenon which repeats itself millions upon millions of times.

"As values, all commodities are only definite masses of congealed labour-time."²

Having made a detailed analysis of the twofold character of the labour incorporated in commodities, Marx goes on to analyse the *forms of value* and *money*. Marx's main task here is to study the *origin* of the money form of value, to study the *historical process* of development of exchange, from isolated and casual acts of exchange ("elementary or accidental form of value," in which a given quantity of one commodity is exchanged for a given quantity of another) to the universal form of value, in which a number of different commodities are exchanged for one and the same particular commodity, and to the money form of value, when gold becomes this particular commodity, the universal equivalent. Being the highest product of the development of exchange and commodity production, money masks and conceals the social character of private labour, the social tie between the individual producers

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 45.—*Ed.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 6.—*Ed.*

who are united by the market. Marx analyses in great detail the various functions of money; and it is essential to note here in particular (as generally in the opening chapters of *Capital*), that the abstract and seemingly at times purely deductive mode of exposition in reality reproduces a gigantic collection of factual material on the history of the development of exchange and commodity production.

"...If we consider money, its existence implies a definite stage in the exchange of commodities. The particular functions of money which it performs, either as the mere equivalent of commodities, or as means of circulation, or means of payment, as hoard or as universal money, point, according to the extent and relative preponderance of the one function or the other, to very different stages in the process of social production" (*Capital*, Vol. I).¹

SURPLUS VALUE

At a certain stage in the development of commodity production money becomes transformed into capital. The formula of commodity circulation was C—M—C (commodity—money—commodity), *i.e.*, the sale of one commodity for the purpose of buying another. The general formula of capital, on the contrary, is M—C—M (money—commodity—money), *i.e.*, purchase for the purpose of selling (at a profit). The increase over the original value of money put into circulation Marx calls surplus value. The fact of this "growth" of money in capitalist circulation is well known. It is this "growth" which transforms money into *capital*, as a special, historically defined, social relation of production. Surplus value cannot arise out of commodity circulation, for the latter knows only the exchange of equivalents; it cannot arise out of an addition to price, for the mutual losses and gains of buyers and sellers would equalize one another, whereas what we have here is not an individual phenomenon but a mass, average, social phenomenon. In order to derive surplus value, the owner of money "must ... find ... in the market a commodity whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value"²—a commodity whose process of consumption is at the same time a process of creation of value. And such a commodity exists. It is human labour power. Its consumption is labour, and labour creates value. The owner of money buys labour power at its value, which.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 148.—*Ed.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 145.—*Ed.*

like the value of every other commodity, is determined by the socially necessary labour time requisite for its production (*i.e.*, the cost of maintaining the worker and his family). Having bought labour power, the owner of money is entitled to use it, that is, to set it to work, for the whole day—twelve hours, let us suppose. Yet, in the course of six hours (“necessary” labour time) the labourer produces product sufficient to cover the cost of his own maintenance; and in the course of the next six hours (“surplus” labour time), he produces “surplus” product, or surplus value, for which the capitalist does not pay. In capital, therefore, from the standpoint of the process of production, two parts must be distinguished: constant capital, expended on means of production (machinery, tools, raw materials, etc.), the value of which, without any change, is transferred (all at once or part by part) to the finished product; and variable capital, expended on labour power. The value of this latter capital is not invariable, but grows in the labour process, creating surplus value. Therefore, to express the degree of exploitation of labour power by capital, surplus value must be compared not with the whole capital but only with the variable capital. Thus in the example given, the rate of surplus value, as Marx calls this ratio, will be 6:6, *i.e.*, 100 per cent.

The historical conditions necessary for the genesis of capital were, firstly, the accumulation of a certain sum of money in the hands of individuals and a relatively high level of development of commodity production in general, and, secondly, the existence of a labourer who is “free” in a double sense: free from all constraint or restriction on the sale of his labour power, and free from the land and all means of production in general, a free and unattached labourer, a “proletarian,” who cannot subsist except by the sale of his labour power.

There are two principal methods by which surplus value can be increased: by lengthening the working day (“absolute surplus value”), and by shortening the necessary working day (“relative surplus value”). Analysing the first method, Marx gives a most impressive picture of the struggle of the working class to shorten the working day and of governmental interference to lengthen the working day (from the fourteenth century to the seventeenth century) and to shorten the working day (factory legislation of the nineteenth century). Since the appearance of *Capital*, the history of the working-class movement in all civilized countries of the world has provided a wealth of new facts amplifying this picture.

Analysing the production of relative surplus value, Marx investigates the three main historical stages by which capitalism has increased the productivity of labour: (1) simple co-operation; (2) division of labour and manufacture; (3) machinery and large-scale industry. How profoundly Marx has here revealed the basic and typical features of capitalist development is incidentally shown by the fact that investigations of what is known as the "kustar" [home] industry of Russia furnish abundant material illustrating the first two of the mentioned stages. And the revolutionizing effect of large-scale machine industry, described by Marx in 1857, has been revealed in a number of "new" countries (Russia, Japan, etc.) in the course of the half-century that has since elapsed.

To continue. New and important in the highest degree is Marx's analysis of the *accumulation of capital*, i.e., the transformation of a part of surplus value into capital, its use, not for satisfying the personal needs or whims of the capitalist, but for new production. Marx revealed the mistake of all the earlier, classical political economists (from Adam Smith on), who assumed that the entire surplus value which is transformed into capital goes to form variable capital. In actual fact, it is divided into *means of production* and variable capital. Of tremendous importance to the process of development of capitalism and its transformation into Socialism is the more rapid growth of the constant capital share (of the total capital) as compared with the variable capital share.

The accumulation of capital, by accelerating the replacement of workers by machinery and creating wealth at one pole and poverty at the other, also gives rise to what is called the "reserve army of labour," to the "relative surplus" of workers, or "capitalist overpopulation," which assumes the most diverse forms and enables capital to expand production at an extremely fast rate. This, in conjunction with credit facilities and the accumulation of capital in the means of production, incidentally furnishes the clue to the *crises* of overproduction that occur periodically in capitalist countries—at first at an average of every ten years, and later at more lengthy and less definite intervals. From the accumulation of capital under capitalism must be distinguished what is known as primitive accumulation: the forcible divorcement of the worker from the means of production, the driving of the peasants from the land, the stealing of the commons, the system of colonies and national debts, protective tariffs, and the like. "Primitive accumulation" creates the "free" proletariat at one pole, and the owner of money, the capitalist, at the other.

The "historical tendency of capitalist accumulation" is described by Marx in the following famous words:

"The expropriation of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless Vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious. Self-earned private property [of the peasant and handicraftsman], that is based, so to say, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent labouring-individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by capitalistic private property, which rests on exploitation of the nominally free labour of others.... That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralization of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economizing of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialized labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and, with this, the international character of the capitalistic régime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated." (*Capital*, Vol. I.)¹

New and important in the highest degree, further, is the analysis Marx gives in the second volume of *Capital* of the reproduction of the aggregate social capital. Here, too, Marx deals not with an individual phenomenon but with a mass phenomenon; not with a fractional part of the economy of society but with this economy as a whole. Correcting the mistake of the classical economists mentioned above, Marx divides the entire social production into two big sections: (I) production of means of production, and (II) production of articles of consumption, and examines in detail, with arithmetical examples, the circulation of the aggregate social

¹ *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 788-89.—Ed.

capital—both in the case of reproduction in its former dimensions and in the case of accumulation. The third volume of *Capital* solves the problem of the formation of the average rate of profit on the basis of the law of value. The immense advance in economic science made by Marx consists in the fact that he conducts his analysis from the standpoint of mass economic phenomena, of the social economy as a whole, and not from the standpoint of individual cases or of the external, superficial aspects of competition, to which vulgar political economy and the modern “theory of marginal utility” are frequently limited. Marx first analyses the origin of surplus value, and then goes on to consider its division into profit, interest, and ground rent. Profit is the ratio between the surplus value and the total capital invested in an undertaking. Capital with a “high organic composition” (i.e., with a preponderance of constant capital over variable capital exceeding the social average) yields a lower than average rate of profit; capital with a “low organic composition” yields a higher than average rate of profit. The competition of capitals and the freedom with which they transfer from one branch of production to another reduce the rate of profit to the average in both cases. The sum total of the values of all the commodities of a given society coincides with the sum total of prices of the commodities; but, owing to competition, in individual undertakings and branches of production commodities are sold not at their values but at the *prices of production* (or production prices), which are equal to the expended capital plus the average profit.

In this way the well-known and indisputable fact of the divergence between prices and values and of the equalization of profits is fully explained by Marx on the basis of the law of value; for the sum total of values of all commodities coincides with the sum total of prices. However, the reduction of (social) value to (individual) prices does not take place simply and directly, but in a very complex way. It is quite natural that in a society of separate producers of commodities, who are united only by the market, law can reveal itself only as an average, social, mass law, when individual deviations to one side or the other mutually compensate one another.

An increase in the productivity of labour implies a more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable capital. And since surplus value is a function of variable capital alone, it is obvious that the rate of profit (the ratio of surplus value to the whole capital, and not to its variable part alone) tends to fall.

Marx makes a detailed analysis of this tendency and of a number of circumstances that conceal or counteract it. Without pausing to give an account of the extremely interesting sections of the third volume of *Capital* devoted to usurer's capital, commercial capital and money capital, we pass to the most important section, the theory of *ground rent*. Owing to the fact that the land area is limited and, in capitalist countries, is all occupied by individual private owners, the price of production of agricultural products is determined by the cost of production not on average soil, but on the worst soil, not under average conditions, but under the worst conditions of delivery of produce to the market. The difference between this price and the price of production on better soil (or under better conditions) constitutes *differential rent*. Analysing this in detail, and showing how it arises out of the difference in fertility of different plots of land and the difference in the amount of capital invested in land, Marx fully exposed (see also *Theories of Surplus Value*, in which the criticism of Rodbertus¹ deserves particular attention) the error of Ricardo, who considered that differential rent is derived only when there is a successive transition from better land to worse. On the contrary, there may be inverse transitions, land may pass from one category into others (owing to advances in agricultural technique, the growth of towns, and so on), and the notorious "law of diminishing returns" is a profound error which charges nature with the defects, limitations and contradictions of capitalism. Further, the equalization of profit in all branches of industry and national economy in general presupposes complete freedom of competition and the free flow of capital from one branch to another. But the private ownership of land creates monopoly, which hinders this free flow. Owing to this monopoly, the products of agriculture, which is distinguished by a lower organic composition of capital, and, consequently, by an individually higher rate of profit, do not participate in the entirely free process of equalization of the rate of profit: the landowner, being a monopolist, can keep the price above the average, and this monopoly price engenders *absolute rent*. Differential rent cannot be done away with under capitalism, but absolute rent *can*—for instance, by the nationalization of the land, by making it the property of the state. Making the land the property of the state would put an end to the monopoly of private landowners, and would lead to a more systematic and complete application of free-

¹ See note 2, p. 296 of this volume.—Ed.

dom of competition in the domain of agriculture. And, therefore, Marx points out, in the course of history bourgeois radicals have again and again advanced this progressive bourgeois demand for the nationalization of the land, which, however, frightens away the majority of the bourgeoisie, because it too closely "touches" another monopoly, which is particularly important and "sensitive" in our day—the monopoly of the means of production in general (Marx gives a remarkably popular, concise, and clear exposition of his theory of the average rate of profit on capital and of absolute ground rent in a letter to Engels, dated August 2, 1862. See *Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, pp. 77-81; also the letter of August 9, 1862, Vol. III, pp. 86-87.)¹ For the history of ground rent it is also important to note Marx's analysis showing how labour rent (when the peasant creates surplus product by labouring on the lord's land) is transformed into rent in produce or in kind (when the peasant creates surplus product on his own land and cedes it to the lord due to "non-economic constraint"), then into money rent (which is rent in kind transformed into money, the *obrok*² of old Russia, due to the development of commodity production), and finally into capitalist rent, when the peasant is replaced by the agricultural entrepreneur, who cultivates the soil with the help of wage labour. In connection with this analysis of the "genesis of capitalist ground rent," note should be made of a number of subtle ideas (especially important for backward countries like Russia) expressed by Marx on the *evolution of capitalism in agriculture*.

"The transformation of rent in kind into money rent is not only necessarily accompanied, but even anticipated by the formation of a class of propertyless day labourers, who hire themselves out for wages. During the period of their rise, when this new class appears but sporadically, the custom necessarily develops among the better situated tributary farmers of exploiting agricultural labourers for their own account, just as the wealthier serfs in feudal times used to employ serfs for their own benefit. In this way they gradually acquire the ability to accumulate a certain amount of wealth and to transform themselves even into future capitalists. The old self-employing possessors of the land thus give rise among themselves to a nursery for capitalist tenants, whose development is conditioned upon the general development of capitalist production outside of the rural districts" (*Capital*, Vol. III).³ "The expropriation and eviction of a part of the agricultural population not only set free for indus-

¹ The references are to the German edition, Dietzgen, Stuttgart 1913 (4 vols.). See *Marx-Engels Selected Correspondence*, Martin Lawrence Ltd., London, pp. 129-33 and 137-38.—Ed.

² Equivalent to quit-rent.—Ed.

³ *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 928.—Ed.

trial capital the labourers, their means of subsistence, and material for labour; it also created the home market."¹

The impoverishment and ruin of the agricultural population lead, in their turn, to the formation of a reserve army of labour for capital. In every capitalist country

"part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat.... (Manufacture is used here in the sense of all non-agricultural industries.) This source of relative surplus population is thus constantly flowing.... The agricultural labourer is therefore reduced to the minimum of wages, and always stands with one foot already in the swamp of pauperism" (*Capital*, Vol. I).²

The private ownership of the peasant in the land he tills constitutes the basis of small-scale production and the condition for its prospering and attaining a classical form. But such small-scale production is compatible only with a narrow and primitive framework of production and society. Under capitalism the

"exploitation [of the peasants] differs only in form from the exploitation of the industrial proletariat. The exploiter is the same: capital. The individual capitalists exploit the individual peasants through mortgages and usury; the capitalist class exploits the peasant class through the state taxes" (*The Class Struggles in France 1848-50*).³ "The small holding of the peasant is now only the pretext that allows the capitalist to draw profits, interest and rent from the soil, while leaving it to the tiller of the soil himself to see how he can extract his wages."⁴

As a rule the peasant cedes to capitalist society, i.e., to the capitalist class, even a part of the wages, sinking "to the level of the Irish tenant farmer—all under the pretence of being a private proprietor" (*The Class Struggles in France 1848-50*).⁵

What is

"one of the causes which keeps the price of cereals lower in countries with a predominance of small farmers than in countries with a capitalist mode of production"? (*Capital*, Vol. III).⁶

It is that the peasant cedes to society (i.e., to the capitalist class) part of his surplus product without an equivalent.

¹ *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 771-72.—Ed.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 657-58.—Ed.

³ See Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 282, Moscow 1936.—Ed.

⁴ See Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in *Selected Works*, *ibid.*, pp. 418-19.—Ed.

⁵ See Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, *ibid.*, p. 282.—Ed.

⁶ *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 937.—Ed.

"This lower price [of cereals and other agricultural produce] is also a result of the poverty of the producers and by no means of the productivity of their labour" (*Capital*, Vol. III).¹

The small-holding system, which is the normal form of small-scale production, deteriorates, collapses, perishes under capitalism.

"Small peasants' property excludes by its very nature the development of the social powers of production of labour, the social forms of labour, the social concentration of capitals, cattle raising on a large scale, and a progressive application of science.

"Usury and a system of taxation must impoverish it everywhere. The expenditure of capital in the price of the land withdraws this capital from cultivation. An infinite dissipation of means of production and an isolation of the producers themselves go with it. [Co-operative societies, i.e., associations of small peasants, while playing an extremely progressive bourgeois role, only weaken this tendency without eliminating it; nor must it be forgotten that these co-operative societies do much for the well-to-do peasants, and very little, almost nothing, for the mass of poor peasants; and then the associations themselves become exploiters of wage labour.] Also an enormous waste of human energy. A progressive deterioration of the conditions of production and a raising of the price of means of production is a necessary law of small peasants' property."²

In agriculture, as in industry, capitalism transforms the process of production only at the price of the "martyrdom of the producers."

"The dispersion of the rural labourers over larger areas breaks their power of resistance while concentration increases that of the town operatives. In modern agriculture, as in the urban industries, the increased productiveness and quantity of the labour set in motion are bought at the cost of laying waste and consuming by disease labour power itself. Moreover, all progress in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer, but of robbing the soil. . . . Capitalist production, therefore, develops technology, and the combining together of various processes into a social whole, only by sapping the original sources of all wealth—the soil and the labourer" (*Capital*, Vol. I).³

SOCIALISM

From the foregoing it is evident that Marx deduces the inevitability of the transformation of capitalist society into Socialist society wholly and exclusively from the economic law of motion

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 937.—Ed.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 938-39.—Ed.

³ *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 514-15 —Ed.

of contemporary society. The socialization of labour, which is advancing ever more rapidly in thousands of forms, and which has manifested itself very strikingly during the half-century that has elapsed since the death of Marx in the growth of large-scale production, capitalist cartels, syndicates and trusts, as well as in the gigantic increase in the dimensions and power of finance capital, forms the chief material foundation for the inevitable coming of Socialism. The intellectual and moral driving force and the physical executant of this transformation is the proletariat, which is trained by capitalism itself. The struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, which manifests itself in various and, as to its content, increasingly richer forms, inevitably becomes a political struggle aiming at the conquest of political power by the proletariat ("the dictatorship of the proletariat"). The socialization of production is bound to lead to the conversion of the means of production into the property of society, to the "expropriation of the expropriators." This conversion will directly result in an immense increase in productivity of labour, a reduction of working hours, and the replacement of the remnants, the ruins of small-scale, primitive, disunited production by collective and improved labour. Capitalism finally snaps the bond between agriculture and industry; but at the same time, in its highest development it prepares new elements of this bond, of a union between industry and agriculture based on the conscious application of science and the combination of collective labour, and on a redistribution of the human population (putting an end at one and the same time to the rural remoteness, isolation and barbarism, and to the unnatural concentration of vast masses of people in big cities). A new form of family, new conditions in the status of women and in the upbringing of the younger generation are being prepared by the highest forms of modern capitalism: female and child labour and the break-up of the patriarchal family by capitalism inevitably assume the most terrible, disastrous, and repulsive forms in modern society. Nevertheless

"modern industry, by assigning as it does an important part in the process of production, outside the domestic sphere, to women, to young persons, and to children of both sexes, creates a new economical foundation for a higher form of the family and of the relations between the sexes. It is, of course, just as absurd to hold the Teutonic-Christian form of the family to be absolute and final as it would be to apply that character to the ancient Roman, the ancient Greek, or the Eastern forms which, moreover, taken together form a series in historic development. Moreover, it is obvious that the fact of the

collective working group being composed of individuals of both sexes and all ages, must necessarily, under suitable conditions, become a source of humane development; although in its spontaneously developed, brutal, capitalistic form, where the labourer exists for the process of production, and not the process of production for the labourer, that fact is a pestiferous source of corruption and slavery" (*Capital*, Vol. I).¹

In the factory system is to be found

"the germ of the education of the future, an education that will, in the case of every child over a given age, combine productive labour with instruction and gymnastics, not only as one of the methods of adding to the efficiency of production, but as the only method of producing fully developed human beings" (*ibid.*).²

Marxian Socialism puts the question of nationality and of the state on the same historical footing, not only in the sense of explaining the past but also in the sense of a fearless forecast of the future and of bold practical action for its achievement. Nations are an inevitable product, an inevitable form in the bourgeois epoch of social development. The working class could not grow strong, could not become mature and formed without "constituting itself within the nation," without being "national" ("though not in the bourgeois sense of the word"). But the development of capitalism more and more breaks down national barriers, destroys national seclusion, substitutes class antagonisms for national antagonisms. It is, therefore, perfectly true that in the developed capitalist countries "the working men have no country" and that "united action" of the workers, of the civilized countries at least, "is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat" (*Communist Manifesto*).³ The state, which is organized violence, inevitably came into being at a definite stage in the development of society, when society had split into irreconcilable classes, and when it could not exist without an "authority" ostensibly standing above society and to a certain degree separate from society. Arising out of class contradictions, the state becomes

"the state of the most powerful class, the class which rules in economics and with its aid becomes also the class which rules in politics, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. Thus, the state of antiquity was primarily the state of the slave owners for the purpose

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 496.—Ed.

² *Ibid.*, p. 489.—Ed.

³ *Communist Manifesto*, p. 128 of this volume.—Ed.

of holding down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern representative state is a tool for the exploitation of wage labour by capital" (Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, a work in which the writer expounds his own and Marx's views).¹

Even the freest and most progressive form of the bourgeois state, the democratic republic, in no way removes this fact, but merely changes its form (connection between the government and the stock exchange, corruption—direct and indirect—of the officialdom and the press, etc.). Socialism, by leading to the abolition of classes, will thereby lead to the abolition of the state.

"The first act," writes Engels in *Anti-Dühring*, "in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production. The state is not 'abolished,' it *withers away*."²

"The society that will reorganize production on the basis of the free and equal association of the producers will put the machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe" (Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*).³

Finally, as regards the attitude of Marxian Socialism towards the small peasantry, which will continue to exist in the period of the expropriation of the expropriators, we must refer to a declaration made by Engels which expresses Marx's views.

"When we are in possession of the state power, we shall not even think of forcibly expropriating the small peasants (with or without compensation), as we shall have to do in relation to the large landowners. Our task as regards the small peasants will first of all be to lead their private enterprise and private property into co-operative lines, not forcibly, but by example and by granting public aid for this purpose. And then, of course, we shall have ample means of showing the small peasant advantages which even now should become obvious to him" (Engels, "The Peasant Question in France and Germany." Original in the *Neue Zeit*).⁴

¹ *Op. cit.*, Moscow 1940, p. 141.—Ed.

² *Anti-Dühring*, p. 315.—Ed.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 143.—Ed.

⁴ *Neue Zeit*: Theoretical magazine of the German Social-Democratic Party; published from 1883 to 1923.—Ed.

TACTICS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT

Having as early as 1844-45¹ examined one of the chief defects of the earlier materialism, namely, its inability to understand the conditions and appreciate the importance of practical-revolutionary activity, Marx, along with his theoretical work, all his life devoted unrelaxed attention to the tactical problems of the class struggle of the proletariat. An immense amount of material bearing on this is contained in *all* the works of Marx and particularly in the four volumes of his correspondence with Engels published in 1913. This material is still far from having been assembled, collated, studied and examined. We shall therefore have to confine ourselves here to the most general and briefest remarks, emphasizing that Marx justly considered that without *this* side to it materialism was irresolute, one-sided, and lifeless. Marx defined the fundamental task of proletarian tactics in strict conformity with all the postulates of his materialist-dialectical conception. Only an objective consideration of the sum total of reciprocal relations of all the classes of a given society without exception, and, consequently, a consideration of the objective stage of development of that society and of the reciprocal relations between it and other societies, can serve as a basis for the correct tactics of the advanced class. At the same time, all classes and all countries are not regarded statically, but dynamically, *i.e.*, not in a state of immobility, but in motion (the laws of which are determined by the economic conditions of existence of each class). Motion, in its turn, is regarded not only from the standpoint of the past, but also from the standpoint of the future, and, at the same time, not in accordance with the vulgar conception of the "evolutionists," who see only slow changes, but dialectically: in historical developments of such magnitude twenty years are no more than a day, Marx wrote to Engels, "although later there may come days in which twenty years are concentrated" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, p. 127).² At each stage of development, at each moment, proletarian tactics must take account of this objectively inevitable dialectics of human history, on the one hand utilizing the periods of political stagnation or of sluggish, so-called "peaceful,"

¹ Lenin is referring to Marx's and Engels' *The Holy Family* and *German Ideology* and to Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*.—Ed.

² The references are to the German edition of 1913. See p. 34, note 1 of this volume.—Ed.

development in order to develop the class-consciousness, strength and fighting capacity of the advanced class, and, on the other hand, conducting all this work of utilization towards the "final aim" of the movement of the advanced class and towards the creation in it of the faculty for practically performing great tasks in the great days in which "twenty years are concentrated." Two of Marx's arguments are of special importance in this connection: one of these is contained in *The Poverty of Philosophy* and concerns the economic struggle and economic organizations of the proletariat; the other is contained in the *Communist Manifesto* and concerns the political tasks of the proletariat. The first argument runs as follows:

"Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to one another. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of wages, this common interest which they have against their boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance—*combination*. . . . Combinations, at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups . . . and in face of always united capital, the maintenance of the association becomes more necessary to them [*i.e.*, the workers] than that of wages. . . . In this struggle—a veritable civil war—are united and developed all the elements necessary for a coming battle. Once it has reached this point, association takes on a political character."¹

Here we have the program and tactics of the economic struggle and of the trade union movement for several decades to come, for the whole long period in which the proletariat will muster its forces for the "coming battle." Side by side with this must be placed numerous references by Marx and Engels to the example of the British labour movement: how industrial "prosperity" leads to attempts "to buy the workers" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. I, p. 136), to divert them from the struggle; how this prosperity generally "demoralizes the workers" (Vol. II, p. 218); how the British proletariat becomes "bourgeoisified"—"this most bourgeois of all nations" (the British) "seems to want in the end to have a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat side by side with the bourgeoisie" (Vol. II, p. 290); how its "revolutionary energy" "oozes away" (Vol. III, p. 124), how it will be necessary to wait a more or less long time "before the British workers rid themselves of their apparent bourgeois corruption" (Vol. III, p. 127); how the British labour movement lacks "the mettle of the Chartists"² (1866; Vol. III, p. 305); how the British work-

¹ Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Eng. ed., 1935, p. 145.—*Ed.*

² See note 1, p. 168 of this volume.—*Ed.*

ers' leaders are becoming a type midway between "a radical bourgeois and a worker" (in reference to Holyoake, Vol. IV, p. 209); how, owing to British monopoly, and as long as this monopoly lasts, "the British working-man will not budge" (Vol. IV, p. 433). The tactics of the economic struggle, in connection with the general course (*and outcome*) of the labour movement, are here considered from a remarkably broad, comprehensive, dialectical, and genuinely revolutionary standpoint.

The *Communist Manifesto* set forth the fundamental Marxian principle on the tactics of the political struggle:

"The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement."¹

That was why in 1848 Marx supported the party of the "agrarian revolution" in Poland, "the party which initiated the Cracow insurrection in the year 1846." In Germany in 1848 and 1849 Marx supported the extreme revolutionary democracy, and subsequently never retracted what he had then said about tactics. He regarded the German bourgeoisie as an element which "was inclined from the very beginning to betray the people" (only an alliance with the peasantry could have brought the bourgeoisie the integral fulfilment of its aims) "and to compromise with the crowned representatives of the old society." Here is Marx's summary of the analysis of the class position of the German bourgeoisie in the era of the bourgeois-democratic revolution—an analysis which, incidentally, is a sample of that materialism which examines society in motion, and examines it, at the same time, not only from the side of the motion which is directed *backwards* ...

"lacking faith in itself, lacking faith in the people, grumbling at those above, trembling before those below ... intimidated by the world storm ... nowhere with energy, everywhere with plagiarism ... without initiative ... an execrable old man, doomed to guide the first youthful impulses of a robust people in his own senile interests. ..." (*Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, 1848; see *Literarischer Nachlass*, Vol. III, p. 212.)

About twenty years later, in a letter to Engels (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, p. 224), Marx declared that the cause of the failure of the Revolution of 1848 was that the bourgeoisie had preferred

¹ See p. 141 of this volume.—Ed.

peace with slavery to the mere prospect of a fight for freedom. When the revolutionary era of 1848-49 ended, Marx opposed every attempt to play at revolution (the fight he put up against Schapper and Willich), and insisted on the ability to work in the new phase which in a seemingly "peaceful" way was preparing for new revolutions. The spirit in which Marx wanted the work to be carried on is shown by his estimate of the situation in Germany in 1856, the blackest period of reaction:

"The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility to back the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. II, p. 108).

As long as the democratic (bourgeois) revolution in Germany was not finished, Marx wholly concentrated attention in the tactics of the Socialist proletariat on developing the democratic energy of the peasantry. He held that Lassalle's attitude was "objectively . . . a betrayal of the whole workers' movement to Prussia" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, p. 210), because Lassalle, among other things, connived at the actions of the Junkers and Prussian nationalism.

"In a predominantly agricultural country," wrote Engels in 1865, exchanging ideas with Marx on the subject of an intended joint statement by them in the press, . . . "it is dastardly . . . in the name of the industrial proletariat to attack the bourgeoisie exclusively, and never to say a word about the patriarchal cudgel exploitation of the rural proletariat by the big feudal nobles" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, p. 217).

From 1864 to 1870, when the era of the completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Germany, the era of the efforts of the exploiting classes of Prussia and Austria to complete this revolution in one way or another *from above*, was coming to an end, Marx not only condemned Lassalle, who was coquetting with Bismarck, but also corrected Liebknecht, who had inclined towards "Austrophilism" and the defence of particularism. Marx demanded revolutionary tactics which would combat both Bismarck and the Austrophiles with equal ruthlessness, tactics which would not be adapted to the "victor," the Prussian Junker, but which would immediately renew the revolutionary struggle against him *also on the basis* created by the Prussian military victories (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, pp. 134, 136, 147, 179, 204, 210, 215, 418, 437, 440-41). In the famous Address of the International Working Men's Association of September 9, 1870, Marx warned the French proletariat against an untimely uprising; but when the uprising nevertheless took place (1871), Marx enthusiastically

hailed the revolutionary initiative of the masses, who were "storming heaven" (letter of Marx to Kugelmann).¹ The defeat of the revolutionary action in this situation, as in many others, was, from the standpoint of Marxian dialectical materialism, a lesser evil in the general course *and outcome* of the proletarian struggle than the abandonment of a position already occupied, than a surrender without battle. Such a surrender would have demoralized the proletariat and undermined its fighting capacity. Fully appreciating the use of legal means of struggle during periods when political stagnation prevails and bourgeois legality dominates, Marx, in 1877 and 1878, after the passage of the Anti-Socialist Law,² sharply condemned Most's "revolutionary phrases"; but he no less, if not more sharply, attacked the opportunism that had temporarily gained sway in the official Social-Democratic Party, which did not at once display resoluteness, firmness, revolutionary spirit, and a readiness to resort to an illegal struggle in response to the Anti-Socialist Law (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. IV, pp. 397, 404, 418, 422, 424; see also letters to Sorge).

¹ Karl Marx, *Letters to Dr. Kugelmann*, Eng. ed., 1934, p. 123.—Ed.

² *Anti-Socialist Law*: An exceptional law against Socialists introduced by Bismarck in 1878, the express purpose of which was to suppress the Social-Democratic movement in Germany. The law was repealed in 1890.—Ed.

V. I. Lenin

THREE SOURCES AND THREE COMPONENT PARTS OF MARXISM¹

Throughout the civilized world the teachings of Marx evoke the utmost hostility and hatred of all bourgeois science (both official and liberal), which regards Marxism as a kind of "pernicious sect." And no other attitude is to be expected, for there can be no "impartial" social science in a society based on class struggle. In one way or another, *all* official and liberal science *defends* wage slavery, whereas Marxism has declared relentless war on wage slavery. To expect science to be impartial in a wage-slave society is as silly and naive as to expect impartiality from manufacturers on the question whether workers' wages should be increased by decreasing the profits of capital.

But this is not all. The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling "sectarianism" in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose *away from* the highroad of development of world civilization. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in the fact that he furnished answers to questions which had already engrossed the foremost minds of humanity. His teachings arose as a direct and immediate *continuation* of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and Socialism.

The Marxian doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is complete and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world conception which is irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor of the best that was created by humanity in the nineteenth century in the shape of German philosophy, English political economy and French Socialism.

On these three sources of Marxism, which are at the same time component parts of it, we shall briefly dwell.

¹ Originally published in the magazine *Prosveshcheniye* (Enlightenment) No. 3. March 1913.—Ed.

I

The philosophy of Marxism is *materialism*. Throughout the modern history of Europe, and especially at the end of the eighteenth century in France, which was the scene of a decisive battle against every kind of mediæval rubbish, against feudalism in institutions and ideas, materialism has proved to be the only philosophy that is consistent, true to all the teachings of natural science and hostile to superstition, cant and so forth. The enemies of democracy therefore tried in every way to "refute," undermine and defame materialism; and advocated various forms of philosophical idealism, which always, in one way or another, amounts to an advocacy or support of religion.

Marx and Engels always defended philosophical materialism in the most determined manner and repeatedly explained the profound erroneousness of every deviation from this basis. Their views are most clearly and fully expounded in the works of Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach* and *Anti-Dühring*, which, like the *Communist Manifesto*, are handbooks for every class-conscious worker.

But Marx did not stop at the materialism of the eighteenth century; he advanced philosophy. He enriched it with the acquisitions of German classical philosophy, especially of the Hegelian system, which in its turn led to the materialism of Feuerbach. The chief of these acquisitions is *dialectics*, i.e., the doctrine of development in its fullest and deepest form, free of one-sidedness—the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge, which provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter. The latest discoveries of natural science—radium, electrons, the transmutation of elements—have remarkably confirmed Marx's dialectical materialism, despite the teachings of the bourgeois philosophers with their "new" reversions to old and rotten idealism.

Deepening and developing philosophical materialism, Marx completed it, extended its knowledge of nature to the knowledge of *human society*. Marx's *historical materialism* was one of the greatest achievements of scientific thought. The chaos and arbitrariness that had previously reigned in the views on history and politics gave way to a strikingly integral and harmonious scientific theory, which shows how, in consequence of the growth of productive forces, out of one system of social life another and higher system develops—how capitalism, for instance, grows out of feudalism.

Just as man's knowledge reflects nature (i. e., developing matter),

which exists independently of him, so man's *social knowledge* (i.e., his various views and doctrines—philosophical, religious, political, and so forth) reflects the *economic system* of society. Political institutions are a superstructure on the economic foundation. We see, for example, that the various political forms of the modern European states serve to fortify the rule of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat.

Marx's philosophy is finished philosophical materialism, which has provided humanity, and especially the working class, with powerful instruments of knowledge.

II

Having recognized that the economic system is the foundation on which the political superstructure is erected, Marx devoted most attention to the study of this economic system. Marx's principal work, *Capital*, is devoted to a study of the economic system of modern, i.e., capitalist, society.

Classical political economy, before Marx, evolved in England, the most developed of the capitalist countries. Adam Smith and David Ricardo, by their investigations of the economic system, laid the foundations of the *labour theory of value*. Marx continued their work. He rigidly proved and consistently developed this theory. He showed that the value of every commodity is determined by the quantity of socially necessary labour time spent on its production.

Where the bourgeois economists saw a relation of things (the exchange of one commodity for another), Marx revealed a *relation of men*. The exchange of commodities expresses the tie by which individual producers are bound through the market. *Money* signifies that this tie is becoming closer and closer, inseparably binding the entire economic life of the individual producers into one whole. *Capital* signifies a further development of this tie: man's labour power becomes a commodity. The wage worker sells his labour power to the owner of the land, factories and instruments of labour. The worker uses one part of the labour day to cover the expense of maintaining himself and his family (wages), while the other part of the day, the worker toils without remuneration, creating *surplus value* for the capitalist, the source of profit; the source of the wealth of the capitalist class.

The doctrine of surplus value is the corner-stone of Marx's economic theory.

Capital, created by the labour of the worker, presses on the worker by ruining the small masters and creating an army of unemployed. In industry, the victory of large-scale production is at once apparent, but we observe the same phenomenon in agriculture as well: the superiority of large-scale capitalist agriculture increases, the application of machinery grows, peasant economy falls into the noose of money-capital, it declines and sinks into ruin, burdened by its backward technique. In agriculture, the decline of small-scale production assumes different forms, but the decline itself is an indisputable fact.

By destroying small-scale production, capital leads to an increase in productivity of labour and to the creation of a monopoly position for the associations of big capitalists. Production itself becomes more and more social—hundreds of thousands and millions of workers become bound together in a systematic economic organism—but the product of the collective labour is appropriated by a handful of capitalists. The anarchy of production grows, as do crises, the furious chase after markets and the insecurity of existence of the mass of the population.

While increasing the dependence of the workers on capital, the capitalist system creates the great power of united labour.

Marx traced the development of capitalism from the first germs of commodity economy, from simple exchange, to its highest forms, to large-scale production.

And the experience of all capitalist countries, old and new, is clearly demonstrating the truth of this Marxian doctrine to increasing numbers of workers every year.

Capitalism has triumphed all over the world, but this triumph is only the prelude to the triumph of labour over capital.

III

When feudalism was overthrown, and “free” capitalist society appeared on God’s earth, it at once became apparent that this freedom meant a new system of oppression and exploitation of the toilers. Various Socialist doctrines immediately began to arise as a reflection of and protest against this oppression. But early Socialism was *utopian* Socialism. It criticized capitalist society, it condemned and damned it, it dreamed of its destruction, it indulged in fancies of a better order and endeavoured to convince the rich of the immorality of exploitation.

But utopian Socialism could not point the real way out. It

could not explain the essence of wage slavery under capitalism, nor discover the laws of its development, nor point to the *social force* which is capable of becoming the creator of a new society.

Meanwhile, the stormy revolutions which everywhere in Europe, and especially in France, accompanied the fall of feudalism, of serfdom, more and more clearly revealed the *struggle of classes* as the basis and the motive force of the whole development.

Not a single victory of political freedom over the feudal class was won except against desperate resistance. Not a single capitalist country evolved on a more or less free and democratic basis except by a life and death struggle between the various classes of capitalist society.

The genius of Marx consists in the fact that he was able before anybody else to draw from this and consistently apply the deduction that world history teaches. This deduction is the doctrine of the *class struggle*.

People always were and always will be the stupid victims of deceit and self-deceit in politics until they learn to discover the *interests* of some class behind all moral, religious, political and social phrases, declarations and promises. The supporters of reforms and improvements will always be fooled by the defenders of the old order until they realize that every old institution, however barbarous and rotten it may appear to be, is maintained by the forces of some ruling classes. And there is *only one* way of smashing the resistance of these classes, and that is to find, in the very society which surrounds us, and to enlighten and organize for the struggle, the forces which can—and, owing to their social position, *must*—constitute a power capable of sweeping away the old and creating the new.

Marx's philosophical materialism has alone shown the proletariat the way out of the spiritual slavery in which all oppressed classes have hitherto languished. Marx's economic theory has alone explained the true position of the proletariat in the general system of capitalism.

Independent organizations of the proletariat are multiplying all over the world, from America to Japan and from Sweden to South Africa. The proletariat is becoming enlightened and educated by waging its class struggle; it is ridding itself of the prejudices of bourgeois society; it is rallying its ranks ever more closely and is learning to gauge the measure of its successes; it is steeling its forces and is growing irresistibly.

V. I. Lenin

MARXISM AND REVISIONISM¹

There is a saying that if geometrical axioms affected human interests attempts would certainly be made to refute them. Theories of the natural sciences which conflict with the old prejudices of theology provoked, and still provoke, the most rabid opposition. No wonder, therefore, that the Marxian doctrine, which directly serves to enlighten and organize the advanced class in modern society, which indicates the tasks of this class and which proves the inevitable (by virtue of economic development) replacement of the present system by a new order—no wonder that this doctrine had to fight at every step in its course.

There is no need to speak of bourgeois science and philosophy, which are officially taught by official professors in order to befuddle the rising generation of the possessing classes and to "coach" it against the internal and foreign enemy. This science will not even hear of Marxism, declaring that it has been refuted and annihilated. The young scientists who are building their careers by refuting Socialism, and the decrepit elders who preserve the traditions of all the various outworn "systems," attack Marx with equal zeal. The progress of Marxism and the fact that its ideas are spreading and taking firm hold among the working class inevitably tend to increase the frequency and intensity of these bourgeois attacks on Marxism, which only becomes stronger, more hardened, and more tenacious every time it is "annihilated" by official science.

But Marxism by no means consolidated its position immediately even among doctrines which are connected with the struggle of the working class and which are current mainly among the proletariat. In the first half-century of its existence (from the 'forties on) Marxism was engaged in combating the-

¹ Written in April 1908 and originally published in the *Miscellany Pamtyati Karla Marksa (Karl Marx Memorial)*, St. Petersburg, 1908.—Ed.

ories fundamentally hostile to it. In the first half of the 'forties Marx and Engels demolished the radical Young Hegelians, who professed philosophical idealism. At the end of the 'forties the struggle invaded the domain of economic doctrine, in opposition to Proudhonism. The 'fifties saw the completion of this struggle: the criticism of the parties and doctrines which manifested themselves in the stormy year of 1848. In the 'sixties the struggle was transferred from the domain of general theory to a domain closer to the direct labour movement: the ejection of Bakunism from the International. In the early 'seventies the stage in Germany was occupied for a short while by the Proudhonist Mühlberger, and in the latter 'seventies by the positivist Dühring. But the influence of both on the proletariat was already absolutely insignificant. Marxism was already gaining an unquestionable victory over all other ideologies in the labour movement.

By the 'nineties this victory was in the main completed. Even in the Latin countries, where the traditions of Proudhonism held their ground longest of all, the labour parties actually based their programs and tactics on a Marxist foundation. The revived international organization of the labour movement—in the shape of periodical international congresses—from the outset, and almost without a struggle, adopted the Marxist standpoint in all essentials. But after Marxism had ousted all the more or less consistent doctrines hostile to it, the tendencies expressed in those doctrines began to seek other channels. The forms and motives of the struggle changed, but the struggle continued. And the second half-century in the existence of Marxism began (in the 'nineties) with the struggle of a trend hostile to Marxism within Marxism.

Bernstein, a one-time orthodox Marxist, gave his name to this current by making the most noise and advancing the most integral expression of the amendments to Marx, the revision of Marx, revisionism. Even in Russia, where, owing to the economic backwardness of the country and the preponderance of a peasant population oppressed by the relics of serfdom, non-Marxian Socialism has naturally held its ground longest of all, it is plainly passing into revisionism before our very eyes. Both in the agrarian question (the program of the municipalization of all land) and in general questions of program and tactics, our social-Narodniks are more and more substituting "amendments" to Marx for the moribund and obsolescent remnants of the old system, which in its own way was integral and fundamentally hostile to Marxism.

Pre-Marxian Socialism has been smashed. It is now continuing the struggle not on its own independent soil but on the general soil of Marxism—as revisionism. Let us, then, examine the ideological content of revisionism.

In the domain of philosophy, revisionism clung to the skirts of bourgeois professorial “science.” The professors went “back to Kant”—and revisionism followed in the wake of the Neo-Kantians. The professors repeated the threadbare banalities of the priests against philosophical materialism—and the revisionists, smiling condescendingly, mumbled (word for word after the latest *Handbuch*) that materialism had been “refuted” long ago. The professors treated Hegel as a “dead dog,” and while they themselves preached idealism, only an idealism a thousand times more petty and banal than Hegel’s they contemptuously shrugged their shoulders at dialectics—and the revisionists floundered after them into the swamp of philosophical vulgarization of science, replacing “artful” (and revolutionary) dialectics by “simple” (and tranquil) “evolution.” The professors earned their official salaries by adjusting both their idealist and “critical” systems to the dominant mediæval “philosophy” (i.e., to theology)—and the revisionists drew close to them and endeavoured to make religion a “private affair,” not in relation to the modern state, but in relation to the party of the advanced class.

What the real class significance of such “amendments” to Marx was need not be said—it is clear enough. We shall simply note that the only Marxist in the international Social-Democratic movement who criticized from the standpoint of consistent dialectical materialism the incredible banalities uttered by the revisionists was Plekhanov. This must be stressed all the more emphatically since thoroughly mistaken attempts are being made in our day to smuggle in the old and reactionary philosophical rubbish under the guise of criticizing Plekhanov’s tactical opportunism.¹

Passing to political economy, it must be noted first of all that the “amendments” of the revisionists in this domain were much more comprehensive and circumstantial; attempts were made to influence the public by adducing “new data of eco-

¹ See *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism* by Bogdanov, Bazarov and others. This is not the place to discuss this book, and I must at present confine myself to stating that in the very near future I shall show in a series of articles or in a separate pamphlet that *everything* I have said in the text about the Neo-Kantian revisionists essentially applies also to these “new” Neo-Humist and Neo-Berkeleian revisionists.—Note by Lenin. (See Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*.)—Ed.

conomic development." It was said that concentration and the ousting of small-scale production by large-scale production do not occur in agriculture at all, while concentration proceeds extremely slowly in commerce and industry. It was said that crises had now become rarer and of less force, and that the cartels and trusts would probably enable capital to do away with crises altogether. It was said that the "theory of the collapse," to which capitalism is heading, was unsound, owing to the tendency of class contradictions to become less acute and milder. It was said, finally, that it would not be amiss to correct Marx's theory of value in accordance with Böhm-Bawerk.¹

The fight against the revisionists on these questions resulted in as fruitful a revival of the theoretical thought of international Socialism as followed from Engels' controversy with Dühring twenty years earlier. The arguments of the revisionists were analysed with the help of facts and figures. It was proved that the revisionists were systematically presenting modern small-scale production in a favourable light. The technical and commercial superiority of large-scale *production* over small-scale production both in industry and in agriculture is proved by irrefutable facts. But commodity production is far less developed in agriculture, and modern statisticians and economists are usually not very skilful in picking out the special branches (sometimes even operations) in agriculture which indicate that agriculture is being progressively drawn into the *exchange* of world economy. Small-scale production maintains itself on the ruins of natural economy by a steady deterioration in nourishment, by chronic starvation, by the lengthening of the working day, by the deterioration in the quality of cattle and in the care given to cattle, in a word, by the very methods whereby handicraft production maintained itself against capitalist manufacture. Every advance in science and technology inevitably and relentlessly undermines the foundations of small-scale production in capitalist society, and it is the task of Socialist economics to investigate this process in all its—often complicated and intricate—forms and to demonstrate to the small producer the impossibility of holding his own under capitalism, the hopelessness of peasant farming under capitalism, and the necessity of the peasant adopting the standpoint of the proletarian. On this

¹ Böhm-Bawerk (1851-1914): Bourgeois economist.—Ed.

question the revisionists sinned from the scientific standpoint by superficially generalizing from facts selected one-sidedly and without reference to the system of capitalism as a whole; they sinned from the political standpoint by the fact that they inevitably, whether they wanted to or not, invited or urged the peasant to adopt the standpoint of the master (i.e., the standpoint of the bourgeoisie), instead of urging him to adopt the standpoint of the revolutionary proletarian.

The position of revisionism was even worse as far as the theory of crises and the theory of collapse were concerned. Only for the shortest space of time could people, and then only the most shortsighted, think of remodelling the foundations of the Marxian doctrine under the influence of a few years of industrial boom and prosperity. Facts very soon made it clear to the revisionists that crises were not a thing of the past: prosperity was followed by a crisis. The forms, the sequence, the picture of the particular crises changed, but crises remained an inevitable component of the capitalist system. While uniting production, the cartels and trusts at the same time, and in a way that was obvious to all, aggravated the anarchy of production, the insecurity of existence of the proletariat and the oppression of capital, thus intensifying class contradictions to an unprecedented degree. That capitalism is moving towards collapse—in the sense both of individual political and economic crises and of the complete wreck of the entire capitalist system—has been made very clear, and on a very large scale, precisely by the latest giant trusts. The recent financial crisis in America and the frightful increase of unemployment all over Europe, to say nothing of the impending industrial crisis to which many symptoms are pointing—all this has brought it about that the recent “theories” of the revisionists are being forgotten by everybody, even, it seems, by many of the revisionists themselves. But the lessons which this instability of the intellectuals has given the working class must not be forgotten.

As to the theory of value, it should only be said that apart from hints and sighs, exceedingly vague, for Böhm-Bawerk, the revisionists have here contributed absolutely nothing, and have therefore left no traces whatever on the development of scientific thought.

In the domain of politics, revisionism tried to revise the very foundation of Marxism, namely, the doctrine of the class struggle. Political freedom, democracy and universal suffrage remove the ground for the class struggle—we were told—and render untrue the

old proposition of the *Communist Manifesto* that the workers have no country. For, they said, since the "will of the majority" prevails under democracy, one must neither regard the state as an organ of class rule, nor reject alliances with the progressive, social-reformist bourgeoisie against the reactionaries.

It cannot be disputed that these objections of the revisionists constituted a fairly harmonious system of views, namely, the old and well-known liberal bourgeois views. The liberals have always said that bourgeois parliamentarism destroys classes and class divisions, since the right to vote and the right to participate in state affairs are shared by all citizens without distinction. The whole history of Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the whole history of the Russian revolution at the beginning of the twentieth, clearly show how absurd such views are. Economic distinctions are aggravated and accentuated rather than mitigated under the freedom of "democratic" capitalism. Parliamentarism does not remove, but rather lays bare the innate character even of the most democratic bourgeois republics as organs of class oppression. By helping to enlighten and to organize immeasurably wider masses of the population than those which previously took an active part in political events, parliamentarism does not make for the elimination of crises and political revolutions, but for the maximum accentuation of civil war during such revolutions. The events in Paris in the spring of 1871 and the events in Russia in the winter of 1905 showed as clear as clear could be how inevitably this accentuation comes about. The French bourgeoisie without a moment's hesitation made a deal with the common national enemy, the foreign army which had ruined its fatherland, in order to crush the proletarian movement. Whoever does not understand the inevitable inner dialectics of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy—dialectics tending to an even more acute decision of a dispute by mass violence than formerly—will never be able through parliamentarism to conduct propaganda and agitation that are consistent in principle and really prepare the working-class masses to take a victorious part in such "disputes." The experience of alliances, agreements and blocs with the social-reformist liberals in the West and with the liberal reformists (Constitutional-Democrats) in the Russian revolution convincingly showed that these agreements only blunt the consciousness of the masses, that they weaken rather than enhance the actual significance of their struggle by linking the fighters with the elements who are least capable of fighting and who are most vacillating and treacher-

ous. French Millerandism¹—the biggest experiment in applying revisionist political tactics on a wide, a really national scale—has provided a practical judgment of revisionism which will never be forgotten by the proletariat all over the world.

A natural complement to the economic and political tendencies of revisionism was its attitude to the final aim of the Socialist movement. "The movement is everything, the ultimate purpose is nothing"—this catch-phrase of Bernstein's expresses the substance of revisionism better than many long arguments. The policy of revisionism consists in determining its conduct from case to case, in adapting itself to the events of the day and to the chops and changes of petty politics; it consists in forgetting the basic interests of the proletariat, the main features of the capitalist system as a whole and of capitalist evolution as a whole, and in sacrificing these basic interests for the real or assumed advantages of the moment. And it patently follows from the very nature of this policy that it may assume an infinite variety of forms, and that every more or less "new" question, every more or less unexpected and unforeseen turn of events, even though it may change the basic line of development only to an insignificant degree and only for the shortest period of time, will always inevitably give rise to one or another variety of revisionism.

The inevitability of revisionism is determined by its class roots in modern society. Revisionism is an international phenomenon. No more or less informed and thinking Socialist can have the slightest doubt that the relation between the orthodox and the Bernsteinites in Germany, the Guesdites and the Jaurèsites (and now particularly the Broussites) in France, the Social-Democratic Federation and the Independent Labour Party in Great Britain, de Brouckère and Vandervelde in Belgium, the integralists and the reformists in Italy, and the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia is everywhere essentially similar, notwithstanding the gigantic variety of national and historically-derived conditions in the present state of all these countries. In reality, the "division" within the present international Socialist movement is now proceeding along *one* line in all the various countries of the world, which testifies to a tremendous advance

¹ *Millerandism*: From the Socialist Millerand's entry, in 1899, into the reactionary bourgeois Government of France, one of whose members was Gen. Gallifet, the butcher of the Paris Commune.—*Ed.*

compared with thirty or forty years ago, when it was not like tendencies within a united international Socialist movement that were combating one another within the various countries. And the "revisionism from the Left" which has begun to take shape in the Latin countries, such as "revolutionary syndicalism," is also adapting itself to Marxism while "amending" it; Labriola in Italy and Lagardelle in France frequently appeal from Marx wrongly understood to Marx rightly understood.

We cannot stop here to analyse the ideological substance of *this* revisionism; it has not yet by far developed to the extent that opportunist revisionism has, it has not yet become international, and it has not yet stood the test of one big practical battle with a Socialist Party even in one country. We shall therefore confine ourselves to the "revisionism from the Right" described above.

Wherein lies its inevitability in capitalist society? Why is it more profound than the differences of national peculiarities and degrees of capitalist development? Because always, in every capitalist country, side by side with the proletariat, there are broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie, small masters. Capitalism arose and is constantly arising out of small production. A number of "middle strata" are inevitably created anew by capitalism (appendages to the factory, homework, and small workshops scattered all over the country in view of the requirements of big industries, such as the bicycle and automobile industries, etc.). These new small producers are just as inevitably cast back into the ranks of the proletariat. It is quite natural that the petty-bourgeois world conception should again and again crop up in the ranks of the broad labour parties. It is quite natural that this should be so, and it always will be so right up to the peripety of the proletarian revolution, for it would be a grave mistake to think that the "complete" proletarianization of the majority of the population is essential before such a revolution can be achieved. What we now frequently experience only in the domain of ideology—disputes over theoretical amendments to Marx—what now crops up in practice only over individual partial issues of the labour movement as tactical differences with the revisionists and splits on these grounds, will all unfailingly have to be experienced by the working class on an incomparably larger scale when the proletarian revolution accentuates all issues and concentrates all differences on points of the most immediate importance in determining the conduct of the masses, and makes it necessary in the heat of the

fight to distinguish enemies from friends and to cast out bad allies, so as to be able to deal decisive blows at the enemy.

The ideological struggle waged by revolutionary Marxism against revisionism at the end of the nineteenth century is but the prelude to the great revolutionary battles of the proletariat, which is marching forward to the complete victory of its cause despite all the waverings and weaknesses of the petty bourgeoisie.

V. I. Lenin

THE HISTORICAL DESTINY OF THE DOCTRINE OF KARL MARX¹

The main thing in the doctrine of Marx is that it brings out the historic role of the proletariat as the builder of a Socialist society. Has the progress of world events confirmed this doctrine since it was expounded by Marx?

Marx first advanced it in 1844. The *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels, published in 1848, already gives an integral and systematic exposition of this doctrine, which has remained the best exposition to this day. Subsequent world history clearly falls into three main periods: 1) from the Revolution of 1848 to the Paris Commune (1871); 2) from the Paris Commune to the Russian Revolution (1905); 3) since the Russian Revolution.

Let us see what has been the destiny of Marx's doctrine in each of these periods.

I

At the beginning of the first period Marx's doctrine by no means dominated. It was only one of the extremely numerous factions or trends of Socialism. The forms of Socialism which did dominate were in the main akin to our *Narodism*: non-comprehension of the materialist basis of historical movement, inability to assign the role and significance of each class in capitalist society, concealment of the bourgeois essence of democratic reforms under diverse, pseudo-socialistic phrases about "the people," "justice," "right," etc.

The Revolution of 1848 struck a fatal blow at all these vociferous, motley and ostentatious forms of *pre-Marxian* Socialism. In all countries the revolution revealed the various classes of society *in action*. The shooting down of the workers by the republican bourgeoisie in the June Days of 1848 in Paris finally

¹ Originally published in *Pravda* of March 14 (1), 1913.—Ed.

established that the proletariat *alone* was Socialist by nature. The liberal bourgeoisie feared the independence of this class a hundred times more than it did any kind of reaction. The craven liberals grovelled before reaction. The peasantry was content with the abolition of the relics of feudalism and joined the supporters of order, only wavering at times between *workers' democracy and bourgeois liberalism*. All doctrines of *non-class Socialism and non-class politics* proved to be sheer nonsense.

The Paris Commune (1871) completed this development of bourgeois reforms; the republic, *i.e.*, the form of state organization in which class relations appear in their most unconcealed form, had only the heroism of the proletariat to thank for its consolidation.

In all the other European countries a more entangled and less finished development also led to a definitely shaped bourgeois society. Towards the end of the first period (1848-71)—a period of storms and revolutions—pre-Marxian Socialism *died away*. Independent *proletarian* parties were born: the First International (1864-72) and the German Social-Democratic Party.

II

The second period (1872-1904) was distinguished from the first by its "peaceful" character, by the absence of revolutions. The West had finished with bourgeois revolutions. The East had not yet reached that stage.

The West entered a phase of "peaceful" preparation for the future era of change. Socialist parties, basically proletarian, were formed everywhere and learned to make use of bourgeois parliamentarism and to create their own daily press, their educational institutions, their trade unions and their co-operative societies. The Marxian doctrine gained a complete victory and *spread*. The process of selection and accumulation of the forces of the proletariat and of the preparation of the proletariat for the impending battles progressed slowly but steadily.

The dialectics of history was such that the theoretical victory of Marxism obliged its enemies to *disguise themselves* as Marxists. Liberalism, rotten to the core, attempted a revival in the form of Socialist *opportunism*. The opportunists interpreted the period of preparation of forces for the great battles as a renunciation of these battles. The improvement of the position of the slaves for the struggle against wage slavery they represented as the neces-

sity for the slaves to sell their right to liberty for a mess of pottage. They pusillanimously preached "social peace" (i.e., peace with the slave owners), the renunciation of the class struggle, and so forth. They had many adherents among Socialist members of parliament, various officials of the labour movement, and the "sympathetic" intellectuals.

III

But the opportunists had scarcely congratulated themselves on "social peace" and the needlessness of storms under "democracy" when a new source of great world storms opened up in Asia. The Russian revolution was followed by the Turkish, the Persian and the Chinese revolutions. It is in this era of storms and their "repercussion" on Europe that we are now living. Whatever may be the fate of the great Chinese Republic, against which the various "civilized" hyenas are now baring their teeth, no power on earth can restore the old serfdom in Asia, or wipe out the heroic democracy of the masses of the people in the Asiatic and semi-Asiatic countries.

Certain people, who were inattentive to the conditions of preparation and development of the mass struggle, were driven to despair and to anarchism by the prolonged postponements of the decisive struggle against capitalism in Europe. We can now see how shortsighted and pusillanimous this anarchist despair is.

The fact that Asia, with its population of eight hundred million, has been drawn into the struggle for these same European ideals should inspire us with courage and not despair.

The Asiatic revolutions have revealed the same spinelessness and baseness of liberalism, the same exceptional importance of the independence of the democratic masses, and the same sharp line of division between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie of all kinds. After the experience both of Europe and Asia, whoever now speaks of *non-class* politics and *non-class* Socialism simply deserves to be put in a cage and exhibited alongside of the Australian kangaroo.

After Asia, Europe has also begun to stir, although not in the Asiatic way. The "peaceful" period of 1872-1904 has passed completely, never to return. The high cost of living and the oppression of the trusts is leading to an unprecedented accentuation of the economic struggle, which has roused even the British workers, who have been most corrupted by liberalism. Before our

eyes a political crisis is brewing even in that extreme "diehard," bourgeois-Junker country, Germany. Feverish armaments and the policy of imperialism are turning modern Europe into a "social peace" which is more like a barrel of gunpowder than anything else. And at the same time the decay of *all* the bourgeois parties and the maturing of the proletariat are steadily progressing.

Each of the three great periods of world history since the appearance of Marxism has brought Marxism new confirmation and new triumphs. But a still greater triumph awaits Marxism, as the doctrine of the proletariat, in the period of history that is now opening.

J. Stalin

FROM THE INTERVIEW GIVEN TO THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION IN RUSSIA

(SEPTEMBER 9, 1927) ¹

FIRST QUESTION PUT BY THE DELEGATION AND STALIN'S ANSWER

Question: What new principles have Lenin and the Communist Party added to Marxism in practice? Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in "constructive revolution" whereas Marx was more inclined to wait for the culmination of the development of economic forces?

Answer: I think that Lenin "added" no "new principles" to Marxism nor did he abolish any of the "old" principles of Marxism. Lenin was, and remains, the most loyal and consistent pupil of Marx and Engels, and he wholly and entirely based himself on the principles of Marxism. But Lenin did not merely carry out the doctrines of Marx and Engels. He developed these doctrines still further. What does that mean? It means that he developed the doctrines of Marx and Engels in accordance with the new conditions of development, with the new phase of capitalism, with imperialism. This means that in developing the doctrines of Marx in the new conditions of the class struggle, Lenin contributed something new to the general treasury of Marxism as compared with what was contributed by Marx and Engels and with what could be contributed in the pre-imperialist period of capitalism. The new contribution Lenin made to the treasury of Marxism is wholly and entirely based on the principles laid down by Marx and Engels. It is in this sense that we speak of Leninism as Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Here are a few questions to which Lenin contributed something new in development of the doctrines of Marx.

¹ Published in *Pravda* of September 15, 1927.—Ed.

First: the question of monopoly capitalism—of imperialism as the new phase of capitalism. In *Capital* Marx and Engels analysed the foundations of capitalism. But Marx and Engels lived in the period of the domination of pre-monopoly capitalism, in the period of the smooth evolution of capitalism and its “peaceful” expansion all over the world. This old phase of capitalism came to a close towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, when Marx and Engels were already dead. Clearly, Marx and Engels could only conjecture the new conditions of development of capitalism that arose out of the new phase of capitalism—which succeeded the old phase—out of the imperialist, monopoly phase of development, when the smooth evolution of capitalism gave way to spasmodic, cataclysmic development, when the unevenness of development and the contradictions of capitalism became particularly pronounced, and when the struggle for markets and spheres for capital export, in view of the extreme unevenness of development, made periodical imperialist wars for periodical redivisions of the world and of spheres of influence inevitable. The service Lenin rendered here, and, consequently, his new contribution, was that, on the basis of the main principles enunciated in *Capital*, he made a reasoned Marxist analysis of imperialism as the last phase of capitalism, and exposed its ulcers and the conditions of its inevitable doom. On the basis of this analysis arose Lenin’s well-known principle that the conditions of imperialism make possible the victory of Socialism in individual capitalist countries, taken separately.

Second: the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The fundamental idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the political rule of the proletariat and as a method of overthrowing the rule of capital by force was advanced by Marx and Engels. Lenin’s new contribution in this field was: a) that he discovered the Soviet form of government as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, utilizing for this purpose the experience of the Paris Commune and the Russian revolution; b) that he deciphered the formula of the dictatorship of the proletariat from the angle of the problem of the allies of the proletariat, and defined the dictatorship of the proletariat as a special form of class alliance between the proletariat, as the leader, and the exploited masses of the non-proletarian classes (the peasantry, etc.), as the led; c) that he laid particular emphasis on the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the highest type of democracy in class society, the form of *proletarian*

democracy, which expresses the interests of the majority (the exploited), as against *capitalist* democracy, which expresses the interests of the minority (the exploiters).

Third: the question of the forms and methods of successfully building Socialism in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism, in a country surrounded by capitalist states. Marx and Engels regarded the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a more or less prolonged one, full of revolutionary conflicts and civil wars, in the course of which the proletariat, being in power, would take the economic, political, cultural and organizational measures necessary for creating, in the place of the old, capitalist society, a new, Socialist society, a society without classes and without a state. Lenin wholly and entirely adhered to these fundamental principles of Marx and Engels. Lenin's new contribution in this field was: a) he proved that a complete Socialist society could be built in a country with a dictatorship of the proletariat surrounded by imperialist states, provided the country were not crushed by the military intervention of the surrounding capitalist states; b) he outlined the specific lines of economic policy (the "New Economic Policy") by which the proletariat, being in command of the economic key positions (industry, land, transport, the banks, etc.), could link up socialized industry with agriculture ("the bond between industry and peasant farming") and thus lead the whole national economy towards Socialism; c) he outlined the specific ways of gradually guiding and drawing the basic mass of the peasantry into the channel of Socialist construction through the medium of co-operative societies, which in the hands of the proletarian dictatorship are a powerful instrument for the transformation of small peasant farming and for the re-education of the mass of the peasantry in the spirit of Socialism.

Fourth: the question of the hegemony of the proletariat in revolution, in all popular revolutions, both in a revolution against tsardom and in a revolution against capitalism. Marx and Engels presented the main outlines of the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat. Lenin's new contribution in this field was that he developed and expanded these outlines into a harmonious system of the hegemony of the proletariat, into a harmonious system of proletarian leadership of the working masses in town and country not only as regards the overthrow of tsardom and capitalism, but also as regards the building of Socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat. We know that, thanks to Lenin and his

Party, the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat was applied in a masterly fashion in Russia. This incidentally explains why the revolution in Russia brought about the power of the proletariat. In previous revolutions it usually happened that the workers did all the fighting on the barricades, shed their blood and overthrew the old order, but that the power fell into the hands of the bourgeoisie, which then oppressed and exploited the workers. That was the case in England and France. That was the case in Germany. Here, in Russia, however, things took a different turn. In Russia, the workers did not merely represent the shock troops of the revolution. While it represented the shock troops of the revolution, the Russian proletariat at the same time strove for the hegemony, for the political leadership, of all the exploited masses of town and country, rallying them around itself, wresting them from the bourgeoisie and politically isolating the bourgeoisie. Being the leader of the exploited masses, the Russian proletariat all the time fought to take the power into its own hands, and to utilize it in its own interests, against the bourgeoisie, against capitalism. This in fact explains why each powerful outbreak of the revolution in Russia, whether in October 1905 or in February 1917, gave rise to Soviets of Workers' Deputies as the embryo of the new apparatus of power—whose function it is to suppress the bourgeoisie—as against the bourgeois parliament, the old apparatus of power—whose function it is to suppress the proletariat. Twice did the bourgeoisie in Russia try to restore the bourgeois parliament and put an end to the Soviets: in August 1917, at the time of the "Pre-parliament," before the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, and in January 1918, at the time of the "Constituent Assembly," after the seizure of power by the proletariat. And on both occasions it suffered defeat. Why? Because the bourgeoisie was already politically isolated, the millions of working people regarded the proletariat as the sole leader of the revolution, and because the Soviets had already been tried and tested by the masses as their own workers' government, to exchange which for a bourgeois parliament would have meant suicide for the proletariat. It is not surprising, therefore, that bourgeois parliamentarism did not take root in Russia. That is why the revolution in Russia led to the rule of the proletariat. Such were the results of the application of Lenin's system of the hegemony of the proletariat in revolution.

Fifth: the national and colonial question. Analysing in their time the events in Ireland, India, China, the Central European

countries, Poland and Hungary, Marx and Engels developed the basic and initial ideas on the national and colonial question. Lenin in his works based himself on these ideas. Lenin's new contribution in this field was: a) that he gathered these ideas into one harmonious system of views on national and colonial revolutions in the epoch of imperialism; b) that he connected the national and colonial question with the overthrow of imperialism; and c) that he declared the national and colonial question to be a component part of the general question of international proletarian revolution.

Lastly: the question of the Party of the proletariat. Marx and Engels gave the main outlines of the idea of the Party as the vanguard of the proletariat, without which (the Party) the proletariat could not achieve its emancipation, either in the sense of capturing power or in the sense of reconstructing capitalist society. Lenin's contribution in this field was that he developed these outlines further and applied them to the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat in the period of imperialism, and showed: a) that the Party is a higher form of class organization of the proletariat compared with other forms of proletarian organization (labour unions, co-operative societies, the organization of state) whose work it is the Party's function to generalize and to direct; b) that the dictatorship of the proletariat can be realized only through the Party, the directing force of the dictatorship; c) that the dictatorship of the proletariat can be complete only if it is led by one party, the Communist Party, which does not and must not share the leadership with any other party; and d) that unless there is iron discipline in the Party, the task of the dictatorship of the proletariat of suppressing the exploiters and transforming class society into Socialist society cannot be accomplished.

This, in the main, is the new contribution made by Lenin in his works, giving more specific form to and developing Marx's doctrine as applied to the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat in the period of imperialism.

That is why we say that Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

It is clear from this that Leninism cannot be separated from Marxism; still less can it be contrasted with Marxism.

The question submitted by the delegation goes on to ask: "Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in 'constructive revolution' whereas Marx was more inclined to wait for the cul-

mination of the development of economic forces?" I think it would be absolutely incorrect to say that. I think that every popular revolution, if it really is a popular revolution, is a constructive revolution, for it breaks up the old system and constructs, creates a new one. Of course, there is nothing constructive in such revolutions—if they may be called that—as take place, say, in Albania, in the form of comic opera "risings" of tribe against tribe. But Marxists never regarded such comic opera "risings" as revolutions. We are obviously not referring to such "risings," but to a mass popular revolution in which the oppressed classes rise up against the oppressing classes. Such a revolution cannot but be constructive. And it was precisely for such a revolution, and only for such a revolution, that Marx and Lenin stood. It goes without saying that such a revolution cannot arise under all conditions, that it can break out only under definite favourable economic and political conditions.

J. Stalin

DIALECTICAL AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM¹

(SEPTEMBER 1938)

Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist Party. It is called dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is *dialectical*, while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, is *materialistic*.

Historical materialism is the extension of the principles of dialectical materialism to the study of social life, an application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the phenomena of the life of society, to the study of society and of its history.

When describing their dialectical method, Marx and Engels usually refer to Hegel as the philosopher who formulated the main features of dialectics. This, however, does not mean that the dialectics of Marx and Engels is identical with the dialectics of Hegel. As a matter of fact, Marx and Engels took from the Hegelian dialectics only its "rational kernel," casting aside its idealistic shell, and developed it further so as to lend it a modern scientific form.

"My dialectic method," says Marx, "is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel . . . the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." (Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. XXX.)

When describing their materialism, Marx and Engels usually refer to Feuerbach as the philosopher who restored materialism to its rights. This, however, does not mean that the materialism

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of Marx and Engels is identical with Feuerbach's materialism. As a matter of fact, Marx and Engels took from Feuerbach's materialism its "inner kernel," developed it into a scientific-philosophical theory of materialism and cast aside its idealistic and religious-ethical encumbrances. We know that Feuerbach, although he was fundamentally a materialist, objected to the name materialism. Engels more than once declared that "in spite of the" materialist "'foundation,'" Feuerbach "remained ... bound by the traditional idealist fetters," and that "the real idealism of Feuerbach becomes evident as soon as we come to his philosophy of religion and ethics." (Pp. 373, 375 of this volume.)

Dialectics comes from the Greek *dialego*, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature.

In its essence, dialectics is the direct opposite of metaphysics.

1) The principal features of *the Marxist dialectical method* are as follows:

a) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other.

The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena, inasmuch as any phenomenon in any realm of nature may become meaningless if it is not considered in connection with the surrounding conditions, but divorced from them; and that, *vice versa*, any phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by surrounding phenomena.

b) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that nature is not a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability, but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away.

The dialectical method therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being.

The dialectical method regards as important primarily not that which at the given moment seems to be durable and yet is already beginning to die away, but that which is arising and developing, even though at the given moment it may appear to be not durable, for the dialectical method considers invincible only that which is arising and developing.

"All nature," says Engels, "from the smallest thing to the biggest, from grains of sand to suns, from the protista [the primary living cells—J. S.] to man, has its existence in eternal coming into being and going out of being, in ceaseless flux, in unresting motion and change." (F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*.)

Therefore, dialectics, Engels says, "takes things and their perceptual images essentially in their interconnection, in their concatenation, in their movement, in their rise and disappearance." (*Anti-Dühring* p. 29.)

c) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard the process of development as a simple process of growth, where quantitative changes do not lead to qualitative changes, but as a development which passes from insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes to open, fundamental changes, to qualitative changes; a development in which the qualitative changes occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, taking the form of a leap from one state to another; they occur not accidentally but as the natural result of an accumulation of imperceptible and gradual quantitative changes.

The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development should be understood not as movement in a circle, not as a simple repetition of what has already occurred, but as an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher.

"Nature," says Engels, "is the test of dialectics and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich and daily increasing materials for this test, and has thus proved that in the last analysis nature's process is dialectical and not metaphysical, that it does not move in an eternally uniform and constantly repeated circle but passes through a real history. Here prime mention should be made of Darwin, who dealt a severe blow to the metaphysical conception of nature by proving that the organic world of today, plants and animals, and consequently man too, is all a product of a process of development that has been in progress for millions of years." (F. Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, p. 165 of this volume.)

Describing dialectical development as a transition from quantitative changes to qualitative changes, Engels says:

"In physics ... every change is a passing of quantity into quality, a result of a quantitative change of the quantity of motion, of one form or another, that is inherent in a body or imparted to it. For example, the temperature of water has at first no effect on its liquid state; but as the temperature of liquid water rises or falls, a moment arrives when this state of cohesion changes and the water is converted in one case into steam and in the other into ice... A definite minimum current is required to make platinum wire ... glow; every metal has its ... melting temperature; every liquid has a definite freezing point and boiling point at a given pressure, as far as we are able with the means at our disposal to attain the required temperatures; finally, every gas has its critical point at which, by proper pressure and cooling, it can be converted into a liquid state.... What are known as the constants of physics [the point at which one state passes into another—J. S.] are in most cases nothing but designations of the nodal points at which a quantitative [change] increase or decrease of motion causes a qualitative change in the state of the given body, and at which, consequently, quantity is transformed into quality." (*Dialectics of Nature*.)

Passing to chemistry Engels continues:

"Chemistry may be called the science of the qualitative changes which take place in bodies as the effect of changes of quantitative composition. This was already known to Hegel.... Take oxygen: if the molecule contains three atoms instead of the usual two, we get ozone, a body definitely distinct in odour and reaction from ordinary oxygen. And what shall we say of the different proportions in which oxygen combines with nitrogen or sulphur, and each of which produces a body qualitatively different from all other bodies!" (*Ibid.*)

Finally, criticizing Dühring, who scolded Hegel for all he was worth but surreptitiously borrowed from him the well-known thesis that the transition from the insentient world to the sentient world, from the kingdom of inorganic matter to the kingdom of organic life, is a leap to a new state, Engels says:

"This is precisely the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, in which, at certain definite nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a *qualitative leap*, for example, in the case of water which is heated or cooled, where boiling point and freezing point are the nodes at which—under normal pressure—the leap to a new aggregate state takes place, and where consequently quantity is transformed into quality." (F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 55.)

d) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes.

The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place not as a harmonious unfolding of phenomena, but as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things and phenomena, as a "struggle" of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions.

"In its proper meaning," Lenin says, "dialectics is the study of the contradiction *within the very essence of things*." (Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, Russian edition, p. 263.)

And further:

"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." (Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. XI, pp. 81-82.)

Such, in brief, are the principal features of the Marxist dialectical method.

It is easy to understand how immensely important is the extension of the principles of the dialectical method to the study of social life and the history of society, and how immensely important is the application of these principles to the history of society and to the practical activities of the party of the proletariat.

If there are no isolated phenomena in the world, if all phenomena are interconnected and interdependent, then it is clear that every social system and every social movement in history must be evaluated not from the standpoint of "eternal justice" or some

other preconceived idea, as is not infrequently done by historians, but from the standpoint of the conditions which gave rise to that system or that social movement and with which they are connected.

The slave system would be senseless, stupid and unnatural under modern conditions. But under the conditions of a disintegrating primitive communal system, the slave system is a quite understandable and natural phenomenon, since it represents an advance on the primitive communal system.

The demand for a bourgeois-democratic republic when tsardom and bourgeois society existed, as, let us say, in Russia in 1905, was a quite understandable, proper and revolutionary demand, for at that time a bourgeois republic would have meant a step forward. But now, under the conditions of the U.S.S.R., the demand for a bourgeois-democratic republic would be a senseless and counter-revolutionary demand, for a bourgeois republic would be a retrograde step compared with the Soviet republic.

Everything depends on the conditions, time and place.

It is clear that without such a *historical* approach to social phenomena, the existence and development of the science of history is impossible, for only such an approach saves the science of history from becoming a jumble of accidents and an agglomeration of most absurd mistakes.

Further, if the world is in a state of constant movement and development, if the dying away of the old and the upgrowth of the new is a law of development, then it is clear that there can be no "immutable" social systems, no "eternal principles" of private property and exploitation, no "eternal ideas" of the subjugation of the peasant to the landlord, of the worker to the capitalist.

Hence, the capitalist system can be replaced by the Socialist system, just as at one time the feudal system was replaced by the capitalist system.

Hence, we must not base our orientation on the strata of society which are no longer developing, even though they at present constitute the predominant force, but on those strata which are developing and have a future before them, even though they at present do not constitute the predominant force.

In the eighties of the past century, in the period of the struggle between the Marxists and the Narodniks, the proletariat in Russia constituted an insignificant minority of the population, whereas the individual peasants constituted the vast majority of the population. But the proletariat was developing as a class,

whereas the peasantry as a class was disintegrating. And just because the proletariat was developing as a class the Marxists based their orientation on the proletariat. And they were not mistaken, for, as we know, the proletariat subsequently grew from an insignificant force into a first-rate historical and political force.

Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must look forward, not backward.

Further, if the passing of slow quantitative changes into rapid and abrupt qualitative changes is a law of development, then it is clear that revolutions made by oppressed classes are a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon.

Hence, the transition from capitalism to Socialism and the liberation of the working class from the yoke of capitalism cannot be effected by slow changes, by reforms, but only by a qualitative change of the capitalist system, by revolution.

Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must be a revolutionist, not a reformist.

Further, if development proceeds by way of the disclosure of internal contradictions, by way of collisions between opposite forces on the basis of these contradictions and so as to overcome these contradictions, then it is clear that the class struggle of the proletariat is a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon.

Hence, we must not cover up the contradictions of the capitalist system, but disclose and unravel them; we must not try to check the class struggle, but carry it to its conclusion.

Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must pursue an uncompromising proletarian class policy, not a reformist policy of harmony of the interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, not a compromisers' policy of "the growing of capitalism into Socialism."

Such is the Marxist dialectical method when applied to social life, to the history of society.

As to Marxist philosophical materialism, it is fundamentally the direct opposite of philosophical idealism.

2) The principal features of *Marxist philosophical materialism* are as follows:

a) Contrary to idealism, which regards the world as the embodiment of an "absolute idea," a "universal spirit," "consciousness," Marx's philosophical materialism holds that the world is by its very nature *material*, that the multifold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter in motion, that interconnection and interdependence of phenomena, as established by

the dialectical method, are a law of the development of moving matter, and that the world develops in accordance with the laws of motion of matter and stands in no need of a "universal spirit."

"The materialistic outlook on nature," says Engels, "means no more than simply conceiving nature just as it exists, without any foreign admixture." (F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Moscow 1934, p. 79, Appendix.)

Speaking of the materialist views of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that "the world, the all in one, was not created by any god or any man, but was, is and ever will be a living flame, systematically flaring up and systematically dying down," Lenin comments: "A very good exposition of the rudiments of dialectical materialism." (Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, Russian edition, p. 318.)

b) Contrary to idealism, which asserts that only our mind really exists, and that the material world, being, nature, exists only in our mind, in our sensations, ideas and perceptions, the Marxist materialist philosophy holds that matter, nature, being, is an objective reality existing outside and independent of our mind; that matter is primary, since it is the source of sensations, ideas, mind, and that mind is secondary, derivative, since it is a reflection of matter, a reflection of being; that thought is a product of matter which in its development has reached a high degree of perfection, namely, of the brain, and the brain is the organ of thought; and that therefore one cannot separate thought from matter without committing a grave error. Engels says:

"The question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature," is "the paramount question of the whole of philosophy.... The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature ... comprised the camp of *idealism*. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of *materialism*." (Pp. 366-67 of this volume. *Stalin's italics*.)

And further:

"The material, sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality.... Our consciousness and thinking, however suprasensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter." (*Ibid.*, p. 370.)

Concerning the question of matter and thought, Marx says:

"It is impossible to separate thought from matter that thinks. This matter is the substratum of all changes." (*Ibid.*, p. 335.)

Describing the Marxist philosophy of materialism, Lenin says:

"Materialism in general recognizes objectively real being (matter) as independent of consciousness, sensation, experience.... Consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best an approximately true (adequate, ideally exact) reflection of it." (Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. XI, p. 377.)

And further:

—"Matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation; matter is the objective reality given to us in sensation.... Matter, nature, being, the physical—is primary, and spirit, consciousness, sensation, the psychical—is secondary." (*Ibid.*, pp. 207-08.)

—"The world picture is a picture of how matter moves and of how 'matter thinks.'" (*Ibid.*, p. 402.)

—"The brain is the organ of thought." (*Ibid.*, p. 214.)

c) Contrary to idealism, which denies the possibility of knowing the world and its laws, which does not believe in the authenticity of our knowledge, does not recognize objective truth, and holds that the world is full of "things-in-themselves" that can never be known to science, Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable, that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth, and that there are no things in the world which are unknowable, but only things which are still not known, but which will be disclosed and made known by the efforts of science and practice.

Criticizing the thesis of Kant and other idealists that the world is unknowable and that there are "things-in-themselves" which are unknowable, and defending the well-known materialist thesis that our knowledge is authentic knowledge, Engels writes:

"The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice, *viz.*, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible 'thing-in-itself.' The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained such 'things-in-themselves' until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the 'thing-in-itself' became a thing for us, as, for instance, alizarin, the colouring matter of the madder, which we no longer trouble to grow in the madder roots in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar. For three hundred years the Copernican solar system was a hypothesis, with a hundred, a thousand or ten thousand chances to one in its favour, but still always a hypothesis. But when Leverrier, by means of the data provided by this system, not only deduced the ne-

cessity of the existence of an unknown planet, but also calculated the position in the heavens which this planet must necessarily occupy, and when Galle really found this planet, the Copernican system was proved." (P. 368 of this volume.)

Accusing Bogdanov, Bazarov, Yushkevich and the other followers of Mach of fideism (a reactionary theory, which gives preference to reliance on faith rather than on science), and defending the well-known materialist thesis that our scientific knowledge of the laws of nature is authentic knowledge, and that the laws of science represent objective truth, Lenin says:

"Contemporary fideism does not at all reject science; all it rejects is the 'exaggerated claims' of science, to wit, its claim to objective truth. If objective truth exists (as the materialists think), if natural science, reflecting the outer world in human 'experience,' is alone capable of giving us objective truth, then all fideism is absolutely refuted." (Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. XI, p. 188.)

Such, in brief, are the characteristic features of the Marxist philosophical materialism.

It is easy to understand how immensely important is the extension of the principles of philosophical materialism to the study of social life, of the history of society, and how immensely important is the application of these principles to the history of society and to the practical activities of the party of the proletariat.

If the connection between the phenomena of nature and their interdependence are laws of the development of nature, it follows, too, that the connection and interdependence of the phenomena of social life are laws of the development of society, and not something accidental.

Hence, social life, the history of society, ceases to be an agglomeration of "accidents," and becomes the history of the development of society according to regular laws, and the study of the history of society becomes a science.

Hence, the practical activity of the party of the proletariat must not be based on the good wishes of "outstanding individuals," not on the dictates of "reason," "universal morals," etc., but on the laws of development of society and on the study of these laws.

Further, if the world is knowable and our knowledge of the laws of development of nature is authentic knowledge, having the validity of objective truth, it follows that social life, the develop-

ment of society, is also knowable, and that the data of science regarding the laws of development of society are authentic data having the validity of objective truths.

Hence, the science of the history of society, despite all the complexity of the phenomena of social life, can become as precise a science as, let us say, biology, and capable of making use of the laws of development of society for practical purposes.

Hence, the party of the proletariat should not guide itself in its practical activity by casual motives, but by the laws of development of society, and by practical deductions from these laws.

Hence, Socialism is converted from a dream of a better future for humanity into a science.

Hence, the bond between science and practical activity, between theory and practice, their unity, should be the guiding star of the party of the proletariat.

Further, if nature, being, the material world, is primary, and mind, thought, is secondary, derivative; if the material world represents objective reality existing independently of the mind of men, while the mind is a reflection of this objective reality, it follows that the material life of society, its being, is also primary, and its spiritual life secondary, derivative, and that the material life of society is an objective reality existing independently of the will of men, while the spiritual life of society is a reflection of this objective reality, a reflection of being.

Hence, the source of formation of the spiritual life of society, the origin of social ideas, social theories, political views and political institutions, should not be sought for in the ideas, theories, views and political institutions themselves, but in the conditions of the material life of society, in social being, of which these ideas, theories, views, etc., are the reflection.

Hence, if in different periods of the history of society different social ideas, theories, views and political institutions are to be observed; if under the slave system we encounter certain social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, under feudalism others, and under capitalism others still, this is not to be explained by the "nature," the "properties" of the ideas, theories, views and political institutions themselves, but by the different conditions of the material life of society at different periods of social development.

Whatever is the being of a society, whatever are the conditions of material life of a society, such are the ideas, theories, political views and political institutions of that society.

In this connection, Marx says:

"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." (P. 300 of this volume.)

Hence, in order not to err in policy, in order not to find itself in the position of idle dreamers, the party of the proletariat must not base its activities on abstract "principles of human reason," but on the concrete conditions of the material life of society, as the determining force of social development; not on the good wishes of "great men," but on the real needs of development of the material life of society.

The fall of the utopians, including the Narodniks, Anarchists and Socialist-Revolutionaries, was due, among other things, to the fact that they did not recognize the primary role which the conditions of the material life of society play in the development of society, and, sinking to idealism, did not base their practical activities on the needs of the development of the material life of society, but, independently of and in spite of these needs, on "ideal plans" and "all-embracing projects" divorced from the real life of society.

The strength and vitality of Marxism-Leninism lies in the fact that it does base its practical activity on the needs of the development of the material life of society and never divorces itself from the real life of society.

It does not follow from Marx's words, however, that social ideas, theories, political views and political institutions are of no significance in the life of society, that they do not reciprocally affect social being, the development of the material conditions of the life of society. We have been speaking so far of the *origin* of social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, of *the way they arise*, of the fact that the spiritual life of society is a reflection of the conditions of its material life. As regards the *significance* of social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, as regards their *role* in history, historical materialism, far from denying them, stresses the role and importance of these factors in the life of society, in its history.

There are different kinds of social ideas and theories. There are old ideas and theories which have outlived their day and which serve the interests of the moribund forces of society. Their significance lies in the fact that they hamper the development, the progress of society. Then there are new and advanced ideas

and theories which serve the interests of the advanced forces of society. Their significance lies in the fact that they facilitate the development, the progress of society; and their significance is the greater the more accurately they reflect the needs of development of the material life of society.

New social ideas and theories arise only after the development of the material life of society has set new tasks before society. But once they have arisen they become a most potent force which facilitates the carrying out of the new tasks set by the development of the material life of society, a force which facilitates the progress of society. It is precisely here that the tremendous organizing, mobilizing and transforming value of new ideas, new theories, new political views and new political institutions manifests itself. New social ideas and theories arise precisely because they are necessary to society, because it is *impossible* to carry out the urgent tasks of development of the material life of society without their organizing, mobilizing and transforming action. Arising out of the new tasks set by the development of the material life of society, the new social ideas and theories force their way through, become the possession of the masses, mobilize and organize them against the moribund forces of society, and thus facilitate the overthrow of these forces, which hamper the development of the material life of society.

Thus social ideas, theories and political institutions, having arisen on the basis of the urgent tasks of the development of the material life of society, the development of social being, themselves then react upon social being, upon the material life of society, creating the conditions necessary for completely carrying out the urgent tasks of the material life of society, and for rendering its further development possible.

In this connection Marx says:

"Theory becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses."
(*Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie.*)

Hence, in order to be able to influence the conditions of material life of society and to accelerate their development and their improvement, the party of the proletariat must rely upon such a social theory, such a social idea as correctly reflects the needs of development of the material life of society, and which is therefore capable of setting into motion broad masses of the people and of mobilizing them and organizing them into a great army of the proletarian party, prepared to smash the

reactionary forces and to clear the way for the advanced forces of society.

The fall of the "Economists" and Mensheviks was due among other things to the fact that they did not recognize the mobilizing, organizing and transforming role of advanced theory, of advanced ideas and, sinking to vulgar materialism, reduced the role of these factors almost to nothing, thus condemning the Party to passivity and inanition.

The strength and vitality of Marxism-Leninism is derived from the fact that it relies upon an advanced theory which correctly reflects the needs of development of the material life of society, that it elevates theory to a proper level, and that it deems it its duty to utilize every ounce of the mobilizing, organizing and transforming power of this theory.

That is the answer historical materialism gives to the question of the relation between social being and social consciousness, between the conditions of development of material life and the development of the spiritual life of society.

3) *Historical Materialism.*

It now remains to elucidate the following question: what, from the viewpoint of historical materialism, is meant by the "conditions of material life of society" which in the final analysis determine the physiognomy of society, its ideas, views, political institutions, etc.?

What, after all, are these "conditions of material life of society," what are their distinguishing features?

There can be no doubt that the concept "conditions of material life of society" includes, first of all, nature which surrounds society, geographical environment, which is one of the indispensable and constant conditions of material life of society and which, of course, influences the development of society. What role does geographical environment play in the development of society? Is geographical environment the chief force determining the physiognomy of society, the character of the social system of man, the transition from one system to another?

Historical materialism answers this question in the negative.

Geographical environment is unquestionably one of the constant and indispensable conditions of development of society and, of course, influences the development of society, accelerates or retards its development. But its influence is not the *determining* influence, inasmuch as the changes and development of society proceed at an incomparably faster rate than the changes and de-

velopment of geographical environment. In the space of three thousand years three different social systems have been successively superseded in Europe: the primitive communal system, the slave system and the feudal system. In the eastern part of Europe, in the U.S.S.R., even four social systems have been superseded. Yet during this period geographical conditions in Europe have either not changed at all, or have changed so slightly that geography takes no note of them. And that is quite natural. Changes in geographical environment of any importance require millions of years, whereas a few hundred or a couple of thousand years are enough for even very important changes in the system of human society.

It follows from this that geographical environment cannot be the chief cause, the *determining* cause of social development, for that which remains almost unchanged in the course of tens of thousands of years cannot be the chief cause of development of that which undergoes fundamental changes in the course of a few hundred years.

Further, there can be no doubt that the concept "conditions of material life of society" also includes growth of population, density of population of one degree or another, for people are an essential element of the conditions of material life of society, and without a definite minimum number of people there can be no material life of society. Is not growth of population the chief force that determines the character of the social system of man?

Historical materialism answers this question too in the negative.

Of course, growth of population does influence the development of society, does facilitate or retard the development of society, but it cannot be the chief force of development of society, and its influence on the development of society cannot be the *determining* influence because, by itself, growth of population does not furnish the clue to the question why a given social system is replaced precisely by such and such a new system and not by another, why the primitive communal system is succeeded precisely by the slave system, the slave system by the feudal system, and the feudal system by the bourgeois system, and not by some other.

If growth of population were the determining force of social development, then a higher density of population would be bound to give rise to a correspondingly higher type of social system. But we do not find this to be the case. The density of population in China is four times as great as in the U.S.A., yet the U.S.A. stands higher than China in the scale of social development, for in China a semi-feudal system still prevails, whereas the U.S.A. has long ago

reached the highest stage of development of capitalism. The density of population in Belgium is nineteen times as great as in the U.S.A., and twenty-six times as great as in the U.S.S.R. Yet the U.S.A. stands higher than Belgium in the scale of social development; and as for the U.S.S.R., Belgium lags a whole historical epoch behind this country, for in Belgium the capitalist system prevails, whereas the U.S.S.R. has already done away with capitalism and has set up a Socialist system.

It follows from this that growth of population is not, and cannot be, the chief force of development of society, the force which *determines* the character of the social system, the physiognomy of society.

a) What, then, is the chief force in the complex of conditions of material life of society which determines the physiognomy of society, the character of the social system, the development of society from one system to another?

This force, historical materialism holds, is the *method of procuring the means of life* necessary for human existence, the *mode of production of material values*—food, clothing, footwear, houses, fuel, instruments of production, etc.—which are indispensable for the life and development of society.

In order to live, people must have food, clothing, footwear, shelter, fuel, etc.; in order to have these material values, people must produce them; and in order to produce them, people must have the instruments of production with which food, clothing, footwear, shelter, fuel, etc., are produced; they must be able to produce these instruments and to use them.

The *instruments of production* wherewith material values are produced, the *people* who operate the instruments of production and carry on the production of material values thanks to a certain *production experience* and *labour skill*—all these elements jointly constitute the *productive forces* of society.

But the productive forces are only one aspect of production, only one aspect of the mode of production, an aspect that expresses the relation of men to the objects and forces of nature which they make use of for the production of material values. Another aspect of production, another aspect of the mode of production, is the relation of men to each other in the process of production, men's *relations of production*. Men carry on a struggle against nature and utilize nature for the production of material values not in isolation from each other, not as separate individuals, but in common, in groups, in societies. Production, therefore, is at all times

and under all conditions *social* production. In the production of material values men enter into mutual relation of one kind or another within production, into relations of production of one kind or another. These may be relations of co-operation and mutual help between people who are free from exploitation; they may be relations of domination and subordination; and, lastly, they may be transitional from one form of relations of production to another. But whatever the character of the relations of production may be, always and in every system, they constitute just as essential an element of production as the productive forces of society.

"In production," Marx says, "men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place." (P. 211 of this volume.)

Consequently, production, the mode of production, embraces both the productive forces of society and men's relations of production, and is thus the embodiment of their unity in the process of production of material values.

b) *The first feature* of production is that it never stays at one point for a long time and is always in a state of change and development, and that, furthermore, changes in the mode of production inevitably call forth changes in the whole social system, social ideas, political views and political institutions—they call forth a reconstruction of the whole social and political order. At different stages of development people make use of different modes of production, or, to put it more crudely, lead different manners of life. In the primitive commune there is one mode of production, under slavery there is another mode of production, under feudalism a third mode of production, and so on. And, correspondingly, men's social system, the spiritual life of men, their views and political institutions also vary.

Whatever is the mode of production of a society, such in the main is the society itself, its ideas and theories, its political views and institutions.

Or, to put it more crudely, whatever is man's manner of life, such is his manner of thought.

This means that the history of development of society is above all the history of the development of production, the history of the modes of production which succeed each other in the course of

centuries, the history of the development of productive forces and of people's relations of production.

Hence, the history of social development is at the same time the history of the producers of material values themselves, the history of the labouring masses, who are the chief force in the process of production and who carry on the production of material values necessary for the existence of society.

Hence, if historical science is to be a real science, it can no longer reduce the history of social development to the actions of kings and generals, to the actions of "conquerors" and "subjugators" of states, but must above all devote itself to the history of the producers of material values, the history of the labouring masses, the history of peoples.

Hence, the clue to the study of the laws of history of society must not be sought in men's minds, in the views and ideas of society, but in the mode of production practised by society in any given historical period; it must be sought in the economic life of society.

Hence, the prime task of historical science is to study and disclose the laws of production, the laws of development of the productive forces and of the relations of production, the laws of economic development of society.

Hence, if the party of the proletariat is to be a real party, it must above all acquire a knowledge of the laws of development of production, of the laws of economic development of society.

Hence, if it is not to err in policy, the party of the proletariat must both in drafting its program and in its practical activities proceed primarily from the laws of development of production, from the laws of economic development of society.

c) *The second feature* of production is that its changes and development always begin with changes and development of the productive forces, and in the first place, with changes and development of the instruments of production. Productive forces are therefore the most mobile and revolutionary element of production. First the productive forces of society change and develop, and then, *depending* on these changes and *in conformity with them*, men's relations of production, their economic relations, change. This, however, does not mean that the relations of production do not influence the development of the productive forces and that the latter are not dependent on the former. While their development is dependent on the development of the productive forces, the relations of production in their turn react upon the development

of the productive forces, accelerating or retarding it. In this connection it should be noted that the relations of production cannot for too long a time lag behind and be in a state of contradiction to the growth of the productive forces, inasmuch as the productive forces can develop in full measure only when the relations of production correspond to the character, the state, of the productive forces and allow full scope for their development. Therefore, however much the relations of production may lag behind the development of the productive forces, they must, sooner or later, come into correspondence with—and actually do come into correspondence with—the level of development of the productive forces, the character of the productive forces. Otherwise we would have a fundamental violation of the unity of the productive forces and the relations of production within the system of production, a disruption of production as a whole, a crisis of production, a destruction of productive forces.

An instance in which the relations of production do not correspond to the character of the productive forces, conflict with them, is the economic crises in capitalist countries, where private capitalist ownership of the means of production is in glaring incongruity with the social character of the process of production, with the character of the productive forces. This results in economic crises, which lead to the destruction of productive forces. Furthermore, this incongruity itself constitutes the economic basis of social revolution, the purpose of which is to destroy the existing relations of production and to create new relations of production corresponding to the character of the productive forces.

In contrast, an instance in which the relations of production completely correspond to the character of the productive forces is the Socialist national economy of the U.S.S.R., where the social ownership of the means of production fully corresponds to the social character of the process of production, and where, because of this, economic crises and the destruction of productive forces are unknown.

Consequently, the productive forces are not only the most mobile and revolutionary element in production, but are also the determining element in the development of production.

Whatever are the productive forces, such must be the relations of production.

While the state of the productive forces furnishes an answer to the question—with what instruments of production do men produce the material values they need?—the state of the relations of pro-

duction furnishes the answer to another question—who owns the *means of production* (the land, forests, waters, mineral resources, raw materials, instruments of production, production premises, means of transportation and communication, etc.), who commands the means of production, whether the whole of society, or individual persons, groups, or classes which utilize them for the exploitation of other persons, groups or classes?

Here is a rough picture of the development of productive forces from ancient times to our day. The transition from crude stone tools to the bow and arrow, and the accompanying transition from the life of hunters to the domestication of animals and primitive pasturage; the transition from stone tools to metal tools (the iron axe, the wooden plough fitted with an iron colter, etc.), with a corresponding transition to tillage and agriculture; a further improvement in metal tools for the working up of materials, the introduction of the blacksmith's bellows, the introduction of pottery, with a corresponding development of handicrafts, the separation of handicrafts from agriculture, the development of an independent handicraft industry and, subsequently, of manufacture; the transition from handicraft tools to machines and the transformation of handicraft and manufacture into machine industry; the transition to the machine system and the rise of modern large-scale machine industry—such is a general and far from complete picture of the development of the productive forces of society in the course of man's history. It will be clear that the development and improvement of the instruments of production was effected by men who were related to production, and not independently of men; and, consequently, the change and development of the instruments of production was accompanied by a change and development of men, as the most important element of the productive forces, by a change and development of their production experience, their labour skill, their ability to handle the instruments of production.

In conformity with the change and development of the productive forces of society in the course of history, men's relations of production, their economic relations, also changed and developed.

Five *main* types of relations of production are known to history: primitive communal, slave, feudal, capitalist and Socialist.

The basis of the relations of production under the primitive communal system is that the means of production are socially owned. This in the main corresponds to the character of the productive forces of that period. Stone tools, and, later, the bow and arrow, precluded the possibility of men individually combating

the forces of nature and beasts of prey. In order to gather the fruits of the forest, to catch fish, to build some sort of habitation, men were obliged to work in common if they did not want to die of starvation, or fall victim to beasts of prey or to neighbouring societies. Labour in common led to the common ownership of the means of production, as well as of the fruits of production. Here the conception of private ownership of the means of production did not yet exist, except for the personal ownership of certain implements of production which were at the same time means of defence against beasts of prey. Here there was no exploitation, no classes.

The basis of the relations of production under the slave system is that the slave owner owns the means of production; he also owns the worker in production—the slave, whom he can sell, purchase, or kill as though he were an animal. Such relations of production in the main correspond to the state of the productive forces of that period. Instead of stone tools, men now have metal tools at their command; instead of the wretched and primitive husbandry of the hunter, who knew neither pasturage nor tillage, there now appear pasturage, tillage, handicrafts, and a division of labour between these branches of production. There appears the possibility of the exchange of products between individuals and between societies, of the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few, the actual accumulation of the means of production in the hands of a minority, and the possibility of subjugation of the majority by a minority and the conversion of the majority into slaves. Here we no longer find the common and free labour of all members of society in the production process—here there prevails the forced labour of slaves, who are exploited by the non-labouring slave owners. Here, therefore, there is no common ownership of the means of production or of the fruits of production. It is replaced by private ownership. Here the slave owner appears as the prime and principal property owner in the full sense of the term.

Rich and poor, exploiters and exploited, people with full rights and people with no rights, and a fierce class struggle between them—such is the picture of the slave system.

The basis of the relations of production under the feudal system is that the feudal lord owns the means of production and does not fully own the worker in production—the serf, whom the feudal lord can no longer kill, but whom he can buy and sell. Alongside of feudal ownership there exists individual ownership by the peasant and the handicraftsman of his implements of production and

his private enterprise based on his personal labour. Such relations of production in the main correspond to the state of the productive forces of that period. Further improvements in the smelting and working of iron; the spread of the iron plough and the loom; the further development of agriculture, horticulture, viniculture and dairying; the appearance of manufactories alongside of the handicraft workshops—such are the characteristic features of the state of the productive forces.

The new productive forces demand that the labourer shall display some kind of initiative in production and an inclination for work, an interest in work. The feudal lord therefore discards the slave, as a labourer who has no interest in work and is entirely without initiative, and prefers to deal with the serf, who has his own husbandry, implements of production, and a certain interest in work essential for the cultivation of the land and for the payment in kind of a part of his harvest to the feudal lord.

Here private ownership is further developed. Exploitation is nearly as severe as it was under slavery—it is only slightly mitigated. A class struggle between exploiters and exploited is the principal feature of the feudal system.

The basis of the relations of production under the capitalist system is that the capitalist owns the means of production, but not the workers in production—the wage labourers, whom the capitalist can neither kill nor sell because they are personally free, but who are deprived of means of production and, in order not to die of hunger, are obliged to sell their labour power to the capitalist and to bear the yoke of exploitation. Alongside of capitalist property in the means of production, we find, at first on a wide scale, private property of the peasants and handicraftsmen in the means of production, these peasants and handicraftsmen no longer being serfs, and their private property being based on personal labour. In place of the handicraft workshops and manufactories there appear huge mills and factories equipped with machinery. In place of the manorial estates tilled by the primitive implements of production of the peasant, there now appear large capitalist farms run on scientific lines and supplied with agricultural machinery.

The new productive forces require that the workers in production shall be better educated and more intelligent than the down-trodden and ignorant serfs, that they be able to understand machinery and operate it properly. Therefore, the capitalists prefer to deal with wage workers, who are free from the bonds of serfdom

and who are educated enough to be able properly to operate machinery.

But having developed productive forces to a tremendous extent, capitalism has become enmeshed in contradictions which it is unable to solve. By producing larger and larger quantities of commodities, and reducing their prices, capitalism intensifies competition, ruins the mass of small and medium private owners, converts them into proletarians and reduces their purchasing power: with the result that it becomes impossible to dispose of the commodities produced. On the other hand, by expanding production and concentrating millions of workers in huge mills and factories, capitalism lends the process of production a social character and thus undermines its own foundation, inasmuch as the social character of the process of production demands the social ownership of the means of production; yet the means of production remain private capitalist property, which is incompatible with the social character of the process of production.

These irreconcilable contradictions between the character of the productive forces and the relations of production make themselves felt in periodical crises of overproduction, when the capitalists, finding no effective demand for their goods owing to the ruin of the mass of the population which they themselves have brought about, are compelled to burn products, destroy manufactured goods, suspend production, and destroy productive forces at a time when millions of people are forced to suffer unemployment and starvation, not because there are not enough goods, but because there is an overproduction of goods.

This means that the capitalist relations of production have ceased to correspond to the state of productive forces of society and have come into irreconcilable contradiction with them.

This means that capitalism is pregnant with revolution, whose mission it is to replace the existing capitalist ownership of the means of production by Socialist ownership.

This means that the main feature of the capitalist system is a most acute class struggle between the exploiters and the exploited.

The basis of the relations of production under the Socialist system, which so far has been established only in the U.S.S.R., is the social ownership of the means of production. Here there are no longer exploiters and exploited. The goods produced are distributed according to labour performed, on the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." Here the mutual relations of people in the process of production are marked by com-

radely co-operation and the Socialist mutual assistance of workers who are free from exploitation. Here the relations of production fully correspond to the state of productive forces, for the social character of the process of production is reinforced by the social ownership of the means of production.

For this reason Socialist production in the U.S.S.R. knows no periodical crises of overproduction and their accompanying absurdities.

For this reason, the productive forces here develop at an accelerated pace, for the relations of production that correspond to them offer full scope for such development.

Such is the picture of the development of men's relations of production in the course of human history.

Such is the dependence of the development of the relations of production on the development of the productive forces of society, and primarily, on the development of the instruments of production, the dependence by virtue of which the changes and development of the productive forces sooner or later lead to corresponding changes and development of the relations of production.

"The use and fabrication of instruments of labour,"¹ says Marx, "although existing in the germ among certain species of animals, is specifically characteristic of the human labour-process, and Franklin therefore defines man as a tool-making animal. Relics of by-gone instruments of labour possess the same importance for the investigation of extinct economical forms of society, as do fossil bones for the determination of extinct species of animals. It is not the articles made, but how they are made, and by what instruments, that enables us to distinguish different economical epochs. Instruments of labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development to which human labour has attained, but they are also indicators of the social conditions under which that labour is carried on." (Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 159.)

And further:

—"Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist." (Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow 1935, p. 92.)

—"There is a continual movement of growth in productive forces, of destruction in social relations, of formation in ideas; the only immutable thing is the abstraction of movement." (*Ibid.*, p. 93.)

¹ By instruments of labour Marx has in mind primarily instruments of production.—J. S.

Speaking of historical materialism as formulated in the *Communist Manifesto*, Engels says:

"Economic production and the structure of society of every historical epoch necessarily arising therefrom constitute the foundation for the political and intellectual history of that epoch; ... consequently (ever since the dissolution of the primeval communal ownership of land) all history has been a history of class struggles, of struggles between exploited and exploiting, between dominated and dominating classes at various stages of social evolution; ... this struggle, however, has now reached a stage where the exploited and oppressed class (the proletariat) can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and oppresses it (the bourgeoisie), without at the same time forever freeing the whole of society from exploitation, oppression and class struggles." (Preface to the German 1883 edition of the *Communist Manifesto*—pp. 100-01 of this volume.)

d) *The third feature* of production is that the rise of new productive forces and of the relations of production corresponding to them does not take place separately from the old system, after the disappearance of the old system, but within the old system; it takes place not as a result of the deliberate and conscious activity of man, but spontaneously, unconsciously, independently of the will of man. It takes place spontaneously and independently of the will of man for two reasons.

Firstly, because men are not free to choose one mode of production or another, because as every new generation enters life it finds productive forces and relations of production already existing as the result of the work of former generations, owing to which it is obliged at first to accept and adapt itself to everything it finds ready made in the sphere of production in order to be able to produce material values.

Secondly, because, when improving one instrument of production or another, one element of the productive forces or another, men do not realize, do not understand or stop to reflect what *social* results these improvements will lead to, but only think of their everyday interests, of lightening their labour and of securing some direct and tangible advantage for themselves.

When, gradually and gropingly, certain members of primitive communal society passed from the use of stone tools to the use of iron tools, they, of course, did not know and did not stop to reflect what *social* results this innovation would lead to; they did not understand or realize that the change to metal tools meant a revolution in production, that it would in the long run lead to the slave system. They simply wanted to lighten their labour

and secure an immediate and tangible advantage; their conscious activity was confined within the narrow bounds of this everyday personal interest.

When, in the period of the feudal system, the young bourgeoisie of Europe began to erect, alongside of the small guild workshops, large manufactories, and thus advanced the productive forces of society, it, of course, did not know and did not stop to reflect what *social* consequences this innovation would lead to; it did not realize or understand that this "small" innovation would lead to a regrouping of social forces which was to end in a revolution both against the power of kings, whose favours it so highly valued, and against the nobility, to whose ranks its foremost representatives not infrequently aspired. It simply wanted to lower the cost of producing goods, to throw larger quantities of goods on the markets of Asia and of recently discovered America, and to make bigger profits. Its conscious activity was confined within the narrow bounds of this commonplace practical aim.

When the Russian capitalists, in conjunction with foreign capitalists, energetically implanted modern large-scale machine industry in Russia, while leaving tsardom intact and turning the peasants over to the tender mercies of the landlords, they, of course, did not know and did not stop to reflect what *social* consequences this extensive growth of productive forces would lead to; they did not realize or understand that this big leap in the realm of the productive forces of society would lead to a regrouping of social forces that would enable the proletariat to effect a union with the peasantry and to bring about a victorious Socialist revolution. They simply wanted to expand industrial production to the limit, to gain control of the huge home market, to become monopolists, and to squeeze as much profit as possible out of the national economy. Their conscious activity did not extend beyond their commonplace, strictly practical interests. Accordingly, Marx says:

"In the social production of their life, [that is, in the production of the material values necessary to the life of men—*J. S.*] men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and *independent*¹ of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production." (P. 300 of this volume.)

This, however, does not mean that changes in the relations of production, and the transition from old relations of production to new relations of production proceed smoothly, without conflicts,

¹ My italics.—*J. S.*

without upheavals. On the contrary, such a transition usually takes place by means of the revolutionary overthrow of the old relations of production and the establishment of new relations of production. Up to a certain period the development of the productive forces and the changes in the realm of the relations of production proceed spontaneously, independently of the will of men. But that is so only up to a certain moment, until the new and developing productive forces have reached a proper state of maturity. After the new productive forces have matured, the existing relations of production and their upholders—the ruling classes—become that “insuperable” obstacle which can only be removed by the conscious action of the new classes, by the forcible acts of these classes, by revolution. Here there stands out in bold relief the *tremendous role* of new social ideas, of new political institutions, of a new political power, whose mission it is to abolish by force the old relations of production. Out of the conflict between the new productive forces and the old relations of production, out of the new economic demands of society, there arise new social ideas; the new ideas organize and mobilize the masses; the masses become welded into a new political army, create a new revolutionary power, and make use of it to abolish by force the old system of relations of production, and to firmly establish the new system. The spontaneous process of development yields place to the conscious actions of men, peaceful development to violent upheaval, evolution to revolution.

“The proletariat,” says Marx, “during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class; ... by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production.” (*The Communist Manifesto*—p. 131 of this volume.)

And further:

—“The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class, and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.” (*Ibid.*, p. 129.)

—“Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one.” (Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 776.)

Here is the brilliant formulation of the essence of historical materialism given by Marx in 1859 in his historic Preface to his famous book, *Critique of Political Economy*:

“In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of

production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work before. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, æsthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production. No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore, mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always find that the task itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation.” (Pp. 300-01 of this volume.)

Such is Marxist materialism as applied to social life, to the history of society.

Such are the principal features of dialectical and historical materialism.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY¹

PREFACE TO THE GERMAN EDITION OF 1872

The Communist League,² an international association of workers, which could of course be only a secret one under the conditions obtaining at the time, commissioned us, the undersigned, at the Congress held in London in November 1847, to write for publication a detailed theoretical and practical program of the Party. Such was the origin of the following *Manifesto*, the manuscript of which travelled to London to be printed a few weeks before the February Revolution.³ First published in German, it has been republished in that language in at least twelve different editions in Germany, England and America. It was published in English for the first time in 1850 in the *Red Republican*, London, translated by Miss Helen Macfarlane, and in 1871 in at least three different translations in America. A French version first appeared in Paris shortly before the June insurrection of 1848⁴ and recently in *Le Socialiste* of New York. A new translation is in the course of preparation. A Polish version appeared in London shortly after it was first published in German. A Russian translation was published in Geneva in the 'sixties. Into Danish, too, it was translated shortly after its first appearance.

However⁵ much the state of things may have altered during the last twenty-five years, the general principles laid down in this *Manifesto* are, on the whole, as correct today as ever. Here and

¹ The *Manifesto* was written by Marx and Engels in German in December 1847 to January 1848, and originally printed in London in 1848. The English version of 1888, reproduced here, was translated by S. Moore and edited by Engels.—Ed.

² For further details see Engels, *The History of the Communist League*, in Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1936.—Ed.

³ The February Revolution in France, 1848.—Ed.

⁴ The insurrection of the Paris workers. See Marx's *The Class Struggles in France*, 1848-50, in Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1936.—Ed.

⁵ The passage from here to the last sentence ("right to alter") is given in Engels' version as cited in his preface to the 1888 English edition.—Ed.

there some detail might be improved. The practical application of the principles will depend, as the *Manifesto* itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of modern industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organization of the working class,¹ in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this program has in some details become antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, *viz.*, that "the working-class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes." (See *The Civil War in France; Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association*, London, Truelove, 1871, p. 15, where this point is further developed.)² Further, it is self-evident, that the criticism of socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also, that the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV), although in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties there enumerated.

But then, the *Manifesto* has become an historical document which we have no longer any right to alter. A subsequent edition may perhaps appear with an introduction bridging the gap from 1847 to the present day; but this reprint was too unexpected to leave us time for that.

Karl Marx Frederick Engels

London, June 24, 1872

¹ The German text reads "and of the Party organization of the working class that is progressing together with it."—*Ed.*

² See Volume II, 1936 edition, *op. cit.*, Lenin in *The State and Revolution* (1917) says: "Thus, Marx and Engels regarded one of the principal and fundamental lessons of the Paris Commune as being of such momentous importance that they introduced it as a vital correction into *The Communist Manifesto*. ... And it is precisely this lesson that has been not only completely forgotten, but positively distorted, in the prevailing Kautskyan 'interpretation' of Marxism." (Lenin, *Selected Works*, Two-Vol. ed., pp. 165 and 166.)—*Ed.*

PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION OF 1882¹

The first Russian edition of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, translated by Bakunin, was published early in the 'sixties by the printing office of the *Kolokol*. Then the West could see in it (the Russian edition of the *Manifesto*) only a literary curiosity. Such a view would be impossible today.

What a limited field the proletarian movement still occupied at that time (December 1847) is most clearly shown by the last section of the *Manifesto*: the position of the Communists in relation of the various opposition parties in the various countries. Precisely Russia and the United States are missing here. It was the time when Russia constituted the last great reserve of all European reaction, when the United States absorbed the surplus proletarian forces of Europe through immigration. Both countries provided Europe with raw materials and were at the same time markets for the sale of its industrial products. Both were therefore, in one way or another, pillars of the existing European order.

How very different today! Precisely European immigration fitted North America for a gigantic agricultural production, whose competition is shaking the very foundations of European landed property—large and small. In addition it enabled the United States to exploit its tremendous industrial resources with an energy and on a scale that must shortly break the industrial monopoly of Western Europe, and especially of England, existing up to now. Both circumstances react in revolutionary manner upon America itself. Step by step the small and middle land ownership of the farmers, the basis of the whole political constitution, is succumbing to the competition of giant farms; at the same time a mass proletariat and a fabulous concentration of capital funds are developing for the first time in the industrial regions.

And now Russia! During the Revolution of 1848-49 not only the European princes, but the European bourgeois as well, found their only salvation from the proletariat, just beginning to awaken, in Russian intervention. The tsar was proclaimed the chief of European reaction. Today he is a prisoner of war of the revolution, in Gatchina, and Russia forms the vanguard of revolutionary action in Europe.

¹ Translated from the German original written by Marx and Engels. See Preface to the German edition of 1890, second paragraph.—Ed.

The Communist Manifesto had as its object the proclamation of the inevitably impending dissolution of modern bourgeois property. But in Russia we find, face to face with the rapidly developing capitalist swindle and bourgeois property, just beginning to develop, more than half the land owned in common by the peasants. Now the question is: can the Russian *obshchina*,¹ though greatly undermined, yet a form of the primeval common ownership of land, pass directly to the higher form of communist common ownership? Or on the contrary, must it first pass through the same process of dissolution as constitutes the historical evolution of the West?

The only answer to that possible today is this: If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development.

Karl Marx Frederick Engels

London, January 21, 1882

PREFACE TO THE GERMAN EDITION OF 1883

The preface to the present edition I must, alas, sign alone. Marx, the man to whom the whole working class of Europe and America owes more than to any one else—rests at Highgate Cemetery and over his grave the first grass is already growing.² Since his death, there can be even less thought of revising or supplementing the *Manifesto*. But I consider it all the more necessary again to state here the following expressly:

The basic thought running through the *Manifesto*—that economic production and the structure of society of every historical epoch necessarily arising therefrom constitute the foundation for the political and intellectual history of that epoch; that consequently (ever since the dissolution of the primeval communal ownership of land) all history has been a history of class struggles, of struggles between exploited and exploiting, between dominated and dominating classes at various stages of social evolution; that this struggle, however, has now reached a stage where the exploit-

¹ *Obshchina*: Peasant community.—Ed.

² Marx died in London on March 14, 1883.—Ed.

ed and oppressed class (the proletariat) can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and oppresses it (the bourgeoisie), without at the same time forever freeing the whole of society from exploitation, oppression and class struggles—this basic thought belongs solely and exclusively to Marx.¹

I have already stated this many times; but precisely now is it necessary that it also stand in front of the *Manifesto* itself.

F. Engels

London, June 28, 1883

FROM THE PREFACE TO THE GERMAN EDITION OF 1890

Since the above was written,² a new German edition of the *Manifesto* has again become necessary, and much has also happened to the *Manifesto* which should be recorded here.

A second Russian translation—by Vera Zasulich³—appeared at Geneva in 1882; the preface to that edition was written by Marx and myself. Unfortunately, the original German manuscript has gone astray; I must therefore retranslate from the Russian, which will in no way improve the text. It reads:⁴

[The text is given on pp. 99-100 of this volume. — Ed.]

At about the same date, a new Polish version appeared in Geneva: *Manifest Komunistyczny*.

Furthermore, a new Danish translation has appeared in the *Socialdemokratisk Bibliothek*, Copenhagen 1885. Unfortunately it is not quite complete; certain essential passages, which seem to have presented difficulties of the translator, have been omitted, and in addition there are signs of carelessness here and there, which are all the more unpleasantly conspicuous since the trans-

¹ "This proposition," I wrote in the preface to the English translation, "which, in my opinion, is destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology, we, both of us, had been gradually approaching for some years before 1845. How far I had independently progressed towards it, is best shown by my *Condition of the Working Class in England*. But when I again met Marx at Brussels in spring, 1845, he had it already worked out, and put it before me, in terms almost as clear as those in which I have stated it here." [Note by F. Engels.]

² Engels is referring to his preface to the German edition of 1833.

³ See note 3, p. 106 of this volume.—Ed.

⁴ The original MS., which Engels said had "gone astray," was found again and is now in the archives of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow.—Ed.

lation indicates that had the translator taken a little more pains he would have done an excellent piece of work.

A new French version appeared in 1886 in *Le Socialiste* of Paris; it is the best published to date.

From this latter a Spanish version was published the same year in *El Socialista* of Madrid, and then re-issued in pamphlet form: *Manifiesto del Partido Comunista* por Carlos Marx y F. Engels, Madrid, Administración de *El Socialista*, Hernán Cortés 8.

As a matter of curiosity I may mention that in 1887 the manuscript of an Armenian translation was offered to a publisher in Constantinople. But the good man did not have the courage to publish something bearing the name of Marx and suggested that the translator set down his own name as author, which the latter, however, declined.

After one and then another of the more or less inaccurate American translations had been repeatedly reprinted in England, an authentic version at last appeared in 1888. This was by my friend Samuel Moore, and we went through it together once more before it was sent to press. It is entitled: *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Authorized English translation, edited and annotated by Frederick Engels, 1888, London, William Reeves, 185 Fleet Street, E. C. I have added some of the notes of that edition to the present one.

The *Manifesto* has had a history of its own. Greeted with enthusiasm, at the time of its appearance, by the not at all numerous vanguard of scientific Socialism (as is proved by the translations mentioned in the first preface), it was soon forced into the background by the reaction that began with the defeat of the Paris workers in June 1848, and was finally excommunicated "by law" in the conviction of the Cologne Communists in November 1852.¹ With the disappearance from the public scene of the workers' movement that had begun with the February Revolution, the *Manifesto* too passed into the background.

When the European workers had again gathered sufficient strength for a new onslaught upon the power of the ruling classes, the International Working Men's Association came into being. Its aim was to weld together into *one* huge army the whole militant working class of Europe and America. Therefore it could

¹ This refers to the trial of the members of the Communist League in Cologne. (See *The History of the Communist League* in Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1936.)—Ed.

not *set out* from the principles laid down in the *Manifesto*. It was bound to have a program which would not shut the door on the English trades unions, the French, Belgian, Italian and Spanish Proudhonists and the German Lassalleans.¹ This program—the considerations underlying the statutes of the International—was drawn up by Marx with a master hand acknowledged even by Bakunin and the Anarchists. For the ultimate triumph of the ideas set forth in the *Manifesto* Marx relied solely upon the intellectual development of the working class, as it necessarily had to ensue from united action and discussion. The events and vicissitudes in the struggle against capital, the defeats even more than the successes, could not but demonstrate to the fighters the inadequacy of their former universal panaceas and make their minds more receptive to a thorough understanding of the true conditions for working class emancipation. And Marx was right. The working class of 1874, at the dissolution of the International, was altogether different from that of 1864, at its foundation. Proudhonism in the Latin countries and the specific Lassalleanism in Germany were dying out, and even the then arch-conservative English trades unions were gradually approaching the point where in 1887 the chairman of their Swansea Congress could say in their name: “Continental Socialism has lost its terrors for us.” Yet by 1887 Continental Socialism was almost exclusively the theory heralded in the *Manifesto*. Thus, to a certain extent, the history of the *Manifesto* reflects the history of the modern working-class movement since 1848. At present it is doubtless the most widely circulated, the most international product of all Socialist literature, the common program of many millions of workers of all countries from Siberia to California.

Nevertheless, when it appeared we could not have called it a *Socialist Manifesto*. In 1847 two kinds of people were considered Socialists. On the one hand were the adherents of the various utopian systems, notably the Owenites in England and the Fourierists in France, both of whom at that date had already dwindled to mere sects gradually dying out. On the other, the manifold types of social quacks who wanted to eliminate social abuses

¹ Lassalle personally, to us, always acknowledged himself to be a “disciple” of Marx, and, as such, stood on the ground of the *Manifesto*. Matters were quite different with regard to those of his followers who did not go beyond his demand for producers’ co-operatives supported by state credits and who divided the whole working class into supporters of state assistance and supporters of self-assistance. [Note by F. Engels.]

through their various universal panaceas and all kinds of patch-work, without hurting capital and profit in the least. In both cases, people who stood outside the labour movement and who looked for support rather to the "educated" classes. The section of the working class, however, which demanded a radical reconstruction of society, convinced that mere political revolutions were not enough, then called itself *Communist*. It was still a rough-hewn, only instinctive, and frequently somewhat crude Communism. Yet it was powerful enough to bring into being two systems of utopian Communism—in France the "Icarian" Communism of Cabet, and in Germany that of Weitling. Socialism in 1847 signified a bourgeois movement, Communism a working-class movement. Socialism was, on the Continent at least, quite respectable, whereas Communism was the very opposite. And since we were very decidedly of the opinion as early as then that "the emancipation of the workers must be the act of the working class itself," we could have no hesitation as to which of the two names we should choose. Nor has it ever occurred to us to repudiate it.

"Working men of all countries, unite!" But few voices responded when we proclaimed these words to the world forty-two years ago, on the eve of the first Paris Revolution, in which the proletariat came out with demands of its own. On September 28, 1864, however, the proletarians of most of the Western European countries joined hands in the International Working Men's Association of glorious memory. True, the International itself lived only nine years. But that the eternal union of the proletarians of all countries created by it is still alive and lives stronger than ever, there is no better witness than this day. Because to-day, as I write these lines, the European and American proletariat is reviewing its fighting forces, mobilized for the first time, mobilized as *one* army, under *one* flag, for *one* immediate aim: the standard eight-hour working day to be established by legal enactment, as proclaimed by the Geneva Congress of the International in 1866, and again by the Paris Workers' Congress in 1889. And today's spectacle will open the eyes of the capitalists and landlords of all countries to the fact that to-day the workingmen of all countries are united indeed.

If only Marx were still by my side to see this with his own eyes!

F. Engels

London, May 1, 1890

PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION OF 1888¹

The *Manifesto* was published as the platform of the "Communist League," a workingmen's association, first exclusively German, later on international, and, under the political conditions of the Continent before 1848, unavoidably a secret society. At a Congress of the League, held in London in November 1847, Marx and Engels were commissioned to prepare for publication a complete theoretical and practical party program. Drawn up in German, in January 1848, the manuscript was sent to the printer in London a few weeks before the French Revolution of February 24th. A French translation was brought out in Paris, shortly before the insurrection of June 1848. The first English translation, by Miss Helen Macfarlane, appeared in George Julian Harney's *Red Republican*, London, 1850. A Danish and a Polish edition had also been published.

The defeat of the Parisian insurrection of June 1848—the first great battle between proletariat and bourgeoisie—drove again into the background, for a time, the social and political aspirations of the European working class. Thenceforth, the struggle for supremacy was again, as it had been before the revolution of February, solely between different sections of the propertied class; the working class was reduced to a fight for political elbow-room, and to the position of extreme wing of the middle-class Radicals. Wherever independent proletarian movements continued to show signs of life, they were ruthlessly hunted down. Thus the Prussian police hunted out the Central Board of the Communist League, then located in Cologne. The members were arrested, and, after eighteen months' imprisonment, they were tried in October 1852. This celebrated "Cologne Communist Trial" lasted from October 4 till November 12; seven of the prisoners were sentenced to terms of imprisonment in a fortress, varying from three to six years. Immediately after the sentence, the League was formally dissolved by the remaining members. As to the *Manifesto*, it seemed thenceforth to be doomed to oblivion.

When the European working class had recovered sufficient strength for another attack on the ruling classes, the International Working Men's Association sprang up. But this association, formed with the express aim of welding into one body the whole militant proletariat of Europe and America, could not at once proclaim the principles laid down in the *Manifesto*. The Interna-

¹ Written by Engels in *English*.—Ed.

tional was bound to have a program broad enough to be acceptable to the English trades unions, to the followers of Proudhon in France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain, and to the Lassalleans¹ in Germany. Marx, who drew up this program² to the satisfaction of all parties, entirely trusted to the intellectual development of the working class, which was sure to result from combined action and mutual discussion. The very events and vicissitudes of the struggle against capital, the defeats even more than the victories, could not help bringing home to men's minds the insufficiency of their various favourite nostrums, and preparing the way for a more complete insight into the true conditions of working-class emancipation. And Marx was right. The International, on its breaking up in 1874, left the workers quite different men from what it had found them in 1864. Proudhonism in France, Lassalleanism in Germany, were dying out, and even the conservative English trades unions, though most of them had long since severed their connection with the International, were gradually advancing towards that point at which, last year at Swansea, their President could say in their name: "Continental Socialism has lost its terrors for us." In fact, the principles of the *Manifesto* had made considerable headway among the working men of all countries.

The *Manifesto* itself thus came to the front again. The German text had been, since 1850, reprinted several times in Switzerland, England and America. In 1872, it was translated into English in New York, where the translation was published in *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly*. From this English version, a French one was made in *Le Socialiste* of New York. Since then at least two more English translations, more or less mutilated, have been brought out in America, and one of them has been reprinted in England. The first Russian translation, made by Bakunin, was published at Herzen's *Kolokol* office in Geneva, about 1863; a second one, by the heroic Vera Zasulich,³ also in

¹ Lassalle personally, to us, always acknowledged himself to be a disciple of Marx, and, as such, stood on the ground of the *Manifesto*. But in his public agitation, 1862-64, he did not go beyond demanding co-operative workshops supported by state credit. [Note by F. Engels.]

² For this program see the *Inaugural Address* and the *Rules of the Working Men's International Association* in Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1936.—Ed.

³ In the Postscript to the article "Social Relations in Russia," published in *Internationales aus dem Volksstaat* (1871-75), Berlin 1894, Engels refers to this translation as Plekhanov's. Plekhanov himself also asserts, in the 1890 Russian edition of the *Manifesto*, that the 1882 translation was done by him.—Ed.

Geneva, 1882. A new Danish edition is to be found in *Socialdemokratisk Bibliothek*, Copenhagen 1885; a fresh French translation in *Le Socialiste*, Paris 1886. From this latter, a Spanish version was prepared and published in Madrid 1886. The German reprints are not to be counted, there have been twelve altogether at the least. An Armenian translation, which was to be published in Constantinople some months ago, did not see the light, I am told, because the publisher was afraid of bringing out a book with the name of Marx on it, while the translator declined to call it his own production. Of further translations into other languages I have heard, but have not seen them. Thus the history of the *Manifesto* reflects, to a great extent, the history of the modern working-class movement; at present it is undoubtedly the most widespread, the most international production of all Socialist literature, the common platform acknowledged by millions of working men from Siberia to California.

Yet, when it was written, we could not have called it a *Socialist* manifesto. By Socialists, in 1847, were understood, on the one hand, the adherents of the various Utopian systems: Owenites in England, Fourierists in France, both of them already reduced to the position of mere sects, and gradually dying out; on the other hand, the most multifarious social quacks, who, by all manners of tinkering, professed to redress, without any danger to capital and profit, all sorts of social grievances, in both cases men outside the working-class movement, and looking rather to the "educated" classes for support. Whatever portion of the working class had become convinced of the insufficiency of mere political revolutions, and had proclaimed the necessity of a total social change, that portion, then, called itself Communist. It was a crude, rough-hewn, purely instinctive sort of Communism; still, it touched the cardinal point and was powerful enough amongst the working class to produce the Utopian Communism, in France, of Cabet, and in Germany, of Weitling. Thus, Socialism was, in 1847, a middle-class movement, Communism a working-class movement. Socialism was, on the continent at least, "respectable"; Communism was the very opposite. And as our notion, from the very beginning, was that "the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself," there could be no doubt as to which of the two names we must take. Moreover, we have, ever since, been far from repudiating it.

The *Manifesto* being our joint production, I consider myself bound to state that the fundamental proposition, which forms

its nucleus, belongs to Marx. That proposition is: that in every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch; that consequently the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution of primitive tribal society, holding land in common ownership) has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes; that the history of these class struggles forms a series of evolutions in which, nowadays, a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class—the proletariat—cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class—the bourgeoisie—without, at the same time, and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class distinctions and class struggles.

This proposition, which, in my opinion, is destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology, we, both of us, had been gradually approaching for some years before 1845. How far I had independently progressed towards it, is best shown by my *Condition of the Working Class in England*.¹ But when I again met Marx at Brussels, in spring, 1845, he had it already worked out, and put it before me, in terms almost as clear as those in which I have stated it here.

From our joint preface to the German edition of 1872, I quote the following:—

"However much the state of things may have altered during the last twenty-five years, the general principles laid down in this *Manifesto* are, on the whole, as correct today as ever. Here and there some detail might be improved. The practical application of the principles will depend, as the *Manifesto* itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded to-day. In view of the gigantic strides of modern industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organization of the working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in

¹ *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*. By Frederick Engels. Translated by Florence K. Wischniewetzky, New York, Lovell—London, W. Reeves, 1888. [Note by F. Engels.]

the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this program has in some details become antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, *viz.*, that 'the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.' (See *The Civil War in France; Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association*, London, Truelove, 1871, p. 15, where this point is further developed.) Further, it is self-evident that the criticism of Socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also, that the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV), although in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties there enumerated.

"But then, the *Manifesto* has become a historical document which we have no longer any right to alter."

The present translation is by Mr. Samuel Moore, the translator of the greater portion of Marx's *Capital*. We have revised it in common, and I have added a few notes explanatory of historical allusions.

Frederick Engels

London, January 30, 1888.

MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals¹ and German police-spies.

Where is the party in the opposition that has not been decried as Communistic by its opponents in power? Where is the opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of Communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?

Two things result from this fact:

I. Communism is already acknowledged by all European powers to be itself a power.

II. It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the spectre of Communism with a manifesto of the party itself.

To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London, and sketched the following manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.

I

BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIANS²

The history of all hitherto existing society³ is the history of class struggles.

¹ The bourgeois-republicans of the time. Prominent writers and politicians, who fought socialism and communism, such as Marrast, were among their adherents.—*Ed.*

² By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage labour. By proletariat, the class of modern wage labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live. [*Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

³ That is, all *written* history. In 1847, the pre-history of society, the social organization existing previous to recorded history, was all but unknown. Since

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian,¹ lord and serf, guild-master² and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.

The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.

Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: It has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat.

From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang the chartered burghers of the earliest towns. From these burgesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie were developed.

The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonization of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an im-

then Haxthausen discovered common ownership of land in Russia, Maurer proved it to be the social foundation from which all Teutonic races started in history, and, by and by, village communities were found to be, or to have been, the primitive form of society everywhere from India to Ireland. The inner organization of this primitive Communistic society was laid bare, in its typical form, by Morgan's crowning discovery of the true nature of the *gens* and its relation to the *tribe*. With the dissolution of these primeval communities society begins to be differentiated into separate and finally antagonistic classes. I have attempted to retrace this process of dissolution in *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats* [The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State], 2nd edition, Stuttgart 1886. [Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.]

¹ For details of the classes in Rome, see Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*.—Ed.

² Guild-master, that is, a full member of a guild, a master within, not a head of a guild. [Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.]

pulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development.

The feudal system of industry, under which industrial production was monopolized by closed guilds, now no longer sufficed for the growing wants of the new markets. The manufacturing system took its place. The guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle class; division of labour between the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of division of labour in each single workshop.

Meantime the markets kept ever growing, the demand ever rising. Even manufacture no longer sufficed. Thereupon, steam and machinery revolutionized industrial production. The place of manufacture was taken by the giant, modern industry, the place of the industrial middle class, by industrial millionaires, the leaders of whole industrial armies, the modern bourgeois.

Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages.

We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange.

Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class.¹ An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing association in the mediæval commune;² here independent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany),³ there taxable "third estate" of the monarchy (as in France);⁴ afterwards,

¹ "Of that class" is not in the German text.—*Ed.*

² "Commune" was the name taken, in France, by the nascent towns even before they had conquered from their feudal lords and masters local self-government and political rights as the "Third Estate." Generally speaking, for the economical development of the bourgeoisie, England is here taken as the typical country, for its political development, France. [*Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

This was the name given their urban communities by the townsmen of Italy and France, after they had purchased or conquered their initial rights of self-government from their feudal lords. [*Note by F. Engels to the German edition of 1890.*]

³ and ⁴ The words in parentheses are not in the German text.—*Ed.*

in the period of manufacture proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility, and, in fact, corner-stone of the great monarchies in general, the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of modern industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative state, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless infeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers.

The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.

The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of vigour in the Middle Ages, which reactionaries so much admire, found its fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former exoduses of nations and crusades.

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial

classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of reactionaries, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures there arises a world literature.

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, *i.e.*, to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities; has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.

The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralized means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralization. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class interest, one frontier and one customs tariff.

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?

We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organization of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.

Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economical and political sway of the bourgeois class.

A similar movement is going on before our own eyes. Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of productions and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who

is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on its trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity—the epidemic of over-production. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation, had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed. And why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented.

The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.

But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons—the modern working class—the proletarians.

In proportion as the bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class, developed—a class of labourers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labour increases capital. These labourers, who must sell themselves piece-

meal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.

Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack that is required of him. Hence, the cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he requires for his maintenance, and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a commodity, and therefore also of 'labour',¹ is equal to its cost of production. In proportion, therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage decreases. Nay more, in proportion as the use of machinery and division of labour increases, in the same proportion the burden of toil also increases, whether by prolongation of the working hours, by increase of the work exacted in a given time, or by increased speed of the machinery, etc.

Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organized like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois state; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overseer, and above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.

The less the skill and exertion of strength implied in manual labour, in other words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the labour of men superseded by that of women. Differences of age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are instruments of labour, more or less expensive to use, according to their age and sex.

No sooner is the exploitation of the labourer by the manufacturer so far at an end that he receives his wages in cash, than he is sat upon by the other portions of the bourgeoisie, the landlord, the shopkeeper, the pawnbroker, etc.

¹ Subsequently Marx pointed out that the worker does not sell his labour but his labour power. See in this connection Engels' Introduction to Marx's *Wage Labour and Capital*, 1891, pp. 191-99 of this volume.—Ed.

The lower strata of the middle class—the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen¹ generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants—all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which modern industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialized skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production. Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.

The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual labourers, then by the workpeople of a factory, then by the operatives of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploits them. They direct their attacks, not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labour; they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages.

At this stage the labourers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition. If anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the consequence of their own active union, but of the union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in order to attain its own political ends, is compelled to set the whole proletariat in motion, and is moreover yet, for a time, able to do so. At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie. Thus the whole historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.

But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalized, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labour, and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level. The growing competition among the bourgeois, and the resulting commercial crises, make the

¹ *Rentiers* in the German original.—*Ed.*

wages of the workers ever more fluctuating. The unceasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more and more precarious; the collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations (trades unions) against the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there the contest breaks out into riots.

Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years.

This organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself. Thus the ten-hours' bill in England was carried.

Altogether, collisions between the classes of the old society further, in many ways, the course of development of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a constant battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on, with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself whose interests have become antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all times, with the bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all these battles it sees itself compelled to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for its help, and thus, to drag it into the political arena. The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat with its own elements of political and general¹ education, in other words, it furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie.

¹ "Political and general" are not in the German text.—Ed.

Further, as we have already seen, entire sections of the ruling classes are, by the advance of industry, precipitated into the proletariat, or are at least threatened in their conditions of existence. These also supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress.¹

Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.

Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.

The lower middle class: the small manufacturer, the shop-keeper, the artisan, the peasant—all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus defend not their present, but their future interests; they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat.

The "dangerous class," the social scum,² that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.

In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already virtually swamped. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois family relations; mod-

¹ The German text has "education" instead of "enlightenment and progress."—*Ed.*

² In the German—*Lumpenproletariat*.—*Ed.*

ern industrial labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.

All the preceding classes that got the upper hand sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation. They have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.

All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air.

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.

In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.

Hitherto, every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under the yoke of feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern labourer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its condi-

tions of existence upon society as an overriding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.

The essential condition for the existence and for the sway of the bourgeois class is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage labour. Wage labour rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, is its own gravediggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

II

PROLETARIANS AND COMMUNISTS

In what relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians as a whole?

The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties.

They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.

They do not set up any sectarian¹ principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement.

The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.

The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class

¹ The German has "special" instead of "sectarian."—Ed.

parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.

The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all the other proletarian parties: Formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat.

The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer.

They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes. The abolition of existing property relations is not at all a distinctive feature of Communism.

All property relations in the past have continually been subject to historical change consequent upon the change in historical conditions.

The French revolution, for example, abolished feudal property in favour of bourgeois property.¹

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few.

In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.

We Communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man's own labour, which property is alleged to be the ground-work of all personal freedom, activity and independence.

Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property! Do you mean the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it daily.

Or do you mean modern bourgeois private property?

¹ This refers to the Great French Bourgeois Revolution of 1789.—Ed.

But does wage labour create any property for the labourer? Not a bit. It creates capital, *i.e.*, that kind of property which exploits wage labour, and which cannot increase except upon condition of begetting a new supply of wage labour for fresh exploitation. Property, in its present form, is based on the antagonism of capital and wage labour. Let us examine both sides of this antagonism.

To be a capitalist is to have not only a purely personal, but a social, *status* in production. Capital is a collective product, and only by the united action of many members, nay, in the last resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion.

Capital is therefore not a personal, it is a social power.

When, therefore, capital is converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby transformed into social property. It is only the social character of the property that is changed. It loses its class character.

Let us now take wage labour.

The average price of wage labour is the minimum wage, *i.e.*, that quantum of the means of subsistence which is absolutely requisite to keep the labourer in bare existence as a labourer. What, therefore, the wage labourer appropriates by means of his labour merely suffices to prolong and reproduce a bare existence. We by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the products of labour, an appropriation that is made for the maintenance and reproduction of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to command the labour of others. All that we want to do away with is the miserable character of this appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so far as the interest of the ruling class requires it.

In bourgeois society, living labour is but a means to increase accumulated labour. In Communist society, accumulated labour is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer.

In bourgeois society, therefore, the past dominates the present; in Communist society, the present dominates the past. In bourgeois society capital is independent* and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality.

And the abolition of this state of things is called by the bourgeois abolition of individuality and freedom! And rightly so. The

abolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois freedom is undoubtedly aimed at.

By freedom is meant, under the present bourgeois conditions of production, free trade, free selling and buying.

But if selling and buying disappears, free selling and buying disappears also. This talk about free selling and buying, and all the other "brave words" of our bourgeoisie about freedom in general, have a meaning, if any, only in contrast with restricted selling and buying, with the fettered traders of the Middle Ages, but have no meaning when opposed to the Communistic abolition of buying and selling, of the bourgeois conditions of production, and of the bourgeoisie itself.

You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society.

In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend.

From the moment when labour can no longer be converted into capital, money, or rent, into a social power capable of being monopolized, i.e., from the moment when individual property can no longer be transformed into bourgeois property, into capital, from that moment, you say, individuality vanishes.

You must, therefore, confess that by "individual" you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property. This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and made impossible.

Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriation.

It has been objected that upon the abolition of private property all work will cease, and universal laziness will overtake us.

According to this, bourgeois society ought long ago to have gone to the dogs through sheer idleness; for those of its members who work acquire nothing, and those who acquire anything do not work. The whole of this objection is but another expression of the tautology: There can no longer be any wage labour when there is no longer any capital.

All objections urged against the Communistic mode of producing and appropriating material products, have, in the same way, been urged against the Communistic modes of producing and appropriating intellectual products. Just as, to the bourgeois, the disappearance of class property is the disappearance of production itself, so the disappearance of class culture is to him identical with the disappearance of all culture.

That culture, the loss of which he laments, is, for the enormous majority, a mere training to act as a machine.

But don't wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois property, the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom, culture, law, etc. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence of your class.

The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property—historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production—this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property,¹ what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.

Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.

On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.

The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital.

Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? To this crime we plead guilty.

But, you will say, we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we replace home education by social.

¹ Property in the ancient world (Greece, Rome), based on the exploitation of slave labour.—Ed.

And your education! Is not that also social, and determined by the social conditions under which you educate, by the intervention, direct or indirect, of society, by means of schools, etc.? The Communists have not invented the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the character of that intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class.

The bourgeois claptrap about the family and education, about the hallowed correlation of parent and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of modern industry, all family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour.

But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams the whole bourgeoisie in chorus.

The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion than that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women.

He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production.

For the rest, nothing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of our bourgeois at the community of women which, they pretend, is to be openly and officially established by the Communists. The Communists have no need to introduce community of women; it has existed almost from time immemorial.

Our bourgeois, not content with having the wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each other's wives.

Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the Communists might possibly be reproached with is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalized community of women. For the rest, it is self-evident that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from that system, *i.e.*, of prostitution, both public and private.

The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality.

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilized countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.

The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical, and, generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination.

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views, and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?

What else does the history of ideas prove than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.

When people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the fact that within the old society the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.

When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the eighteenth century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death battle with the then revolutionary bourgeoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.

"Undoubtedly," it will be said, "religious, moral, philosophical and juridical ideas have been modified in the course of historical development. But religion, morality, philosophy, political science, and law constantly survived this change."

"There are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of society. But Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience."

What does this accusation reduce itself to? The history of all past society has consisted in the development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs.

But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past ages, *viz.*, the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms.

The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas.

But let us have done with the bourgeois objections to Communism.

We have seen above that the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state, *i.e.*, of the proletariat organized as the ruling class,¹ and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.

Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production.

¹ Lenin makes the following emphatic comment on this passage of *The Communist Manifesto*: "The state, *i.e.*, the proletariat organized as the ruling

These measures will of course be different in different countries.

Nevertheless in the most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable.¹

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the state.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal liability of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of the population over the country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc.

class, is precisely the dictatorship of the proletariat." (*Marxism on the State*.) On the basis of the experience of the 1848 Revolution, Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* developed and made more specific the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Here he says that the proletariat cannot simply take possession of the bourgeois state machinery, but must "smash," must "destroy" it (See Vol. II of the 1936 edition.) Furthermore, on the basis of the experience of the Paris Commune (see *The Civil War in France*, 1871, also in Volume II), Marx gives a characterization of the machinery of state (the state of the Commune type), with which the proletariat will replace the oppressive bourgeois state machinery destroyed by it. (See also Lenin, *The State and Revolution*.)—Ed.

¹ In the *Grundsätze des Kommunismus* [*Principles of Communism*], which served as an outline for the *Manifesto*, Engels set forth this program in twelve demands. As early as 1926, at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Stalin pointed out that "nine-tenths of this program has already been realized by our revolution." With the completion of the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. this whole program has not only been fulfilled but overfulfilled. The socialist state, the fundamental principles of which are unshakeable and have been recorded in the Stalin Constitution of 1936, has proved its strength during the course of the Great Patriotic War against the German fascist invaders.—Ed.

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class; if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

III

SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST LITERATURE

1. REACTIONARY SOCIALISM

a. Feudal Socialism

Owing to their historical position, it became the vocation of the aristocracies of France and England to write pamphlets against modern bourgeois society. In the French Revolution of July 1830, and in the English reform agitation, these aristocracies again succumbed to the hateful upstart.¹ Thenceforth, a serious political contest was altogether out of the question. A literary battle alone remained possible. But even in the domain of literature the old cries of the restoration period² had become impossible.

¹ The *July Revolution* (1830) in France overthrew the rule of the landed aristocracy and transferred power to the high finance section of the bourgeoisie, forming the July monarchy, the incumbent of the throne being Louis Philippe of the House of Orleans.

The Parliamentary Reform Movement in England achieved, in 1832, a considerable extension of the franchise of the trading and industrial bourgeoisie.—*Ed.*

² Not the English Restoration, 1660 to 1689, but the French Restoration, 1814 to 1830. [*Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

In order to arouse sympathy, the aristocracy were obliged to lose sight, apparently, of their own interests, and to formulate their indictment against the bourgeoisie in the interest of the exploited working class alone. Thus the aristocracy took their revenge by singing lampoons on their new master; and whispering in his ears sinister prophecies of coming catastrophe.

In this way arose feudal Socialism: half lamentation, half lampoon; half echo of the past, half menace of the future; at times, by its bitter, witty and incisive criticism, striking the bourgeoisie to the very heart's core, but always ludicrous in its effect, through total incapacity to comprehend the march of modern history.

The aristocracy, in order to rally the people to them, waved the proletarian alms-bag in front for a banner. But the people, so often as it joined them, saw on their hindquarters the old feudal coats of arms and deserted with loud and irreverent laughter.

One section of the French Legitimists¹ and "Young England"² exhibited this spectacle.

In pointing out that their mode of exploitation was different to that of the bourgeoisie, the feudalists forget that they exploited under circumstances and conditions that were quite different, and that are now antiquated. In showing that, under their rule, the modern proletariat never existed, they forget that the modern bourgeoisie is the necessary offspring of their own form of society.

For the rest, so little do they conceal the reactionary character of their criticism that their chief accusation against the bourgeoisie amounts to this, that under the bourgeois *régime* a class is being developed which is destined to cut up root and branch the old order of society.

What they upbraid the bourgeoisie with is not so much that it creates a proletariat, as that it creates a *revolutionary* proletariat.

In political practice, therefore, they join in all coercive measures against the working class, and in ordinary life, despite their

¹ *The Legitimists*: The most reactionary of the monarchist parties in France—were the party of the noble landowners, adherents of the "legitimate" Bourbon dynasty.—*Ed.*

² *"Young England"*: A group of British Conservatives which appeared in public in the early eighteen-forties.—*Ed.*

high-falutin phrases, they stoop to pick up the golden apples dropped from the tree of industry,¹ and to barter truth, love, and honour for traffic in wool, beetroot-sugar, and potato spirits.²

As the parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord, so has Clerical Socialism with Feudal Socialism.

Nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a Socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaimed against private property, against marriage, against the state? Has it not preached in the place of these, charity and poverty, celibacy and mortification of the flesh, monastic life and Mother Church? Christian Socialism is but the holy water with which the priest consecrates the heartburnings of the aristocrat.

b. Petty-Bourgeois Socialism

The feudal aristocracy was not the only class that was ruined by the bourgeoisie, not the only class whose conditions of existence pined and perished in the atmosphere of modern bourgeois society. The mediæval burgesses and the small peasant proprietors were the precursors of the modern bourgeoisie. In those countries which are but little developed, industrially and commercially, these two classes still vegetate side by side with the rising bourgeoisie.

In countries where modern civilization has become fully developed, a new class of petty bourgeois has been formed, fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society. The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced, in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.

In countries like France, where the peasants constitute far more than half of the population, it was natural that writers

¹ "Dropped from the tree of industry" was added in the English text.—Ed.

² This applies chiefly to Germany where the landed aristocracy and squirearchy have large portions of their estates cultivated for their own account by stewards, and are, moreover, extensive beetroot-sugar manufacturers and distillers of potato spirits. The wealthier British aristocracy are, as yet, rather above that; but they, too, know how to make up for declining rents by lending their names to floaters of more or less shady joint-stock companies. [Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.]

who sided with the proletariat against the bourgeoisie should use, in their criticism of the bourgeois *régime*, the standard of the peasant and petty bourgeois, and from the standpoint of these intermediate classes should take up the cudgels for the working class. Thus arose petty-bourgeois Socialism. Sismondi was the head of this school, not only in France but also in England.

This school of Socialism dissected with great acuteness the contradictions in the conditions of modern production. It laid bare the hypocritical apologies of economists. It proved, incontrovertibly, the disastrous effects of machinery and division of labour; the concentration of capital and land in a few hands; overproduction and crises; it pointed out the inevitable ruin of the petty bourgeois and peasant, the misery of the proletariat, the anarchy in production, the crying inequalities in the distribution of wealth, the industrial war of extermination between nations, the dissolution of old moral bonds, of the old family relations, of the old nationalities.

In its positive aims, however, this form of Socialism aspires either to restoring the old means of production and of exchange, and with them the old property relations, and the old society, or to cramping the modern means of production and of exchange within the framework of the old property relations that have been, and were bound to be, exploded by those means. In either case, it is both reactionary and utopian.

Its last words are: Corporate guilds for manufacture; patriarchal relations in agriculture.

Ultimately, when stubborn historical facts had dispersed all intoxicating effects of self-deception, this form of Socialism ended in a miserable fit of the blues.

c. German or "True" Socialism¹

The Socialist and Communist literature of France, a literature that originated under the pressure of a bourgeoisie in power, and that was the expression of the struggle against this power, was introduced into Germany at a time when the bourgeoisie, in that country, had just begun its contest with feudal absolutism.

German philosophers, would-be philosophers, and *beaux esprits* eagerly seized on this literature, only forgetting that when

¹ See Engels' article, *The History of the Communist League* in Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1936, p. 14, for the German or "True" Socialists.—Ed.

these writings immigrated from France into Germany, French social conditions had not immigrated along with them. In contact with German social conditions, this French literature lost all its immediate practical significance, and assumed a purely literary aspect. Thus, to the German philosophers of the eighteenth century, the demands of the first French Revolution were nothing more than the demands of "Practical Reason" in general, and the utterance of the will of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie signified in their eyes the laws of pure will, of will as it was bound to be, of true human will generally.

The work of the German *literati* consisted solely in bringing the new French ideas into harmony with their ancient philosophical conscience, or rather, in annexing the French ideas without deserting their own philosophic point of view.

This annexation took place in the same way in which a foreign language is appropriated, namely, by translation.

It is well known how the monks wrote silly lives of Catholic saints *over* the manuscripts on which the classical works of ancient heathendom had been written. The German *literati* reversed this process with the profane French literature. They wrote their philosophical nonsense beneath the French original. For instance, beneath the French criticism of the economic functions of money, they wrote "alienation of humanity," and beneath the French criticism of the bourgeois state, they wrote, "dethronement of the category of the general," and so forth.

The introduction of these philosophical phrases at the back of the French historical criticisms they dubbed "Philosophy of Action," "True Socialism," "German Science of Socialism," "Philosophical Foundation of Socialism," and so on.

The French Socialist and Communist literature was thus completely emasculated. And, since it ceased in the hands of the German to express the struggle of one class with the other, he felt conscious of having overcome "French one-sidedness" and of representing, not true requirements, but the requirements of truth; not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests of human nature, of man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, who exists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy.

This German Socialism, which took its school-boy task so seriously and solemnly, and extolled its poor stock-in-trade in such mountebank fashion, meanwhile gradually lost its pedantic innocence.

The fight of the German, and especially of the Prussian, bour-

geoisie against feudal aristocracy and absolute monarchy, in other words, the liberal movement, became more earnest.

By this, the long-wished-for opportunity was offered to "True" Socialism of confronting the political movement with the Socialist demands, of hurling the traditional anathemas against liberalism, against representative government, against bourgeois competition, bourgeois freedom of the press, bourgeois legislation, bourgeois liberty and equality, and of preaching to the masses that they had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by this bourgeois movement. German Socialism forgot, in the nick of time, that French criticism, whose silly echo it was, presupposed the existence of modern bourgeois society, with its corresponding economic conditions of existence, and the political constitution adapted thereto, the very things whose attainment was the object of the pending struggle in Germany.

To the absolute governments, with their following of parsons, professors, country squires and officials, it served as a welcome scarecrow against the threatening bourgeoisie.

It was a sweet finish after the bitter pills of floggings and bullets with which these same governments, just at that time, dosed the German working-class risings.

While this "True" Socialism thus served the governments as a weapon for fighting the German bourgeoisie, it, at the same time, directly represented a reactionary interest, the interest of the German Philistines. In Germany the *petty-bourgeois* class, a relic of the sixteenth century, and since then constantly cropping up again under various forms, is the real social basis of the existing state of things.

To preserve this class is to preserve the existing state of things in Germany. The industrial and political supremacy of the bourgeoisie threatens it with certain destruction—on the one hand, from the concentration of capital; on the other, from the rise of a revolutionary proletariat. "True" Socialism appeared to kill these two birds with one stone. It spread like an epidemic.

The robe of speculative cobwebs, embroidered with flowers of rhetoric, steeped in the dew of sickly sentiment, this transcendental robe in which the German Socialists wrapped their sorry "eternal truths," all skin and bone, served to wonderfully increase the sale of their goods amongst such a public.

And on its part, German Socialism recognized, more and more, its own calling as the bombastic representative of the petty-bourgeois Philistine.

It proclaimed the German nation to be the model nation, and the German petty Philistine to be the typical man. To every villainous meanness of this model man it gave a hidden, higher, Socialistic interpretation, the exact contrary of its real character. It went to the extreme length of directly opposing the "brutally destructive" tendency of Communism, and of proclaiming its supreme and impartial contempt of all class struggles. With very few exceptions, all the so-called Socialist and Communist publications that now (1847) circulate in Germany belong to the domain of this foul and enervating literature.¹

2. CONSERVATIVE OR BOURGEOIS SOCIALISM

A part of the bourgeoisie is desirous of redressing social grievances, in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society.

To this section belong economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the condition of the working class, organizers of charity, members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance fanatics, hole-and-corner reformers of every imaginable kind. This form of Socialism has, moreover, been worked out into complete systems.

We may cite Proudhon's *Philosophie de la Misère* as an example of this form.

The socialistic bourgeois want all the advantages of modern social conditions without the struggles and dangers necessarily resulting therefrom. They desire the existing state of society minus its revolutionary and disintegrating elements. They wish for a bourgeoisie without a proletariat. The bourgeoisie naturally conceives the world in which it is supreme to be the best; and bourgeois Socialism develops this comfortable conception into various more or less complete systems. In requiring the proletariat to carry out such a system, and thereby to march straightway into the social New Jerusalem, it but requires in reality that the proletariat should remain within the bounds of existing society, but should cast away all its hateful ideas concerning the bourgeoisie.

A second and more practical, but less systematic, form of this Socialism sought to depreciate every revolutionary movement

¹ The revolutionary storm of 1848 swept away this whole shabby tendency and cured its protagonists of the desire to dabble in Socialism. The chief representative and classical type of this tendency is Mr. Karl Grün. [Note by F. Engels to the German edition of 1890.]

in the eyes of the working class, by showing that no mere political reform, but only a change in the material conditions of existence, in economical relations, could be of any advantage to them. By changes in the material conditions of existence, this form of Socialism, however, by no means understands abolition of the bourgeois relations of production, an abolition that can be effected only by a revolution, but administrative reforms, based on the continued existence of these relations; reforms, therefore, that in no respect affect the relations between capital and labour, but, at the best, lessen the cost, and simplify the administrative work, of bourgeois government.

Bourgeois Socialism attains adequate expression when, and only when, it becomes a mere figure of speech.

Free trade: for the benefit of the working class. Protective duties: for the benefit of the working class. Prison reform: for the benefit of the working class. This is the last word and the only seriously meant word of bourgeois Socialism.

It is summed up in the phrase: the bourgeois is a bourgeois—for the benefit of the working class.

3. CRITICAL-UTOPIAN SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM

We do not here refer to that literature which, in every great modern revolution, has always given voice to the demands of the proletariat, such as the writings of Babeuf and others.

The first direct attempts of the proletariat to attain its own ends, made in times of universal excitement, when feudal society was being overthrown—these attempts necessarily failed, owing to the then undeveloped state of the proletariat, as well as to the absence of the economic conditions for its emancipation, conditions that had yet to be produced, and could be produced by the impending bourgeois epoch alone. The revolutionary literature that accompanied these first movements of the proletariat had necessarily a reactionary character. It inculcated universal asceticism and social levelling in its crudest form.

The Socialist and Communist systems properly so called, those of St. Simon, Fourier, Owen and others, spring into existence in the early undeveloped period, described above, of the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie (see Section I. Bourgeois and Proletarians).

The founders of these systems see, indeed, the class antagonisms, as well as the action of the decomposing elements in the

prevailing form of society. But the proletariat, as yet in its infancy, offers to them the spectacle of a class without any historical initiative or any independent political movement.

Since the development of class antagonism keeps even pace with the development of industry, the economic situation, as they find it, does not as yet offer to them the material conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. They therefore search after a new social science, after new social laws, that are to create these conditions.

Historical action is to yield to their personal inventive action; historically created conditions of emancipation to fantastic ones; and the gradual, spontaneous class organization of the proletariat to an organization of society specially contrived by these inventors. Future history resolves itself, in their eyes, into the propaganda and the practical carrying out of their social plans.

In the formation of their plans they are conscious of caring chiefly for the interests of the working class, as being the most suffering class. Only from the point of view of being the most suffering class does the proletariat exist for them.

The undeveloped state of the class struggle, as well as their own surroundings, causes Socialists of this kind to consider themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every member of society, even that of the most favoured. Hence, they habitually appeal to society at large, without distinction of class; nay, by preference, to the ruling class. For how can people, when once they understand their system, fail to see in it the best possible plan of the best possible state of society?

Hence, they reject all political, and especially all revolutionary, action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavour, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social gospel.

Such fantastic pictures of future society, painted at a time when the proletariat is still in a very undeveloped state and has but a fantastic conception of its own position, correspond with the first instinctive yearnings of that class for a general reconstruction of society.

But these Socialist and Communist publications contain also a critical element. They attack every principle of existing society. Hence they are full of the most valuable materials for the enlightenment of the working class. The practical measures proposed in them—such as the abolition of the distinction between town and country, of the family, of the carrying on of industries

for the account of private individuals, and of the wage system, the proclamation of social harmony, the conversion of the functions of the state into a mere superintendence of production—all these proposals point solely to the disappearance of class antagonisms which were, at that time, only just cropping up, and which, in these publications, are recognized in their earliest, indistinct and undefined forms only. These proposals, therefore, are of a purely utopian character.

The significance of Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism bears an inverse relation to historical development. In proportion as the modern class struggle develops and takes definite shape, this fantastic standing apart from the contest, these fantastic attacks on it, lose all practical value and all theoretical justification. Therefore, although the originators of these systems were, in many respects, revolutionary, their disciples have, in every case, formed mere reactionary sects. They hold fast by the original views of their masters, in opposition to the progressive historical development of the proletariat. They, therefore, endeavour, and that consistently, to deaden the class struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms. They still dream of experimental realization of their social Utopias, of founding isolated *phalanstères*, of establishing "Home Colonies," of setting up a "Little Icaria"¹—duodecimo editions of the New Jerusalem—and to realize all these castles in the air, they are compelled to appeal to the feelings and purses of the bourgeois. By degrees they sink into the category of the reactionary conservative Socialists depicted above, differing from these only by more systematic pedantry, and by their fanatical and superstitious belief in the miraculous effects of their social science.

They, therefore, violently oppose all political action on the part of the working class; such action, according to them, can only result from blind unbelief in the new gospel.

The Owenites in England, and the Fourierists in France, respectively oppose the Chartist and the *réformistes*.²

¹ *Phalanstères* were Socialist colonies on the plan of Charles Fourier; Icaria was the name given by Cabet to his Utopia and, later on, to his American Communist colony. [Note by F. Engels to the English Edition of 1888.]

"Home colonies" were what Owen called his Communist model societies. *Phalanstères* was the name of the public palaces planned by Fourier. Icaria was the name given to the Utopian fantasy land, whose Communist institutions Cabet portrayed. [Note by F. Engels to the German edition of 1890.]

² This refers to the adherents of the newspaper *La Réforme*, organ of the "Social-Democratic" Party.—Ed.

IV

POSITION OF THE COMMUNISTS IN RELATION TO THE
VARIOUS EXISTING OPPOSITION PARTIES

Section II has made clear the relations of the Communists to the existing working-class parties, such as the Chartists in England and the Agrarian Reformers in America.

The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement. In France the Communists ally themselves with the Social-Democrats,¹ against the conservative and radical bourgeoisie, reserving, however, the right to take up a critical position in regard to phrases and illusions traditionally handed down from the Great Revolution.

In Switzerland they support the Radicals, without losing sight of the fact that this party consists of antagonistic elements, partly of Democratic Socialists, in the French sense, partly of radical bourgeois.

In Poland they support the party that insists on an agrarian revolution as the prime condition for national emancipation, that party which fomented the insurrection of Cracow in 1846.

In Germany they fight with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie.²

But they never cease, for a single instant, to instil into the working class the clearest possible recognition of the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, in order that the German workers may straightway use, as so many weapons

¹ The party then represented in Parliament by Ledru-Rollin, in literature by Louis Blanc, in the daily press by the *Réforme*. The name of Social-Democracy signified, with these its inventors, a section of the Democratic or Republican Party more or less tinged with Socialism. [Note by F. Engels to the English Edition of 1888.]

The party that called itself the Social-Democratic Party in France was represented in political life by Ledru-Rollin and in literature by Louis Blanc; thus it differed immeasurably from present-day German Social-Democracy. [Note by F. Engels to the German edition of 1890.]

² *Kleinbürgerei* in the German original. Marx and Engels used this term to describe the reactionary elements of the urban petty bourgeoisie who supported the role of the feudal nobility and the absolute monarchy. The ideal of these elements was the guild system of the Middle Ages. In Germany this section of the population was very numerous in most of the cities and towns.—Ed.

against the bourgeoisie, the social and political conditions that the bourgeoisie must necessarily introduce along with its supremacy, and in order that, after the fall of the reactionary classes in Germany, the fight against the bourgeoisie itself may immediately begin.

The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilization and with a much more developed proletariat than that of England was in the seventeenth and of France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution.

In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things.

In all these movements they bring to the front, as the leading question in each, the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the time.

Finally, they labour everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries.

The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

Working men of all countries, unite!

Frederick Engels

SOCIALISM: UTOPIAN AND SCIENTIFIC¹

PREFACE TO THE FIRST GERMAN EDITION

The following work is derived from three chapters of my book: *Herrn E. Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* [*Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*], Leipzig 1878.² I put it together for my friend Paul Lafargue for translation into French and added a few extra remarks. The French translation examined by me appeared first in the *Revue socialiste* and then independently under the title: *Socialisme utopique et socialisme scientifique*, Paris, 1880. A rendering into Polish made from the French translation has just appeared in Geneva and bears the title: *Socjalizm utopijny a naukowy* [*Socialism Utopian and Scientific*], Imprimerie de l'Aurore, Genève, 1882.

The surprising success of the Lafargue translation in the French-speaking countries and especially in France itself forced me to consider the question whether a separate German edition of these three chapters would not likewise be of value. Then the editors of the Zurich *Sozialdemokrat*³ informed me that a demand was generally being raised within the German Social-Democratic Party for the publication of new propaganda pamphlets, and they asked me whether I would not apply those three

¹ The German title is *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft* [*The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science*]. This work was originally published as a series of articles in the Leipzig *Vorwärts* in 1877-78. It first appeared as a separate pamphlet (in French, translated by Lafargue) in Paris, 1880.

² This work of Engels, popularly known under the title of *Anti-Dühring*, is one of the main sources of the study of Marxist theory. For the pamphlet entitled *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, Engels took one chapter (the first) from the introduction to *Anti-Dühring* and two chapters (the first and second) from Part III (*Socialism*).—Ed.

³ The *Sozialdemokrat*, the central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, was published in Zurich, Switzerland, from 1879-88 and in London from 1889-90, since Social-Democratic newspapers and books were forbidden in Germany during the period of the Anti-Socialist Law (1878-90).—Ed.

chapters to this purpose. I was naturally in agreement with that and put my work at their disposal.

It was, however, not originally written for immediate popular propaganda. How could what was in the first place a purely scientific work be suitable for that? What changes in form and content were required?

So far as form is concerned, only the numerous foreign words could arouse doubts. But already Lassalle in his speeches and propaganda writings was not at all sparing of foreign words and to my knowledge there has been no complaint about it. Since that time our workers have read newspapers to a far greater extent and far more regularly and to that extent they have become thereby more familiar with foreign words. I have restricted myself to removing all unnecessary foreign words.

In regard to those that were unavoidable I have refrained from adding so-called explanatory translations. The unavoidable foreign words, usually generally accepted scientific-technical expressions, would not have been unavoidable if they had been translatable. Translation, therefore, distorts the sense; it confuses instead of explaining. Oral information is of much more assistance.

The content on the other hand, I think I can assert, will cause German workers few difficulties. In general, only the third section is difficult, but far less so for workers, whose general conditions of life it concerns, than for the "educated" bourgeois. In the many explanatory additions that I have made here, I have had in mind not so much the workers as "educated" readers; persons of the type of Deputy von Eynern,¹ the *Geheimrat* Heinrich von Sybel and other Treitschkes,² being governed by the irresistible impulse to demonstrate again and again in black and white their frightful ignorance and their consequently comprehensible colossal misconception of socialism. If Don Quixote tilts his lance at windmills, that is in accordance with his duty, his role; but it would be impossible for us to permit Sancho Panza anything of the sort.

Such readers will also be surprised that in a sketch of the history of the development of socialism they should encounter the Kant-Laplace cosmogony, modern natural science and

¹ Von Eynern: a Bremen manufacturer who wrote a pamphlet against the Social-Democracy.—Ed.

² Sybel and Treitschke: German bourgeois historians.—Ed.

Darwin, classical German philosophy and Hegel. But scientific socialism is indeed an essentially German product and could arise only in that nation whose classical philosophy had kept alive the tradition of conscious dialectics: in Germany.¹ The materialist conception of history and its special application to the modern class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie was only possible by means of dialectics. And if the schoolmasters of the German bourgeoisie have drowned the memory of the great German philosophers and of the dialectics pursued by them in a swamp of desolate eclecticism, so much so that we are compelled to appeal to modern natural science as a witness that dialectics proves itself in reality—we German Socialists are proud of the fact that we stem not only from Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen, but also from Kant, Fichte and Hegel.

Frederick Engels

London, September 21, 1882.

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH GERMAN EDITION

My assumption that the contents of this publication will present little difficulty to our German workers has proven correct. At any rate, since March 1883, when it first appeared, three editions totaling 10,000 copies have been disposed of, and this under the operation of the now defunct Anti-Socialist Law—which again illustrates how impotent police bans against a movement like that of the modern proletariat are.

Since the first edition various additional translations into foreign languages have appeared: an Italian rendition by Pasqual Martignetti: *Il Socialismo Utopico ed il Socialismo scientifico*, Benvenuto 1883; a Russian one: *Razvitie nauchnago Socializma*,

¹ "In Germany," is a slip of the pen. It should read "among Germans." For as indispensable, on the one hand, as German dialectics were for the genesis of scientific socialism, as equally indispensable for it were the developed economic and social conditions of England and France. The economic and political stage of development of Germany, which at the beginning of the 'forties was still more backward than today, could produce at the most caricatures of socialism (see *The Communist Manifesto*, Section III, 1. c., *German or "True" Socialism*). Only by the subjection of the economic and political conditions produced in England and France to German dialectical criticism could a real result be achieved. From this angle, therefore, scientific socialism is not an *exclusively* German, but just as much an international product. [Note by F. Engels.]

Geneva 1884; a Danish one: *Socialismens Udvikling fra Utopi til Videnskab*, in *Socialisk Bibliotek*, I. Bind, Kjöbenhavn 1885; a Spanish one: *Socialismo utopico y Socialismo científico*, Madrid 1886, and a Dutch one: *De Ontwikkeling van het Socialisme van Utopie tot Wetenschap*, Haag 1886.

The present edition has undergone various slight alterations; more important additions have been made in only two places: in the first chapter on Saint-Simon, who was dealt with too briefly in comparison with Fourier and Owen, and towards the end of the third chapter on the new form of production, the "trusts," which meanwhile has become important.

Frederick Engels

London, May 12, 1891.

FROM THE SPECIAL INTRODUCTION¹ TO THE ENGLISH EDITION of 1892

The present little book is, originally, a part of a larger whole. About 1875, Dr. E. Dühring, *privatdocent* at Berlin University, suddenly and rather clamorously announced his conversion to socialism, and presented the German public not only with an elaborate socialist theory, but also with a complete practical plan for the reorganization of society. As a matter of course he fell foul of his predecessors; above all, he honoured Marx by pouring out upon him the full vials of his wrath.

This took place about the time when the two sections of the Socialist Party in Germany—Eisenachers and Lassalleans—had just effected their fusion, and thus obtained not only an immense increase of strength, but, what was more, the faculty of employing the whole of this strength against the common enemy. The Socialist Party in Germany was fast becoming a power. But to make it a power, the first condition was that the newly-conquered unity should not be imperilled. And Dr. Dühring openly proceeded to form around himself a sect, the nucleus of a future separate party. It thus became necessary to take up the gauntlet thrown down to us, and to fight out the struggle whether we liked it or not.

¹ Written by Engels in *English*.—Ed.

This, however, though it might not be an over-difficult, was evidently a long-winded business. As is well known, we Germans are of a terribly ponderous *Gründlichkeit*, radical profundity or profound radicality, whatever you may like to call it. Whenever anyone of us expounds what he considers a new doctrine, he has first to elaborate it into an all-comprising system. He has to prove that both the first principles of logic and the fundamental laws of the universe had existed from all eternity for no other purpose than to ultimately lead to this newly-discovered, crowning theory. And Dr. Dühring, in this respect, was quite up to the national mark. Nothing less than a complete *System of Philosophy*, mental, moral, natural, and historical; a complete *System of Political Economy and Socialism*; and, finally, a *Critical History of Political Economy*—three big volumes in octavo, heavy extrinsically and intrinsically, three army-corps of arguments mobilized against all previous philosophers and economists in general, and against Marx in particular—in fact, an attempt at a complete “revolution in science”—these were what I should have to tackle. I had to treat of all and every possible subject, from the concepts of time and space to bimetallism; from the eternity of matter and motion to the perishable nature of moral ideas; from Darwin’s natural selection to the education of youth in a future society. Anyhow, the systematic comprehensiveness of my opponent gave me the opportunity of developing, in opposition to him, and in a more connected form than had previously been done, the views held by Marx and myself on this great variety of subjects. And that was the principal reason which made me undertake this otherwise ungrateful task.

My reply was first published in a series of articles in the Leipzig *Vorwärts*, the chief organ of the Socialist Party, and later on as a book: *Herrn Eugen Dührings Unwälvung der Wissenschaft* (*Mr. E. Dühring’s Revolution in Science*), a second edition of which appeared in Zurich, 1886.

At the request of my friend, Paul Lafargue, now representative of Lille in the French Chamber of Deputies, I arranged three chapters of this book as a pamphlet, which he translated and published in 1880, under the title, *Socialisme utopique et socialisme scientifique*. From this French text a Polish and a Spanish edition were prepared. In 1883, our German friends brought out the pamphlet in the original language. Italian, Russian, Danish, Dutch and Rumanian translations, based upon the German text, have since been published. Thus, with the present

English edition, this little book circulates in ten languages. I am not aware that any other socialist work, not even our *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 or Marx's *Capital*, has been so often translated. In Germany it has had four editions of about 20,000 copies in all.

The Appendix, "The Mark,"¹ was written with the intention of spreading among the German Socialist Party some elementary knowledge of the history and development of landed property in Germany. This seemed all the more necessary at a time when the assimilation by that party of the working-people of the towns was in a fair way of completion, and when the agricultural labourers and peasants had to be taken in hand. This appendix has been included in the translation, as the original forms of tenure of land common to all Teutonic tribes, and the history of their decay, are even less known in England than in Germany. I have left the text as it stands in the original, without alluding to the hypothesis recently started by Maxim Kovalevsky, according to which the partition of the arable and meadow lands among the members of the Mark was preceded by their being cultivated for joint-account by a large patriarchal family community embracing several generations (as exemplified by the still existing South Slavonian Zadruga), and that the partition, later on, took place when the community had increased, so as to become too unwieldy for joint-account management. Kovalevsky is probably quite right, but the matter is still *sub judice*.

The economic terms used in this work, as far as they are new, agree with those used in the English edition of Marx's *Capital*. We call "production of commodities" that economic phase where articles are produced not only for the use of the producers, but also for purposes of exchange; that is, as *commodities*, not as use values. This phase extends from the first beginnings of production for exchange down to our present time; it attains its full development under capitalist production only, that is, under conditions where the capitalist, the owner of the means of production, employs, for wages, labourers, people

¹ The Appendix is omitted in this edition. It will be found in separate publications of *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*.

In "The Mark," the name given to the ancient Germanic village community, Engels briefly related the history of the German peasantry beginning with antiquity. In 1883 "The Mark" was published as a separate pamphlet (in German) entitled *The German peasant. What was he? What is he? What could he be?*—Ed.

deprived of all means of production except their own labour power, and pockets the excess of the selling price of the products over his outlay. We divide the history of industrial production since the Middle Ages into three periods: 1) handicraft, small master craftsmen with a few journeymen and apprentices, where each labourer produces the complete article; 2) manufacture, where greater numbers of workmen, grouped in one large establishment, produce the complete article on the principle of division of labour, each workman performing only one partial operation so that the product is complete only after having passed successively through the hands of all; 3) modern industry, where the product is produced by machinery driven by power, and where the work of the labourer is limited to superintending and correcting the performances of the mechanical agent.¹

¹ The continuation of the English Introduction to the pamphlet, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* was published separately by Engels in the *Neue Zeit* in 1892-93 under the title *On Historical Materialism*. See pp. 333-51 of this volume.—Ed.

SOCIALISM: UTOPIAN AND SCIENTIFIC

I

Modern socialism is, in its content, primarily the product of the perception on the one hand of the class antagonisms existing in modern society, between possessors and non-possessors, capitalists and wage workers; and on the other hand, of the anarchy ruling in production. In its theoretical form, however, it originally appears as a further and ostensibly more consistent extension of the principles established by the great French enlighteners of the eighteenth century.¹ Like every new theory, it had at first to link itself on to the intellectual material which lay ready to its hand, however deep its roots lay in material-economic facts.

The great men who in France were clearing the minds of men for the coming revolution themselves acted in an extremely revolutionary fashion. They recognized no external authority of any kind. Religion, conceptions of nature, society, political systems, everything was subjected to the most merciless criticism; everything had to justify its existence at the bar of reason or renounce all claim to existence. The reasoning intellect was applied to everything as the sole measure. It was the time when, as Hegel says, the world was stood upon its head;² first, in the sense that the

¹ The reference is to the representatives of the French bourgeoisie in the spheres of philosophy and science during the preparatory period of the French bourgeois revolution of 1789.—Ed.

² Hegel's passage concerning the French Revolution is as follows: "The thought, the idea of right, asserted itself *all at once*, and against this the old framework of wrong could make no stand. In the thought of right, therefore, a constitution has now become established, and henceforth, everything is to be based on this foundation. Ever since the sun has been in the firmament and the planets have encircled it, it had never yet been witnessed that men should stand on their heads, that is on thought, and construct reality according to thought. It was Anaxagoras who first said that *nous*, reason, governs the world; now for the first time man arrived at recognizing that thought ought to govern spiritual reality. This was then a *glorious sunrise*. All think-

human head and the principles arrived at by its thought claimed to be the basis of all human action and association; and then later on also in the wider sense, that the reality which was in contradiction with these principles was in fact turned upside down from top to bottom. All previous forms of society and government, all the old ideas handed down by tradition were flung into the lumber-room as irrational; the world had hitherto allowed itself to be guided solely by prejudices; everything in the past deserved only pity and contempt. Now for the first time appeared the light of day, the kingdom of reason; henceforth, superstition, injustice, privilege and oppression were to be superseded by eternal truth, eternal justice, equality grounded in nature and the inalienable rights of man.

We know today that this kingdom of reason was nothing more than the idealized kingdom of the bourgeoisie; that eternal justice found its realization in bourgeois justice; that equality reduced itself to bourgeois equality before the law; that bourgeois property was proclaimed as one of the most essential rights of man; and that the government of reason, the Social Contract of Rousseau, came into existence and could only come into existence as a bourgeois, democratic republic. No more than their predecessors could the great thinkers of the eighteenth century pass beyond the limits imposed on them by their own epoch.

But side by side with the antagonism between the feudal nobility and the bourgeoisie, appearing on the scene as the representative of all the rest of society, was the general antagonism between the exploiters and the exploited, the rich idlers and the toiling poor. And it was precisely this circumstance that enabled the representatives of the bourgeoisie to put themselves forward as the representatives not of a special class but of the whole of suffering humanity. Still more. From its origin the bourgeoisie had been afflicted with its antithesis: that capitalists cannot exist without wage workers, and in the same degree as the mediæval burgher of the guild developed into the modern bourgeois, so the guild journeyman and the day-labourer outside the guilds developed in-

ing beings have joined in celebrating this epoch. A sublime emotion prevailed at that time, an enthusiasm of the intellect sent a thrill through the world, as if the reconciliation of the divine with the mundane had only now been arrived at." (Hegel: Philosophie der Geschichte, 1840, p. 535.) Is it not high time to put the Anti-Socialist Law into operation against such a public nuisance as the revolutionary doctrines of the whilom Professor Hegel? [Note by F. Engels.]

to the proletariat. And although, on the whole, the bourgeoisie in its struggle with the nobility could claim to represent at the same time the interests of the different labouring classes of that period, yet in every great bourgeois movement there were independent outbursts of that class which was the more or less developed forerunner of the modern proletariat. For example, the Anabaptists and Thomas Münzer in the period of the Reformation and Peasant War in Germany;¹ the Levellers,² in the great English Revolution; in the great French Revolution, Babeuf.³ Alongside of these revolutionary armed uprisings of a class which was as yet immature, corresponding theoretical manifestations made their appearance; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries⁴ utopian portrayals of ideal social conditions; in the eighteenth century, direct communistic theories (Morelly and Mably). The demand for equality was no longer limited to political rights, but was extended also to the social conditions of individuals; it was not merely class privileges that were to be abolished, but class distinctions themselves. An ascetic communism, scorning all enjoyment of life and linked to Spartan conceptions, was the first form in which the new doctrine made its appearance. Then came the three great utopians: Saint-Simon, with whom bourgeois tendencies still had a certain influence, side by side with proletarian; Fourier; and Owen, who, in the country where capitalist production was the most developed, and under the influence of the antagonisms begotten of this, worked out his schemes for the removal of class distinctions systematically and in direct relation to French materialism.

It is common to all three of these that they do not come forward as representatives of the interests of the proletariat which in the meantime history has brought into being. Like the philosophers of the Enlightenment, they aim at the emancipation of all humanity at once, and not first of a definite class. Like them, they wish to establish the kingdom of reason and eternal justice; but

¹ The Reformation and the peasant wars in Germany took place at the beginning of the sixteenth century. For the Reformation see Engels, *On Historical Materialism*, p. 333 of this volume.—Ed.

² *Levellers*: name applied to the urban and rural plebeian elements which advanced the most radical democratic demands during the Revolution of 1648 in England.—Ed.

³ *François Noël Babeuf* (1760-97): French revolutionist. A utopian communist, he organized a "conspiracy of the equals," upon the discovery of which he was executed.—Ed.

⁴ Engels refers here to the works of the utopian socialists Thomas More (1478-1535) and Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639).—Ed.

their kingdom is spheres apart from that of the French philosophers. To them the bourgeois world based on the principles of these philosophers is also irrational and unjust, and therefore finds its way to the rubbish bin just as readily as feudalism and all earlier orders of society. If pure reason and justice have not hitherto ruled the world, this has been due only to the fact that men have not rightly understood them. What was lacking was just the individual man of genius, who has now arisen and has recognized the truth; the fact that he has now arisen, that the truth has been recognized precisely at this moment, is not an inevitable event, following of necessity in the chain of historical development, but a mere happy accident. He might just as well have been born five hundred years earlier, and would then have saved humanity five hundred years of error, strife and suffering.

We saw how the French philosophers of the eighteenth century, who paved the way for the revolution, appealed to reason as the sole judge of all that existed. A rational state, a rational society were to be established; everything that ran counter to eternal reason was to be relentlessly set aside. We saw also that in reality this eternal reason was nothing else than the idealized intellect of the average burgher, just at that period developing into the bourgeois. When therefore the French Revolution had realized this rational society and this rational state, it became apparent that the new institutions, however rational in comparison with earlier conditions, proved by no means absolutely rational. The rational state had suffered shipwreck. Rousseau's Social Contract had found its realization in the Reign of Terror, from which the bourgeoisie, which had lost faith in its own political capacity, had sought refuge first in the corruption of the Directorate, and ultimately in the protection afforded by the Napoleonic despotism. The promised eternal peace had changed to an endless war of conquest. Rational society had fared no better. The antithesis between rich and poor, instead of being resolved in general well-being, had been sharpened by the abolition of the guild and other privileges, which had bridged it over, and of the benevolent institutions of the church, which had mitigated its effects; the "freedom of property" from feudal fetters, now become a reality, turned out to be for the small bourgeois and small peasants the freedom of selling this small property, which was being crushed by the overpowering competition of big capital and big landed property, precisely to these great lords, and thus, for the small bourgeois and small peasants, became converted into freedom *from* prop-

erty; the impetuous growth of industry on a capitalist basis raised the poverty and suffering of the working masses to a condition of society's existence. Cash payment became more and more, according to Carlyle's expression, the sole nexus between man and man. The number of crimes increased from year to year. And if the feudal depravities, formerly shamelessly flaunting in the light of day, though not abolished, were yet temporarily forced into the background, on the other hand the bourgeois vices, until then indulged in only in privacy, now bloomed all the more luxuriantly. Trade developed more and more into swindling. The "fraternity" of the revolutionary motto was realized in the chicanery and envy of the competitive struggle. Corruption took the place of violent oppression, and money replaced the sword as the chief lever of social power. The "right of the first night" passed from the feudal lords to the bourgeois manufacturers. Prostitution assumed proportions hitherto unknown. Marriage itself remained, as before, the legally recognized form, the official cloak of prostitution, and was besides supplemented by widespread adultery. In a word, compared with the glowing promises of the prophets of the Enlightenment, the social and political institutions established by the "victory of reason" proved to be bitterly disillusioning caricatures. The only thing still lacking was people to voice this disillusionment, and these came with the turn of the century. In 1802 Saint-Simon's *Geneva Letters* appeared; Fourier's first work was published in 1808, although the groundwork of his theory dated from 1799; on the first of January, 1800, Robert Owen took over the management of New Lanark.

At this period, however, the capitalist mode of production, and with it the antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, was as yet very undeveloped. Large-scale industry, which had only just arisen in England, was still unknown in France. But it is large-scale industry that on the one hand first develops the conflicts which make a revolution in the mode of production, the abolition of its capitalist character, an imperative necessity—conflicts not only between the classes born of it, but also between the very productive forces and forms of exchange which it creates; and on the other hand it develops, precisely in these gigantic productive forces, the means through which these conflicts can be resolved. If, therefore, about 1800, the conflicts arising from the new social order were only just beginning to develop, this is even more true of the means through which they were to be resolved. Though during the Reign of Terror the propertyless masses of

Paris had been able to win the mastery for a moment, and thus, even *against* the bourgeoisie, to lead the bourgeois revolution to victory, they had only proved by doing so how impossible, in the long run, their rule was in the then existing conditions. The proletariat, then only just separating itself from these propertyless masses as the nucleus of a new class, as yet quite incapable of independent political action, appeared as an oppressed, suffering estate of society, to which, in its incapacity to help itself, help could at most be brought from outside, from above.

This historical situation also dominated the founders of socialism. To the immature stage of capitalist production and the immature class position, immature theories corresponded. The solution of social problems, a solution which still lay hidden in the undeveloped economic conditions, was to be produced out of their heads. Society presented nothing but abuses; it was the task of cogitating reason to remove them. What was required was to discover a new and more perfect social order, and to impose this on society from without, by propaganda and, where possible, by the example of model experiments. These new social systems were from the outset doomed to be utopias; the more their details were elaborated, the more they necessarily receded into pure fantasy.

This once established, we shall not dwell a moment longer on this aspect, now belonging wholly to the past. We can leave it to literary retailers to puzzle their brains solemnly over these fantasies, which today are only diverting, and to prove the superiority of their own insipid mode of thought over such "absurdity." We, on the contrary, delight in the inspired ideas and germs of ideas which everywhere emerge through their covering of fantasy, and to which those philistines are blind.

Saint-Simon was a son of the Great French Revolution, at the outbreak of which he was not yet thirty. The revolution was the victory of the third estate, *i.e.*, of the great masses of the nation. *working* in production and in trade, over the hitherto privileged *idle* estates, the nobles and the priests. But victory of the third estate soon revealed itself as exclusively the victory of a small part of this estate, as the conquest of political power by the socially privileged section of it, the propertied bourgeoisie. And this bourgeoisie had certainly developed rapidly even during the revolution, partly by speculation in the lands of the nobility and of the Church, confiscated and afterwards *sold*, and partly by frauds upon the nation by means of army contracts. It was the domina-

tion of these swindlers that, under the Directorate, brought France and the Revolution to the verge of ruin, and thus gave Napoleon the pretext for his *coup d'état*. Hence, in Saint-Simon's mind the antagonism between the third estate and the privileged estates took the form of an antagonism between "workers" and "idlers." The idlers were not merely the old privileged persons, but also all who, without taking any part in production or distribution, lived on their unearned incomes [*Renten*]. And the "workers" were not only the wage workers, but also the manufacturers, the merchants, the bankers. That the idlers had lost the capacity for intellectual leadership and political supremacy had been proved, and was finally settled by the revolution. That the non-possessing classes had not this capacity seemed to Saint-Simon proved by the experiences of the Reign of Terror. Then, who was to lead and command? According to Saint-Simon, science and industry, both united by a new religious bond, destined to restore that unity of religious ideas which had been lost since the time of the Reformation—a necessarily mystic and rigidly hierarchic "new Christianity." But science, that was the scholars; and industry, that was, in the first place, the active bourgeois, manufacturers, merchants, bankers. These bourgeois were, true enough, supposed to transform themselves into a kind of public officials, of social trustees; but they were nevertheless to hold, compared with the workers, a commanding and economically privileged position. The bankers especially were assigned the mission of regulating the whole of social production by the regulation of credit. This conception was in exact keeping with a time in which modern industry in France and, with it, the chasm between bourgeoisie and proletariat, was only just coming into existence. But what Saint-Simon especially lays stress upon is this: what interests him first, and above all other things, is the lot of the class that is the most numerous and the most poor ("*la classe la plus nombreuse et la plus pauvre*").

In his *Geneva Letters*, Saint-Simon already laid down the principle that "all men should work." When he wrote these letters he already knew that the Reign of Terror was the reign of the propertyless masses. "See," he tells them, "what happened in France when your comrades were masters there; they created famine." But to conceive the French Revolution as a class war, and, at that, not merely one between nobility and bourgeoisie, but between nobility, bourgeoisie and the propertyless masses was, indeed, in the year 1802, a discovery of genius. In 1816 he de-

clared that politics was the science of production, and predicted the complete absorption of politics in economics. And if the recognition that economic conditions are the basis of political institutions here shows itself only in embryo, nevertheless the transformation of political government over men into the administration of things and the direction of production processes—that is, the “abolition of the state” about which so much noise has recently been made everywhere—is already clearly stated. With equal superiority over his contemporaries, in 1814, immediately after the entry of the Allies into Paris, and again in 1815, during the Hundred Days’ War, he proclaimed the alliance of France with England, and in the second line, of these two countries with Germany, as the sole guarantee of the prosperous development and the peace of Europe. To preach to the French in 1815 an alliance with the victors of Waterloo certainly required in equal measure courage and historical foresight.

If in Saint-Simon we find the breadth of view of a genius, thanks to which almost all the ideas of later socialists which are not strictly economic are contained in his works in embryo, in Fourier we find a critique of existing social conditions, which, typically French in its wit, is none the less penetrating. Fourier takes the bourgeoisie at its word—both its enthusiastic prophets before the revolution and its interested sycophants after it. He mercilessly lays bare the material and moral poverty of the bourgeois world, contrasting it both with the glittering promises, made by the earlier philosophers of the Enlightenment, of a society only ruled by reason, of a civilization which would yield universal happiness, of the illimitable perfectibility of man, and with the highly-coloured phraseology of his contemporary bourgeois ideologists, showing how everywhere the most pitiable reality corresponds to the most fine-sounding phrase, and overwhelming with his mordant satire this hopeless fiasco of phrases. Fourier is not only a critic; his irrepressible gaiety makes him a satirist, and indeed one of the greatest satirists of all time. He depicts with the touch of a master, and at the same time in a most diverting way, the speculative swindles which flourished on the decline of the revolution, and also the shopkeeping outlook which was characteristic of the French merchants of that period. His criticism of the bourgeois form of relations between the sexes, and of the position of woman in bourgeois society, is even more masterly. He was the first to declare that in a given society the degree of emancipation of women is the natural measure of the general emancipa-

tion. But it is in his conception of the history of society that Fourier appears at his greatest. He divides its whole past course into four stages of development: savagery, barbarism, the patriarchate, civilization, the last of which coincides with what is now called bourgeois society and, therefore, with the social order introduced since the sixteenth century; and he shows "that the civilized stage raises every vice, practised by barbarism in a simple way, to a complex, ambiguous, hypocritical mode of existence"; that civilization moves in a "vicious circle," in contradictions which it constantly reproduces but is never able to overcome, so that it constantly attains the opposite of what it wants or pretends that it wants to achieve. So that, for example, "in civilization, *poverty springs from superabundance itself.*" Fourier, as we see, handles dialectics in the same masterly way as his contemporary Hegel. With the same use of dialectics he brings out the fact, in opposition to the talk about the illimitable perfectibility of man, that each historical phase has its ascending but also its descending curve, and applies this conception also to the future of the whole human race. As Kant introduced into natural science the ultimate destruction of the earth, so Fourier introduced into historical thought the ultimate extinction of humanity.

While in France the hurricane of the revolution swept through the land, in England a quieter, but no less mighty, revolutionizing process was going on. Steam and the new toolmaking machinery were transforming manufacture into modern large-scale industry, and thereby revolutionizing the whole basis of bourgeois society. The sluggish march of development in the manufacturing period changed to a real period of storm and stress in production. The division of society into big capitalists and propertyless proletarians was taking place with ever-increasing rapidity; and between these two classes, instead of the former stable middle class, there was now an unstable mass of artisans and small shopkeepers leading a precarious existence—the most fluctuating section of the population. The new mode of production was still only at the beginning of its ascending curve; it was still the normal, proper, in existing conditions the sole possible mode of production. But even at that time it was producing crying social abuses: the crowding together of a homeless population in the worst quarters of great cities—the rupture of all traditional bonds based on descent, of patriarchal subordination, of the family—excessive labour, especially of women and children, on an appalling scale—widespread demoralization of the working

class, suddenly hurled into completely new conditions, from the countryside into the town, from agriculture into industry, from stable conditions of life into uncertain and daily varying conditions. Then a twenty-nine-year-old manufacturer appeared on the scene as a reformer, a man of almost sublimely childlike simplicity of character and at the same time a born leader of men such as is rarely seen. Robert Owen had adopted the teaching of the materialist philosophers of the Enlightenment that man's character is the product on the one hand of his hereditary constitution, and on the other, of his environment during his lifetime, and particularly during the period of his development. In the industrial revolution most of his class saw only confusion and chaos, enabling them to fish in troubled waters and get rich quickly. He saw in it the opportunity to put his favourite theory into practice, and thereby to bring order out of chaos. He had already tried it out with success in Manchester, as manager of a factory with over five hundred workers; from 1800 to 1829 he directed the great cotton-spinning mill of New Lanark in Scotland, as managing partner, along the same lines but with greater freedom of action and with a success which won him European fame. He transformed a population which rose gradually to 2,500 persons, and was originally composed of the most diverse and for the most part greatly demoralized elements, into an absolutely model colony, in which drunkenness, police, magistrates, law-suits, poor law institutions and any need of charity were things unknown. And, in fact, he did so simply by placing the people in conditions more worthy of human beings, and especially by having the rising generation carefully brought up. He was the inventor of infant schools, and first introduced them here. From two years of age the children came to school, where they enjoyed themselves so much that they could hardly be got home again. While his competitors worked their people thirteen to fourteen hours a day, in New Lanark only ten and a half hours were worked. When a cotton crisis made a four months' stoppage necessary full wages were paid to the idle workers. And with all this the concern had more than doubled its value and to the end brought in substantial profits to the proprietors.

But for all that Owen was not content. The existence which he had contrived for his workers fell far short in his eyes of being worthy of human beings; "the people were my slaves"; the relatively favourable conditions in which he had set them were still far from allowing them an all-round and rational develop-

ment of character and mind, and much less a free exercise of their faculties. "And yet, the working part of this population of 2,500 persons was daily producing as much real wealth for society as, less than half a century before, it would have required the working part of a population of 600,000 to create. I asked myself: what became of the difference between the wealth consumed by 2,500 persons and that which would have been consumed by 600,000?"¹ The answer was clear. It had been used to pay the owners of the concern five percent interest on their invested capital and in addition a profit of more than £300,000 sterling. And what was true of New Lanark held good in still greater measure of all the factories in England. "If this new wealth had not been created by machinery, . . . the wars . . . in opposition to Napoleon, and to support the aristocratic principles of society, could not have been maintained. And yet this new power was the creation of the working classes."² To them, therefore, also belonged the fruits. To Owen, the new mighty productive forces, which until then had served only for the enrichment of individuals and the enslavement of the masses, offered the basis for a reconstruction of society, and were destined, as the common property of all, to work only for the common welfare of all.

The Owenite communism arose in this purely business way, as the result, so to speak, of commercial calculation. It retained this practical character throughout. Thus in 1823 Owen put forward a scheme to end the distress in Ireland by means of communist colonies; attached to the scheme were comprehensive estimates of the initial costs, the annual expenditure and the revenue which could be expected. Thus, too, in his definite plan for the future the technical elaboration of details, including ground plan, front elevation and bird's eye view, shows such practical knowledge that, once the Owenite method of social reforms is accepted, there is little to be said against the actual detailed arrangements even from the standpoint of an expert.

His advance to communism was the turning point in Owen's life. As long as he merely played the part of a philanthropist he had reaped nothing but wealth, applause, honour and glory. He was the most popular man in Europe. Not only those of his own

¹ From *The Revolution in Mind and Practice*, p. 21, a memorial addressed to all the "Red republicans, communists and socialists of Europe," and sent to the provisional government of France, 1848, and also "to Queen Victoria and her responsible advisers." [Note by F. Engels.]

² *Ibid.*, p. 22.—Ed.

class, but statesmen and princes listened to him with approval. But when he came forward with his communist theories, the situation was entirely changed. There were three great obstacles which above all seemed to him to block the path to social reform: private property, religion and marriage in its present form. He knew what confronted him if he attacked them: complete outlawry from official society and the loss of his whole social position. But he did not let anything hold him back from attacking them regardless of the consequences, and what he had foreseen came to pass. Banished from official society, banned by the press, impoverished by the failure of communist experiments in America in which he sacrificed his whole fortune, he turned directly to the working class and worked among them for another thirty years. All social movements, all real advances made in England in the interest of the working class were associated with Owen's name. Thus in 1819, after five years' effort, he secured the passage of the first law limiting the labour of women and children in the factories. He presided at the first Congress at which the trade unions of all England united in a single great trades association.¹ As transition measures to the complete communist organization of society he introduced on the one hand co-operative societies (both consumers' and producers'), which have since at least given practical proof that it is very well possible to dispense with both merchants and manufacturers; and on the other hand labour bazaars, institutions for the exchange of the products of labour by means of labour-notes with the labour-hour as unit. These institutions were necessarily doomed to failure, but they completely anticipated the Proudhon exchange bank of a much later period, and only differed from it in that they did not represent the panacea for all social ills, but only the first step towards a far more radical transformation of society.

The mode of outlook of the utopians for a long time governed the socialist conceptions of the nineteenth century and in part still governs them. Until quite recently it received the homage of all French and English socialists, and the earlier German communism, including Weitling, also belongs to it. To all these, socialism is the expression of absolute truth, reason and justice and needs only to be discovered to conquer the world

¹ The *Great National Consolidated Trades Union*, founded in 1834, was the first attempt to create a united national organization of English trade unions. The organization was dissolved at the end of 1834.—Ed.

by virtue of its own power; as absolute truth is independent of time and space and of the historical development of man, it is a mere accident when and where it is discovered. At the same time absolute truth, reason and justice are different for the founder of each different school; and as each one's special brand of absolute truth, reason and justice is in turn conditioned by his subjective understanding, his conditions of existence, the measure of his knowledge and intellectual training, so the only solution possible in this conflict of absolute truths is that they should grind each other down. And nothing could come of this but a kind of eclectic, average socialism, such as in fact dominates the minds of most socialist workers in France and England up to the present time; a mixture, admitting of the most manifold shades, of such of the critical observations, economic doctrines and delineations of future society made by the various founders of sects as excite the least opposition; a mixture which is the more easily produced the more its individual constituents have the sharp edges of precision rubbed off in the stream of debate, as pebbles are rounded in a brook. In order to make a science of socialism it had first to be placed upon a real basis.

II

Meanwhile, along with and after the French philosophy of the eighteenth century, the newer German philosophy had arisen, terminating in Hegel. Its greatest merit was the re-adoption of dialectics as the highest form of thinking. The old Greek philosophers were all natural-born dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopædic intellect of them, had even already analysed the most essential forms of dialectic thought. The newer philosophy, on the other hand, although it too included brilliant exponents of dialectics (*e.g.*, Descartes and Spinoza), had become, especially under English influence, more and more rigidly fixed in the so-called metaphysical mode of reasoning, by which also the French of the eighteenth century, at all events in their special philosophical works, were almost exclusively dominated. But outside philosophy in the restricted sense, the French were nevertheless able to produce masterpieces of dialectic; we need only recall *Rameau's Nephew* by Diderot and *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men* by Rousseau. We give here, in brief, the essential character of these two modes of thought.

When we reflect on nature or the history of mankind or our own intellectual activity, there first presents itself to us the picture of an endless maze of relations and interactions in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes out of existence. We see, therefore, at first the picture as a whole, in which the details are still kept more or less in the background; we pay more attention to the motion, the transitions, the interconnections than to *what it is* that moves, changes or is interconnected. This primitive, naive, yet intrinsically correct conception of the world was that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and also is not, for everything is *in flux*, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away. But this conception, correctly as it covers the general character of the picture of phenomena as a whole, is yet inadequate to explain the details of which this total picture is composed; and so long as we do not understand these, we also have no clear idea of the picture as a whole. In order to understand these details, we must detach them from their natural or historical connections, and examine each one separately as to its nature, its special causes and effects, etc. This is primarily the task of natural science and historical research—branches of science which the Greeks of the classical period, on very good grounds, relegated to a merely subordinate position, because they had first of all to collect materials for these sciences to work upon. A certain amount of natural and historical material must be collected before there can be any critical analysis, comparison or arrangement in classes, orders and species. The beginnings of the exact investigation of nature were therefore first developed by the Greeks of the Alexandrian period,¹ and later on, in the Middle Ages, were further developed by the Arabs. Real natural science, however, dates only from the second half of the fifteenth century, and from then on it has advanced with constantly increasing rapidity. The analysis of nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and natural objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organic bodies

¹ The Alexandrian period of the development of science comprises the period extending from the third century B.C. to the sixth century A.D. It derives its name from the town of Alexandria in Egypt, which was one of the most important centres of international economic connections at that time. In the Alexandrian period, the exact sciences and natural sciences, such as mathematics (Euclid and Archimedes), geography, astronomy, anatomy, physiology, etc., attained considerable development.—Ed.

in their manifold forms—these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of nature which have been made during the last four hundred years. But this method of investigation has also left us as a legacy the habit of observing natural objects and natural processes in their isolation, detached from the whole vast interconnection of things; and therefore not in their motion, but in their repose; not as essentially changing, but as fixed constants; not in their life, but in their death. And when, as was the case with Bacon and Locke, this way of looking at things was transferred from natural science to philosophy, it produced the specific narrow-mindedness of last century, the metaphysical mode of thought.

To the metaphysician, things and their mental images, ideas, are isolated, to be considered one after the other, apart from each other, rigid, fixed objects of investigation given once for all. He thinks in absolutely unmediated antitheses. His communication is: "Yea, Yea; Nay, Nay;" for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil. For him a thing either exists, or it does not exist; it is equally impossible for a thing to be itself and at the same time something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in an equally rigid antithesis one to the other. At first sight this mode of thought seems to us extremely plausible, because it is the mode of thought of so-called sound common sense. But sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is within the homely precincts of his own four walls, has most wonderful adventures as soon as he ventures out into the wide world of scientific research. Here the metaphysical mode of outlook, justifiable and even necessary as it is in domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the object under investigation, nevertheless always, sooner or later, reaches a limit beyond which it becomes one-sided, limited, abstract, and loses its way in insoluble contradictions. And this is so because in considering individual things it loses sight of their connections; in contemplating their existence it forgets their coming into being and passing away; in looking at them at rest it leaves their motion out of account; because it cannot see the wood for the trees. For everyday purposes we know, for example, and can say with certainty whether an animal is alive or not; but when we look more closely we find that this is often an extremely complex question, as jurists know very well. They have cudgelled their brains in vain to discover some rational limit beyond which the killing of a child in its mother's womb is murder; and it is equally impossible to de-

termine the moment of death, as physiology has established that death is not a sudden, instantaneous event, but a very protracted process. In the same way every organic being is at each moment the same and not the same; at each moment it is assimilating matter drawn from without, and excreting other matter; at each moment cells of its body are dying and new ones are being formed; in fact, within a longer or shorter period the matter of its body is completely renewed and is replaced by other atoms of matter, so that every organic being is at all times itself and yet something other than itself. Closer investigation also shows us that the two poles of an antithesis, like positive and negative, are just as inseparable from each other as they are opposed, and that despite *all* their opposition they mutually penetrate each other. It is just the same with cause and effect; these are conceptions which only have validity as such in their application to a particular case, but when we consider the particular case in its general connection with the world as a whole they merge and dissolve in the conception of universal interaction, in which causes and effects are constantly changing places, and what is now or here an effect becomes there or then a cause, and *vice versa*.

None of these processes and methods of thought fit into the frame of metaphysical thinking. But for dialectics, which grasps things and their conceptual images essentially in their interconnection, in their concatenation, their motion, their coming into and passing out of existence, such processes as those mentioned above are so many corroborations of its own method of treatment. Nature is the test of dialectics and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich and daily increasing materials for this test, and has thus proved that in the last analysis nature's process is dialectical and not metaphysical, that it does not move in an eternally uniform and constantly repeated circle but passes through a real history. Here prime mention should be made of Darwin, who dealt a severe blow to the metaphysical conception of nature by proving that the organic world of today, plants and animals, and consequently man too, is all a product of a process of development that has been in progress for millions of years. But the natural scientists who have learnt to think dialectically are still few and far between, and hence the conflict between the discoveries made and the old traditional mode of thought is the explanation of the boundless confusion which now reigns in theoretical natural science and reduces both teachers and students, writers and readers, to despair.

An exact representation of the universe, of its evolution and that of mankind, as well as of the reflection of this evolution in the human mind, can therefore only be built up in a dialectical way, taking constantly into account the general actions and reactions of becoming and ceasing to be, of progressive or retrogressive changes. And it was along this line that the more recent German philosophy worked from the first. Kant began his career by resolving the stable solar system of Newton and its eternal permanence—after the famous initial impulse had once been given—into a historical process: the formation of the sun and of all the planets out of a rotating nebulous mass. Together with this he already drew the conclusion that given this origin of the solar system, its ultimate doom followed of necessity. Half a century later his views were given a mathematical basis by Laplace, and another fifty years later the spectroscope proved the existence in cosmic space of such incandescent masses of gas in various stages of condensation.

This newer German philosophy terminated in the Hegelian system, in which for the first time—and this is its great merit—the whole natural, historical and spiritual world was presented as a process, that is, as in constant motion, change, transformation and development; and the attempt was made to show the internal interconnections in this motion and development. From this standpoint the history of mankind no longer appeared as a wild whirl of senseless deeds of violence, all equally condemnable before the judgment seat of the now matured philosophic reason, and best forgotten as quickly as possible, but as the process of development of humanity itself. It now became the task of thought to follow the gradual stages of this process through all its devious ways, and to trace out the inner regularities running through all its apparently fortuitous phenomena.

That the Hegelian system did not accomplish the task it set itself is here immaterial. Its epoch-making service was that it propounded it. It is indeed a task which no individual will ever be able to accomplish. Although Hegel was—with Saint-Simon—the most encyclopædic mind of his time, yet he was limited, in the first place, by the necessarily restricted compass of his own knowledge, and, secondly, by the similarly restricted scope and depth of the knowledge and ideas of his age. But there was also a third factor. Hegel was an idealist, that is to say, the thoughts within his mind were to him not the more or less abstract images of real things and processes, but on the contrary, things and their

développement were to him only the images made real of the "idea" existing somehow or other already before the world existed. This mode of thought placed everything on its head, and completely reversed the real connections of things in the world. And though Hegel's brilliant mind correctly grasped many individual interconnections, yet, for the reasons just given, there is also much that in point of detail necessarily turned out botched, artificial, laboured, in a word, wrong. The Hegelian system as such was a colossal miscarriage—but it was the last of its kind. It suffered, in fact, from an internal and insoluble contradiction. On the one hand, its basic assumption was the historical outlook that human history is a process of evolution, which by its very nature cannot find intellectual finality in the discovery of any so-called absolute truth; but on the other hand, it laid claim to being the very essence of precisely this absolute truth. A system of natural and historical knowledge which is all-embracing and final for all time is in contradiction to the fundamental laws of dialectical thinking; which, however, far from excluding, on the contrary includes, the idea that the systematic knowledge of the entire external universe can make giant strides from generation to generation.

The realization of the complete inversion of previous German idealism led necessarily to materialism, but, it must be noted, not to the simply metaphysical, exclusively mechanical materialism of the eighteenth century. Instead of the simple and naively revolutionary rejection of all previous history, modern materialism sees history as the process of the evolution of humanity, and its own task as the discovery of the laws of motion of this process. The conception was prevalent among the French of the eighteenth century, and still continued with Hegel, that nature was a whole moving in narrow circles and remaining immutable, with eternal celestial bodies, as Newton taught, and with unalterable species of organic beings, as Linnæus taught. In opposition to this conception, modern materialism embraces the more recent advances of natural science, according to which nature also has its history in time, the celestial bodies, like the organic species which under favourable circumstances people them, coming into being and passing away, and the recurrent cycles, in so far as they are in any way admissible, assuming infinitely vaster dimensions. In both cases modern materialism is essentially dialectical, and no longer needs any philosophy standing above the other sciences. As soon as each separate science is required to get clarity as to its position in the great totality of things and of our knowledge of things,

a special science dealing with this totality is superfluous. What still independently survives of all former philosophy is the science of thought and its laws—formal logic and dialectics. Everything else is merged in the positive science of nature and history.

While, however, the revolution in the conception of nature could only proceed to the extent that research furnished the corresponding positive materials of knowledge, already much earlier certain historical facts had occurred which led to a decisive change in the conception of history. In 1831 the first working-class rising had taken place in Lyons; between 1838 and 1842 the first national workers' movement, that of the English Chartists,¹ reached its height. The class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie came to the front in the history of the most advanced European countries, in proportion to the development there, on the one hand, of large-scale industry, and on the other, of the newly-won political domination of the bourgeoisie. Facts more and more forcibly stamped as lies the teachings of bourgeois economics as to the identity of the interests of capital and labour, as to the universal harmony and universal prosperity that free competition brings. All these things could no longer be ignored, any more than the French and English socialism which was their theoretical, even though extremely imperfect, expression. But the old idealist conception of history, which was not yet displaced, knew nothing of class struggles based on material interests, in fact knew nothing at all of material interests; production and all economic relations appeared in it only as incidental, subordinate elements in the "history of civilization."

The new facts made imperative a new examination of all past history, and then it was seen that *all* past history, with the exception of primitive conditions, was the history of class struggles, that these classes of society warring upon each other are always products of the relations of production and exchange, in a word, of the *economic* relations of their time; that therefore the economic structure of society always forms the real basis from which, in the last analysis, is to be explained the whole superstructure of legal and political institutions, as well as of the religious, philosophical and other conceptions of each historical period. Hegel

¹ The *Chartist movement* in England embraced the vast majority of the English working class and constituted the first *independent political* movement of the proletariat. It received its name from the "Charter," a petition which the workers laid before parliament in 1839, containing their chief demands.—Ed.

had freed the conception of history from metaphysics; he had made it dialectical—but his conception of history was essentially idealistic. Now idealism was driven from its last refuge, the conception of history; now a materialist conception of history was propounded, and the way found to explain man's consciousness by his being; instead of, as heretofore, his being by his consciousness.

Henceforward socialism no longer appeared as the accidental discovery of this or that brilliant mind, but as the necessary outcome of the struggle between two historically developed classes—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Its task was no longer to manufacture a system of society as perfect as possible, but to investigate the historical economic process from which these classes and their antagonism had of necessity sprung and to discover in the economic position thus created the means for solving the conflict. But the socialism of earlier days was just as incompatible with this materialist conception of history as French materialism's conception of nature was with dialectics and modern natural science. It is true that the earlier socialism criticized the existing capitalist mode of production and its consequences, but it could not explain them, and so also could not get the mastery over them; it could only simply reject them as evil. The more violently it denounced the exploitation of the working class, which was inseparable from it, the less was it in a position to state clearly wherein this exploitation consists and how it arises. But what had to be done was to show the capitalist mode of production on the one hand in its historical interconnection and as a necessity for a definite historical period, and therefore also the necessity of its doom; and on the other hand also to lay bare its essential character, which was still hidden. This was done by the revelation of *surplus value*. It was shown that the appropriation of unpaid labour is the basic form of the capitalist mode of production and of the exploitation of the worker effected through it; that even if the capitalist buys the labour power of his labourer at its full value as a commodity on the market, he yet extracts more value from it than he paid for; and that in the ultimate analysis this surplus value forms that sum of value from which is heaped up the constantly increasing mass of capital in the hands of the possessing classes. The process both of capitalist production and of the production of capital was explained.

These two great discoveries, the materialist conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalist production by means of surplus value, we owe to Marx. With these discoveries

socialism became a science, which had in the first place to be developed in all its details and interconnections.

III

The materialist conception of history starts from the principle that production, and with production the exchange of its products, is the basis of every social order; that in every society which has appeared in history the distribution of the products, and with it the division of society into classes or estates, is determined by what is produced and how it is produced, and how the product is exchanged. According to this conception, the ultimate causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in the minds of men, in their increasing insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the mode of production and exchange; they are to be sought not in the *philosophy* but in the *economics* of the epoch concerned. The growing realization that existing social institutions are irrational and unjust, that reason has become nonsense and good deeds a scourge, is only a sign that changes have been taking place quietly in the methods of production and forms of exchange, with which the social order, cut to fit previous economic conditions, is no longer in accord. This also implies that the means through which the abuses that have been revealed can be got rid of must likewise be present, in more or less developed form, in the altered relations of production. These means are not to be *invented* by the mind, but *discovered* by means of the mind in the existing material facts of production.

Where then, on this basis, does modern socialism stand?

The existing social order, as is now fairly generally admitted, is the creation of the present ruling class, the bourgeoisie. The mode of production peculiar to the bourgeoisie—called, since Marx, the capitalist mode of production—was incompatible with the local privileges and the privileges of estate as well as with the reciprocal personal ties of the feudal system; the bourgeoisie shattered the feudal system, and on its ruins established the bourgeois social order, the realm of free competition, freedom of movement, equal rights for commodity owners, and all the other bourgeois glories. The capitalist mode of production could now develop freely. From the time when steam and the new tool-making machinery had begun to transform the former manufacture into large-scale industry, the productive forces evolved under bour-

geois direction developed at a pace that was previously unknown and to an unprecedented degree. But just as manufacture, and the handicraft industry which had been further developed under its influence, had previously come into conflict with the feudal fetters of the guilds, so large-scale industry, as it develops more fully, comes into conflict with the barriers within which the capitalist mode of production holds it confined. The new forces of production have already outgrown the bourgeois form of using them; and this conflict between productive forces and mode of production is not a conflict which has arisen in men's heads, as for example the conflict between original sin and divine justice; but it exists in fact, objectively, outside of us, independently of the will or purpose even of the men who brought it about. Modern socialism is nothing but the reflex in thought of this actual conflict, its ideal reflection in the minds first of the class which is directly suffering under it—the working class.

Now in what does this conflict consist?

Previous to capitalist production, that is to say, in the Middle Ages, small-scale production was general, on the basis of the private ownership by the workers of their means of production: the agricultural industry of the small peasant, freeman or serf, and the handicraft industry of the towns. The instruments of labour—land, agricultural implements, the workshop and tools—were the instruments of labour of individuals, intended only for individual use, and therefore necessarily puny, dwarfish, restricted. But just because of this they belonged, as a rule, to the producer himself. To concentrate and enlarge these scattered, limited means of production, to transform them into the mighty levers of production of the present day, was precisely the historic role of the capitalist mode of production and of its representative, the bourgeoisie. In Part IV of *Capital*¹ Marx gives a detailed account of how, since the fifteenth century, the latter accomplished this historically through the three stages of simple co-operation, manufacture and large-scale industry. But, as Marx also points out, the bourgeoisie was unable to transform those limited means of production into mighty productive forces except by transforming them from individual means of production into *social* means of

¹ Engels refers here to Vol. I of *Capital*, which in part IV (Chap. XIII and XIV) traces the history of the development of production from small handicrafts to large-scale industry. Marx also deals briefly with this course of evolution in Chap. XXXII. This chapter is reproduced in the present volume. See p. 285.—*Ed.*

production, which could be used only *by a body of men as a whole*. The spinning-wheel, the hand-loom and the blacksmith's hammer were replaced by the spinning machine, the mechanical loom and the steam-hammer; and the factory, making the co-operation of hundreds and thousands of workers necessary, took the place of the individual workroom. And, like the means of production, production itself changed from a series of individual operations into a series of social acts, and the products from the products of individuals into social products. The yarn, the cloth, and the metal goods, which now came from the factory were the common product of many workers through whose hands it had to pass successively before it was ready. No individual can say of such products: I made it, that is *my* product.

However, where the spontaneous division of labour gradually arisen planlessly within society is the basic form of production, it imprints upon the products the form of *commodities*, the mutual exchange, purchase and sale of which enables the individual producers to satisfy their manifold needs. And this was the case during the Middle Ages. The peasant, for example, sold agricultural products to the artisan and purchased from him in exchange the products of his craft. Into this society of individual producers, producers of commodities, the new mode of production thrust itself, setting up, in the midst of the spontaneous, *planless* division of labour which then existed throughout society, the *planned* division of labour organized in the individual factory; alongside of *individual* production *social* production made its appearance. The products of both were sold on the same market, and consequently at prices which were at least approximately the same. But the planned organization was stronger than the spontaneous division of labour; the factories in which labour was socially organized produced their commodities more cheaply than the separate small producers. Individual production succumbed on one field after another; social production revolutionized the whole former mode of production. But this, its revolutionary character, was so little understood that, on the contrary, it was introduced as a means of stimulating and promoting the production of commodities. In its origin, it was directly linked with certain levers of commodity production and exchange which were already in existence: merchants' capital, handicraft, wage labour. Inasmuch as it itself came into being as a new form of commodity production, the forms of appropriation characteristic of commodity production remained in full force also for it.

In commodity production as it had developed in the Middle Ages, the question could never arise of who should be the owner of the product of labour. The individual producer had produced it, as a rule, from raw material which belonged to him and was often produced by himself, with his own instruments of labour, and by his own manual labour or that of his family. There was no need whatever for the product to be appropriated by him; it belonged to him as an absolute matter of course. His ownership of the product was therefore based *upon his own labour*. Even where outside help was used, it was as a rule subsidiary, and in many cases received other compensation in addition to wages: the guild apprentice and journeyman worked less for the sake of their board and wages than to train themselves to become master craftsmen. Then came the concentration of the means of production in large workshops and manufactories, their transformation into means of production that were in fact social. But the social means of production and the social products were treated as if they were still, as they had been before, the means of production and the products of individuals. Hitherto, the owner of the instruments of labour had appropriated the product because it was as a rule his own product, the auxiliary labour of other persons being the exception; now, the owner of the instruments of labour continued to appropriate the product, although it was no longer *his* product, but exclusively the product of the *labour of others*. Thus the products, now socially produced, were not appropriated by those who had really set the means of production in motion and really produced the products, but by the *capitalists*. Means of production and production itself have in essence become social. But they are subjected to a form of appropriation which has as its presupposition private production by individuals, with each individual owning his own product and bringing it onto the market. The mode of production is subjected to this form of appropriation, although it removes the presupposition on which the latter is based.¹ In this contradiction, which gives the new mode

¹ There is no need here to explain that although the *form* of appropriation remains the same, the *character* of the appropriation is revolutionized by the process described above to no less a degree than production. My appropriation of my own product and my appropriation of another person's product are certainly two very different forms of appropriation. It may be noted in passing that wage labour, in which the whole capitalist mode of production is already present in embryo form, is a very old institution; in sporadic and scattered form it occurred alongside of slavery for centuries. But the germ could only develop into the capitalist mode of production when the necessary historical conditions had come into existence. [Note by F. Engels.]

of production its capitalist character, *the whole conflict of today is already present in germ*. The more the new mode of production gained the ascendancy on all decisive fields of production and in all countries of decisive economic importance, supplanting individual production except for insignificant relics, *the more glaring necessarily became the incompatibility of social production with capitalist appropriation*.

The first capitalists found, as we have said, the form of wage labour already in existence; but wage labour as the exception, as an auxiliary occupation, as a supplementary, as a transitory phase. The agricultural labourer who occasionally went to work as a day labourer had a few acres of his own land, from which if need be he could get his livelihood. The regulations of the guilds ensured that the journeyman of today became the master-craftsman of tomorrow. But as soon as the means of production had become social and were concentrated in the hands of capitalists, this situation changed. Both the means of production and the products of the small, individual producer lost more and more of their value; there was nothing left for him to do but to go to the capitalist and work for wages. Wage labour, hitherto an exception and supplemental, became the rule and the basic form of all production; hitherto an auxiliary occupation, it now became the labourer's exclusive activity. The occasional wage worker became the wage worker for life. The number of life-long wage workers was also increased to a colossal extent by the simultaneous collapse of the feudal system, the dispersal of the retainers of the feudal lords, the eviction of peasants from their homesteads, etc. The separation between the means of production concentrated in the hands of the capitalists, on the one side, and the producers now possessing nothing but their labour power, on the other, was accomplished. *The contradiction between social production and capitalist appropriation became manifest as the antagonism between proletariat and bourgeoisie*.

We have seen that the capitalist mode of production thrust itself into a society of commodity producers, individual producers, whose social interconnection resulted from the exchange of their products. But every society based on commodity production has the peculiarity that in it the producers have lost control of their own social relationships. Each produces for himself, with the means of production which happen to be at his disposal and in order to satisfy his individual needs through the medium of exchange. No one knows how much of the article he produces is

coming onto the market, or how much demand there is for it; no one knows whether his individual product will meet a real need, whether he will cover his costs or even be able to sell it at all. Anarchy reigns in social production. But commodity production, like all other forms of production, has its own peculiar laws, which are inherent in and inseparable from it; and these laws assert themselves in spite of anarchy, in and through anarchy. These laws are manifested in the sole form of social interconnection which continues to exist, in exchange, and enforce themselves on the individual producers as compulsory laws of competition. At first, therefore, they are unknown even to these producers, and have to be discovered by them gradually, only through long experience. They assert themselves, therefore, without the producers and against the producers, as the natural laws of their form of production, working blindly. The product dominates the producers.

In mediæval society, especially in the earlier centuries, production was essentially for the producer's own use; for the most part its aim was to satisfy only the needs of the producer and his family. Where, as in the countryside, personal relations of dependence existed, it also contributed towards satisfying the needs of the feudal lord. No exchange was involved, and consequently the products did not assume the character of commodities. The peasant family produced almost everything it required—utensils and clothing as well as food. It was only when it succeeded in producing a surplus beyond its own needs and the payments in kind due to the feudal lord—it was only at this stage that it also produced commodities; these surplus products, thrown into social exchange, offered for sale, became commodities. The town artisans, it is true, had to produce for exchange from the very beginning. But even they supplied the greatest part of their own needs themselves; they had gardens and small fields; they sent their cattle out into the communal woodland, which also provided them with timber and firewood; the women spun flax, wool, etc. Production for the purpose of exchange, the production of commodities, was only just coming into being. Hence, restricted exchange, restricted market, stable mode of production, local isolation from the outside world, and local unity within: the Mark¹ in the countryside, the guild in the town.

With the extension of commodity production, however, and especially with the emergence of the capitalist mode of produc-

¹ See p. 148, note 1 of this volume.—Ed.

tion, the laws of commodity production, previously latent, began to operate more openly and more potently. The old bonds were loosened, the old dividing barriers broken through, the producers more and more transformed into independent, isolated commodity producers. The anarchy of social production became obvious, and was carried to further and further extremes. But the chief means by which the capitalist mode of production accentuated this anarchy in social production was the direct opposite of anarchy: the increasing organization of production on a social basis in each individual productive establishment. This was the lever with which it put an end to the former peaceful stability. In whatever branch of industry it was introduced, it could suffer no older method of production to exist alongside it; where it laid hold of a handicraft, that handicraft was wiped out. The field of labour became a field of battle. The great geographical discoveries and the colonization which followed on them multiplied markets and hastened on the transformation of handicraft into manufacture. The struggle broke out not only between the individual local producers; the local struggles developed into national struggles, the trade wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹ Finally, large-scale industry and the creation of the world market have made the struggle universal, and at the same time given it an unparalleled intensity. Between individual capitalists, as between whole industries and whole countries, advantages in natural or artificial conditions of production decide life or death. The vanquished are relentlessly cast aside. It is the Darwinian struggle for individual existence, transferred from nature to society with intensified fury. The standpoint of the animal in nature appears as the last word in human development. The contradiction between social production and capitalist appropriation now presents itself as *the antithesis between the organization of production in the individual factory and the anarchy of production in society as a whole*.

The capitalist mode of production moves in these two forms of manifestation of the contradiction immanent in it because of its origin, describes, without hope of escape, that "vicious circle" which Fourier long ago discovered in it. But what Fourier in his day

¹ The trade wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were waged between Portugal, Spain, Holland, France and England for control of the trade with India and America, and the exploitation of these two areas as colonies.—Ed.

was as yet unable to see is that this circle is gradually narrowing; that the motion is rather in the form of a spiral and must come to an end, like the motion of the planets, by collision with the centre. It is the driving force of the social anarchy of production which transforms the immense majority of men more and more into proletarians, and it is in turn the proletarian masses who will ultimately put an end to the anarchy of production. It is the driving force of the social anarchy of production which transforms the infinite perfectibility of the machine in large-scale industry into a compulsory commandment for each individual industrial capitalist to make his machinery more and more perfect, under penalty of ruin. But the perfecting of machinery means rendering human labour superfluous. If the introduction and increase of machinery meant the displacement of millions of hand workers by a few machine workers, the improvement of machinery means the displacement of larger and larger numbers of machine workers themselves, and ultimately the creation of a mass of available wage workers exceeding the average requirements of capital for labour—a complete industrial reserve army, as I called it as long ago as 1845¹—a reserve available at periods when industry works at high pressure, but thrown out onto the streets by the crash inevitably following the boom, at all times a leaden weight on the feet of the working class in their fight for existence against capital, a regulator to keep wages down to the low level which suits the needs of capital. Thus it comes about that machinery, to use Marx's phrase, becomes the most powerful weapon in the war of capital against the working class, that the instruments of labour constantly tear the means of subsistence out of the hands of the labourer, that the very product of the labourer is turned into an instrument for his subjection. Thus it comes about that the economizing of the instruments of labour becomes from the outset a simultaneous and absolutely reckless waste of labour power and robbery of the normal conditions necessary for the labour function; that machinery, "the most powerful instrument for shortening labour time, becomes the most unfailing means for placing every moment of the labourer's time and that of his family at the disposal of the capitalist for the purpose of expanding the value of his capital."² Thus it comes about

¹ *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 109 (German edition). [Note by F. Engels.], English ed., London 1926, p. 85.—Ed.

² *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 406.—Ed.

that the excessive labour of some becomes the necessary condition for the lack of employment of others, and that large-scale industry, which hunts all over the world for new consumers, restricts the consumption of the masses at home to a starvation minimum and thereby undermines its own internal market. "The law, finally, that always equilibrates the relative surplus population, or industrial reserve army, to the extent and energy of accumulation, this law rivets the labourer to capital more firmly than the wedges of Vulcan did Prometheus to the rock. It establishes an accumulation of misery, corresponding with accumulation of capital. Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole, *i.e.*, on the side of the class that produces its own product in the form of capital."¹ And to expect any other distribution of the products from the capitalist mode of production is like expecting the electrodes of a battery, while they are in contact with the battery, not to decompose water, not to develop oxygen at the positive pole and hydrogen at the negative.

We have seen how the perfectibility of modern machinery, pushed to an extreme point, is transformed, through the medium of the anarchy of production in society, into a compulsory commandment for the individual industrial capitalist constantly to improve his machinery, constantly to increase its productive power. The mere actual possibility of extending his field of production is transformed for him into a similar compulsory commandment. The enormous expanding power of large-scale industry, compared with which the expanding power of gases is mere child's play, now appears to us as a *need* for both qualitative and quantitative expansion that laughs at all counteracting pressure. Such counteracting pressure comes from consumption, sale, markets for the products of large-scale industry. But the capacity of the market to expand, both extensively and intensively, is controlled primarily by quite other and far less effective laws. The expansion of the market cannot keep pace with the expansion of production. The collision becomes inevitable, and as it can yield no solution so long as it does not burst the capitalist mode of production itself, it becomes periodic. Capitalist production brings into being a new "vicious circle."

And in fact, since 1825, when the first general crisis broke out, the whole industrial and commercial world, the production and ex-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 661.— *Ed.*

change of all civilized peoples and of their more or less barbarian appendants, have been dislocated practically once in every ten years. Trade comes to a standstill, the markets are glutted, the products lie in great masses, unsaleable, ready money disappears, credit vanishes, the factories are idle, the working masses go short of the means of subsistence because they have produced too much of them. Bankruptcy follows upon bankruptcy, forced sale upon forced sale. The stagnation lasts for years, both productive forces and products are squandered and destroyed on a large scale, until the accumulated masses of commodities are at last disposed of at a more or less considerable depreciation, until production and exchange gradually begin to move again. By degrees the pace quickens; it becomes a trot; the industrial trot passes into a gallop, and the gallop in turn passes into the mad onrush of a complete industrial, commercial, credit and speculative steeplechase, only to land again in the end, after the most breakneck jumps—in the ditch of a crash. And so on again and again. We have now experienced it fully five times since 1825, and at this moment (1877) we are experiencing it for the sixth time. And the character of these crises is so clearly marked that Fourier hit them all off when he described the first as a *crise pléthorique*, a crisis of superabundance.

In these crises, the contradiction between social production and capitalist appropriation comes to a violent explosion. The circulation of commodities is for the moment reduced to nothing; the means of circulation, money, becomes an obstacle to circulation; all the laws of commodity production and commodity circulation are turned upside down. The economic collision has reached its culminating point: *the mode of production rebels against the mode of exchange*.

The fact that the social organization of production within the factory has developed to the point at which it has become incompatible with the anarchy of production in society which exists alongside it and above it—this fact is made palpable to the capitalists themselves by the violent concentration of capitals which takes place during crises through the ruin of many big and even more small capitalists. The whole mechanism of the capitalist mode of production breaks down under the pressure of the productive forces which it itself created. It is no longer able to transform the whole of this mass of means of production into capital; they lie idle, and for this very reason the industrial reserve army must also lie idle. Means of production, means of subsistence, available labourers, all the elements of production and of general wealth are there in abundance. But “abundance becomes the

source of distress and want" (Fourier), because it is precisely abundance that prevents the conversion of the means of production and subsistence into capital. For in capitalist society the means of production cannot begin to function unless they have first been converted into capital, into means for the exploitation of human labour power. The necessity for the means of production and subsistence to take on the form of capital stands like a ghost between them and the workers. It alone prevents the coming together of the material and personal levers of production; it alone forbids the means of production to function, the workers to work and to live. Thus on the one hand the capitalist mode of production stands convicted of its own incapacity any longer to control these productive forces. And on the other hand these productive forces themselves press forward with increasing force to put an end to the contradiction, to rid themselves of their character as capital, *to the actual recognition of their character as social productive forces.*

It is this counterpressure of the productive forces, in their mighty upgrowth, against their character as capital, increasingly compelling the recognition of their social character, which forces the capitalist class itself more and more to treat them as social productive forces, as far as this is at all possible within the framework of capitalist relations. Both the period of industrial boom, with its unlimited credit inflation, and the crash itself, through the collapse of great capitalist establishments, urge forward towards that form of the socialization of huge masses of means of production which we find in the various kinds of joint-stock companies. Many of these means of production and communication are from the outset so colossal that, like the railways, they exclude all other forms of capitalist exploitation. At a certain stage of development even this form no longer suffices; the large-scale producers in one and the same branch of industry in a country unite in a "trust," a union for the purpose of regulating production. They determine the total amount to be produced, parcel it out among themselves and thus enforce the selling price fixed beforehand. But since such trusts as soon as business becomes bad usually go to pieces, they for this very reason compel a still more concentrated socialization: The whole branch of industry is converted into one great joint-stock company; internal competition gives place to the internal monopoly of this one company, as happened as early as 1890 with English alkali production, which is now, after the fusion of all the forty-eight large works, carried on by

a single company, under uniform control, with a capital of 120,000,000 marks.

In the trusts, freedom of competition changes into its opposite—into monopoly,¹ the planless production of capitalist society capitulates before the planned production of the invading socialist society. Certainly this is still at first to the benefit and advantage of the capitalists. But in this case the exploitation becomes so palpable that it must break down. No nation would put up with production conducted by trusts, with such a barefaced exploitation of the community by a small band of coupon-clippers.

In one way or another, with trusts or without, the official representative of capitalist society, the state, is finally constrained to take over the management of production.² This necessity of conversion into state property makes itself evident first in the big institutions for communication: the postal service, telegraphs and railways.

If the crises revealed the incapacity of the bourgeoisie any longer to control the modern productive forces, the conversion of the great organizations for production and communication into joint-stock companies, trusts and state property shows that for

¹ *Monopolies*, as Lenin, in developing the doctrine of Marxism, pointed out, constitute the principal characteristic feature of imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism.

"Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental attributes of capitalism in general. But capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its fundamental attributes began to be transformed into their opposites, when the features of a period of transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system began to take shape and reveal themselves all along the line. Economically, the main thing in this process is the substitution of capitalist monopolies for capitalist free competition. Free competition is the fundamental attribute of capitalism, and of commodity production generally. Monopoly is exactly the opposite of free competition; but we have seen the latter being transformed into monopoly before our eyes, creating large-scale industry and eliminating small industry, replacing large-scale industry by still larger-scale industry, finally leading to such a concentration of production and capital that monopoly has been and is the result: cartels, syndicates and trusts, and merging with them, the capital of a dozen or so banks manipulating thousands of millions. At the same time monopoly, which has grown out of free competition, does not abolish the latter, but exists over it and alongside of it, and thereby gives rise to a number of very acute, intense antagonisms, friction and conflicts." (Lenin, *Selected Works*, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. I, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," p. 708.)—Ed.

² I say *is constrained to*. For it is only when the means of production or communication have *actually* outgrown management by share companies, and therefore their transfer to the state has become inevitable from an *economic* standpoint—it is only then that this transfer to the state, even when carried out by the state of today, represents an economic advance, the attainment of another preliminary step towards the taking over of all productive

this purpose the bourgeoisie can be dispensed with. All the social functions of the capitalist are now carried out by salaried employees. The capitalist has no longer any social activity save the pocketing of revenues, the clipping of coupons and gambling on the Stock Exchange, where the different capitalists fleece each other of their capital. Just as at first the capitalist mode of production displaced the workers, so now it displaces the capitalists, relegating them, just as it did the workers, to the superfluous population, even if in the first instance not to the industrial reserve army.

But neither conversion into joint-stock companies and trusts, nor conversion into state property deprives the productive forces of their character as capital. In the case of joint-stock companies and trusts this is obvious. And the modern state, too, is only the organization with which bourgeois society provides itself in order to maintain the general external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against encroachments either by the workers or by individual capitalists. The modern state, whatever its form, is an essentially capitalist machine; it is the state of the capitalists, the ideal aggregate capitalist. The more productive forces it takes over, the more does it become a real aggregate capitalist, the more citizens does it exploit. The workers remain wage earners, proletarians. The capitalist relationship is not abolished; it is rather pushed to an extreme. But at this extreme it changes radically. State ownership of the productive forces is not the solution of the conflict, but it contains within itself the formal means, the key to the solution.

This solution can only consist in the recognition in practice of the social nature of the modern productive forces, in bringing,

forces by society itself. Recently, however, since Bismarck became keen on state ownership, a certain spurious socialism has made its appearance—here and there even degenerating into a kind of flunkeyism—which declares that *all* taking over by the state, even the Bismarckian kind, is in itself socialistic. If, however, the taking over of the tobacco trade by the state were socialistic, Napoleon and Metternich would rank among the founders of Socialism. If the Belgian state, for quite ordinary political and financial reasons, constructed its own main railway lines; if Bismarck, without any economic compulsion, made the main railway lines in Prussia state property, simply in order to be better able to organize and use them for war, to train the railway officials as the government's voting cattle, and especially to secure a new source of revenue independent of parliamentary votes, such actions were in no sense socialist measures, whether direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious. Otherwise, the Royal Maritime Company, the Royal Porcelain Manufacture, and even the regimental tailors in the army would be socialist institutions, or even, as was seriously proposed by a sly dog in the 'thirties, during the reign of Frederick William III, the taking over by the state of the—brothels. [Note by F. Engels.]

therefore, the mode of production, appropriation and exchange into accord with the social character of the means of production. And this can only be brought about by society, openly and without circuitry, taking possession of the productive forces, which have outgrown all control other than that of society itself. Thereby the social character of the means of production and of the products—which today operates against the producers themselves, periodically breaking through the mode of production and exchange and enforcing itself only as a blindly operating law of nature, violently and destructively—is quite consciously asserted by the producers, and is transformed from a cause of disorder and periodic collapse into the most powerful lever of production itself.

The forces operating in society work exactly like the forces operating in nature: blindly, violently, destructively, so long as we do not understand them and fail to take them into account. But when once we have come to know them and understood how they work, their direction and their effects, the gradual subjection of them to our will and the use of them for the attainment of our aims depend entirely upon ourselves. And this is especially true of the mighty productive forces of the present day. So long as we obstinately refuse to understand their nature and their character—and the capitalist mode of production and its defenders set themselves against any such attempt—these forces operate in spite of us, against us, dominate us, as we have shown in detail. But once their nature is grasped, in the hands of the producers working in association they can be transformed from demoniacal masters into willing servants. This is the difference between the destructive force of electricity in the lightning of a thunderstorm and the tamed electricity of the telegraph and the arc-light; the difference between a conflagration and fire in the service of man. Such treatment of today's productive forces in accordance with their nature, now become known at last, opens the way to the replacement of the anarchy of social production by a socially planned regulation of production in accordance with the needs both of society as a whole and of each individual. The capitalist mode of appropriation, in which the product enslaves first the producer, and then also the appropriator, will thereby be replaced by the mode of appropriation of the product based on the nature of the modern means of production themselves: on the one hand direct social appropriation as a means to the maintenance and extension of production, and on the other hand direct individual appropriation as a means to life and pleasure.

By transforming the great majority of the population more and more into proletarians, the capitalist mode of production brings into being the force which, under penalty of its own destruction, is compelled to carry out this revolution. By driving more and more towards the conversion of the vast socialized means of production into state property, it itself points the way for the carrying through of this revolution. *The proletariat seizes the state power and transforms the means of production in the first instance into state property.* But in doing this, it puts an end to itself as proletariat, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms; it puts an end also to the state as state. Former society, moving in class antagonisms, had need of the state, that is, an organization of the exploiting class at each period for the maintenance of its external conditions of production; that is, therefore, mainly for the forcible holding down of the exploited class in the conditions of oppression (slavery, villeinage or serfdom, wage labour) determined by the existing mode of production. The state was the official representative of society as a whole, its summation in a visible corporation; but it was this only in so far as it was the state of that class which itself, in its epoch, represented society as a whole: in ancient times, the state of the slave-owning citizens; in the Middle Ages, of the feudal nobility; in our epoch, of the bourgeoisie. When ultimately it becomes really representative of society as a whole, it makes itself superfluous. As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in subjection, as soon as, along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the anarchy of production hitherto, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed which would make a special repressive force, a state, necessary. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not “abolished,” *it withers away.*¹ It is from this standpoint that we

¹ This thesis of Engels' was cited at the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.) by Stalin who, developing further the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism on the state, said:

must appraise the phrase "free people's state"¹—both its temporary justification for agitational purposes, and its ultimate scientific inadequacy—and also the demand of the so-called anarchists that the state should be abolished overnight.

Since the emergence in history of the capitalist mode of production, the taking over of all means of production by society has often been dreamed of, by individuals as well as by whole sects,

"Is this proposition of Engels' correct?

"Yes, it is correct, but only on either of two conditions: 1) if we study the Socialist state only from the angle of the internal development of the country, abstracting ourselves in advance from the international factor, isolating, for the convenience of investigation, the country and the state from the international situation; or 2) if we assume that Socialism is already victorious in all countries, or in the majority of countries, that a Socialist encirclement exists instead of a capitalist encirclement, that there is no more danger of foreign attack, and that there is no more need to strengthen the army and the state.

"Well, but what if Socialism has been victorious only in one country, taken singly, and if, in view of this, it is quite impossible to abstract oneself from international conditions—what then? Engels' formula does not furnish an answer to this question. As a matter of fact, Engels did not set himself this question, and therefore could not have given an answer to it. Engels proceeds from the assumption that Socialism has already been victorious in all countries, or in a majority of countries, more or less simultaneously. Consequently, Engels is not here investigating any specific Socialist state of any particular country, but the development of the Socialist state in general, on the assumption that Socialism has been victorious in a majority of countries—according to the formula: 'Assuming that Socialism is victorious in a majority of countries, what changes must the proletariat, Socialist state undergo?' Only this general and abstract character of the problem can explain why in his investigation of the question of the Socialist state Engels completely abstracted himself from such a factor as international conditions, the international situation.

"But it follows from this that Engels' general formula about the destiny of the Socialist state in general cannot be extended to the special and specific case of the victory of Socialism in one country only, a country which is surrounded by a capitalist world, is subject to the menace of foreign military attack, cannot therefore abstract itself from the international situation, and must have at its disposal a well-trained army, well-organized punitive organs, and a strong intelligence service—consequently, must have its own state, strong enough to defend the conquests of Socialism from foreign attack.

"We have no right to expect of the classical Marxist writers, separated as they were from our day by a period of forty-five or fifty-five years, that they should have foreseen each and every zigzag of history in the distant future in every separate country. It would be ridiculous to expect that the classical Marxist writers should have elaborated for our benefit ready-made solutions for each and every theoretical problem that might arise in any particular country fifty or one hundred years afterwards, so that we, the descendants of the classical Marxist writers, might calmly doze at the fireside and munch ready-made solutions." Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 634-35, Moscow 1945.—Ed.

¹ On the "free people's state" see Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, in Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1936; and Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 274-75, Moscow 1945.—Ed.

more or less vaguely and as an ideal of the future. But it could only become possible, it could only become a historical necessity, when the actual conditions for its realization had come into existence. Like every other social progress, it becomes realizable not through the perception that the existence of classes is in contradiction with justice, equality, etc., not through the mere will to abolish these classes, but through certain new economic conditions. The division of society into an exploiting and an exploited class, a ruling and an oppressed class, was the necessary outcome of the low development of production hitherto. So long as the sum of social labour yields a product which only slightly exceeds what is necessary for the bare existence of all; so long, therefore, as all or almost all the time of the great majority of the members of society is absorbed in labour, society is necessarily divided into classes. Alongside of this great majority exclusively absorbed in toil there has arisen a class freed from direct productive labour, which manages the general business of society: the direction of labour, affairs of state, justice, science, art and so forth. It is therefore the law of the division of labour which lies at the root of the division into classes. But this does not mean that this division into classes was not established by violence and robbery, by deception and fraud, or that the ruling class, once in the saddle, has ever failed to strengthen its domination at the cost of the working class and to convert its direction of society into increased exploitation of the masses.

But if, upon this showing, division into classes has a certain historical justification, it has this only for a given period of time, for given social conditions. It was based on the insufficiency of production; it will be swept away by the full development of the modern productive forces. And in fact the abolition of social classes has as its presupposition a stage of historical development at which the existence not merely of some particular ruling class or other but of any ruling class at all, that is to say, of class difference itself, has become an anachronism, is out of date. It therefore presupposes that the development of production has reached a level at which the appropriation of means of production and of products, and with these, of political supremacy, the monopoly of education and intellectual leadership by a special class of society, has become not only superfluous but also economically, politically and intellectually a hindrance to development. This point has now been reached. Its political and intellectual bankruptcy is hardly still a secret to the bourgeoisie itself, and its

economic bankruptcy recurs regularly every ten years. In each crisis society is smothered beneath the weight of its own productive forces and products of which it can make no use, and stands helpless in face of the absurd contradiction that the producers have nothing to consume because there are no consumers. The expansive force of the means of production bursts asunder the bonds imposed upon them by the capitalist mode of production. Their release from these bonds is the sole condition necessary for an unspoken and constantly more rapidly progressing development of the productive forces, and therewith of a practically limitless growth of production itself. Nor is this all. The appropriation by society of the means of production will put an end not only to the artificial restraints on production which exist today, but also to the positive waste and destruction of productive forces and products which is now the inevitable accompaniment of production and reaches its zenith in crises. Further, it sets free for society as a whole a mass of means of production and products by putting an end to the senseless luxury and extravagance of the present ruling classes and their political representatives. The possibility of securing for every member of society, through social production, an existence which is not only fully sufficient from a material standpoint and becoming richer from day to day, but also guarantees to them the completely free development and exercise of their physical and mental faculties—this possibility now exists for the first time, but it does exist.¹

The seizure of the means of production by society puts an end to commodity production, and therewith to the domination of the product over the producer. Anarchy in social production is replaced by conscious organization on a planned basis. The struggle for individual existence comes to an end. And at this point man in a certain sense separates finally from the animal world, leaves the

¹ A few figures may give an approximate idea of the enormous expansive power of modern means of production, even under the weight of capitalism. According to Giffen's estimates, the total wealth of Great Britain and Ireland was, in round figures:

1814 £ 2,200,000,000

1865 £ 6,100,000,000

1875 £ 8,500,000,000

An indication of the waste of means of production and products resulting from crises is the estimate given at the Second German Industrial Congress, (Berlin, February 21, 1878) that the total loss to the *German iron industry* alone in the last crash amounted to 445,000,000 marks. [Note by F. Engels.]

conditions of animal existence behind him and enters conditions which are really human. The conditions of existence forming man's environment, which up to now have dominated man, at this point pass under the dominion and control of man, who now for the first time becomes the real conscious master of nature, because and in so far as he has become master of his own socialization. The laws of his own social activity, which have hitherto confronted him as extraneous laws of nature dominating him, will then be applied by man with complete understanding, and hence will be dominated by man. Men's socialization of themselves, which has hitherto stood in opposition to them as forced upon them by nature and history, will then become the voluntary act of men themselves. The objective, extraneous forces which have hitherto dominated history, will then pass under the control of men themselves. It is only from this point on that men, with full consciousness, will make their history themselves; it is only from this point on that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.

* * *

In conclusion, let us briefly sum up our sketch of the course of development:

I. *Mediæval Society*—Individual production on a small scale. Means of production fitted for individual use, hence primitively clumsy, petty, dwarfed in action. Production for immediate consumption, either of the producer himself or of his feudal lord. Only where an excess of production over this consumption occurs is such excess offered for sale and enters into exchange. Production of commodities, therefore, only in its nascent state; but it already contains within itself the germ of *anarchy in social production*.

II. *Capitalist Revolution*—Transformation of industry, at first by means of simple co-operation and manufacture. Concentration of the means of production, hitherto scattered, into large workshops. As a consequence, their transformation from individual into social means of production—a transformation which on the whole does not affect the form of exchange. The old forms of appropriation remain in force. The *capitalist* appears: in his quality of owner of the means of production he appropriates the products and turns them into commodities. Production has become

a social act; exchange and with it appropriation remain individual acts, the acts of separate individuals. *The social product is appropriated by the individual capitalist.* Fundamental contradiction, from which arise all the contradictions in which present-day society moves and which modern industry brings to light.

a) Severance of the producer from the means of production. Condemnation of the worker to wage labour for life. *Antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie.*

b) Growing prominence and increasing effectiveness of the laws governing commodity production. Unbridled competitive struggle. *Contradiction between social organization in the individual factory and social anarchy in production as a whole.*

c) On the one hand, perfecting of machinery, owing to competition made a compulsory commandment for each individual manufacturer, and equivalent to a continually increasing displacement of workers: *industrial reserve army*. On the other hand, unlimited expansion of production, likewise a compulsory law of competition for every manufacturer. On both sides, unheard of development of productive forces, excess of supply over demand, overproduction, glutting of the markets, crises every ten years, vicious circle: *excess here of means of production and products, excess there of workers* without employment and means of existence. But these two levers of production and of social well-being are unable to work together, because the capitalist form of production does not permit the productive forces to work and the products to circulate, unless they are first turned into capital—which their very superabundance prevents. The contradiction has grown until it has become an absurdity. *The mode of production rebels against the form of exchange.* The bourgeoisie is convicted of incapacity further to manage its own social productive forces.

d) Partial recognition of the social character of the productive forces forced upon the capitalists themselves. Appropriation of the great institutions for production and communication, first by *joint-stock companies*, later by *trusts*, then by the *state*. The bourgeoisie proves to be a superfluous class; all its social functions are now performed by hired employees.

III. *Proletarian Revolution*—Solution of the contradictions: The proletariat seizes the public power and by virtue of this power transforms the social means of production, slipping from the hands of the bourgeoisie, into public property. By this act, the proletariat frees the means of production from the character of capital hitherto borne by them, and gives their social character

complete freedom to assert itself. A social production upon a predetermined plan now becomes possible. The development of production makes the further existence of different classes of society an anachronism. In proportion as anarchy in social production vanishes the political authority of the state dies away. Men, at last masters of their own mode of socialization, become thereby at the same time masters of nature, masters of themselves—free.

To carry through this world-emancipating action is the historical mission of the modern proletariat. And it is the task of scientific socialism, the theoretical expression of the proletarian movement, to ascertain the historical conditions and, with these, the nature of this action, and thus to bring to the consciousness of the class destined to take action, the class that is now oppressed, the conditions and the nature of its own action.

Karl Marx
WAGE LABOUR AND CAPITAL

INTRODUCTION BY FREDERICK ENGELS

The following work appeared as a series of leading articles in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* [*New Rhenish Gazette*]¹ from April 4, 1849 onwards. It is based on the lectures delivered by Marx in 1847 at the German workers' society in Brussels. The work as printed remained a fragment; the words at the end of No. 269: "To be continued," remained unfulfilled in consequence of the events which just then came crowding one after another: the invasion of Hungary by the Russians, the insurrections in Dresden, Iserlohn, Elberfeld, the Palatinate and Baden, which led to the suppression of the newspaper itself (May 19, 1849). The manuscript of the continuation was not found among Marx's papers after his death.

Wage Labour and Capital has appeared in a number of editions as a separate publication in pamphlet form, the last being in 1884, by the Swiss Co-operative Press, Hottingen-Zurich.² The editions hitherto published retained the exact wording of the original. The present new edition, however, is to be circulated in not less than 10,000 copies as a propaganda pamphlet, and so the question could not but force itself upon me, whether under these circumstances Marx himself would have approved of an unaltered reproduction of the original.

In the 'forties, Marx had not yet published his critique of political economy. This took place only towards the end of the 'fifties. Consequently, his works which appeared before the first part of the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) differ in some points from those written after 1859, and contain expressions and whole sentences which, from the point

¹ The *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* appeared in Cologne from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849. Karl Marx was its editor-in-chief.—*Ed.*

² The German Anti-Socialist Law then in operation compelled the Social-Democratic Party to have its literature printed abroad and smuggled into Germany.—*Ed.*

of view of the later works, appear unfortunate and even incorrect. Now, it is self-evident that in ordinary editions intended for the general public this earlier point of view, as a part of the intellectual development of the author, also has its place, and that both author and public have an indisputable right to the unaltered reproduction of these older works. And I should not have dreamed of altering a word of them.

It is another thing when the new edition is intended practically exclusively for propaganda among workers. In such a case Marx would certainly have brought the old presentation dating from 1849 into harmony with his new point of view. I felt certain of acting as he would have done in undertaking *for this edition* the few alterations and additions which are required in order to attain this object in all essential respects. I therefore tell the reader beforehand: this is not the pamphlet as Marx wrote it in 1849 but approximately as he would have written it in 1891. The actual text, moreover, is circulated in so many copies that this will suffice until I am able to reprint it again, unaltered, in a later complete edition of Marx's works.

My alterations all turn on one point. According to the original, the worker sells his *labour* to the capitalist for wages; according to the present text he sells his labour *power*. And for this alteration I owe an explanation. I owe it to the workers in order that they may see it is not a case here of mere juggling with words, but rather of one of the most important points in the whole of political economy. I owe it to the bourgeois, so that they can convince themselves how greatly superior the uneducated workers, for whom one can easily make comprehensible the most difficult economic analyses, are to our conceited "educated people" to whom such intricate questions remain insoluble their whole life long.

Classical political economy¹ took over from industrial practice the current conception of the manufacturer, that he buys and pays for the *labour* of his workers. This conception had been quite adequate for the business needs, the bookkeeping and price calculations of the manufacturer. But, naively transferred to po-

¹ Marx says in *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 53:

"...By classical political economy, I understand that economy which, since the time of W. Petty [1623-87.—*Ed.*] has investigated the real relations of production in bourgeois society, in contradistinction to vulgar economy, which deals with appearances only."

The most important representatives of classical economics in England were Adam Smith (1723-90) and David Ricardo (1772-1823).—*Ed.*

litical economy, it produced there really wondrous errors and confusions.

Economics observes the fact that the prices of all commodities, among them also the price of the commodity that it calls "labour," are continually changing; that they rise and fall as the result of the most varied circumstances, which often bear no relation to the production of the commodities themselves, so that prices seem, as a rule, to be determined by pure chance. As soon, then, as political economy made its appearance as a science,¹ one of its first tasks was to seek for the law which was concealed behind this chance that apparently governed the prices of commodities, and which, in reality, itself governed this very chance. Within the prices of commodities, continually fluctuating and oscillating, now upwards and now downwards, they sought for the firm central point around which these fluctuations and oscillations turned. In a word, they started from the *prices* of commodities in order to look for the *value* of the commodities as the law controlling prices, the value by which all fluctuations in price are to be explained and to which finally they are all to be ascribed.

Classical economics found then that the value of a commodity is determined by the labour contained in it requisite for its production. With this explanation it contented itself. And we also can pause here for the time being. I will only remind the reader, in order to avoid misunderstandings, that this explanation has nowadays become totally inadequate. Marx was the first thoroughly to investigate the value-creating quality of labour and he discovered in so doing that not all labour apparently, or even really, necessary for the production of a commodity gives it under all circumstances a magnitude of value which corresponds to the quantity of labour expended. If therefore today we say, in short, with economists like Ricardo, that the value of a commodity is determined by the labour necessary for its production, we always in so doing imply the reservations made by Marx. This suffices here; more is to be found in Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, 1859, and the first volume of *Capital*.²

¹ "Although it first took shape in the minds of a few men of genius towards the end of the seventeenth century, political economy in the narrow sense, in its positive formulation by the physiocrats and Adam Smith, is nevertheless essentially a child of the eighteenth century." (F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 172.)—*Ed.*

² A popular explanation of this question was given by Marx himself in 1865 in his work, *Value, Price and Profit* (not published until 1898), particularly section VI. See p. 246, of this volume.—*Ed.*

But as soon as the economists applied this determination of value by labour to the commodity "labour," they fell into one contradiction after another. How is the value of "labour" determined? By the necessary labour contained in it. But how much labour is contained in the labour of a worker for a day, a week, a month, a year? The labour of a day, a week, a month, a year. If labour is the measure of all values, then indeed we can express the "value of labour" only in labour. But we know absolutely nothing about the value of an hour of labour, if we only know that it is equal to an hour of labour. Thus, we are not a hair's breadth nearer the goal thereby; we keep on moving in a circle.

Classical economics, therefore, tried another tack. It said: The value of a commodity is equal to its cost of production. But what is the cost of production of labour? In order to answer this question, the economists have to tamper a little with logic. Instead of investigating the cost of production of labour itself, which unfortunately cannot be ascertained, they proceed to investigate the cost of production of the *worker*. And this can be ascertained. It varies according to time and circumstance, but for a given state of society, a given locality and a given branch of production, it too is given, at least within fairly narrow limits. We live today under the domination of capitalist production, in which a large, ever-increasing class of the population can live only if it works for the owners of the means of production—the tools, machines, raw materials and means of subsistence—in return for wages. On the basis of this mode of production, the cost of production of the worker consists of that quantity of the means of subsistence—or their price in money—which, on the average, is necessary to make him capable of working, keep him capable of working, and to replace him, after his departure by reason of old age, sickness or death, with a new worker—that is to say, to reproduce the working class in the necessary numbers. Let us assume that the money price of these means of subsistence averages three marks a day.

Our worker, therefore, receives a wage of three marks a day from the capitalist who employs him. For this, the capitalist makes him work, say, twelve hours a day. The capitalist calculates, roughly, as follows:

Let us assume that our worker—a machinist—has to make a part of a machine which he can complete in one day. The raw material—iron and brass in the necessary previously prepared form—costs twenty marks. The consumption of coal by the

steam-engine, the wear and tear of this same engine, of the lathe and other tools which our worker uses, represent for one day, and reckoned by his share of their use, a value of one mark. The wage for one day, according to our assumption, is three marks. This makes twenty-four marks in all for our machine part. But the capitalist calculates that he will obtain, on an average, twenty-seven marks from his customers in return, or three marks more than his outlay.

Whence came the three marks pocketed by the capitalist? According to the assertion of classical economics, commodities are, on the average, sold at their values, that is, at prices corresponding to the amount of necessary labour contained in them. The average price of our machine part—twenty-seven marks—would thus be equal to its value, that is, equal to the labour embodied in it. But of these twenty-seven marks, twenty-one marks were values already present before our machinist began work. Twenty marks were contained in the raw materials, one mark in the coal consumed during the work, or in the machines and tools which were used in the process and which were diminished in their efficiency to the value of this sum. There remain six marks which have been added to the value of the raw material. But according to the assumption of our economists themselves, these six marks can only arise from the labour added to the raw material by our worker. His twelve hours' labour has thus created a new value of six marks. The value of his twelve hours' labour would, therefore, be equal to six marks. And thereby we would at last have discovered what the "value of labour" is.

"Hold on there!" cries our machinist. "Six marks? But I have only received three marks! My capitalist swears by all that is holy that the value of my twelve hours' labour is only three marks, and if I demand six, he laughs at me. How does that fit?"

If previously we got into a vicious circle with our value of labour, we are now properly caught in an insoluble contradiction. We looked for the value of labour and we have found more than we can use. For the worker, the value of the twelve hours' labour is three marks, for the capitalist it is six marks, of which he pays three to the worker as wages and pockets three for himself. Thus labour would have not one but two values and very different values into the bargain!

The contradiction becomes still more absurd as soon as we reduce to labour time the values expressed in money. During the twelve hours' labour a new value of six marks is created.

Hence, in six hours three marks—the sum which the worker receives for twelve hours' labour. For twelve hours' labour the worker receives as an equivalent value the product of six hours' labour. Either, therefore, labour has two values, of which one is double the size of the other, or twelve equals six! In both cases we get pure nonsense.

Turn and twist as we will, we cannot get out of this contradiction, as long as we speak of the purchase and sale of labour and of the value of labour. And this also happened to the economists. The last off-shoot of classical economics, the Ricardian school, was wrecked mainly by the insolubility of this contradiction. Classical economics had got into a blind alley. The man who found the way out of this blind alley was Karl Marx.

What the economists had regarded as the cost of production of "labour" was the cost of production not of labour but of the living worker himself. And what this worker sold to the capitalist was not his labour. "As soon as his labour actually begins" says Marx, "it has already ceased to belong to him; it can, therefore, no longer be sold by him."¹ At the most, he might sell his future labour, *i.e.*, undertake to perform a certain amount of work in a definite time. In so doing, however, he does not sell labour (which would first have to be performed) but puts his labour power at the disposal of the capitalist for a definite time (in the case of time wages) or for the purpose of a definite output (in the case of piece wages) in return for a definite payment: he hires out, or sells, his *labour power*. But this labour power is amalgamated with his person and inseparable from it. Its cost of production, therefore, coincides with his cost of production; what the economists called the cost of production of labour is really the cost of production of the worker and therewith of his labour power. And so we can also go back from the cost of production of labour power to the *value* of labour power and determine the amount of socially necessary labour requisite for the production of labour power of a particular quality, as Marx has done in the chapter on the buying and selling of labour power. (*Capital*, Vol. I, chapter VI, Moore and Aveling translation.)

Now what happens after the worker has sold his labour power to the capitalist, *i.e.*, placed it at the disposal of the latter in return for a wage—day wage or piece wage—agreed upon beforehand? The capitalist takes the worker into his workshop or fac-

¹ *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 547.—Ed.

tory, where all the things necessary for work—raw materials, auxiliary materials (coal, dyes, etc.); tools, machines are already to be found. Here the worker begins to toil. His daily wage may be, as above, three marks—and in this connection it does not make any difference whether he earns it as day wage or piece wage. Here also we again assume that in twelve hours the worker by his labour adds a new value of six marks to the raw materials used, which new value the capitalist realizes on the sale of the finished piece of work. Out of this he pays the worker his three marks; the other three marks he keeps for himself. If, now, the worker creates a value of six marks in twelve hours, then in six hours he creates a value of three marks. He has, therefore, already repaid the capitalist the counter-value of the three marks contained in the wages when he has worked six hours for him. After six hours' labour they are both quits, neither owes the other a pfennig.

"Hold on there!" the capitalist now cries. "I have hired the worker for a whole day, for twelve hours. Six hours, however, are only half a day. So go on working steadily until the other six hours are up—only then shall we be quits!" And, in fact, the worker has to comply with his contract "voluntarily" entered into, according to which he has pledged himself to work twelve hours for a labour product which costs six hours of labour.

It is just the same with piece wages. Let us assume that our worker makes twelve items of a commodity in twelve hours. Each of these costs two marks in raw materials and depreciation and is sold at two and a half marks. Then the capitalist, on the same assumptions as before, will give the worker twenty-five pfennigs per item; that makes three marks for twelve items, to earn which the worker needs twelve hours. The capitalist receives thirty marks for the twelve items; deduct twenty-four marks for raw materials and depreciation and there remain six marks, of which he pays three marks to the worker and pockets three marks. It is just as above. Here, too, the worker works six hours for himself, *i.e.*, for replacement of his wages (half an hour in each of the twelve hours) and six hours for the capitalist.

The difficulty on which the best economists came to grief, so long as they started out from the value of "labour," vanishes as soon as we start out from the value of labour *power* instead. In our present-day capitalist society, labour power is a commodity, a commodity like any other, and yet quite a peculiar commodity. It has, namely, the peculiar property of being a value-creating

power, a source of value, and, indeed, with suitable treatment a source of more value than it itself possesses. With the present state of production, human labour power not only produces in one day a greater value than it itself possesses or costs; with every new scientific discovery, with every new technical invention, this surplus of its daily product over its daily cost increases, and therefore that portion of the labour day in which the worker works to produce the replacement of his day's wage decreases; consequently on the other hand that portion of the labour day in which he has to *make a present* of his labour to the capitalist without being paid for it increases.

And this is the economic constitution of the whole of our present-day society: it is the working class alone which produces all values. For value is only another expression for labour, that expression whereby in our present-day capitalist society is designated the amount of socially necessary labour contained in a particular commodity. These values produced by the workers do not, however, belong to the workers. They belong to the owners of the raw materials, machines, tools and the reserve funds which allow these owners to buy the labour power of the working class. From the whole mass of products produced by it, the working class, therefore, only receives a part for itself. And, as we have just seen, the other part, which the capitalist class keeps for itself and at most has to divide with the class of landowners, becomes larger with every new discovery and invention, while the part falling to the working class (reckoned per head) either increases only very slowly and inconsiderably or not at all, and under certain circumstances may even fall.

But these discoveries and inventions which supersede each other at an ever-increasing rate, this productivity of human labour which rises day by day to an extent previously unheard of, finally gives rise to a conflict in which the present-day capitalist economy must perish. On the one hand are immeasurable riches and a superfluity of products which the purchasers cannot cope with; on the other hand, the great mass of society proletarianized, turned into wage workers, and precisely for that reason made incapable of appropriating for themselves this superfluity of products. The division of society into a small, excessively rich class and a large, propertyless class of wage workers results in a society suffocating from its own superfluity, while the great majority of its members is scarcely, or even not at all, protected from extreme want. This state of affairs becomes daily more absurd and—

more unnecessary. It *must* be abolished, it *can* be abolished. A new social order is possible in which the present class differences will have disappeared and in which—perhaps after a short transitional period of privation, but of great value morally—through the planned utilization and extension of the already existing enormous productive forces of all members of society, and with uniform obligation to work, the means for existence, for enjoying life, for the development and employment of all bodily and mental faculties will be available for all, in an equal measure, in ever-increasing fullness. And that the workers are becoming more and more determined to *win* this new social order will be demonstrated on both sides of the ocean by May the First, tomorrow, and by Sunday, May 3.

Frederick Engels

London, April 30, 1891.

WAGE LABOUR AND CAPITAL¹

I²

From various quarters we have been reproached with not having presented the *economic relationships* which constitute the material foundation of the present class struggle and national struggles. We have designedly touched upon these relationships only where they directly forced themselves to the front in political conflicts.

The point was, above all, to trace the class struggle in contemporary history, and to prove empirically, by means of the historical material already to hand and which is being newly created daily, that, with the subjugation of the working class that had carried through February and March,³ its opponents were simultaneously conquered—the bourgeois republicans in France and the bourgeois and peasant classes which were fighting feudal absolutism throughout the whole continent of Europe; that the victory of the “honest republic” in France was at the same time

¹ Originally published in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, Nos. 264-67 and 269, April 5-11, 1849.—Ed.

² A verification of the original text in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, and of a photostat, preserved in the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow, of a copy made by Marx's friend Joseph Weydemeyer, failed to disclose any of the subheadings with which former editions of this work had been provided.

These subheadings appear only in “a few copies” of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* that were published without the participation of Marx and Engels.

These subheadings have now been embodied in the text proper, where they had been in the original, and the division into five sections, as in the original, has been restored. In the Weydemeyer MS. referred to, Marx's work is entitled *Arbeitslohn* [Wages], and Marx himself refers to it by this title in his letter to Weydemeyer dated August 1, 1849.—Ed.

³ This refers to the Revolution of February 23 and 24, 1848 in Paris, of March 13 in Vienna, and March 18 in Berlin. For further details in regard to these and the subsequent events, see Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1936: *The Class Struggles in France, 1848-50, The Eighteenth Brumaire and Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution*.—Ed.

the downfall of the nations that had responded to the February Revolution by heroic wars of independence; finally, that Europe, with the defeat of the revolutionary workers, had relapsed into its old double slavery, the *Anglo-Russian* slavery. The June struggle in Paris, the fall of Vienna, the tragi-comedy of Berlin's November 1848, the desperate exertions of Poland, Italy and Hungary, the starvation of Ireland—these were the chief factors which characterized the European class struggle between bourgeoisie and working class and by means of which we proved that every revolutionary upheaval, however remote from the class struggle its goal may appear to be, must fail until the revolutionary working class is victorious, that every social reform remains a utopia until the proletarian revolution and the feudalistic counter-revolution take arms against one another in a *world war*. In our presentation, as in reality, *Belgium* and *Switzerland* were tragi-comic genre-pictures akin to caricature in the great historical tableau, the one being the model state of the bourgeois monarchy, the other the model state of the bourgeois republic, both of them states which imagine themselves to be as independent of the class struggle as of the European revolution.

Now after our readers have seen the class struggle develop in colossal political forms in 1848, the time has come to deal more closely with the economic relationships themselves on which the existence of the bourgeoisie and its class rule; as well as the slavery of the workers, are founded.

We shall present in three large sections: 1) the relation of *wage labour to capital*, the slavery of the worker, the domination of the capitalist; 2) *the inevitable destruction of the middle bourgeois classes and of the so-called peasant class under the present system*; 3) *the commercial subjugation and exploitation of the bourgeois classes of the various European nations by the despot of the world market—England*.

We shall try to make our presentation as simple and popular as possible and shall not presuppose even the most elementary notions of political economy. We wish to be comprehensible to the workers. Moreover, the most remarkable ignorance and confusion of ideas prevails in Germany in regard to the simplest economic relationships, from the accredited defenders of the existing state of things down to the *socialist miracle-workers*¹

¹ For a description of these "social quacks" see the Preface to the German 1890 edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, pp. 103-04 of this volume.—Ed.

and the *unrecognized political geniuses* in which fragmented Germany is even richer than in sovereign princes.

Now, therefore, for the first question: *What are wages? How are they determined?*

If workers were asked: "How much are your wages?" one would reply: "I get a mark a day from my employer," another "I get two marks," and so on. According to the different trades to which they belong, they would mention different sums of money which they receive from their respective employers for a particular labour time or for the performance of a particular piece of work, *e.g.*, weaving a yard of linen or type-setting a printed sheet. In spite of the variety of their statements, they would all agree on one point: wages are the sum of money paid by the capitalist for a particular labour time or for a particular output of labour.

The capitalist, it seems, therefore, *buys* their labour with money. They *sell* him their labour for money. But this is merely the appearance. In reality what they sell to the capitalist is their labour *power*. The capitalist buys this labour power for a day, a week, a month, etc. And after he has bought it, he uses it by having the workers work for the stipulated time. For the same sum with which the capitalist has bought their labour power, *e.g.*, two marks, he could have bought two pounds of sugar or a definite amount of any other commodity. The two marks, with which he bought two pounds of sugar, are the *price* of the two pounds of sugar. The two marks, with which he bought twelve hours' use of labour power, are the price of twelve hours' labour. Labour power, therefore, is a commodity, neither more nor less than sugar. The former is measured by the clock, the latter by the scales.

The workers exchange their commodity, labour power, for the commodity of the capitalist, for money, and this exchange takes place in a definite ratio. So much money for so long a use of labour power. For twelve hours' weaving, two marks. And do not the two marks represent all the other commodities which I can buy for two marks? In fact, therefore, the worker has exchanged his commodity, labour power, for other commodities of all kinds and that in a definite ratio. By giving him two marks, the capitalist has given him so much meat, so much clothing, so much fuel, light, etc., in exchange for his day's labour. Accordingly, the two marks express the ratio in which labour power is exchanged for other commodities, the *exchange value* of his labour

power. The exchange value of a commodity, reckoned in *money*, is what is called its *price*. *Wages* are only a particular name for the price of labour power, commonly called the *price of labour*, for the price of this peculiar commodity which has no other repository than human flesh and blood.

Let us take any worker, say, a weaver. The capitalist supplies him with the loom and yarn. The weaver sets to work and the yarn is converted into linen. The capitalist takes possession of the linen and sells it, say, for twenty marks. Now are the wages of the weaver a *share* in the linen, in the twenty marks, in the product of his labour? By no means. Long before the linen is sold, perhaps long before its weaving is finished, the weaver has received his wages. The capitalist, therefore, does not pay these wages with the money which he will obtain from the linen, but with money already in hand. Just as the loom and the yarn are not the product of the weaver to whom they are supplied by his employer, so likewise with the commodities which the weaver receives in exchange for his commodity, labour power. It was possible that his employer found no purchaser at all for his linen. It was possible that he did not get even the amount of the wages by its sale. It is possible that he sells it very profitably in comparison with the weaver's wages. That has nothing to do with the weaver. The capitalist buys the labour power of the weaver with a part of his available wealth, of his capital, just as he has bought the raw material—the yarn—and the instrument of labour—the loom—with another part of his wealth. After he has made these purchases, and these purchases include the labour power necessary for the production of linen, he produces only with the *raw materials and instruments of labour belonging to him*. For the latter include now, it is true, our good weaver as well, who has as little share in the product or the price of the product as the loom has.

Wages are, therefore, not the worker's share in the commodity produced by him. Wages are the part of the already existing commodities with which the capitalist buys for himself a definite amount of productive labour power.

Labour power is, therefore, a commodity which its possessor, the wage worker, sells to capital. Why does he sell it? In order to live.

But the exercise of labour power, labour, is the worker's own life-activity, the manifestation of his own life. And this *life-activity* he sells to another person in order to secure the necessary *means of*

subsistence. Thus his life-activity is for him only a means to enable him to exist. He works in order to live. He does not even reckon labour as part of his life, it is rather a sacrifice of his life. It is a commodity which he has made over to another. Hence, also, the product of his activity is not the object of his activity. What he produces for himself is not the silk that he weaves, not the gold that he draws from the mine, not the palace that he builds. What he produces for himself is *wages*: and silk, gold, palace, resolve themselves for him into a definite quantity of the means of subsistence, perhaps into a cotton jacket, some copper coins and a lodging in a cellar. And the worker who for twelve hours weaves, spins, drills, turns, builds, shovels, breaks stones, carries loads, etc.—does he consider this twelve hours' weaving, spinning, drilling, turning, building, shovelling, stone-breaking as an expression of his life, as life? On the contrary, life begins for him where this activity ceases, at table, in the public house, in bed. The twelve hours' labour, on the other hand, has no meaning for him as weaving, spinning, drilling, etc., but as *earnings*, which bring him to the table, to the public house, into bed. If the silk worm were to spin, in order to continue its existence as a caterpillar, it would be a complete wage worker. Labour power was not always a *commodity*. Labour was not always wage labour, *i.e.*, *free* labour. The *slave* did not sell his labour power to the slave owner, any more than the ox sells its services to the peasant. The slave, together with his labour power, is sold once for all to his owner. He is a commodity which can pass from the hand of one owner to that of another. He is *himself* a commodity, but the labour power is not *his* commodity. The *serf* sells only a part of his labour power. He does not receive a wage from the owner of the land; rather the owner of the land receives a tribute from him.

The serf belongs to the land and turns over to the owner of the land the fruits thereof. The *free labourer*, on the other hand, sells himself and, indeed, sells himself piecemeal. He sells at auction, eight, ten, twelve, fifteen hours of his life, day after day, to the highest bidder, to the owner of the raw materials, instruments of labour and means of subsistence, *i.e.*, to the capitalist. The worker belongs neither to an owner nor to the land, but eight, ten, twelve, fifteen hours of his daily life belong to him who buys them. The worker leaves the capitalist to whom he hires himself whenever he likes, and the capitalist discharges him whenever he thinks fit, as soon as he no longer gets any profit

out of him, or not the anticipated profit. But the worker, whose sole source of livelihood is the sale of labour power, cannot leave the *whole class of purchasers, that is, the capitalist class*, without renouncing his existence. He belongs not to this or that capitalist but to the *capitalist class*, and, moreover, it is his business to dispose of himself, *i.e.*, to find a purchaser within the capitalist class.

Now, before going more closely into the relation between capital and wage labour, we shall present briefly the most general relations which come into consideration in the determination of wages.

Wages, as we have seen, are the *price* of a definite commodity, of labour power. Wages are, therefore, determined by the same laws that determine the price of every other commodity. The question, therefore, is, *how is the price of a commodity determined?*

II

By what is the *price* of a commodity determined?

By competition between buyers and sellers, by the relation of inquiry to delivery, of demand to supply. Competition, through which the price of a commodity is determined, is *three-sided*.

The same commodity is offered by various sellers. With goods of the same quality, the one who sells most cheaply is certain of driving the others out of the field and securing the greatest sale for himself. Thus, the sellers mutually contend among themselves for sales, for the market. Each of them desires to sell, to sell as much as possible and, if possible, to sell to the exclusion of the other sellers. Hence, one sells cheaper than another. Consequently, *competition takes place among the sellers, which depresses the price of the commodities offered by them.*

But *competition* also takes place *among the buyers*, which in its turn *causes* the commodities offered to *rise in price*.

Finally, *competition* occurs *between buyers and sellers*; the former desire to buy as cheaply as possible, the latter desire to sell as dearly as possible. The result of this competition between buyers and sellers will depend upon how the two above-mentioned sides of the competition are related, that is, whether the competition is stronger in the army of buyers or in the army of sellers. Industry leads two armies into the field against each other, each of which again carries on a battle within its own ranks among its own troops. The army among whose troops the least fighting takes place gains the victory over the opposing host.

Let us suppose there are 100 bales of cotton on the market and at the same time buyers for 1,000 bales of cotton. In this case, therefore, the demand is ten times as great as the supply. Competition will be very strong among the buyers, each of whom desires to get one, and if possible all, of the hundred bales for himself. This example is no arbitrary assumption. We have experienced periods of cotton crop failure in the history of the trade, when a few capitalists in alliance have tried to buy, not one hundred bales, but all the cotton stocks of the world. Hence, in the example mentioned, one buyer will seek to drive the other from the field by offering a relatively higher price for the bales of cotton. The cotton sellers, who perceive that the troops of the enemy army are engaged in the most violent struggle amongst themselves and that the sale of all their hundred bales is absolutely certain, will take good care not to fall out amongst themselves and depress the price of cotton at the moment when their adversaries are competing with one another to force it up. Thus, peace suddenly descends on the army of the sellers. They stand facing the buyers as one man, fold their arms philosophically, and there would be no bounds to their demands were it not that the offers of even the most persistent and eager buyers have very definite limits.

If, therefore, the supply of a commodity is weaker than the demand for it, then only slight competition, or none at all, takes place among the sellers. In the same proportion as this competition decreases, competition increases among the buyers. The result is a more or less considerable rise in commodity prices.

It is well known that the reverse case with a reverse result occurs more frequently. Considerable surplus of supply over demand; desperate competition among the sellers; lack of buyers; goods disposed of at ridiculously low prices.

But what is the meaning of a rise, a fall in prices, what is the meaning of high price, low price? A grain of sand is high when examined through a microscope, and a tower is low when compared with a mountain. And if price is determined by the relation between supply and demand, what determines the relation between supply and demand?

Let us turn to the first capitalist we meet. He will not reflect for an instant but, like another Alexander the Great, will cut this metaphysical knot with the multiplication table. "If the production of the goods which I sell has cost 100 marks," he will tell us, "and if I get 110 marks from the sale of these goods, within the

year of course—then that is sound, honest, reasonable profit. But if I get in exchange 120 or 130 marks, that is a high profit; and if I get 200 marks, that would be an extraordinary, an enormous profit.” What, therefore, serves the capitalist as the *measure* of profit? The *cost of production* of his commodity. If he receives in exchange for this commodity an amount of other commodities which has cost less to produce, then he has lost. If he receives in exchange for his commodity an amount of other commodities the production of which has cost more, then he has gained. And he calculates the rise or fall of the profit according to the degree in which the exchange value of his commodity stands above or below zero—the *cost of production*.

We have seen then how the changing relation of supply and demand causes now a rise and now a fall of prices, now high, now low prices. If the price of a commodity rises considerably through inadequate supply or exceptional increase of the demand, the price of some other commodity must have fallen proportionately, for the price of a commodity only expresses in money the ratio in which other commodities are given in exchange for it. If, for example, the price of a yard of silk material rises from five marks to six marks, the price of silver in relation to silk has fallen and likewise the prices of all other commodities that have remained at their old prices have fallen in relation to the silk. One has to give a larger amount of them in exchange to get the same amount of silk. What will be the consequence of the rising price of a commodity? A mass of capital will be thrown into that flourishing branch of industry and this influx of capital into the domain of the favoured industry will continue until it yields no more than the ordinary profits or, rather, until the price of its products, through overproduction, sinks below the cost of production.

Conversely, if the price of a commodity falls below its cost of production, capital will be withdrawn from the production of this commodity. Except in the case of a branch of industry which has become obsolete and must, therefore, perish, the production of such a commodity, *i.e.*, its supply, will go on decreasing owing to this flight of capital until it corresponds to the demand, and consequently its price is again on a level with the cost of production or, rather, until the supply has sunk below the demand, *i.e.*, until its price rises again above the cost of production, *for the current price of a commodity is always either above or below its cost of production.*

We see how capital continually migrates in and out, out of the domain of one industry into that of another. High prices bring too great an immigration and low prices too great an emigration.

We could show from another point of view how not only supply but also demand is determined by the cost of production. But this would take us too far away from our subject.

We have just seen how the fluctuations of supply and demand continually bring the price of a commodity back to the cost of production. *The real price of a commodity, it is true, is always above or below its cost of production; but rise and fall reciprocally balance each other*, so that within a certain period of time, taking the ebb and flow of the industry together, commodities are exchanged for one another in accordance with their cost of production, their price, therefore, being determined by the cost of production.

This determination of price by cost of production is not to be understood in the sense of the economists. The economists say that the *average price* of commodities is equal to the cost of production; that this is a *law*. The anarchical movement, in which rise is compensated by fall and fall by rise, is regarded by them as chance. With just as much right one could regard the fluctuations as the law and the determination by the cost of production as chance, as has also been done by other economists. But it is solely these fluctuations, which, looked at more closely, bring with them the most fearful devastations and like earthquakes cause bourgeois society to tremble to its foundations—it is solely these fluctuations that in their course determine price through the cost of production. The total movement of this disorder is its order. In the course of this industrial anarchy, in this movement in a circle, competition compensates so to speak for one excess by means of another.

We see, therefore, that the price of a commodity is determined by its cost of production, in such manner that the periods in which the price of this commodity rises above its cost of production are compensated by the periods in which it sinks below the cost of production, and *vice versa*. This does not hold good, of course, for a particular isolated industrial product but only for the whole branch of industry. Consequently, it also does not hold good for the individual industrialist but only for the whole class of industrialists.

The determination of price by the cost of production is equivalent to the determination of price by the labour time necessary

for the manufacture of a commodity, for the cost of production consists of 1) raw materials and depreciation of instruments, *i.e.*, of industrial products the production of which has cost a certain amount of labour days and which therefore, represent a certain amount of labour time, and 2) of direct labour, the measure of which is likewise time.

Now, the same general laws that regulate the price of commodities in general of course also regulate *wages*, the *price of labour*.

Wages will rise and fall according to the relation of supply and demand, according to the turn taken by the competition between the buyers of labour power, the capitalists, and the sellers of labour power, the workers. The fluctuations in wages correspond in general to the fluctuations in prices of commodities. *Within these fluctuations, however, the price of labour will be determined by the cost of production, by the labour time necessary to produce this commodity—labour power.*

What then is the cost of production of labour power?

It is the cost required for maintaining the worker as a worker and of developing him into a worker.

The less the period of training, therefore, that any work requires the smaller is the cost of production of the worker and the lower is the price of his labour, his wages. In those branches of industry in which hardly any period of apprenticeship is required and where the mere bodily existence of the worker suffices, the cost necessary for his production is almost confined to the commodities necessary for keeping him alive and capable of working. The *price of his labour* will, therefore, be determined by the *price of the necessary means of subsistence*.

Another consideration, however, also comes in. The manufacturer in calculating his cost of production and thereby the price of the products takes into account the wear and tear of the instruments of labour. If, for example, a machine costs him 1,000 marks and wears out in ten years, he adds 100 marks annually to the price of the commodities so as to be able to replace the worn-out machine by a new one at the end of ten years. In the same way, in calculating the cost of production of simple labour power, there must be included the cost of reproduction, whereby the race of workers is enabled to increase and to replace worn-out workers by new ones. Thus the depreciation of the worker is taken into account in the same way as the depreciation of the machine.

The cost of production of simple labour power, therefore, amounts to the *cost of existence and reproduction of the work-*

er. The price of this cost of existence and reproduction constitutes wages. Wages so determined are called the *wage minimum*.¹ This wage minimum, like the determination of the price of commodities by the cost of production in general, does not hold good for the *single individual* but for the *species*. Individual workers, millions of workers, do not get enough to be able to exist and reproduce themselves; *but the wages of the whole working class* level themselves out within their fluctuations to this minimum.

Now that we have arrived at an understanding of the most general laws which regulate wages like the price of any other commodity, we can go into our subject more specifically.

III

Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of labour and means of subsistence of all kinds, which are utilized in order to produce new raw materials, new instruments of labour and new means of subsistence. All these component parts are creations of labour, products of labour, *accumulated labour*. Accumulated labour which serves as a means of new production is capital.

So say the economists.

What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good as the other.

A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a *slave* in certain relationships. A cotton-spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. Only in certain relationships does it become *capital*. Torn from these relationships it is no more capital than gold in itself is *money* or sugar the *price* of sugar.

¹ An analogous proposition laid down by Marx in his *Poverty of Philosophy* was commented upon as follows by Engels in a note to the German edition of 1885, reproduced on page 45 of the English edition (Moscow 1935) of that book: "The thesis that the 'natural,' i.e., normal, price of labour power coincides with the wage minimum, i.e., with the equivalent in value of the means of subsistence absolutely indispensable for the life and reproduction of the worker, was first put forward by me in *Sketches for a Critique of Political Economy* (*Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* [Franco-German Annuals] Paris, 1844) and in *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*. As seen here, Marx at that time accepted the thesis. Lassalle took it over from both of us. Although, however, in reality wages have a constant tendency to approach the minimum, the above thesis is nevertheless incorrect. The fact that labour is regularly and on the average paid below its value cannot alter its value. In *Capital*, Marx has both put the above thesis right (Section on the Purchase and Sale of Labour Power) and also (Chapter 25: The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation) analysed the circumstances which permit capitalist production to depress the price of labour power more and more below its value."—Ed.

In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place.

These social relations into which the producers enter with one another, the conditions under which they exchange their activities and participate in the whole act of production, will naturally vary according to the character of the means of production. With the invention of a new instrument of warfare, firearms, the whole internal organization of the army necessarily changed; the relationships within which individuals can constitute an army and act as an army, were transformed and the relations of different armies to one another also changed.

Thus the social relations within which individuals produce, *the social relations of production, change, are transformed, with the change and development of the material means of production, the productive forces. The relations of production in their totality constitute what is called the social relations, society, and indeed a society at a definite stage of historical development, a society with a peculiar, distinctive character. Ancient society, feudal society, bourgeois society are such totalities of production relations, each of which at the same time denotes a special stage of development in the history of mankind.*

Capital, also, is a social relation of production. *It is a bourgeois production relation, a production relation of bourgeois society.* Are not the means of subsistence, the instruments of labour, the raw materials, of which capital consists, produced and accumulated under given social conditions, in definite social relations? Are they not utilized for new production under given social conditions, in definite social relations? And is it not just this definite social character which makes the products serving for new production into *capital*?

Capital consists not only of means of subsistence, instruments of labour and raw materials, not only of material products; it consists just as much of *exchange values*. All the products of which it consists are *commodities*. Capital is, therefore, not only a sum of material products, it is a sum of commodities, of exchange values, *of social magnitudes*.

Capital remains the same, whether we put cotton in place of wool, rice in place of wheat or steamships in place of railways,

provided only that the cotton, the rice, the steamships—the body of capital—have the same exchange value, the same price as the wool, the wheat, the railways in which it was previously incorporated. The body of capital can change continually without the capital suffering the slightest alteration.

But while all capital is a sum of commodities, *i.e.*, of exchange values, not every sum of commodities, of exchange values, is as yet capital.

Every sum of exchange values is an exchange value. Every separate exchange value is a sum of exchange values. For instance, a house that is worth 1,000 marks is an exchange value of 1,000 marks. A piece of paper worth a pfennig is a sum of exchange values of one-hundred hundredths of a pfennig. Products which are exchangeable for others are *commodities*. The particular proportion in which they are exchangeable constitutes their *exchange value* or, expressed in money, their *price*. The quantity of these products can make no difference to their being *commodities* or representing an *exchange value* or having a definite *price*. Whether a tree is large or small it remains a tree. Whether we exchange iron for other products in ounces or in hundredweights, does this make any difference to its character as commodity, as exchange value? According to the quantity it is a commodity of greater or lesser value, of higher or lower price.

How, then, does a sum of commodities, of exchange values, become capital?

By maintaining and multiplying itself as an independent social power, *i.e.*, as the power of a portion of society, by means of its *exchange for direct, living labour power*. The existence of a class which possesses nothing but its capacity for labour is a necessary prerequisite of capital.

It is only the domination of accumulated, past, materialized labour over direct, living labour, which turns accumulated labour into capital.

Capital does not consist in accumulated labour serving living labour as a means for new production. It consists in living labour serving accumulated labour as a means for maintaining and multiplying the exchange value of the latter.

What takes place in the exchange between capitalist and wage worker?

The worker receives means of subsistence in exchange for his labour power, but the capitalist receives in exchange for his means of subsistence labour, the productive activity of the work-

er, the creative power whereby the worker not only replaces what he consumes but *gives to the accumulated labour a greater value than it previously possessed*. The worker receives a part of the available means of subsistence from the capitalist. For what do these means of subsistence serve him? For immediate consumption. As soon, however, as I consume the means of subsistence, they are irretrievably lost to me unless I use the time during which I am kept alive by them in order to produce new means of subsistence, in order during consumption to create by my labour new values in place of the values which perish in being consumed. But it is just this noble reproductive power which the worker surrenders to the capitalist in exchange for the means of subsistence received. He has, therefore, lost them for himself.

Let us take an example: a tenant farmer gives his day labourer five silver groschen a day. For five silver groschen the labourer works all day on the farmer's field and thus secures him a return of ten silver groschen. The farmer not only gets the value replaced that he has to give the day labourer; he doubles it. He has therefore employed, consumed, the five silver groschen that he gave to the labourer in a fruitful, productive manner. He has bought with the five silver groschen just that labour and power of the labourer which produces agricultural products of double value and makes ten silver groschen out of five. The day labourer, on the other hand, receives in place of his productive power, the results of which he has bargained away to the farmer, five silver groschen, which he exchanges for means of subsistence, and these he more or less rapidly consumes. The five silver groschen have, therefore, been consumed in a double way, *reproductively* for capital, for they have been exchanged for labour power¹ which produced ten silver groschen, *unproductively* for the worker, for they have been exchanged for means of subsistence which have disappeared forever and the value of which he can only recover by repeating the same exchange with the farmer. *Thus capital presupposes wage labour; wage labour presupposes capital. They reciprocally condition the existence of each other; they reciprocally evoke each other.*

Does a worker in a cotton factory produce merely cotton textiles? No, he produces capital. He produces values which serve afresh to command his labour and by means of it to create new values.

¹ "Power" was not added here by Engels but had been in the text Marx published in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*.—Ed.

Capital can only increase by exchanging itself for labour power, by calling wage labour to life. The labour power of the wage worker can only be exchanged for capital by increasing capital, by strengthening the power whose slave it is. *Hence, increase of capital is increase of the proletariat, i.e., of the working class.*

The interests of the capitalist and those of the worker are, therefore, *one and the same*, assert the bourgeois and their economists. They are, indeed! The worker perishes if capital does not employ him. Capital perishes if it does not exploit labour power and in order to exploit it, it must buy it. The faster capital intended for production, productive capital, increases, the more, therefore, industry prospers, the more the bourgeoisie enriches itself and the better business is, the more workers does the capitalist need, the more dearly does the worker sell himself.

The indispensable condition for a tolerable situation of the worker is, *therefore, the fastest possible growth of productive capital.*

But what is the growth of productive capital? Growth of the power of accumulated labour over living labour. Growth of the domination of the bourgeoisie over the working class. If wage labour produces the wealth of others that rules over it, the power that is hostile to it, capital, then the means of employment, i.e., the means of subsistence, flow back to it from this hostile power, on condition that it makes itself afresh into a part of capital, into the lever which hurls capital anew into an accelerated movement of growth.

To say that the interests of capital and those of the workers are one and the same is only to say that capital and wage labour are two sides of one and the same relationship. The one determines the other, as usurer and squanderer reciprocally condition the existence of each other.

As long as the wage worker is a wage worker his lot depends upon capital. That is the much-vaunted community of interests between worker and capitalist.

IV

If capital grows, the mass of wage labour grows, the number of wage workers grows; in a word, the domination of capital extends over a greater number of individuals. And if we assume the most favourable case, when productive capital grows, the demand for labour grows. Consequently, wages, the price of labour, goes up.

A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a little house to a hut. The little house shows now that its owner has only very slight or no demands to make; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilization, if the neighbouring palace grows to an equal or even greater extent, the dweller in the relatively small house will feel more and more uncomfortable, dissatisfied and cramped within its four walls.

A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a rapid growth of productive capital. The rapid growth of productive capital brings about an equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social needs, social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the worker have risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which are inaccessible to the worker, in comparison with the state of development of society in general. Our needs and enjoyments spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.

Wages are by no means determined only by the amount of commodities for which I can exchange them. They embody various relations.

What the workers receive for their wages, in the first place, is a definite sum of money. Are wages determined only by this money price?

In the sixteenth century, the gold and silver circulating in Europe increased as a result of the discovery of richer and more easily worked mines in America. Hence, the value of gold and silver fell in relation to other commodities. The workers received the same amount of coined silver for their labour power as before. The money price of their labour remained the same, and yet their wages had fallen, for in exchange for the same quantity of silver they received a smaller amount of other commodities in return. This was one of the circumstances which furthered the growth of capital and the rise of the bourgeoisie in the sixteenth century.

Let us take another case. In the winter of 1847, as a result of a crop failure, the most indispensable means of subsistence, corn, meat, butter, cheese, etc., rose considerably in price. Assume that the workers received the same sum of money for their labour

power as before. Had not their wages fallen? Of course. For the same money they received less bread, meat, etc., in exchange. Their wages had fallen, not because the value of silver had diminished, but because the value of the means of subsistence had increased.

Assume, finally, that the money price of labour remains the same while all agricultural and manufactured goods have fallen in price owing to the employment of new machinery, a favourable season, etc. For the same money the workers can now buy more commodities of all kinds. Their wages, therefore, have risen, just because the money-value of their wages has not altered.

Thus, the money price of labour, nominal wages, do not coincide with real wages, *i.e.*, with the sum of commodities which is actually given in exchange for the wages. If, therefore, we speak of a rise or fall of wages, we must not only keep in mind the money price of labour, the nominal wages.

But neither nominal wages, *i.e.*, the sum of money for which the worker sells himself to the capitalist, nor real wages, *i.e.*, the sum of commodities which he can buy for this money, exhaust the relations contained in wages.

Wages are, above all, also determined by their relation to the gain, to the profit of the capitalist—comparative, relative wages.

Real wages express the price of labour in relation to the price of other commodities; relative wages, on the other hand, express the share of direct labour in the new value it has created in relation to the share which falls to accumulated labour, to capital.

We said above, page 14:¹ "Wages are . . . not the worker's share in the commodity produced by him. Wages are the part of the already existing commodities with which the capitalist buys for himself a definite amount of productive labour power." But the capitalist must replace these wages out of the price at which he sells the product produced by the worker, he must replace it in such a way that there remains to him, as a rule, a surplus over the cost of production expended by him, a profit. For the capitalist, the selling price of the commodities produced by the worker is divided into three parts: *firstly*, replacement of the price of the raw materials advanced by him together with replacement of the depreciation of the tools, machinery, and other means of labour

¹ See p. 203 of this volume.—Ed.

also advanced by him; *secondly*, the replacement of the wages advanced by him, and *thirdly*, the surplus left over, the capitalist's profit. While the first part only replaces *previously existing values*, it is clear that both the replacement of the wages and also the surplus profit of the capitalist are, as a whole, taken from the *new value created by the worker's labour* and added to the raw materials. And *in this sense*, in order to compare them with one another, we can regard both wages and profit as shares in the product of the worker.

Real wages may remain the same, they may even rise, and yet relative wages fall. Let us suppose, for example, that all means of subsistence have gone down in price by two-thirds while wages per day have only fallen by one-third, that is to say, for example, from three marks to two marks. Although the worker can command a greater amount of commodities with these two marks than he previously could with three marks, yet his wages have gone down in relation to the profit of the capitalist. The profit of the capitalist (*e.g.*, the manufacturer) has increased by one mark, *i.e.*, for a smaller sum of exchange values which he pays to the worker, the latter must produce a greater amount of exchange values than before. The share of capital relative to the share of labour has risen. The division of social wealth between capital and labour has become still more unequal. With the same capital, the capitalist commands a greater quantity of labour. The power of the capitalist class over the working class has grown, the social position of the worker has deteriorated, has been depressed one step further below that of the capitalist.

What then is the general law which determines the rise and fall of wages and profits in their reciprocal relation?

They stand in inverse ratio to each other. Capital's share, profit, rises in the same proportion as labour's share, wages, falls, and vice versa. Profit rises to the extent that wages fall; it falls to the extent that wages rise.

The objection will, perhaps, be made that the capitalist can profit by a favourable exchange of his products with other capitalists, by increase of the demand for his commodities, whether as a result of the opening of new markets, or as a result of a momentarily increased demand in the old markets, etc.; that the capitalist's profit can, therefore, increase by over-reaching other capitalists, independently of the rise and fall of wages, of the exchange value of labour power; or that the capitalist's profit

may also rise owing to the improvement of the instruments of labour, a new application of natural forces, etc.

First of all, it will have to be admitted that the result remains the same, although it is brought about in reverse fashion. It is true the profit has not risen because wages have fallen, but wages have fallen because the profit has risen. With the same amount of other people's labour, the capitalist has bought a greater amount of exchange values, without having paid more for the labour on that account; that is, therefore, labour is paid less in proportion to the net profit which it yields the capitalist.

In addition, we recall that, in spite of the fluctuations in prices of commodities, the average price of every commodity, the ratio in which it is exchanged for other commodities, is determined by its *cost of production*. Hence the over-reachings within the capitalist class necessarily balance one another. The improvement of machinery, new application of natural forces in the service of production, enable a larger amount of products to be created in a given period of time with the same amount of labour and capital, but not by any means a larger amount of exchange values. If, by the use of the spinning jenny, I can turn out twice as much yarn in an hour as before its invention, e.g., one hundred pounds instead of fifty, then in the long run I will receive for these hundred pounds no more commodities in exchange than formerly for the fifty pounds, because the cost of production has fallen by one-half, or because I can deliver double the product at the same cost.

Finally, in whatever proportion the capitalist class, the bourgeoisie, whether of one country or of the whole world market, shares the net profit of production within itself, the total amount of this net profit always consists only of the amount by which, on the whole, accumulated labour has been increased by direct labour. This total amount grows, therefore, in the proportion in which labour augments capital, i.e., in the proportion in which profit rises in contrast to wages.

We see, therefore, that even if we remain *within the relationship of capital and wage labour, the interests of capital and the interests of wage labour are diametrically opposed*.

A rapid increase of capital is equivalent to a rapid increase of profit. Profit can only increase rapidly if the price of labour, if relative wages, decrease just as rapidly. Relative wages can fall although real wages rise simultaneously with nominal wages, with the money value of labour, if they do not rise, however, in the same proportion as profit. If, for instance, in times

when business is good, wages rise by five per cent, profit on the other hand by thirty per cent, then the comparative, the relative wages, have not *increased* but *decreased*.

Even if, therefore, the income of the worker increases with the rapid growth of capital, the social gulf that separates the worker from the capitalist increases at the same time, and the power of capital over labour, the dependence of labour on capital, likewise increases.

To say that the worker has 'an interest in the rapid growth of capital is only to say that the more rapidly the worker increases the wealth of others, the richer will be the crumbs that fall to him, the greater is the number of workers that can be employed and called into existence, the more can the mass of slaves dependent on capital be increased.

We have thus seen that:

Even the *most favourable* situation for the working class, the *most rapid possible growth of capital*, however much it may improve the material existence of the worker, does not remove the antagonism between his interests and the bourgeois interests, those of the capitalist. *Profit and wages* remain as before in *inverse proportion*.

If capital is growing rapidly, wages may rise; the profit of capital rises incomparably more rapidly. The material position of the worker has improved, but at the cost of his social position. The social gulf that divides him from the capitalist has widened.

Finally:

To say that the most favourable condition for wage labour is the most rapid possible growth of productive capital, is only to say that the more rapidly the working class increases and enlarges the power that is hostile to it, the wealth that does not belong to it and that controls it, the more favourable will be the conditions under which it is allowed to labour anew at increasing bourgeois wealth, at enlarging the power of capital, content with forging for itself the golden fetters by which the bourgeoisie drags it in its train.

V

Growth of productive capital and rise of wages, are these really so inseparably connected as the bourgeois economists maintain? We must not take their word for it. We must not even believe them when they say that the fatter capital is, the better

will its slave be fed. The bourgeoisie is too enlightened, it calculates too well, to share the prejudices of the feudal lord who makes a display by the brilliance of his retinue. The conditions of existence of the bourgeoisie compel it to calculate.

We must, therefore, examine more closely:

How does the growth of productive capital affect wages?

If, on the whole, the productive capital of bourgeois society grows, a *more varied* accumulation of labour takes place. The capitals increase in number and extent. The increase of the capitals increases the *competition between the capitalists*. The *increasing extent* of the capitals provides the means for *bringing more powerful labour armies with more gigantic instruments of warfare into the industrial battlefield*.

One capitalist can only drive another from the field and capture his capital by selling more cheaply. In order to be able to sell more cheaply without ruining himself, he must produce more cheaply, *i.e.*, raise the productive power of labour as much as possible. But the productive power of labour is raised, above all, by a *greater division of labour*, by a more universal introduction and continual improvement of *machinery*. The greater the labour army among whom labour is divided, the more gigantic the scale on which machinery is introduced, the more does the cost of production proportionately decrease, the more fruitful is labour. Hence, a general rivalry arises among the capitalists to increase machinery and the division of labour, and to exploit them on the greatest possible scale.

If, now, by a greater division of labour, by the utilization and improvement of new machines, by more profitable and extensive exploitation of natural forces, one capitalist has found the means of producing with the same amount of labour or of accumulated labour a greater amount of products, of commodities, than his competitors, if he can for example produce a whole yard of linen in the same labour time in which his competitors weave half a yard, how will this capitalist operate?

He could continue to sell half a yard of linen at the old market price; this would, however, be no means of driving his opponents from the field and of enlarging his own sales. But in the same measure in which his production has expanded, his need to sell has also increased. The more powerful and costly means of production that he has called into life *enable* him, indeed, to sell his commodities more cheaply, they *compel* him, however, at the same time *to sell more commodities*, to conquer a much *larger* market for his

commodities; consequently our capitalist will sell his half yard of linen more cheaply than his competitors.

The capitalist will not, however, sell a whole yard as cheaply as his competitors sell half a yard, although the production of the whole yard does not cost him more than the half yard costs the others. Otherwise he would not gain anything extra but only get back the cost of production by the exchange. His possibly greater income would be derived, therefore, from having set a larger capital into motion, but not from having made more of his capital than the others. Moreover, he attains the object he wishes to attain, if he puts the price of his goods only a small percentage lower than that of his competitors. He drives them from the field, he wrests from them at least a part of their sales, by *underselling* them. And, finally, it will be remembered that the current price always stands *above or below the cost of production*, according to whether the sale of the commodity occurs in a favourable or unfavourable industrial season. According as the market price of the yard of linen stands below or above its hitherto customary cost of production, the percentage will vary at which the capitalist who has employed new and more fruitful means of production sells above his real cost of production.

However, the *privilege* of our capitalist is not of long duration; other competing capitalists introduce the same machines, the same division of labour, introduce them on the same, or on a larger, scale, and this introduction will become so general that the price of linen *is reduced* not only *below its old*, but *below its new cost of production*.

The capitalists find themselves, therefore, in the same position relative to one another as *before* the introduction of the new means of production, and if they are able to supply by these means double the production at the same price, they are *now* forced to supply the double product *below* the old price. On the basis of this new cost of production, the same game begins again. More division of labour, more machinery, enlarged scale of exploitation of machinery and division of labour. And again competition brings the same counter-action against this result.

We see how in this way the mode of production and the means of production are continually transformed, revolutionized, *how the division of labour is necessarily followed by greater division of labour, the application of machinery by still greater*

application of machinery, work on a large scale by work on a still larger scale.

That is the law which again and again throws bourgeois production out of its old course and which compels capital to intensify the productive forces of labour, *because* it has intensified it; the law which gives capital no rest and continually whips in its ear: "March on! March on!"

This law is none other than that which, within the fluctuations of trade periods, necessarily *levels out* the price of a commodity to its *cost of production*.

However powerful the means of production which a capitalist brings into the field, competition will make these means of production universal and from the moment when it has made them universal, the only result of the greater fruitfulness of his capital is that he must now supply for the *same* price ten, twenty, a hundred times as much as before. But, as he must sell perhaps a thousand times as much as before in order to outweigh the lower selling price by the greater amount of the products sold, because a more extensive sale is now necessary, not only in order to make more profit but in order to replace the cost of production—the instrument of production itself, as we have seen, becomes more and more expensive—and because this extensive sale becomes a question of life or death not only for him but also for his rivals, the old struggle begins again *all the more violently the more fruitful the already discovered means of production are. The division of labour and the application of machinery, therefore, will go on anew on an incomparably greater scale.*

Whatever the power of the means of production employed may be, competition seeks to rob capital of the golden fruits of this power, by bringing the price of the commodities back to the cost of production and therefore by making the cheaper production, the supply of ever greater amounts of the product for the same sum, into an imperative law to the same extent as production is cheapened, *i.e.*, as more is produced with the same amount of labour. Thus the capitalist will have won nothing by his own exertions but the obligation to supply more in the same labour time, in a word, *more difficult conditions for profitable use of his capital*. While, therefore, competition continually pursues him with its law of the cost of production and every weapon that he forges against his rivals recoils against himself, the capitalist continually tries to get the better of competition by incessantly introducing new machines, more expen-

sive, it is true, but producing more cheaply, and new division of labour in place of the old, and by not waiting until competition has rendered the new ones obsolete.

If now we picture to ourselves this feverish agitation on the *whole world market*, it will be comprehensible how the growth, accumulation and concentration of capital results in an uninterrupted division of labour, and in the application of new and the perfecting of old machinery proceeding feverishly and on an ever more gigantic scale.

But how do these circumstances, which are inseparable from the growth of productive capital, affect the determination of wages?

The greater *division of labour* enables one worker to do the work of five, ten or twenty; it therefore multiplies competition among the workers fivefold, tenfold and twentyfold. The workers do not only compete by one selling himself cheaper than another; they compete by one doing the work of five, ten, twenty; and the *division of labour*, introduced by capital and continually increased, compels the workers to compete among themselves in this way. Further, in the same measure as the *division of labour* increases, the labour itself is *simplified*. The special skill of the worker becomes worthless. He becomes transformed into a simple, monotonous productive force that does not have to use intense bodily or intellectual faculties. His labour becomes a labour accessible to all. Hence, competitors crowd upon him on all sides, and besides we remind the reader that the more simple and easily learned the labour is, the lower the cost of production needed to master it, the lower do wages sink, for, like the price of every other commodity, they are determined by the cost of production.

In the same measure, therefore, in which labour becomes more unsatisfying, more repulsive, competition increases and wages decrease. The worker tries to keep up the amount of his wages by working more, whether by working longer hours or by producing more in the same time. Impelled by want, therefore, he still further increases the evil effects of the division of labour. The result is that *the more he works the less wages he receives*, and for the simple reason that he competes to that extent against his fellow workers, hence makes them into so many competitors who offer themselves on just the same bad terms as he does himself, and that, therefore, in the last resort he *competes against himself, against himself as a member of the working class.*

Machinery brings about the same results on a much greater scale, by replacing skilled workers by unskilled, men by women, adults by children. It brings about the same results, where it is newly introduced, by throwing the hand workers on to the streets in masses, and, where it is developed, improved and replaced by more productive machinery, by discharging small batches of workers. We have portrayed above, in a hasty sketch, the industrial war of the capitalists among themselves; *this war has the peculiarity that its battles are won less by recruiting than by discharging the army of labour. The generals, the capitalists, compete with one another as to who can discharge most soldiers of industry.*

The economists tell us, it is true, that the workers rendered superfluous by machinery find *new* branches of employment.

They dare not assert directly that the same workers who are discharged find places in the new branches of labour. The facts cry out too loudly against this lie. They really only assert that new means of employment will open up for *other component sections of the working class*, e.g., for the portion of the young generation of workers that was already standing ready to enter the branch of industry which has died out. That is, of course, a great consolation for the discharged workers. The worshipful capitalists will never want for fresh exploitable flesh and blood, and will let the dead bury their dead. This is a consolation which the capitalists give themselves rather than one which they give the workers. If the whole class of wage workers were to be abolished owing to machinery, how dreadful that would be for capital which, without wage labour, ceases to be capital!

Let us suppose, however, that those directly driven out of their jobs by machinery, and the entire section of the new generation that was already on the watch for this employment, *find a new occupation*. Does any one imagine that it will be as highly paid as that which has been lost? *That would contradict all the laws of economics.* We have seen how modern industry always brings with it the substitution of a more simple, subordinate occupation for the more complex and higher one.

How, then, could a mass of workers who have been thrown out of one branch of industry owing to machinery find refuge in another, unless the latter *is lower and worse paid*?

The workers who work on the manufacture of machinery itself have been cited as an exception. As soon as more machinery is demanded and used in industry, it is said, there must necessarily

be an increase of machines, consequently of the manufacture of machines, and consequently of the employment of workers in the manufacture of machines; and the workers engaged in this branch of industry are claimed to be skilled, even educated workers.

Since the year 1840 this assertion, which even before was only half true, has lost all semblance of truth because ever more versatile machines have been employed in the manufacture of machinery, no more and no less than in the manufacture of cotton yarn, and the workers employed in the machine factories, confronted by highly elaborate machines, can only play the part of highly unelaborate machines.

But in place of the man who has been discharged owing to the machine, the factory employs maybe *three* children and *one* woman! And did not the man's wages have to suffice for his wife and three children? Did not the minimum of wages have to suffice to maintain and to propagate the race? What, then, does this favourite bourgeois phrase prove? Nothing more than that now four times as many workers' lives are used up in order to gain a livelihood for *one* worker's family.

Let us sum up: *The more productive capital grows, the more the division of labour and the application of machinery expands. The more the division of labour and the application of machinery expands, the more competition among the workers expands and the more their wages contract.*

In addition, the working class gains recruits from the *higher strata of society* also; a mass of petty industrialists and small *rentiers* are hurled down into its ranks and have nothing better to do than urgently stretch out their arms alongside those of the workers. Thus the forest of uplifted arms demanding work becomes ever thicker, while the arms themselves become ever thinner.

That the small industrialist cannot survive in a contest one of the first conditions of which is to produce on an ever greater scale, *i.e.*, precisely to be a large and not a small industrialist, is self-evident.

That the interest on capital decreases in the same measure as capital grows, as the mass and number of capitals increase; that, therefore, the small *rentier* can no longer live on his interest but must throw himself into industry, and, consequently, help to increase the ranks of the small industrialists and therefore of candidates for the proletariat—all this surely requires no further exposition.

Finally, in the measure that the capitalists are compelled, by the movement described above, to exploit the already existing gigantic means of production on a larger scale and to set in motion all the mainsprings of credit to this end, in the same measure do the industrial earthquakes increase, in which the trading world can only maintain itself by sacrificing a part of wealth, products and even of productive forces to the gods of the nether world—in a word, *crises* increase. They become more frequent and more violent, if only because in the same measure in which the mass of production, and consequently the need for extended markets, grows, the world market becomes more and more contracted, fewer and fewer new markets remain available for exploitation, since every preceding crisis has subjected to world trade a market hitherto unconquered or only superficially exploited. But capital not only *lives* on labour. A lord, at once aristocratic and barbarous, it drags with it into the grave the corpses of its slaves, whole hecatombs of workers who perish in the crises. Thus we see: *if capital grows rapidly, competition among the workers grows incomparably more rapidly, i.e., the means of employment, the means of subsistence, of the working class decrease proportionately so much the more, and, nevertheless, the rapid growth of capital is the most favourable condition for wage labour.*

Karl Marx

VALUE, PRICE AND PROFIT¹

[PRELIMINARY]

CITIZENS,

Before entering into the subject matter, allow me to make a few preliminary remarks.

There reigns now on the Continent a real epidemic of strikes, and a general clamour for a rise of wages. The question will turn up at our Congress. You, as the head of the International Association, ought to have settled convictions upon this paramount question. For my own part, I considered it, therefore, my duty to enter fully into the matter, even at the peril of putting your patience to a severe test.

Another preliminary remark I have to make in regard to Citizen Weston. He has not only proposed to you, but has publicly

¹ The present work is an address delivered in *English* by Marx at two sessions of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association (the First International), on June 20 and 27, 1865. The circumstances which led to this report are briefly as follows:

At the session of the General Council on April 4, 1865, John Weston, a member of the General Council and an Owenist, proposed that the General Council should discuss the following questions:

"(1) Can the social and material prosperity of the working classes generally be improved by means of higher wages?"

"(2) Do not the efforts of Trades' Societies to secure higher wages operate prejudicially to the other sections of Industry?"

Weston declared that he would uphold a negative answer to the first question and a positive answer to the second one.

Weston's report was delivered and discussed at the session of the Council of May 20 and 23. In a letter to Engels of May 20, 1865, Marx refers to this as follows:

"This evening," wrote Marx, "a special session of the International. A good old fellow, an old Owenist, *Weston* (carpenter) has put forward the two following propositions, which he is continually defending in the *Beehive* [for a time the official organ of the First International which published the reports of the sittings of the General Council.—*Ed.*]: 1) that a general rise in the rate would be of no use to the workers; 2) that therefore, etc., the trade unions have a *harmful* effect."

If these two propositions, in which *he* alone in our society believes, were accepted, we should be turned into a joke [*so wären wir Kladderad-*

defended, in the interest of the working class, as he thinks, opinions he knows to be most unpopular with the working class. Such an exhibition of moral courage all of us must highly honour. I hope that, despite the unvarnished style of my paper, at its conclusion he will find me to agree with what appears to me the just idea lying at the bottom of his theses, which, however, in their present form, I cannot but consider theoretically false and practically dangerous.

I shall now at once proceed to the business before us.

I. [PRODUCTION AND WAGES]

Citizen Weston's argument rested, in fact, upon two premises: firstly, that the *amount of national production* is a *fixed thing*, a *constant* quantity or magnitude, as the mathematicians would say; secondly, that the *amount of real wages*, that is to say, of wages as measured by the quantity of the commodities they can buy, is a *fixed* amount, a *constant* magnitude.

Now, his first assertion is evidently erroneous. Year after year, you will find that the value and mass of production increase, that the productive powers of the national labour increase, and that the amount of money necessary to circulate this increasing production continuously changes. What is true at the end of the year, and for different years compared with each other, is true for every

datsch] both on account of the trade unions here and of the *infection of strikes* which now prevails on the Continent.

...I am, of course, expected to supply the refutation. I ought really therefore to have worked out my reply for this evening, but thought it more important to write on at my book [*Capital*] and so shall have to depend on improvisation.

"Of course, I know beforehand what the two main points are: 1) that the *wages of labour* determine the value of commodities; 2) that if the capitalists pay five instead of four shillings today, they will sell their commodities for five instead of four shillings tomorrow (being enabled to do so by the increased demand).

"Inane though this is, only attaching itself to the most superficial external appearance, it is nevertheless not easy to explain to ignorant people all the economic questions which compete with one another here. *You can't compress a course of political economy into one hour. But we shall do our best.*" (Marx-Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, pp. 202-03.)

The present address was written and delivered by Marx in addition to his remarks during the debate.

In connection with this address Marx wrote as follows to Engels on June 24:

"I have read a paper in the Central Council (it would make two printer's sheets perhaps) on the question brought up by Mr. Weston as to the effect

average day of the year. The amount or magnitude of national production changes continuously. It is not a *constant* but a *variable* magnitude, and, apart from changes in population, it must be so, because of the continuous change in the *accumulation of capital* and the *productive powers of labour*. It is perfectly true that if a *rise in the general rate of wages* should take place today, that rise, whatever its ulterior effects might be, would, *by itself*, not *immediately* change the amount of production. It would, in the first instance, proceed from the existing state of things. But if *before* the rise of wages the national production was *variable*, and not *fixed*, it will continue to be variable and not fixed *after* the rise of wages.

But suppose the amount of national production to be *constant* instead of *variable*. Even then, what our friend Weston considers a logical conclusion would still remain a gratuitous assertion. If I have a given number, say eight, the absolute limits of this number do not prevent its parts from changing their *relative* limits. If profits were six and wages two, wages might increase to six and profits decrease to two, and still the total amount remain eight. Thus the fixed amount of production would by no means prove the fixed amount of wages. How then does our friend Weston prove this fixity? By asserting it.

But even conceding him his assertion, it would cut both ways, while he presses it only in one direction. If the amount of wages is a constant magnitude, then it can be neither increased nor diminished. If, then, in enforcing a temporary rise of wages,

of a general rise of wages, etc. The first part of it was an answer to Weston's nonsense; the second, a theoretical explanation, in so far as the occasion was suited to this. Now the people want to have this printed. On the one hand, this might perhaps be of advantage to me, as they are connected with J. St. Mill, Professor Beesly, Harrison, and others. On the other, I have my doubts:

1) as it is not particularly flattering to have "Mr. Weston" as your opponent;

2) in the second part the thing contains, in an extremely condensed but relatively popular form, much that is new, taken in advance from my book [*Capital*], while at the same time it has necessarily to slur over all sorts of things.

Question: is it advisable to anticipate in such matters?" (*Ibid.*).

The work, however, was not published either by Marx or Engels. It was found among Marx's papers after Engels' death and originally published in English in 1898, under the present title, by Marx's daughter, Eleanor and her husband, Eduard Aveling, who also wrote the first six subtitles. In 1897-98 it was published in the *Neue Zeit* serially under the title of *Lohn, Preis und Profit* [*Wages, Price and Profit*], which describes the contents of the address better than the English title.—Ed.

the workingmen act foolishly, the capitalists, in enforcing a temporary fall of wages, would act not less foolishly. Our friend Weston does not deny that, under certain circumstances, the workingmen *can* enforce a rise of wages, but their amount being naturally fixed, there must follow a reaction. On the other hand, he knows also that the capitalists *can* enforce a fall of wages, and, indeed, continuously try to enforce it. According to the principle of the constancy of wages, a reaction ought to follow in this case not less than in the former. The workingmen, therefore, reacting against the attempt at, or the act of, lowering wages, would act rightly. They would, therefore, act rightly in enforcing *a rise of wages, because every reaction* against the lowering of wages is an *action* for raising wages. According to Citizen Weston's own principle of the *constancy of wages*, the workingmen ought, therefore, under certain circumstances, to combine and struggle for a rise of wages.

If he denies this conclusion, he must give up the premise from which it flows. He must not say that the amount of wages is a *constant quantity*, but that, although it cannot and must not *rise*, it can and must *fall*, whenever capital pleases to lower it. If the capitalist pleases to feed you upon potatoes instead of upon meat, and upon oats instead of upon wheat, you must accept his will as a law of political economy and submit to it. If in one country the rate of wages is higher than in another, in the United States, for example, than in England, you must explain this difference in the rate of wages by a difference between the will of the American capitalist and the will of the English capitalist, a method which would certainly very much simplify not only the study of economic phenomena, but of all other phenomena.

But even then, we might ask *why* the will of the American capitalist differs from the will of the English capitalist. And to answer the question you must go beyond the domain of *will*. A parson may tell me that God wills one thing in France, and another thing in England. If I summon him to explain to me this duality of will, he might have the brass to answer me that God wills to have one will in France and another will in England. But our friend Weston is certainly the last man to make an argument of such a complete negation of all reasoning.

The *will* of the capitalist is certainly to take as much as possible. What we have to do is not to talk about his *will*, but to inquire into his *power*, the *limits of that power*, and the *character of those limits*.

II [PRODUCTION, WAGES, PROFITS]

The address Citizen Weston read to us might have been compressed into a nutshell.

All his reasoning amounted to this: If the working class forces the capitalist class to pay five shillings instead of four shillings in the shape of money wages, the capitalist will return in the shape of commodities four shillings' worth instead of five shillings' worth. The working class would have to pay five shillings for what, before the rise of wages, they bought with four shillings. But why is this the case? Why does the capitalist only return four shillings' worth for five shillings? Because the amount of wages is fixed. But why is it fixed at four shillings' worth of commodities? Why not at three, or two, or any other sum? If the limit of the amount of wages is settled by an economic law, independent alike of the will of the capitalist and the will of the working man, the first thing Citizen Weston had to do was to state that law and prove it. He ought then, moreover, to have proved that the amount of wages actually paid at every given moment always corresponds exactly to the necessary amount of wages, and never deviates from it. If, on the other hand, the given limit of the amount of wages is founded on the *mere will* of the capitalist, or the limits of his avarice, it is an arbitrary limit. There is nothing necessary in it. It may be changed *by* the will of the capitalist, and may, therefore, be changed *against* his will.

Citizen Weston illustrated his theory by telling you that when a bowl contains a certain quantity of soup, to be eaten by a certain number of persons, an increase in the broadness of the spoons would produce no increase in the amount of soup. He must allow me to find this illustration rather spoony. It reminded me somewhat of the simile employed by Menenius Agrippa. When the Roman plebeians struck against the Roman patricians, the patrician Agrippa told them that the patrician belly fed the plebeian members of the body politic. Agrippa failed to show that you feed the members of one man by filling the belly of another. Citizen Weston, on his part, has forgotten that the bowl from which the workmen eat is filled with the whole produce of the national labour, and that what prevents them fetching more out of it is neither the narrowness of the bowl nor the scantiness of its contents, but only the smallness of their spoons.

By what contrivance is the capitalist enabled to return four shillings' worth for five shillings? By raising the price of the com-

modity he sells. Now, does a rise and, more generally, a change in the prices of commodities, do the prices of commodities themselves, depend on the mere will of the capitalist? Or are, on the contrary, certain circumstances wanted to give effect to that will? If not, the ups and downs, the incessant fluctuations of market prices, would become an insoluble riddle.

As we suppose that no change whatever has taken place either in the productive powers of labour or in the amount of capital and labour employed or in the value of the money wherein the values of products are estimated, but *only a change in the rate of wages*, how could that *rise of wages* affect the *prices of commodities*? Only by affecting the actual proportion between the demand for, and the supply of, these commodities.

It is perfectly true that, considered as a whole, the working class spends, and must spend, its income upon *necessaries*. A general rise in the rate of wages would, therefore, produce a rise in the demand for, and consequently in the *market prices of, necessaries*. The capitalists who produce these necessaries would be compensated for the risen wages by the rising market prices of their commodities. But how with the other capitalists, who do *not* produce necessaries? And you must not fancy them a small body. If you consider that two-thirds of the national produce are consumed by one-fifth of the population—a member of the House of Commons stated it recently to be but one-seventh of the population—you will understand what an immense proportion of the national produce must be produced in the shape of luxuries or be *exchanged* for luxuries, and what an immense amount of the necessaries themselves must be wasted upon flunkies, horses, cats, and so forth, a waste we know from experience to become always much limited with the rising prices of necessaries.

Well, what would be the position of those capitalists who do *not* produce necessaries? For the *fall in the rate of profit*, consequent upon the general rise of wages, they could not compensate themselves by a *rise in the price of their commodities*, because the demand for those commodities would not have increased. Their income would have decreased; and from this decreased income they would have to pay more for the same amount of higher-priced necessaries. But this would not be all. As their income had diminished they would have less to spend upon luxuries, and therefore their mutual demand for their respective commodities would diminish. Consequent upon this diminished demand the prices of their commodities would fall. In these branches of industry,

therefore, *the rate of profit would fall*, not only in simple proportion to the general rise in the rate of wages, but in the compound ratio of the general rise of wages, the rise in the prices of necessities, and the fall in the prices of luxuries.

What would be the consequence of *this difference in the rates of profit* for capitals employed in the different branches of industry? Why, the consequence that generally obtains whenever, from whatever reason, the *average rate of profit* comes to differ in the different spheres of production. Capital and labour would be transferred from the less remunerative to the more remunerative branches; and this process of transfer would go on until the supply in the one department of industry would have risen proportionately to the increased demand, and would have sunk in the other departments according to the decreased demand. This change effected, the *general rate of profit* would again be *equalized* in the different branches. As the whole derangement originally arose from a mere change in the proportion of the demand for, and the supply of, different commodities, the cause ceasing, the effect would cease, and *prices* would return to their former level and equilibrium. Instead of being limited to some branches of industry, *the fall in the rate of profit* consequent upon the rise of wages would have become *general*. According to our supposition, there would have taken place no change in the productive powers of labour, nor in the aggregate amount of production, but *that given amount of production would have changed its form*. A greater part of the produce would exist in the shape of necessities, a lesser part in the shape of luxuries, or what comes to the same, a lesser part would be exchanged for foreign luxuries, and be consumed in its original form, or, what again comes to the same, a greater part of the native produce would be exchanged for foreign necessities instead of for luxuries. The general rise in the rate of wages would, therefore, after a temporary disturbance of market prices, only result in a general fall of the rate of profit without any permanent change in the prices of commodities.

If I am told that in the previous argument I assume the whole surplus wages to be spent upon necessities, I shall answer that I have made the supposition most advantageous to the opinion of Citizen Weston. If the surplus wages were spent upon articles formerly not entering into the consumption of the workingmen, the real increase of their purchasing power would need no proof. Being, however, only derived from an advance of wages, that increase of their purchasing power must exactly correspond to the

decrease of the purchasing power of the capitalists. The *aggregate demand* for commodities would, therefore, not *increase*, but the constituent parts of that demand would *change*. The increasing demand on the one side would be counter-balanced by the decreasing demand on the other side. Thus, the aggregate demand remaining stationary, no change whatever could take place in the market prices of commodities.

You arrive, therefore, at this dilemma: Either the surplus wages are equally spent upon all articles of consumption—then the expansion of demand on the part of the working class must be compensated by the contraction of demand on the part of the capitalist class—or the surplus wages are only spent upon some articles whose market prices will temporarily rise. Then the consequent rise in the rate of profit in some, and the consequent fall in the rate of profit in other branches of industry will produce a change in the distribution of capital and labour, going on until the supply is brought up to the increased demand in the one department of industry, and brought down to the diminished demand in the other. On the one supposition there will occur no change in the prices of commodities. On the other supposition, after some fluctuations of market prices, the exchangeable values of commodities will subside to the former level. On both suppositions the general rise in the rate of wages will ultimately result in nothing else but a general fall in the rate of profit.

To stir up your powers of imagination, Citizen Weston requested you to think of the difficulties which a general rise of English agricultural wages from nine shillings to eighteen shillings would produce. Think, he exclaimed, of the immense rise in the demand for necessaries, and the consequent fearful rise in their prices! Now, all of you know that the average wages of the American agricultural labourer amount to more than double that of the English agricultural labourer, although the prices of agricultural produce are lower in the United States than in the United Kingdom, although the general relations of capital and labour obtain in the United States the same as in England, and although the annual amount of production is much smaller in the United States than in England. Why, then, does our friend ring this alarm bell? Simply to shift the real question before us. A sudden rise of wages from nine shillings to eighteen shillings would be a sudden rise to the amount of 100 per cent. Now, we are not at all discussing the question whether the general rate of wages in England could suddenly be increased by 100 per cent. We have nothing at all to do

with the *magnitude* of the rise, which in every practical instance must depend on, and be suited to, given circumstances. We have only to inquire how a general rise in the rate of wages, even if restricted to one per cent, will act.

Dismissing friend Weston's fancy rise of 100 per cent, I propose calling your attention to the real rise of wages that took place in Great Britain from 1849 to 1859.

You are all aware of the Ten Hours Bill, or rather Ten and a Half Hours Bill, introduced since 1848. This was one of the greatest economic changes we have witnessed. It was a sudden and compulsory rise of wages, not in some local trades, but in the leading industrial branches by which England sways the markets of the world. It was a rise of wages under circumstances singularly unpropitious. Dr. Ure, Professor Senior, and all the other official economic mouthpieces of the middle class, *proved*, and I must say upon much stronger grounds than those of our friend Weston, that it would sound the death knell of English industry. They proved that it not only amounted to a simple rise of wages, but to a rise of wages initiated by, and based upon, a diminution of the quantity of labour employed. They asserted that the twelfth hour you wanted to take from the capitalist was exactly the only hour from which he derived his profit. They threatened a decrease of accumulation, rise of prices, loss of markets, stinting of production, consequent reaction upon wages, ultimate ruin. In fact, they declared Maximilian Robespierre's Maximum Laws¹ to be a small affair compared to it; and they were right in a certain sense. Well, what was the result? A rise in the money wages of the factory operatives, despite the curtailing of the working day, a great increase in the number of factory hands employed, a continuous fall in the prices of their products, a marvellous development in the productive powers of their labour, an unheard-of progressive expansion of the markets for their commodities. In Manchester, at the meeting in 1860 of the Society for the Advancement of Science, I myself heard Mr. Newman confess that he, Dr. Ure, Senior, and all other official propounders of economic science had been wrong, while the instinct of the people had been right. I mention Mr. W. Newman,² not Professor Francis Newman, because he occupies an eminent position in economic science, as the con-

¹ *Maximum Laws*: Introduced in 1793 by the Jacobin Convention. It fixed definite price limits for commodities and maximum wages.—Ed.

² Marx means the British economist W. Newmarch (1820-82), who wrote two volumes in continuation of Tooke's *History of Prices*.—Ed.

tributor to, and editor of, Mr. Thomas Tooke's *History of Prices*, that magnificent work which traces the history of prices from 1793 to 1856. If our friend Weston's fixed idea of a fixed amount of wages, a fixed amount of production, a fixed degree of the productive power of labour, a fixed and permanent will of the capitalists, and all his other fixedness and finality were correct, Professor Senior's woeful forebodings would have been right, and Robert Owen,¹ who already in 1816 proclaimed a general limitation of the working day the first preparatory step to the emancipation of the working class and actually in the teeth of the general prejudice inaugurated it on his own hook in his cotton factory at New Larnark, would have been wrong.

In the very same period during which the introduction of the Ten Hours Bill, and the rise of wages consequent upon it, occurred, there took place in Great Britain, for reasons which it would be out of place to enumerate here, a *general rise in agricultural wages*.

Although it is not required for my immediate purpose, in order not to mislead you, I shall make some preliminary remarks.

If a man got two shillings weekly wages, and if his wages rose to four shillings, the *rate of wages* would have risen by 100 per cent. This would seem a very magnificent thing if expressed as a rise in the *rate of wages*, although the *actual amount of wages*, four shillings weekly, would still remain a wretchedly small, a starvation, pittance. You must not, therefore, allow yourselves to be carried away by the high-sounding per cents in the *rate of wages*. You must always ask: What was the *original* amount?

Moreover, you will understand that if there were ten men receiving each 2s. per week, five men receiving each 5s., and five men receiving 11s. weekly, the twenty men together would receive 100s., or £5, weekly. If then a rise, say by 20 per cent, upon the *aggregate* sum of their weekly wages took place, there would be an advance from £5 to £6. Taking the average, we might say that the *general rate of wages* had risen by 20 per cent, although, in fact, the wages of the ten men had remained stationary, the wages of the one lot of five men had risen from 5s. to 6s. only, and the wages of the other lot of five men from 5s. to 7s.² One-half of the men would not have improved their position at all, one-quarter would have improved it in an imperceptible degree, and

¹ See pp. 159-61 of this volume.—Ed.

² These figures, 5s.-7s., refer to the total wages of the second group of five. The wage of each man in the group would increase from 11s. to 14s.—Ed.

only one-quarter would have bettered it really. Still, reckoning by the *average*, the total amount of the wages of those twenty men would have increased by 20 per cent, and as far as the aggregate capital that employs them, and the prices of the commodities they produce, are concerned, it would be exactly the same as if all of them had equally shared in the average rise of wages. In the case of agricultural labour, the standard of wages being very different in the different counties of England and Scotland, the rise affected them very unequally.

Lastly, during the period when that rise of wages took place, counteracting influences were at work, such as the new taxes consequent upon the Russian war,¹ the extensive demolition of the dwelling houses of the agricultural labourers, and so forth.

Having premised so much, I proceed to state that from 1849 to 1859 there took place a *rise of about 40 per cent* in the average rate of the agricultural wages of Great Britain. I could give you ample details in proof of my assertion, but for the present purpose think it sufficient to refer you to the conscientious and critical paper read in 1860 by the late Mr. John C. Morton at the London Society of Arts on *The Forces Used in Agriculture*. Mr. Morton gives the returns, from bills and other authentic documents, which he had collected from about one hundred farmers, residing in twelve Scotch and thirty-five English counties.

According to our friend Weston's opinion, and taken together with the simultaneous rise in the wages of the factory operatives, there ought to have occurred a tremendous rise in the prices of agricultural produce during the period 1849 to 1859. But what is the fact? Despite the Russian war, and the consecutive unfavourable harvests from 1854 to 1856, the average price of wheat, which is the leading agricultural produce of England, fell from about £3 per quarter for the years 1838 to 1848 to about £2 10s. per quarter for the years 1849 to 1859. This constitutes a fall in the price of wheat of more than 16 per cent, simultaneously with an average rise of agricultural wages of 40 per cent. During the same period, if we compare its end with its beginning, 1859 with 1849, there was a decrease of official pauperism from 934,419 to 860,470, the difference being 73,949; a very small decrease, I grant, and which in the following years was again lost, but still a decrease.

It might be said that, consequent upon the abolition of the Corn Laws, the import of foreign corn was more than doubled

¹ Marx refers to the Crimean War.—Ed.

during the period from 1849 to 1859, as compared with the period from 1838 to 1848. And what of that? From Citizen Weston's standpoint one would have expected that this sudden, immense, and continuously increasing demand upon foreign markets must have sent up the prices of agricultural produce there to a frightful height, the effect of increased demand remaining the same, whether it comes from without or from within. What was the fact? Apart from some years of failing harvests, during all that period the ruinous fall in the price of corn formed a standing theme of declamation in France; the Americans were again and again compelled to burn their surplus produce; and Russia, if we are to believe Mr. Urquhart, prompted the Civil War in the United States because her agricultural exports were crippled by the Yankee competition in the markets of Europe.

Reduced to its abstract form, Citizen Weston's argument would come to this: Every rise in demand occurs always on the basis of a given amount of production. It can, therefore, *never increase the supply of the articles demanded*, but *only enhance their money prices*. Now the most common observation shows that an increased demand will, in some instances, leave the market prices of commodities altogether unchanged, and will, in other instances, cause a temporary rise of market prices followed by an increased supply, followed by a reduction of the prices to their original level, and in many cases *below* their original level. Whether the rise of demand springs from surplus wages, or from any other cause, does not at all change the conditions of the problem. From Citizen Weston's standpoint the general phenomenon was as difficult to explain as the phenomenon occurring under the exceptional circumstances of a rise of wages. His argument had, therefore, *no* peculiar bearing whatever upon the subject we treat. It only expressed his perplexity at accounting for the laws by which an increase of demand produces an increase of supply, instead of an ultimate rise of market prices.

III [WAGES AND CURRENCY]

On the second day of the debate our friend Weston clothed his old assertion in new forms. He said: Consequent upon a general rise in money wages, more currency will be wanted to pay the same wages. The currency being *fixed*, how can you pay with this fixed currency increased money wages? First the difficulty arose

from the fixed amount of commodities accruing to the working man, despite his increase of money wages; now it arises from the increased money wages, despite the fixed amount of commodities. Of course, if you reject his original dogma, his secondary grievance will disappear.

However, I shall show that this currency question has nothing at all to do with the subject before us.

In your country the mechanism of payments is much more perfected than in any other country of Europe. Thanks to the extent and concentration of the banking system, much less currency is wanted to circulate the same amount of values, and to transact the same or a greater amount of business. For instance, as far as wages are concerned, the English factory operative pays his wages weekly to the shopkeeper, who sends them weekly to the banker, who returns them weekly to the manufacturer, who again pays them away to his workmen, and so forth. By this contrivance the yearly wages of an operative, say of £52, may be paid by one single sovereign turning round every week in the same circle. Even in England this mechanism is less perfect than in Scotland, and is not everywhere equally perfect; and, therefore, we find, for example, that in some agricultural districts, as compared to the manufacturing districts, much more currency is wanted to circulate a much smaller amount of values.

If you cross the Channel, you will find that the *money wages* are much lower than in England, but that they are circulated in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and France by a *much larger amount of currency*. The same sovereign will not be so quickly intercepted by the banker or returned to the industrial capitalist; and, therefore, instead of one sovereign circulating £52 yearly, you want, perhaps, three sovereigns to circulate yearly wages to the amount of £25. Thus, by comparing Continental countries with England, you will see at once that low money wages may require a much larger currency for their circulation than high money wages; and that this is, in fact, a merely technical point, quite foreign to our subject.

According to the best calculations I know, the yearly income of the working class of this country may be estimated at £250,000,000. This immense sum is circulated by about £3,000,000. Suppose a rise of wages of 50 per cent to take place. Then instead of £3,000,000 of currency, £4,500,000 would be wanted. As a very considerable part of the workman's daily expenses is laid out in silver and copper, that is to say, in mere tokens, whose

relative value to gold is arbitrarily fixed by law, like that of inconvertible money paper, a rise of money wages by 50 per cent would, in the extreme case, require an additional circulation of sovereigns, say to the amount of one million. One million, now dormant, in the shape of bullion or coin, in the cellars of the Bank of England, or of private bankers, would circulate. But even the trifling expense resulting from the additional minting or the additional wear and tear of that million might be spared, and would actually be spared, if any friction should arise from the want of the additional currency. All of you know that the currency of this country is divided into two great departments. One sort, supplied by bank-notes of different descriptions, is used in the transactions between dealers and dealers, and the larger payments from consumers to dealers, while another sort of currency, metallic coin, circulates in the retail trade. Although distinct, these two sorts of currency intermix with each other. Thus gold coin, to a very great extent, circulates even in larger payments for all the odd sums under £5. If tomorrow £4 notes, or £3 notes, or £2 notes were issued, the gold coin filling these channels of circulation would at once be driven out of them, and flow into those channels where they would be needed from the increase of money wages. Thus the additional million required by an advance of wages by 50 per cent would be supplied without the addition of one single sovereign. The same effect might be produced, without one additional bank-note, by an additional bill circulation, as was the case in Lancashire for a very considerable time.

If a general rise in the rate of wages, for example, of 100 per cent, as Citizen Weston supposed it to take place in agricultural wages, would produce a great rise in the prices of necessaries, and, according to his views, require an additional amount of currency not to be procured, a *general fall in wages* must produce the same effect, on the same scale, in an opposite direction. Well! All of you know that the years 1858 to 1860 were the most prosperous years for the cotton industry, and that peculiarly the year 1860 stands in that respect unrivalled in the annals of commerce, while at the same time all other branches of industry were most flourishing. The wages of the cotton operatives and of all the other workingmen connected with their trade stood, in 1860, higher than ever before. The American crisis came, and those aggregate wages were suddenly reduced to about one-fourth of their former amount. This would have been in the opposite direction a rise of 300 per cent. If wages rise from five to twenty, we say that they rise by 300

per cent; if they fall from twenty to five, we say that they fall by 75 per cent, but the amount of rise in the one and the amount of fall in the other case would be the same, namely, fifteen shillings. This, then, was a sudden change in the rate of wages unprecedented, and at the same time extending over a number of operatives which, if we count all the operatives not only directly engaged in but indirectly dependent upon the cotton trade, was larger by one-half than the number of agricultural labourers. Did the price of wheat fall? It rose from the annual average of 47s. 8d. per quarter during the three years 1858-60 to the annual average of 55s. 10d. per quarter during the three years 1861-63. As to the currency, there were coined in the mint in 1861 £8,673,232, against £3,378,102 in 1860. That is to say, there were coined £5,295,130 more in 1861 than in 1860. It is true the bank-note circulation was in 1861 less by £1,319,000 than in 1860. Take this off. There remains still an overplus of currency for the year 1861, as compared with the prosperity year, 1860, to the amount of £3,976,130, or about £4,000,000; but the bullion reserve in the Bank of England had simultaneously decreased, not quite in the same, but in an approximating proportion.

Compare the year 1862 with 1842. Apart from the immense increase in the value and amount of commodities circulated, in 1862 the capital paid in regular transactions for shares, loans, etc., for the railways in England and Wales amounted alone to £320,000,000, a sum that would have appeared fabulous in 1842. Still, the aggregate amounts of currency in 1862 and 1842 were pretty nearly equal, and generally you will find a tendency to a progressive diminution of currency in the face of an enormously increasing value, not only of commodities, but of monetary transactions generally. From our friend Weston's standpoint this is an unsolvable riddle.

Looking somewhat deeper into this matter, he would have found that, quite apart from wages, and supposing them to be fixed, the value and mass of the commodities to be circulated, and generally the amount of monetary transactions to be settled, vary daily; that the amount of bank-notes issued varies daily; that the amount of payments realized without the intervention of any money, by the instrumentality of bills, cheques, book credits, clearing houses, varies daily; that, as far as actual metallic currency is required, the proportion between the coin in circulation and the coin and bullion in reserve or sleeping in the cellars of banks varies daily; that the amount of bullion absorbed by the

national circulation and the amount being sent abroad for international circulation vary daily. He would have found that his dogma of a fixed currency is a monstrous error, incompatible with the everyday movement. He would have inquired into the laws which enable a currency to adapt itself to circumstances so continually changing, instead of turning his misconception of the laws of currency into an argument against a rise of wages.

IV [SUPPLY AND DEMAND]

Our friend Weston accepts the Latin proverb that *repetitio est mater studiorum*, that is to say, that repetition is the mother of study, and consequently he repeated his original dogma again under the new form that the contraction of currency, resulting from an enhancement of wages, would produce a diminution of capital, and so forth. Having already discarded his currency crotchet, I consider it quite useless to enter upon the imaginary consequences he fancies to flow from his imaginary currency mishap. I shall proceed at once to reduce his *orte and the same dogma*, repeated in so many different shapes, to its simplest theoretical expression.

The uncritical way in which he has treated his subject will become evident from one single remark. He pleads against a rise of wages or against high wages as the result of such a rise. Now, I ask him: What are high wages and what are low wages? Why constitute, for instance, five shillings weekly low, and twenty shillings weekly high wages? If five is low as compared with twenty, twenty is still lower as compared with two hundred. If a man was to lecture on the thermometer, and commenced by declaiming on high and low degrees, he would impart no knowledge whatever. He must first tell me how the freezing point is found out, and how the boiling point, and how these standard points are settled by natural laws, not by the fancy of the sellers or makers of thermometers. Now, in regard to wages and profits, Citizen Weston has not only failed to deduce such standard points from economic laws, but he has not even felt the necessity to look after them. He satisfied himself with the acceptance of the popular slang terms of low and high as something having a fixed meaning, although it is self-evident that wages can only be said to be high or low as compared with a standard by which to measure their magnitudes.

He will be unable to tell me why a certain amount of money

is given for a certain amount of labour. If he should answer me, "This was settled by the law of supply and demand," I should ask him, in the first instance, by what law supply and demand are themselves regulated. And such an answer would at once put him out of court. The relations between the supply and demand of labour undergo perpetual changes, and with them the market prices of labour. If the demand overshoots the supply wages rise; if the supply overshoots the demand wages sink, although it might in such circumstances be necessary to *test* the real state of demand and supply by a strike, for example, or any other method. But if you accept supply and demand as the law regulating wages, it would be as childish as useless to declaim against a rise of wages, because, according to the supreme law you appeal to, a periodical rise of wages is quite as necessary and legitimate as a periodical fall of wages. If you do *not* accept supply and demand as the law regulating wages, I again repeat the question, why a certain amount of money is given for a certain amount of labour.

But to consider matters more broadly: You would be altogether mistaken in fancying that the value of labour or any other commodity whatever is ultimately fixed by supply and demand. Supply and demand regulate nothing but the temporary *fluctuations* of market prices. They will explain to you why the market price of a commodity rises above or sinks below its *value*, but they can never account for that *value* itself. Suppose supply and demand to equilibrate, or, as the economists call it, to cover each other. Why, the very moment these opposite forces become equal, they paralyse each other, and cease to work in the one or the other direction. At the moment when supply and demand equilibrate each other, and therefore cease to act, the *market price* of a commodity coincides with its *real value*, with the standard price, round which its market prices oscillate. In inquiring into the nature of that *value*, we have therefore nothing at all to do with the temporary effects on market prices of supply and demand. The same holds true of wages as of the prices of all other commodities.

V [WAGES AND PRICES]

Reduced to their simplest theoretical expression, all our friend's arguments resolve themselves into this one single dogma: "*The prices of commodities are determined or regulated by wages.*"

I might appeal to practical observation to bear witness against this antiquated and exploded fallacy. I might tell you that the

English factory operatives, miners, shipbuilders, and so forth, whose labour is relatively high-priced, undersell by the cheapness of their produce all other nations; while the English agricultural labourer, for example, whose labour is relatively low-priced, is undersold by almost every other nation because of the dearness of his produce. By comparing article with article in the same country, and the commodities of different countries, I might show, apart from some exceptions more apparent than real, that on an average the high-priced labour produces the low-priced, and the low-priced labour produces the high-priced commodities. This, of course, would not prove that the high price of labour in the one, and its low price in the other instance, are the respective causes of those diametrically opposed effects, but at all events it would prove that the prices of commodities are not ruled by the prices of labour. However, it is quite superfluous for us to employ this empirical method.

It might, perhaps, be denied that Citizen Weston has put forward the dogma: "*The prices of commodities are determined or regulated by wages.*" In point of fact, he has never formulated it. He said, on the contrary, that profit and rent form also constituent parts of the prices of commodities, because it is out of the prices of commodities that not only the workingman's wages, but also the capitalist's profits and the landlord's rents must be paid. But how, in his idea, are prices formed? First by wages. Then an additional percentage is joined to the price on behalf of the capitalist, and another additional percentage on behalf of the landlord. Suppose the wages of the labour employed in the production of a commodity to be ten. If the rate of profit was 100 per cent, to the wages advanced the capitalist would add ten, and if the rate of rent was also 100 per cent upon the wages, there would be added ten more, and the aggregate price of the commodity would amount to thirty. But such a determination of prices would be simply their determination by wages. If wages in the above case rose to twenty, the price of the commodity would rise to sixty, and so forth. Consequently all the superannuated writers on political economy who propounded the dogma that wages regulate prices have tried to prove it by treating profit and rent as mere additional percentages upon wages. None of them was, of course, able to reduce the limits of those percentages to any economic law. They seem, on the contrary, to think profits settled by tradition, custom, the will of the capitalist, or by some other equally arbitrary and inexplicable method. If they assert that they

are settled by the competition between the capitalists, they say nothing. That competition is sure to equalize the different rates of profit in different trades, or reduce them to one average level, but it can never determine the level itself, or the general rate of profit.

What do we mean by saying that the prices of commodities are determined by wages? Wages being but a name for the price of labour, we mean that the prices of commodities are regulated by the price of labour. As "*price*" is exchangeable value—and in speaking of value I speak always of exchangeable value—is exchangeable *value expressed in money*, the proposition comes to this, that "*the value of commodities is determined by the value of labour,*" or that "*the value of labour is the general measure of value.*"

But how, then, is the "*value of labour*" itself determined? Here we come to a standstill. Of course, to a standstill if we try reasoning logically. Yet the propounders of that doctrine make short work of logical scruples. Take our friend Weston, for instance. First he told us that wages regulate the price of commodities and that, consequently, when wages rise prices must rise. Then he turned round to show us that a rise of wages will be no good because the prices of commodities had risen, and because wages were indeed measured by the prices of the commodities upon which they are spent. Thus we begin by saying that the value of labour determines the value of commodities, and we wind up by saying that the value of commodities determines the value of labour. Thus we move to and fro in the most vicious circle, and arrive at no conclusion at all.

On the whole, it is evident that by making the value of one commodity, say labour, corn, or any other commodity, the general measure and regulator of value, we only shift the difficulty, since we determine one value by another value, which on its side wants to be determined.

The dogma that "wages determine the prices of commodities," expressed in its most abstract terms, comes to this, that "value is determined by value," and this tautology means that, in fact, we know nothing at all about value. Accepting this premise, all reasoning about the general laws of political economy turns into mere twaddle. It was, therefore, the great merit of Ricardo that in his work *On The Principles of Political Economy*, published in 1817, he fundamentally destroyed the old, popular, and worn-out fallacy that "wages determine prices," a fallacy which Adam

Smith and his French predecessors had spurned in the really scientific parts of their researches, but which, nevertheless, they reproduced in their more exoterical and vulgarizing chapters.

VI [VALUE AND LABOUR]

Citizens, I have now arrived at a point where I must enter upon the real development of the question. I cannot promise to do this in a very satisfactory way, because to do so I should be obliged to go over the whole field of political economy. I can, as the French would say, but *effleurer la question*, touch upon the main points.

The first question we have to put is: What is the *value* of a commodity? How is it determined?

At first sight it would seem that the value of a commodity is a thing quite *relative*, and not to be settled without considering one commodity in its relations to all other commodities. In fact, in speaking of the value, the value in exchange of a commodity, we mean the proportional quantities in which it exchanges with all other commodities. But then arises the question: How are the proportions in which commodities exchange with each other regulated?

We know from experience that these proportions vary infinitely. Taking one single commodity, wheat, for instance, we shall find that a quarter of wheat exchanges in almost countless variations of proportion with different commodities. Yet, *its value remaining always the same*, whether expressed in silk, gold, or any other commodity, it must be something distinct from, and independent of, these *different rates of exchange* with different articles. It must be possible to express, in a very different form, these various equations with various commodities.

Besides, if I say a quarter of wheat exchanges with iron in a certain proportion, or the value of a quarter of wheat is expressed in a certain amount of iron, I say that the value of wheat and its equivalent in iron are equal *to some third thing*, which is neither wheat nor iron, because I suppose them to express the same magnitude in two different shapes. Either of them, the wheat or the iron, must, therefore, independently of the other, be reducible to this third thing which is their common measure.

To elucidate this point I shall recur to a very simple geometrical illustration. In comparing the areas of triangles of all possible forms and magnitudes, or comparing triangles with rectangles,

or any other rectilinear figure, how do we proceed? We reduce the area of any triangle whatever to an expression quite different from its visible form. Having found from the nature of the triangle that its area is equal to half the product of its base by its height, we can then compare the different values of all sorts of triangles, and of all rectilinear figures whatever, because all of them may be resolved into a certain number of triangles.

The same mode of procedure must obtain with the values of commodities. We must be able to reduce all of them to an expression common to all, distinguishing them only by the proportions in which they contain that same and identical measure.

As the *exchangeable values* of commodities are only *social functions* of those things, and have nothing at all to do with their *natural* qualities, we must first ask: What is the common *social substance* of all commodities? It is *labour*. To produce a commodity a certain amount of labour must be bestowed upon it, or worked up in it. And I say not only *labour*, but *social labour*. A man who produces an article for his own immediate use, to consume it himself, creates a *product*, but not a *commodity*. As a self-sustaining producer he has nothing to do with society. But to produce a *commodity*, a man must not only produce an article satisfying some *social* want, but his labour itself must form part and parcel of the total sum of labour expended by society. It must be subordinate to the *division of labour within society*. It is nothing without the other divisions of labour, and on its part is required to *integrate* them.

If we consider *commodities as values*, we consider them exclusively under the single aspect of *realized, fixed*, or, if you like, *crystallized social labour*. In this respect they can *differ* only by representing greater or smaller quantities of labour, as, for example, a greater amount of labour may be worked up in a silken handkerchief than in a brick. But how does one measure *quantities of labour*? By the *time the labour lasts*, in measuring the labour by the hour, the day, etc. Of course, to apply this measure, all sorts of labour are reduced to average or simple labour as their unit.

We arrive, therefore, at this conclusion. A commodity has a *value*, because it is a *crystallization of social labour*. The *greatness* of its value, or its *relative* value, depends upon the greater or less amount of that social substance contained in it; that is to say, on the relative mass of labour necessary for its production. The *relative values of commodities* are, therefore, determined by the *re-*

spective quantities or amounts of labour, worked up, realized, fixed in them. The *correlative* quantities of commodities which can be produced in the *same time of labour* are *equal*. Or the value of one commodity is to the value of another commodity as the quantity of labour fixed in the one is to the quantity of labour fixed in the other.

I suspect that many of you will ask: Does, then, indeed, there exist such a vast, or any difference whatever, between determining the values of commodities by *wages*, and determining them by the *relative quantities of labour* necessary for their production? You must, however, be aware that the *reward* for labour, and *quantity* of labour, are quite disparate things. Suppose, for example, *equal quantities of labour* to be fixed in one quarter of wheat and one ounce of gold. I resort to the example because it was used by Benjamin Franklin in his first essay published in 1729, and entitled: *A Modest Enquiry into the Nature and Necessity of a Paper Currency*, where he, one of the first, hit upon the true nature of value. Well. We suppose, then, that one quarter of wheat and one ounce of gold are *equal values* or *equivalents*, because they are *crystallizations of equal amounts of average labour*, of so many days' or so many weeks' labour respectively fixed in them. In thus determining the relative values of gold and corn, do we refer in any way whatever to the *wages* of the agricultural labourer and the miner? Not a bit. We leave it quite *indeterminate how* their day's or week's labour was paid, or even whether wage labour was employed at all. If it was, wages may have been very unequal. The labourer whose labour is realized in the quarter of wheat may receive two bushels only, and the labourer employed in mining may receive one-half of the ounce of gold. Or, supposing their wages to be equal, they may deviate in all possible proportions from the values of the commodities produced by them. They may amount to one-half, one-third, one-fourth, one-fifth, or any other proportional part of the one quarter of corn or the one ounce of gold. Their *wages* can, of course, not *exceed*, not be *more* than the values of the commodities they produced, but they can be *less* in every possible degree. Their *wages* will be *limited* by the *values* of the products, but the *values of their products* will not be limited by the wages. And above all, the values, the relative values of corn and gold, for example, will have been settled without any regard whatever to the value of the labour employed, that is to say, to *wages*. To determine the values of commodities, by the *relative quantities of labour fixed in them*, is, therefore, a thing

quite different from the tautological method of determining the values of commodities by the value of labour, or by *wages*. This point, however, will be further elucidated in the progress of our inquiry.

In calculating the exchangeable value of a commodity we must add to the quantity of labour *last* employed the quantity of labour *previously* worked up in the raw material of the commodity, and the labour bestowed on the implements, tools, machinery, and buildings, with which such labour is assisted.¹ For instance, the value of a certain amount of cotton yarn is the crystallization of the quantity of labour added to the cotton during the spinning process, the quantity of labour previously realized in the cotton itself, the quantity of labour realized in the coal, oil, and other auxiliary matter used, the quantity of labour fixed in the steam-engine, the spindles, the factory building, and so forth. Instruments of production, properly so-called, such as tools, machinery, buildings, serve again and again for a longer or shorter period during repeated processes of production. If they were used up at once, like the raw material, their whole value would at once be transferred to the commodities they assist in producing. But as a spindle, for example, is but gradually used up, an average calculation is made, based upon the average time it lasts, and its average waste of wear and tear during a certain period, say a day. In this way we calculate how much of the value of the spindle is transferred to the yarn daily spun, and how much, therefore, of the total amount of labour realized in a pound of yarn, for example, is due to the quantity of labour previously realized in the spindle. For our present purpose it is not necessary to dwell any longer upon this point.

It might seem that if the value of a commodity is determined by the *quantity of labour bestowed upon its production*, the lazier a man, or the clumsier a man, the more valuable his commodity, because the greater the time of labour required for finishing the commodity. This, however, would be a sad mistake. You will recollect that I used the word "*social labour*," and many points are involved in this qualification of "*social*." In saying that the value of a commodity is determined by the *quantity of labour* worked up or crystallized in it, we mean *the quantity of labour necessary for its production in a given state of society, under certain social*

¹ See David Ricardo: *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, Chap. I, section IV, Macmillan, New York 1931.—Ed.

average conditions of production, with a given social average intensity, and average skill of the labour employed. When, in England, the power-loom came to compete with the hand-loom, only half the former time of labour was wanted to convert a given amount of yarn into a yard of cotton or cloth. The poor hand-loom weaver now worked seventeen and eighteen hours daily, instead of the nine or ten hours he had worked before. Still the product of twenty hours of his labour represented now only ten social hours of labour or ten hours of labour socially necessary for the conversion of a certain amount of yarn into textile stuffs. His product of twenty hours had, therefore, no more value than his former product of ten hours.

If then the quantity of socially necessary labour realized in commodities regulates their exchangeable values, every increase in the quantity of labour wanted for the production of a commodity must augment its value, as every diminution must lower it.

If the respective quantities of labour necessary for the production of the respective commodities remained constant, their relative values also would be constant. But such is not the case. The quantity of labour necessary for the production of a commodity changes continuously with the changes in the productive powers of the labour employed. The greater the productive powers of labour, the more produce is finished in a given time of labour; and the smaller the productive powers of labour, the less produce is finished in the same time. If, for example, in the progress of population it should become necessary to cultivate less fertile soils, the same amount of produce would be only attainable by a greater amount of labour spent, and the value of agricultural produce would consequently rise. On the other hand, if with the modern means of production a single spinner converts into yarn, during one working day, many thousand times the amount of cotton which he could have spun during the same time with the spinning wheel, it is evident that every single pound of cotton will absorb many thousand times less of spinning labour than it did before, and, consequently, the value added by spinning to every single pound of cotton will be a thousand times less than before. The value of yarn will sink accordingly.

Apart from the different natural energies and acquired working abilities of different peoples, the productive powers of labour must principally depend:

Firstly: Upon the *natural* conditions of labour, such as fertility of soil, mines, and so forth;

Secondly: Upon the progressive improvement of the *social powers of labour*, such as are derived from production on a grand scale, concentration of capital and combination of labour, subdivision of labour, machinery, improved methods, appliance of chemical and other natural agencies, shortening of time and space by means of communication and transport, and every other contrivance by which science presses natural agencies into the service of labour, and by which the social or co-operative character of labour is developed. The greater the productive powers of labour, the less labour is bestowed upon a given amount of produce; hence the smaller the value of this produce. The smaller the productive powers of labour, the more labour is bestowed upon the same amount of produce; hence the greater its value. As a general law we may, therefore, set it down that:

The values of commodities are directly as the times of labour employed in their production, and are inversely as the productive powers of the labour employed.

Having till now spoken only of *value*, I shall add a few words about *price*, which is a peculiar form assumed by value.

Price, taken by itself, is nothing but the *monetary expression of value*. The values of all commodities of this country, for example, are expressed in gold prices, while on the Continent they are mainly expressed in silver prices. The value of gold or silver, like that of all other commodities, is regulated by the quantity of labour necessary for getting them. You exchange a certain amount of your national products, in which a certain amount of your national labour is crystallized, for the produce of the gold and silver producing countries, in which a certain quantity of *their* labour is crystallized. It is in this way, in fact by barter, that you learn to express in gold and silver the values of all commodities, that is, the respective quantities of labour bestowed upon them. Looking somewhat closer into *the monetary expression of value*, or what comes to the same, *the conversion of value into price*, you will find that it is a process by which you give to the *values* of all commodities an *independent* and *homogeneous form*, or by which you express them as quantities of *equal* social labour. So far as it is but the monetary expression of value, price has been called *natural price* by Adam Smith, *prix nécessaire* by the French physiocrats.

What then is the relation between *value* and *market prices*, or between *natural prices* and *market prices*? You all know that the *market price* is the *same* for all commodities of the same kind.

however the conditions of production may differ for the individual producers. The market prices express only the *average amount of social labour* necessary, under the average conditions of production, to supply the market with a certain mass of a certain article. It is calculated upon the whole lot of a commodity of a certain description.

So far the *market price* of a commodity coincides with its *value*. On the other hand, the oscillations of market prices, rising now over, sinking now under the value or natural price, depend upon the fluctuations of supply and demand. The deviations of market prices from values are continual, but as Adam Smith says: "The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this centre of repose and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it."¹

I cannot now sift this matter. It suffices to say that *if* supply and demand equilibrate each other, the market prices of commodities will correspond with their natural prices, that is to say, with their values, as determined by the respective quantities of labour required for their production. But supply and demand *must* constantly tend to equilibrate each other, although they do so only by compensating one fluctuation by another, a rise by a fall, and *vice versa*. If instead of considering only the daily fluctuations you analyse the movement of market prices for longer periods, as Mr. Tooke, for instance, has done in his *History of Prices*, you will find that the fluctuations of market prices, their deviations from values, their ups and downs, paralyse and compensate each other; so that, apart from the effect of monopolies and some other modifications I must now pass by, all descriptions of commodities are, on the average, sold at their respective *values* or natural prices. The average periods during which the fluctuations of market prices compensate each other are different for different kinds of commodities, because with one kind it is easier to adapt supply to demand than with the other.

If then, speaking broadly, and embracing somewhat longer periods, all descriptions of commodities sell at their respective

¹ Adam Smith: *The Wealth of Nations*, Book I, Chap. VII, p. 57, Macmillan, New York 1931.

values, it is nonsense to suppose that profit, not in individual cases, but that the constant and usual profits of different trades spring from *surcharging* the prices of commodities, or selling them at a price over and above their *value*. The absurdity of this notion becomes evident if it is generalized. What a man would constantly win as a seller he would as constantly lose as a purchaser. It would not do to say that there are men who are buyers without being sellers, or consumers without being producers. What these people pay to the producers, they must first get from them for nothing. If a man first takes your money and afterwards returns that money in buying your commodities, you will never enrich yourselves by selling your commodities too dear to that same man. This sort of transaction might diminish a loss, but would never help in realizing a profit.

To explain, therefore, the *general nature of profits*, you must start from the theorem that, on an average, commodities are *sold at their real values*, and that *profits are derived from selling them at their values*, that is, in proportion to the quantity of labour realized in them. If you cannot explain profit upon this supposition, you cannot explain it at all. This seems paradoxical and contrary to everyday observation. It is also paradoxical that the earth moves round the sun, and that water consists of two highly inflammable gases. Scientific truth is always paradoxical, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive appearance of things.

VII LABOURING POWER¹

Having now, as far as it could be done in such a cursory manner, analysed the nature of *value*, of the *value of any commodity whatever*, we must turn our attention to the specific *value of labour*. And here, again, I must startle you by a seeming paradox. All of you feel sure that what they daily sell is their labour; that, therefore, labour has a price, and that, the price of a commodity being only the monetary expression of its value, there must certainly exist such a thing as the *value of labour*. However, there exists no such thing as the *value of labour* in the common acceptance of the word. We have seen that the amount of necessary labour crystallized in a commodity constitutes its value. Now, applying this notion of value, how could we define, say, the value

¹ "Labour Power" in the English translation of *Capital*.—Ed.

of a ten hours' working day? How much labour is contained in that day? Ten hours' labour. To say that the value of a ten hours' working day is equal to ten hours' labour, or the quantity of labour contained in it, would be a tautological and, moreover, a nonsensical expression. Of course, having once found out the true but hidden sense of the expression "*value of labour*," we shall be able to interpret this irrational, and seemingly impossible application of value, in the same way that, having once made sure of the real movement of the celestial bodies, we shall be able to explain their apparent or merely phenomenal movements.

What the working man sells is not directly his *labour*, but his *labouring power*, the temporary disposal of which he makes over to the capitalist. This is so much the case that I do not know whether by the English laws, but certainly by some Continental laws, the *maximum time* is fixed for which a man is allowed to sell his labouring power. If allowed to do so for any period whatever, slavery would be immediately restored. Such a sale, if it comprised his lifetime, for instance, would make him at once the lifelong slave of his employer.

One of the oldest economists and most original philosophers of England—Thomas Hobbes—has already, in his *Leviathan*, instinctively hit upon this point overlooked by all his successors. He says: "*The value or worth of a man* is, as in all other things, his *price*: that is, so much as would be given for the *use of his power*."

Proceeding from this basis, we shall be able to determine the *value of labour* as that of all other commodities.

But before doing so, we might ask, how does this strange phenomenon arise, that we find on the market a set of buyers, possessed of land, machinery, raw material, and the means of life, all of them, save land in its crude state, the *products of labour*, and on the other hand, a set of sellers who have nothing to sell except their labouring power, their working arms and brains? That the one set buys continually in order to make a profit and enrich themselves, while the other set continually sells in order to earn their livelihood? The inquiry into this question would be an inquiry into what the economists call "*Previous, or Original Accumulation*," but which ought to be called *original expropriation*. We should find that this so-called *original accumulation* means nothing but a series of historical processes, resulting in a *decomposition of the original union* existing between the labouring man and his means of labour. Such an inquiry, however, lies beyond

the pale of my present subject. The *separation* between the man of labour and the means of labour once established, such a state of things will maintain itself and reproduce itself upon a constantly increasing scale, until a new and fundamental revolution in the mode of production should again overturn it, and restore the original union in a new historical form.

What, then, is the *value of labouring power*?

Like that of every other commodity, its value is determined by the quantity of labour necessary to produce it. The labouring power of a man exists only in his living individuality. A certain mass of necessities must be consumed by a man to grow up and maintain his life. But the man, like the machine, will wear out, and must be replaced by another man. Besides the mass of necessities required for *his own* maintenance, he wants another amount of necessities to bring up a certain quota of children that are to replace him on the labour market and to perpetuate the race of labourers. Moreover, to develop his labouring power, and acquire a given skill, another amount of values must be spent. For our purpose it suffices to consider only *average* labour, the costs of whose education and development are vanishing magnitudes. Still I must seize upon this occasion to state that, as the costs of producing labouring powers of different quality do differ, so must differ the values of the labouring powers employed in different trades. The cry for an *equality of wages* rests, therefore, upon a mistake, is an *inane* wish never to be fulfilled. It is an offspring of that false and superficial radicalism that accepts premises and tries to evade conclusions. Upon the basis of the wage system the value of labouring power is settled like that of every other commodity; and as different kinds of labouring power have different values, or require different quantities of labour for their production, they *must* fetch different prices in the labour market. To clamour for *equal or even equitable retribution* on the basis of the wage system is the same as to clamour for *freedom* on the basis of the slavery system. What you think just or equitable is out of the question. The question is: what is necessary and unavoidable with a given system of production?

After what has been said, the *value of labouring power* is determined by the *value of the necessities* required to produce, develop, maintain, and perpetuate the labouring power.

VIII PRODUCTION OF SURPLUS VALUE

Now suppose that the average amount of the daily necessities of a labouring man require *six hours of average labour* for their production. Suppose, moreover, six hours of average labour to be also realized in a quantity of gold equal to 3s. Then 3s. would be the *price*, or the monetary expression of the *daily value* of that man's *labouring power*. If he worked daily six hours, he would daily produce a value sufficient to buy the average amount of his daily necessities, or to maintain himself as a labouring man.

But our man is a wage labourer. He must, therefore, sell his labouring power to a capitalist. If he sells it at 3s. daily, or 18s. weekly, he sells it at its value. Suppose him to be a spinner. If he works six hours daily he will add to the cotton a value of 3s. daily. This value, daily added by him, would be an exact equivalent for the wages, or the price of his labouring power, received daily. But in that case no *surplus value* or *surplus produce* whatever would go to the capitalist. Here, then, we come to the rub.

In buying the labouring power of the workman, and paying its value, the capitalist, like every other purchaser, has acquired the right to consume or use the commodity bought. You consume or use the labouring power of a man by making him work, as you consume or use a machine by making it run. By paying the daily or weekly value of the labouring power of the workman, the capitalist has, therefore, acquired the right to use or make that labouring power work during the *whole day or week*. The working day or the working week has, of course, certain limits, but those we shall afterwards look more closely at.

For the present I want to turn your attention to one decisive point.

The *value* of the labouring power is determined by the quantity of labour necessary to maintain or reproduce it, but the *use* of that labouring power is only limited by the active energies and physical strength of the labourer. The daily or weekly *value* of the labouring power is quite distinct from the daily or weekly exercise of that power, the same as the food a horse wants and the time it can carry the horseman are quite distinct. The quantity of labour by which the *value* of the workman's labouring power is limited forms by no means a limit to the quantity of labour which his labouring power is apt to perform. Take the example of our spinner. We have seen that, to daily reproduce his labouring power, he must daily reproduce a value of three shillings, which he will do by working six hours daily. But this

does not disable him from working ten or twelve or more hours a day. But by paying the daily or weekly *value* of the spinner's labouring power, the capitalist has acquired the right of using that labouring power during *the whole day or week*. He will, therefore, make him work daily, say, *twelve* hours. *Over and above* the six hours required to replace his wages, or the value of his labouring power, he will, therefore, have to work *six other hours*, which I shall call hours of *surplus labour*, which surplus labour will realize itself in a *surplus value* and a *surplus produce*. If our spinner, for example, by his daily labour of six hours, added three shillings' value to the cotton, a value forming an exact equivalent to his wages, he will, in twelve hours, add six shillings' worth to the cotton, and produce a *proportional surplus of yarn*. As he has sold his labouring power to the capitalist, the whole value of produce created by him belongs to the capitalist, the owner *pro tem.* of his labouring power. By advancing three shillings, the capitalist will, therefore, realize a value of six shillings, because, advancing a value in which six hours of labour are crystallized, he will receive in return a value in which twelve hours of labour are crystallized. By repeating this same process daily, the capitalist will daily advance three shillings and daily pocket six shillings, one-half of which will go to pay wages anew, and the other half of which will form the *surplus value*, for which the capitalist pays no equivalent. It is this *sort of exchange between capital and labour* upon which capitalistic production, or the wage system, is founded, and which must constantly result in reproducing the workingman as a workingman, and the capitalist as a capitalist.

The rate of surplus value, all other circumstances remaining the same, will depend on the proportion between that part of the working day necessary to reproduce the value of the labouring power and the *surplus time* or *surplus labour* performed for the capitalist. It will, therefore, depend on the *ratio in which the working day is prolonged over and above that extent*, by working which the workingman would only reproduce the value of his labouring power, or replace his wages.

IX VALUE OF LABOUR

We must now return to the expression, "*value, or price of labour.*"

We have seen that, in fact, it is only the value of the labouring power, measured by the values of commodities necessary

for its maintenance. But since the workman receives his wages *after* his labour is performed, and knows, moreover, that what he actually gives to the capitalist is his labour, the value or price of his labouring power necessarily appears to him as the *price or value of his labour itself*. If the price of his labouring power is three shillings, in which six hours of labour are realized, and if he works twelve hours, he necessarily considers these three shillings as the value or price of twelve hours of labour, although these twelve hours of labour realize themselves in a value of six shillings. A double consequence flows from this.

Firstly: *The value or price of the labouring power* takes the semblance of the *price or value of labour itself*, although, strictly speaking, value and price of labour are senseless terms.

Secondly: Although one part only of the workman's daily labour is *paid*, while the other part is *unpaid*, and while that unpaid or surplus labour constitutes exactly the fund out of which *surplus value or profit* is formed, it seems as if the aggregate labour was paid labour.

This false appearance distinguishes *wage labour* from other *historical* forms of labour. On the basis of the wage system even the *unpaid* labour seems to be *paid* labour. With the *slave*, on the contrary, even that part of his labour which is paid appears to be unpaid. Of course, in order to work the slave must live, and one part of his working day goes to replace the value of his own maintenance. But since no bargain is struck between him and his master, and no acts of selling and buying are going on between the two parties, all his labour seems to be given away for nothing.

Take, on the other hand, the peasant serf, such as he, I might say, until yesterday existed in the whole east of Europe. This peasant worked, for instance, three days for himself on his own field or the field allotted to him, and the three subsequent days he performed compulsory and gratuitous labour on the estate of his lord. Here, then, the paid and unpaid parts of labour were visibly separated, separated in time and space; and our Liberals overflowed with moral indignation at the preposterous notion of making a man work for nothing.

In point of fact, however, whether a man works three days of the week for himself on his own field and three days for nothing on the estate of his lord, or whether he works in the factory or the workshop six hours daily for himself and six for

his employer, comes to the same, although in the latter case the paid and unpaid portions of labour are inseparably mixed up with each other, and the nature of the whole transaction is completely masked by the *intervention of a contract* and the *pay* received at the end of the week. The gratuitous labour appears to be voluntarily given in the one instance, and to be compulsory in the other. That makes all the difference.

In using the word "*value of labour*," I shall only use it as a popular slang term for "*value of labouring power*."

X PROFIT IS MADE BY SELLING A COMMODITY AT ITS VALUE

Suppose an average hour of labour to be realized in a value equal to sixpence, or twelve average hours of labour to be realized in six shillings. Suppose, further, the value of labour to be three shillings or the produce of six hours' labour. If, then, in the raw material, machinery, and so forth, used up in a commodity, twenty-four average hours of labour were realized, its value would amount to twelve shillings. If, moreover, the workman employed by the capitalist added twelve hours of labour to those means of production, these twelve hours would be realized in an additional value of six shillings. The *total value of the product* would, therefore, amount to thirty-six hours of realized labour, and be equal to eighteen shillings. But as the value of labour, or the wages paid to the workman, would be three shillings only, no equivalent would have been paid by the capitalist for the six hours of surplus labour worked by the workman, and realized in the value of the commodity. By selling this commodity at its value for eighteen shillings, the capitalist would, therefore, realize a value of three shillings, for which he had paid no equivalent. These three shillings would constitute the surplus value or profit pocketed by him. The capitalist would consequently realize the profit of three shillings, not by selling his commodity at a price *over and above* its value, but by selling it *at its real value*.

The value of a commodity is determined by the *total quantity of labour* contained in it. But part of that quantity of labour is realized in a value for which an equivalent has been paid in the form of wages; part of it is realized in a value for which *no* equivalent has been paid. Part of the labour contained in the commodity is *paid* labour; part is *unpaid* labour. By selling, therefore, the commodity *at its value*, that is, as the crystallization of

the *total quantity of labour* bestowed upon it, the capitalist must necessarily sell it at a profit. He sells not only what has cost him an equivalent, but he sells also what has cost him nothing, although it has cost the labour of his workman. The cost of the commodity to the capitalist and its real cost are different things. I repeat, therefore, that normal and average profits are made by selling commodities not *above*, but *at their real values*.

XI THE DIFFERENT PARTS INTO WHICH SURPLUS VALUE IS DECOMPOSED

The *surplus value*, or that part of the total value of the commodity in which the *surplus labour* or *unpaid labour* of the workman is realized, I call *profit*. The whole of that profit is not pocketed by the employing capitalist. The monopoly of land enables the landlord to take one part of that *surplus value*, under the name of *rent*, whether the land is used for agriculture or buildings or railways, or for any other productive purpose. On the other hand, the very fact that the possession of the *means of labour* enables the employing capitalist to produce a *surplus value*, or, what comes to the same, to *appropriate to himself a certain amount of unpaid labour*, enables the owner of the means of labour, which he lends wholly or partly to the employing capitalist—enables, in one word, the *money-lending capitalist* to claim for himself under the name of *interest* another part of that surplus value, so that there remains to the employing capitalist *as such* only what is called *industrial or commercial profit*.

By what laws this division of the total amount of surplus value amongst the three categories of people is regulated is a question quite foreign to our subject. This much, however, results from what has been stated.

Rent, interest, and industrial profit are only *different names for different parts of the surplus value* of the commodity, or the *unpaid labour realized in it*, and they are *equally derived from this source, and from this source alone*. They are not derived from *land* as such nor from *capital* as such, but land and capital enable their owners to get their respective shares out of the surplus value extracted by the employing capitalist from the labourer. For the labourer himself it is a matter of subordinate importance whether that surplus value, the result of his surplus labour, or unpaid labour, is altogether pocketed by the employing capitalist, or whether the latter is obliged to pay portions of it, under the names

of rent and interest, away to third parties. Suppose the employing capitalist to use only his own capital and to be his own landlord, then the whole surplus value would go into his pocket.

It is the employing capitalist who immediately extracts from the labourer this surplus value, whatever part of it he may ultimately be able to keep for himself. Upon this relation, therefore, between the employing capitalist and the wage labourer the whole wage system and the whole present system of production hinge. Some of the citizens who took part in our debate were, therefore, wrong in trying to mince matters, and to treat this fundamental relation between the employing capitalist and the workman as a secondary question, although they were right in stating that, under given circumstances, a rise of prices might affect in very unequal degrees the employing capitalist, the landlord, the moneyed capitalist, and, if you please, the taxgatherer.

Another consequence follows from what has been stated.

That part of the value of the commodity which represents only the value of the raw materials, the machinery, in one word, the value of the means of production used up, forms *no revenue* at all, but replaces *only capital*. But, apart from this, it is false that the other part of the value of the commodity *which forms revenue*, or may be spent in the form of wages, profits, rent, interest, is *constituted* by the value of wages, the value of rent, the value of profit, and so forth. We shall, in the first instance, discard wages, and only treat industrial profits, interest, and rent. We have just seen that the *surplus value* contained in the commodity, or that part of its value in which *unpaid labour* is realized, resolves itself into different fractions, bearing three different names. But it would be quite the reverse of the truth to say that its value is *composed* of, or *formed* by, the *addition* of the *independent values of these three constituents*.

If one hour of labour realizes itself in a value of sixpence, if the working day of the labourer comprises twelve hours, if half of this time is unpaid labour, that surplus labour will add to the commodity a *surplus value* of three shillings, that is, of value for which no equivalent has been paid. This surplus value of three shillings constitutes the *whole fund* which the employing capitalist may divide, in whatever proportions, with the landlord and the money-lender. The value of these three shillings constitutes the limit of the value they have to divide amongst them. But it is not the employing capitalist who adds to the value of the commodity an arbitrary value for his profit, to which another value

is added for the landlord, and so forth, so that the addition of these arbitrarily fixed values would constitute the total value. You see, therefore, the fallacy of the popular notion, which confounds the *decomposition* of a *given value* into three parts with the *formation* of that value by the addition of three *independent* values, thus converting the aggregate value, from which rent, profit, and interest are derived, into an arbitrary magnitude.

If the total profit realized by a capitalist be equal to £100, we call this sum, considered as *absolute* magnitude, the *amount of profit*. But if we calculate the ratio which those £100 bear to the capital advanced we call this *relative* magnitude, the *rate of profit*. It is evident that this rate of profit may be expressed in a double way.

Suppose £100 to be the capital *advanced in wages*. If the surplus value created is also £100—and this would show us that half the working day of the labourer consists of *unpaid* labour—and if we measured this profit by the value of the capital advanced in wages, we should say that the *rate of profit* amounted to one hundred per cent, because the value advanced would be one hundred and the value realized would be two hundred.

If, on the other hand, we should not only consider the *capital advanced in wages*, but the *total capital* advanced, say, for example, £500, of which £400 represented the value of raw materials, machinery, and so forth, we should say that the *rate of profit* amounted only to twenty per cent, because the profit of one hundred would be but the fifth part of the *total capital* advanced.

The first mode of expressing the rate of profit is the only one which shows you the real ratio between paid and unpaid labour, the real degree of the *exploitation* (you must allow me this French word) *of labour*. The other mode of expression is that in common use, and is, indeed, appropriate for certain purposes. At all events, it is very useful for concealing the degree in which the capitalist extracts gratuitous labour from the workman.

In the remarks I have still to make I shall use the word *profit* for the whole amount of the surplus value extracted by the capitalist without any regard to the division of that surplus value between different parties, and in using the words *rate of profit*, I shall always measure profits by the value of the capital advanced in wages.

XII GENERAL RELATION OF PROFITS, WAGES AND PRICES

Deduct from the value of a commodity the value replacing the value of the raw materials and other means of production used upon it, that is to say, deduct the value representing the *past* labour contained in it, and the remainder of its value will resolve into the quantity of labour added by the workingman *last* employed. If that workingman works twelve hours daily, if twelve hours of average labour crystallize themselves in an amount of gold equal to six shillings, this additional value of six shillings is the *only* value his labour will have created. This given value, determined by the time of his labour, is the only fund from which both he and the capitalist have to draw their respective shares or dividends, the only value to be divided into wages and profits. It is evident that this value itself will not be altered by the variable proportions in which it may be divided amongst the two parties. There will also be nothing changed if in the place of one workingman you put the whole working population, twelve million working days, for instance, instead of one.

Since the capitalist and workman have only to divide this limited value, that is, the value measured by the total labour of the workingman, the more the one gets the less will the other get, and *vice versa*. Whenever a quantity is given, one part of it will increase inversely as the other decreases. If the wages change, profits will change in an opposite direction. If wages fall, profits will rise; and if wages rise, profits will fall. If the workingman, on our former supposition, gets three shillings, equal to one half of the value he has created, or if his whole working day consists half of paid, half of unpaid labour, the *rate of profit* will be 100 per cent because the capitalist would also get three shillings. If the workingman receives only two shillings or works only one-third of the whole day for himself, the capitalist will get four shillings, and the rate of profit will be 200 per cent. If the workingman receives four shillings, the capitalist will only receive two, and the rate of profit would sink to 50 per cent, but all these variations will not affect the value of the commodity. A general rise of wages would, therefore, result in a fall of the general rate of profit, but not affect values. But although the values of commodities, which must ultimately regulate their market prices, are exclusively determined by the total quantities of labour fixed in them, and not by the division of that quantity into paid and un-

paid labour, it by no means follows that the values of the single commodities, or lots of commodities, produced during twelve hours, for instance, will remain constant. The *number* or mass of commodities produced in a given time of labour, or by a given quantity of labour, depends upon the *productive power* of the labour employed, and not upon its *extent* or length. With one degree of the productive power of spinning labour, for example, a working day of twelve hours may produce twelve pounds of yarn, with a lesser degree of productive power only two pounds. If then twelve hours' average labour were realized in the value of six shillings in the one case, the twelve pounds of yarn would cost six shillings, in the other case the two pounds of yarn would also cost six shillings. One pound of yarn would, therefore, cost sixpence in the one case, and three shillings in the other. This difference of price would result from the difference in the productive powers of the labour employed. One hour of labour would be realized in one pound of yarn with the greater productive power, while with the smaller productive power, six hours of labour would be realized in one pound of yarn. The price of a pound of yarn would, in the one instance, be only sixpence, although wages were relatively high and the rate of profit low; it would be three shillings in the other instance, although wages were low and the rate of profit high. This would be so because the price of the pound of yarn is regulated by the *total amount of labour worked up in it*, and not by the *proportional division of that total amount into paid and unpaid labour*. The fact I have before mentioned that high-priced labour may produce cheap, and low-priced labour may produce dear commodities, loses, therefore, its paradoxical appearance. It is but the expression of the general law that the value of a commodity is regulated by the quantity of labour worked up in it, but that the quantity of labour worked up in it depends altogether upon the productive power of the labour employed, and will, therefore, vary with every variation in the productivity of labour.

XIII MAIN CASES OF ATTEMPTS AT RAISING WAGES OR RESISTING THEIR FALL

Let us now seriously consider the main cases in which a rise of wages is attempted or a reduction of wages resisted.

1. We have seen that the *value of the labouring power*, or in more popular parlance, the *value of labour*, is determined by the

value of necessities, or the quantity of labour required to produce them. If, then, in a given country the value of the daily average necessities of the labourer represented six hours of labour expressed in three shillings, the labourer would have to work six hours daily to produce an equivalent for his daily maintenance. If the whole working day was twelve hours, the capitalist would pay him the value of his labour by paying him three shillings. Half the working day would be unpaid labour, and the rate of profit would amount to 100 per cent. But now suppose that, consequent upon a decrease of productivity, more labour should be wanted to produce, say, the same amount of agricultural produce, so that the price of the average daily necessities should rise from three to four shillings. In that case the *value* of labour would rise by one-third, or $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. Eight hours of the working day would be required to produce an equivalent for the daily maintenance of the labourer, according to his old standard of living. The surplus labour would therefore sink from six hours to four, and the rate of profit from 100 to 50 per cent. But in insisting upon a rise of wages, the labourer would only insist upon getting the *increased value of his labour*, like every other seller of a commodity, who, the costs of his commodities having increased, tries to get its increased value paid. If wages did not rise, or not sufficiently rise, to compensate for the increased values of necessities, the *price* of labour would sink *below the value of labour*, and the labourer's standard of life would deteriorate.

But a change might also take place in an opposite direction. By virtue of the increased productivity of labour, the same amount of the average daily necessities might sink from three to two shillings, or only four hours out of the working day, instead of six, be wanted to reproduce an equivalent for the value of the daily necessities. The workingman would now be able to buy with two shillings as many necessities as he did before with three shillings. Indeed, the *value of labour* would have sunk, but that diminished value would command the same amount of commodities as before. Then profits would rise from three to four shillings, and the rate of profit from 100 to 200 per cent. Although the labourer's absolute standard of life would have remained the same, his *relative* wages, and therewith his *relative social position*, as compared with that of the capitalist, would have been lowered. If the workingman should resist that reduction of relative wages, he would only try to get some share in the increased productive powers of his own labour, and to maintain his former relative

position in the social scale. Thus, after the abolition of the Corn Laws, and in flagrant violation of the most solemn pledges given during the anti-Corn Law agitation, the English factory lords generally reduced wages ten per cent. The resistance of the workmen was at first baffled, but, consequent upon circumstances I cannot now enter upon, the ten per cent lost were afterwards regained.

2. The *values* of necessaries, and consequently the *value of labour*, might remain the same, but a change might occur in their *money prices*, consequent upon a previous *change in the value of money*.

By the discovery of more fertile mines and so forth, two ounces of gold might, for example, cost no more labour to produce than one ounce did before. The *value* of gold would then be depreciated by one-half, or fifty per cent. As the *values* of all other commodities would then be expressed in twice their former *money prices*, so also the same with the *value of labour*. Twelve hours of labour, formerly expressed in six shillings, would now be expressed in twelve shillings. If the workingman's wages should remain three shillings, instead of rising to six shillings, the *money price of his labour* would only be equal to *half the value of his labour*, and his standard of life would fearfully deteriorate. This would also happen in a greater or lesser degree if his wages should rise, but not proportionately to the fall in the value of gold. In such a case nothing would have been changed, either in the productive powers of labour, or in supply and demand, or in values. Nothing would have been changed except the *money names* of those values. To say that in such a case the workman ought not to insist upon a proportionate rise of wages is to say that he must be content to be paid with names instead of with things. All past history proves that whenever such a depreciation of money occurs, the capitalists are on the alert to seize this opportunity for defrauding the workman. A very large school of political economists assert that, consequent upon the new discoveries of gold lands, the better working of silver mines, and the cheaper supply of quicksilver, the value of precious metals has been again depreciated. This would explain the general and simultaneous attempts on the Continent at a rise of wages.

3. We have till now supposed that the *working day* has given limits. The working day, however, has, by itself, no constant limits. It is the constant tendency of capital to stretch it to its utmost physically possible length, because in the same degree surplus labour, and consequently the profit resulting therefrom, will

be increased. The more capital succeeds in prolonging the working day, the greater the amount of other people's labour it will appropriate. During the seventeenth and even the first two-thirds of the eighteenth century a ten hours' working day was the normal working day all over England. During the anti-Jacobin war,¹ which was in fact a war waged by the British barons against the British working masses, capital celebrated its bacchanalia, and prolonged the working day from ten to twelve, fourteen, eighteen hours. Malthus, by no means a man whom you would suspect of a maudlin sentimentalism, declared in a pamphlet, published about 1815, that if this sort of thing was to go on, the life of the nation would be attacked at its very source. A few years before the general introduction of the newly-invented machinery, about 1765, a pamphlet appeared in England under the title: *An Essay on Trade*. The anonymous author, an avowed enemy of the working classes, declaims on the necessity of expanding the limits of the working day. Amongst other means to this end, he proposes *working houses*, which, he says, ought to be "*Houses of Terror*." And what is the length of the working day he prescribes for these "*Houses of Terror*"? *Twelve hours*, the very same time which in 1832 was declared by capitalists, political economists, and ministers to be not only the existing but the necessary time of labour for a child under twelve years.

By selling his labouring power, and he must do so under the present system, the workingman makes over to the capitalist the consumption of that power, but within certain rational limits. He sells his labouring power in order to maintain it, apart from its natural wear and tear, but not to destroy it. In selling his labouring power at its daily or weekly value, it is understood that in one day or one week that labouring power shall not be submitted to two days' or two weeks' waste or wear and tear. Take a machine worth £1,000. If it is used up in ten years it will add to the value of the commodities in whose production it assists £100 yearly. If it be used up in five years it would add £200 yearly, or the value of its annual wear and tear is in inverse ratio to the time in which it is consumed. But this distinguishes the workingman from the machine. Machinery does not wear out exactly in the same ratio in which it is used. Man, on the contrary,

¹ The Wars of the coalition of European powers, headed by England, against revolutionary France during the period of the Great French Bourgeois Revolution.—Ed.

decays in a greater ratio than would be visible from the mere numerical addition of work.

In their attempts at reducing the working day to its former rational dimensions, or, where they cannot enforce a legal fixation of a normal working day, at checking overwork by a rise of wages, a rise not only in proportion to the surplus time exacted, but in a greater proportion, workingmen fulfil only a duty to themselves and their race. They only set limits to the tyrannical usurpations of capital. Time is the room of human development. A man who has no free time to dispose of, whose whole lifetime, apart from the mere physical interruptions by sleep, meals, and so forth, is absorbed by his labour for the capitalist, is less than a beast of burden. He is a mere machine for producing foreign wealth, broken in body and brutalized in mind. Yet the whole history of modern industry shows that capital, if not checked, will recklessly and ruthlessly work to cast down the whole working class to this utmost state of degradation.

In prolonging the working day the capitalist may pay *higher wages* and still lower the *value of labour*, if the rise of wages does not correspond to the greater amount of labour extracted, and the quicker decay of the labouring power thus caused. This may be done in another way. Your middle-class statisticians will tell you, for instance, that the average wages of factory families in Lancashire have risen. They forget that instead of the labour of the man, the head of the family, his wife, and perhaps three or four children, are now thrown under the Juggernaut wheels of capital, and that the rise of the aggregate wages does not correspond to the aggregate surplus labour extracted from the family.

Even with given limits of the working day, such as they now exist in all branches of industry subjected to the factory laws, a rise of wages may become necessary, if only to keep up the old standard *value of labour*. By increasing the *intensity* of labour, a man may be made to expend as much vital force in one hour as he formerly did in two. This has, to a certain degree, been effected in the trades, placed under the Factory Acts, by the acceleration of machinery, and the greater number of working machines which a single individual has now to superintend. If the increase in the intensity of labour or the mass of labour spent in an hour keeps some fair proportion to the decrease in the extent of the working day, the workingman will still be the winner. If this limit is overshot, he loses in one form what he has gained in another, and ten hours of labour may then become as ruinous as

twelve hours were before. In checking this tendency of capital, by struggling for a rise of wages corresponding to the rising intensity of labour, the workingman only resists the depreciation of his labour and the deterioration of his race.

4. All of you know that, from reasons I have not now to explain, capitalistic production moves through certain periodical cycles. It moves through a state of quiescence, growing animation, prosperity, overtrade, crisis, and stagnation. The market prices of commodities, and the market rates of profit, follow these phases, now sinking below their averages, now rising above them. Considering the whole cycle, you will find that one deviation of the market price is being compensated by the other, and that, taking the average of the cycle, the market prices of commodities are regulated by their values. Well. During the phase of sinking market prices and the phases of crisis and stagnation, the workingman, if not thrown out of employment altogether, is sure to have his wages lowered. Not to be defrauded, he must, even with such a fall of market prices, debate with the capitalist in what proportional degree a fall of wages has become necessary. If, during the phases of prosperity, when extra profits are made, he did not battle for a rise of wages, he would, taking the average of one industrial cycle, not even receive his *average wages*, or the *value* of his labour. It is the utmost height of folly to demand that while his wages are necessarily affected by the adverse phases of the cycle, he should exclude himself from compensation during the prosperous phases of the cycle. Generally, the *values* of all commodities are only realized by the compensation of the continuously changing market prices, springing from the continuous fluctuations of demand and supply. On the basis of the present system labour is only a commodity like others. It must, therefore, pass through the same fluctuations to fetch an average price corresponding to its value. It would be absurd to treat it on the one hand as a commodity, and to want on the other hand to exempt it from the laws which regulate the prices of commodities. The slave receives a permanent and fixed amount of maintenance; the wage labourer does not. He must try to get a rise of wages in the one instance, if only to compensate for a fall of wages in the other. If he resigned himself to accept the will, the dictates of the capitalist as a permanent economic law, he would share in all the miseries of the slave, without the security of the slave.

5. In all the cases I have considered, and they form ninety-nine out of a hundred, you have seen that a struggle for a rise

of wages follows only in the track of *previous* changes, and is the necessary offspring of previous changes in the amount of production, the productive powers of labour, the value of labour, the value of money, the extent or the intensity of labour extracted, the fluctuations of market prices, dependent upon the fluctuations of demand and supply, and coexistent with the different phases of the industrial cycle; in one word, as reactions of labour against the previous action of capital. By treating the struggle for a rise of wages independently of all these circumstances, by looking only upon the change of wages, and overlooking all the other changes from which they emanate, you proceed from a false premise in order to arrive at false conclusions.

XIV THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOUR AND ITS RESULTS

1. Having shown that the periodical resistance on the part of the workingmen against a reduction of wages, and their periodical attempts at getting a rise of wages, are inseparable from the wage system, and dictated by the very fact of labour being assimilated to commodities, and therefore subject to the laws regulating the general movement of prices; having, furthermore, shown that a general rise of wages would result in a fall in the general rate of profit, but not affect the average prices of commodities, or their values, the question now ultimately arises, how far, in this incessant struggle between capital and labour, the latter is likely to prove successful.

I might answer by a generalization, and say that, as with all other commodities, so with labour, its *market price* will, in the long run, adapt itself to its *value*; that, therefore, despite all the ups and downs, and do what he may, the workingman will, on an average, only receive the value of his labour, which resolves into the value of his labouring power, which is determined by the value of the necessities required for its maintenance and reproduction, which value of necessities finally is regulated by the quantity of labour wanted to produce them.

But there are some peculiar features which distinguish the *value of the labouring power*, or the *value of labour*, from the values of all other commodities. The value of the labouring power is formed by two elements—the one merely physical, the other historical or social. Its *ultimate limit* is determined by the *physical* element, that is to say, to maintain and reproduce itself, to

perpetuate its physical existence, the working class must receive the necessities absolutely indispensable for living and multiplying. The *value* of those indispensable necessities forms, therefore, the ultimate limit of the *value of labour*. On the other hand, the length of the working day is also limited by ultimate, although very elastic boundaries. Its ultimate limit is given by the physical force of the labouring man. If the daily exhaustion of his vital forces exceeds a certain degree, it cannot be exerted anew, day by day. However, as I said, this limit is very elastic. A quick succession of unhealthy and short-lived generations will keep the labour market as well supplied as a series of vigorous and long-lived generations.

Besides this mere physical element, the value of labour is in every country determined by a *traditional standard of life*. It is not mere physical life, but it is the satisfaction of certain wants springing from the social conditions in which people are placed and reared up. The English standard of life may be reduced to the Irish standard; the standard of life of a German peasant to that of a Livonian peasant. The important part which historical tradition and social habitude play in this respect, you may learn from Mr. Thornton's work on *Overpopulation*, where he shows that the average wages in different agricultural districts of England still nowadays differ more or less according to the more or less favourable circumstances under which the districts have emerged from the state of serfdom.

This historical or social element, entering into the value of labour, may be expanded, or contracted, or altogether extinguished, so that nothing remains but the *physical limit*. During the time of the *anti-Jacobin war*, undertaken, as the incorrigible tax-eater and sinecurist, old George Rose, used to say, to save the comforts of Our Holy Religion from the inroads of the French infidels, the honest English farmers, so tenderly handled in a former session of ours, depressed the wages of the agricultural labourers even beneath that *mere physical minimum*, but made up by *Poor Laws* the remainder necessary for the physical perpetuation of the race. This was a glorious way to convert the wage labourer into a slave, and Shakespeare's proud yeoman into a pauper.

By comparing the standard wages or values of labour in different countries, and by comparing them in different historical epochs of the same country, you will find that the *value of labour* itself is not a fixed but a variable magnitude, even supposing the values of all other commodities to remain constant.

A similar comparison would prove that not only the *market rates of profit* change, but its *average* rates.

But as to *profits*, there exists no law which determines their *minimum*. We cannot say what is the ultimate limit of their decrease. And why cannot we fix that limit? Because, although we can fix the *minimum* of wages, we cannot fix their *maximum*. We can only say that, the limits of the working day being given, the *maximum of profit* corresponds to the *physical minimum of wages*; and that wages being given, the *maximum of profit* corresponds to such a prolongation of the working day as is compatible with the physical forces of the labourer. The maximum of profit is, therefore, limited by the physical minimum of wages and the physical maximum of the working day. It is evident that between the two limits of this *maximum rate of profit* an immense scale of variations is possible. The fixation of its actual degree is only settled by the continuous struggle between capital and labour, the capitalist constantly tending to reduce wages to their physical minimum, and to extend the working day to its physical maximum, while the workingman constantly presses in the opposite direction.

The question resolves itself into a question of the respective powers of the combatants.

2. As to the *limitation of the working day*, in England, as in all other countries, it has never been settled except by *legislative interference*. Without the workingmen's continuous pressure from without, that interference would never have taken place. But at all events, the result was not to be attained by private settlement between the workingmen and the capitalists. This very necessity of *general political action* affords the proof that in its merely economic action capital is the stronger side.

As to the *limits of the value of labour*, its actual settlement always depends upon supply and demand, I mean the demand for labour on the part of capital, and the supply of labour by the workingmen. In colonial countries the law of supply and demand favours the workingman. Hence the relatively high standard of wages in the United States. Capital may there try its utmost. It cannot prevent the labour market from being continuously emptied by the continuous conversion of wage labourers into independent, self-sustaining peasants. The function of a wage labourer is for a very large part of the American people but a probational state, which they are sure to leave within a longer

or shorter term.¹ To mend this colonial state of things, the paternal British government accepted for some time what is called the modern colonization theory, which consists in putting an artificial high price upon colonial land, in order to prevent the too quick conversion of the wage labourer into the independent peasant.

But let us now come to old civilized countries, in which capital domineers over the whole process of production. Take, for instance, the rise in England of agricultural wages from 1849 to 1859. What was its consequence? The farmers could not, as our friend Weston would have advised them, raise the value of wheat, nor even its market prices. They had, on the contrary, to submit to their fall. But during these eleven years they introduced machinery of all sorts, adopted more scientific methods, converted part of the arable land into pasture, increased the size of farms, and with it the scale of production, and by these and other processes diminishing the demand for labour by increasing its productive power, made the agricultural population again relatively redundant. This is the general method in which a reaction, quicker or slower, of capital against a rise of wages takes place in old, settled countries. Ricardo has justly remarked that machinery is in constant competition with labour, and can often be only introduced when the price of labour has reached a certain height, but the appliance of machinery is but one of the many methods for increasing the productive powers of labour. This very same development which makes common labour relatively redundant simplifies on the other hand skilled labour, and thus depreciates it.

The same law obtains in another form. With the development of the productive powers of labour the accumulation of capital will be accelerated, even despite a relatively high rate of wages. Hence, one might infer, as Adam Smith, in whose days modern industry was still in its infancy, did infer, that this accelerated accumulation of capital must turn the balance in favour of the workingman, by securing a growing demand for his labour. From this same standpoint many contemporary writers have wondered

¹ See in this connection *Capital*, Vol. I, Chap. XXXIII, p. 790, note 1): "We treat here of real Colonies, virgin soils, colonized by free immigrants. The United States are, speaking economically, still only a Colony of Europe. Besides, to this category belong also such old plantations as those in which the abolition of slavery has completely altered the earlier conditions." As the land in colonial countries has gradually become private property, wage workers there have been deprived of the possibility of becoming independent producers.—Ed.

that English capital having grown in the last twenty years so much quicker than English population, wages should not have been more enhanced. But simultaneously with the progress of accumulation there takes place a *progressive change* in the *composition of capital*. That part of the aggregate capital which consists of fixed capital, machinery, raw materials, means of production in all possible forms, progressively increases as compared with the other part of capital, which is laid out in wages or in the purchase of labour. This law has been stated in a more or less accurate manner by Mr. Barton, Ricardo, Sismondi, Professor Richard Jones, Professor Ramsay, Cherbuliez, and others.

If the proportion of these two elements of capital was originally one to one, it will, in the progress of industry, become five to one, and so forth. If of a total capital of 600, 300 is laid out in instruments, raw materials, and so forth, and 300 in wages, the total capital wants only to be doubled to create a demand for 600 workmen instead of for 300. But if of a capital of 600, 500 is laid out in machinery, materials, and so forth, and 100 only in wages, the same capital must increase from 600 to 3,600 in order to create a demand for 600 workmen instead of for 300. In the progress of industry the demand for labour keeps, therefore, no pace with the accumulation of capital. It will still increase, but increase in a constantly diminishing ratio as compared with the increase of capital.

These few hints will suffice to show that the very development of modern industry must progressively turn the scale in favour of the capitalist against the workingman, and that consequently the general tendency of capitalistic production is not to raise, but to sink the average standard of wages, or to push the *value of labour* more or less to its *minimum limit*. Such being the tendency of *things* in this system, is this to say that the working class ought to renounce their resistance against the encroachments of capital, and abandon their attempts at making the best of the occasional chances for their temporary improvement? If they did, they would be degraded to one level mass of broken-down wretches past salvation. I think I have shown that their struggles for the standard of wages are incidents inseparable from the whole wage system, that in 99 cases out of 100 their efforts at raising wages are only efforts at maintaining the given value of labour and that the necessity of debating their price with the capitalist is inherent in their condition of having to sell themselves as commodities. By cowardly giving way in their everyday

conflict with capital, they would certainly disqualify themselves for the initiating of any larger movement.

At the same time, and quite apart from the general servitude involved in the wage system, the working class ought not to exaggerate to themselves the ultimate working of these everyday struggles. They ought not to forget that they are fighting with effects, but not with the causes of those effects; that they are retarding the downward movement, but not changing its direction; that they are applying palliatives, not curing the malady. They ought, therefore, not to be exclusively absorbed in these unavoidable guerilla fights incessantly springing up from the never-ceasing encroachments of capital or changes of the market. They ought to understand that, with all the miseries it imposes upon them, the present system simultaneously engenders the *material conditions* and the *social forms* necessary for an economic reconstruction of society. Instead of the *conservative* motto: "*A fair day's wage for a fair day's work!*"¹ they ought to inscribe on their banner the *revolutionary* watchword: "*Abolition of the wage system!*"

After this very long and, I fear, tedious exposition, which I was obliged to enter into to do some justice to the subject matter, I shall conclude by proposing the following resolutions:

Firstly: A general rise in the rate of wages would result in a fall of the general rate of profit, but, broadly speaking, not affect the prices of commodities.

Secondly: The general tendency of capitalist production is not to raise, but to sink the average standard of wages.

Thirdly: Trades Unions work well as centres of resistance against the encroachments of capital. They fail partially from an injudicious use of their power. They fail generally from limiting themselves to a guerilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it, instead of using their organized forces as a lever for the final emancipation of the working class, that is to say, the ultimate abolition of the wage system.

¹ See Engels' article in the *Labour Standard* of May 7, 1881 entitled: "*A Fair Day's Wage for a Fair Day's Work.*"—Ed.

Karl Marx

**PREFACE TO THE FIRST GERMAN EDITION
OF CAPITAL¹**

The work, the first volume of which I now submit to the public, forms the continuation of my "*Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie*" [*A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*] published in 1859. The long pause between the first part and the continuation is due to an illness of many years' duration that again and again interrupted my work.

The substance of that earlier work is summarized in the first three chapters of this volume. This is done not merely for the sake of connection and completeness. The presentation of the subject-matter is improved. As far as circumstances in any way permit, many points only hinted at in the earlier book are here worked out more fully, whilst, conversely, points worked out fully there are only touched upon in this volume. The sections on the history of the theories of value and of money are now, of course, left out altogether. The reader of the earlier work will find, however, in the notes to the first chapter additional sources of reference relative to the history of those theories.

Every beginning is difficult, holds in all sciences. To understand the first chapter, especially the section that contains the analysis of commodities, will, therefore, present the greatest difficulty. That which concerns more especially the analysis of the substance of value and the magnitude of value, I have, as much as it was possible, popularized.² The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it, whilst on the other hand, to the successful

¹ Originally published in the first edition of the first volume of *Capital*, at Hamburg in 1867.

² This is the more necessary, as even the section of Ferdinand Lassalle's work against Schulze-Delitzsch, in which he professes to give "the intellectual quintessence" of my explanations on these subjects, contains important mistakes. If Ferdinand Lassalle has borrowed almost literally from my writings, and without any acknowledgment, all the general theoretical propositions in

analysis of much more composite and complex forms, there has been at least an approximation. Why? Because the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the cells of that body. In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both. But in bourgeois society the commodity-form of the product of labour—or the value-form of the commodity—is the economic cell-form. To the superficial observer, the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon minutiae. It does in fact deal with minutiae, but they are of the same order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy.

With the exception of the section on value-form, therefore, this volume cannot stand accused on the score of difficulty. I presuppose, of course, a reader who is willing to learn something new and therefore to think for himself.

The physicist either observes physical phenomena where they occur in their most typical form and most free from disturbing influence, or, wherever possible, he makes experiments under conditions that assure the occurrence of the phenomenon in its normality. In this work I have to examine the capitalist mode of production, and the conditions of production and exchange corresponding to that mode. Up to the present time, their classic ground is England. That is the reason why England is used as the chief illustration in the development of my theoretical ideas. If, however, the German reader shrugs his shoulders at the condition of the English industrial and agricultural labourers, or in optimist fashion comforts himself with the thought that in Germany things are not nearly so bad, I must plainly tell him: "*De te fabula narratur!*" ["It is of you that the story is told!"]

Intrinsically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms that result from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results. The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.

his economic works, *e.g.*, those on the historical character of capital, on the connection between the conditions of production and the mode of production, &c., &c., even to the terminology created by me, this may perhaps be due to purposes of propaganda. I am here, of course, not speaking of his detailed working out and application of these propositions, with which I have nothing to do. [Note by Kari Marx.]

But apart from this. Where capitalist production is fully naturalized among the Germans (for instance, in the factories proper) the condition of things is much worse than in England, because the counterpoise of the Factory Acts is wanting. In all other spheres, we, like all the rest of Continental Western Europe, suffer not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from the incompleteness of that development. Alongside of modern evils, a whole series of inherited evils oppress us, arising from the passive survival of antiquated modes of production, with their inevitable train of social and political anachronisms. We suffer not only from the living, but from the dead. *Le mort saisit le vif!* [The dead holds the living in its grasp!]

The social statistics of Germany and the rest of Continental Western Europe are, in comparison with those of England, wretchedly compiled. But they raise the veil just enough to let us catch a glimpse of the Medusa head behind it. We should be appalled at the state of things at home, if, as in England, our governments and parliaments appointed periodically commissions of enquiry into economic conditions; if these commissions were armed with the same plenary powers to get at the truth; if it were possible to find for this purpose men as competent, as free from partisanship and respect of persons as are the English factory-inspectors, her medical reporters on public health, her commissioners of enquiry into the exploitation of women and children, into housing and food. Perseus wore a magic cap that the monsters he hunted down might not see him. We draw the magic cap down over eyes and ears as a make-believe that there are no monsters.

Let us not deceive ourselves on this. As in the 18th century, the American War of Independence sounded the tocsin for the European middle-class, so in the 19th century, the American Civil War sounded it for the European working class. In England the progress of social disintegration is palpable. When it has reached a certain point, it must react on the continent. There it will take a form more brutal or more humane, according to the degree of development of the working class itself. Apart from higher motives, therefore, their own most important interests dictate to the classes that are for the nonce the ruling ones, the removal of all legally removable hindrances to the free development of the working class. For this reason, as well as others, I have given so large a space in this volume to the history, the details, and the results of English factory legislation. One nation can and should learn from others. And even when a society has got upon the right track for the dis-

covery of the natural laws of its movement—and it is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society—it can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development. But it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs.

To prevent possible misunderstanding, a word. I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense *coulour de rose*. But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests. My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.

In the domain of Political Economy, free scientific inquiry meets not merely the same enemies as in all other domains. The peculiar nature of the material it deals with, summons as foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest. The English Established Church, *e.g.*, will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles than on $\frac{1}{39}$ of its income. Nowadays atheism itself is *culpa levis* [a light offense], as compared with criticism of existing property relations. Nevertheless, there is an unmistakable advance. I refer, *e.g.*, to the blue book published within the last few weeks: "Correspondence with Her Majesty's Missions Abroad, regarding Industrial Questions and Trades' Unions." The representatives of the English Crown in foreign countries there declare in so many words that in Germany, in France, to be brief, in all the civilized states of the European continent, a radical change in the existing relations between capital and labour is as evident and inevitable as in England. At the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, Mr. Wade, vice-president of the United States, declared in public meetings that, after the abolition of slavery, a radical change of the relations of capital and of property in land is next upon the order of the day. These are signs of the times not to be hidden by purple mantels or black cassocks. They do not signify that tomorrow a miracle will happen. They show that, within the ruling classes themselves, a foreboding is dawning that the present society is no solid crystal, but an organism capable of change, and is constantly changing.

The second volume of this work will treat of the process of the

circulation of capital (Book II.), and of the varied forms assumed by capital in the course of its development (Book III.); the third and last volume (Book IV.), the history of the theory.

Every opinion based on scientific criticism I welcome. As to the prejudices of so-called public opinion, to which I have never made concessions, now as aforesaid the maxim of the great Florentine is mine:

"Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti."

[*"Follow your own course, and let people talk."*]

Karl Marx

London, July 25, 1867

Karl Marx

FROM THE PREFACE TO
THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION OF *CAPITAL*

...That the method employed in *Das Kapital* has been little understood, is shown by the various conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it.

Thus the Paris *Revue Positiviste* reproaches me in that, on the one hand, I treat economics metaphysically, and on the other hand—imagine!—confine myself to the mere critical analysis of actual facts, instead of writing recipes (Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future. In answer to the reproach *in re* metaphysics, Professor Sieber has it: “In so far as it deals with actual theory, the method of Marx is the deductive method of the whole English school, a school whose failings and virtues are common to the best theoretic economists.” M. Block—“Les théoriciens du socialisme en Allemagne, Extrait du Journal des Economistes, Juillet et Août 1872”—makes the discovery that my method is analytic and says: “Par cet ouvrage M. Marx se classe parmi les esprits analytiques les plus éminents.” German reviews, of course, shriek out at “Hegelian sophistics.” The *European Messenger* [*Vestnik Yevropy*] of St. Petersburg, in an article dealing exclusively with the method of *Das Kapital* (May number, 1872, pp. 427-436), finds my method of inquiry severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-dialectical. It says: “At first sight, if the judgment is based on the external form of the presentation of the subject, Marx is the most ideal of ideal philosophers, always in the German, *i.e.*, the bad sense of the word. But in point of fact he is infinitely more realistic than all his fore-runners in the work of economic criticism. He can in no sense be called an idealist.” I cannot answer the writer better than by aid of a few extracts from his own criticism, which may interest some of my readers to whom the Russian original is inaccessible.

After a quotation from the Preface to my *Criticism* [*Critique*] of *Political Economy*, Berlin 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on: “The one thing which

is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connection within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, *i.e.*, of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connections into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. . . . If in the history of civilization the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilization, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different moments of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own. . . . As soon as society had outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon ana-

logous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, etc. Marx, *e.g.*, denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. . . . With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, and death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has."

Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and (as far as concerns my own application of it) generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?

Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connection. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere *a priori* construction.

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, *i.e.*, the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.

The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticized nearly

thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of *Das Kapital*, it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre *Επίγοροι* [Epi-*goni*] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in the same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing's time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a "dead dog." I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things at the same time also the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.

The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new holy Prusso-German empire.¹

Karl Marx

London, January 24, 1873.

¹ Marx adds the following note here in the French edition of *Capital*: "The Preface to the second edition is dated January 24, 1873, and only a short time after its publication the crisis predicted in it broke out in Austria, the United States and Germany. Many erroneously believe that the general crisis exhausted its strength in these violent but partial explosions. Yet, on the contrary, this crisis is approaching its apogee. England will be the site of the main explosion, but the whole world market will feel its repercussions."—Ed.

Karl Marx

HISTORICAL TENDENCY OF CAPITALIST ACCUMULATION¹

What does the primitive accumulation of capital, *i.e.*, its historical genesis, resolve itself into? In so far as it is not immediate transformation of slaves and serfs into wage labourers, and therefore a mere change of form, it only means the expropriation of the immediate producers, *i.e.*, the dissolution of private property based on the labour of its owner. Private property, as the antithesis to social, collective property, exists only where the means of labour and the external conditions of labour belong to private individuals. But according as these private individuals are labourers or not labourers, private property has a different character. The numberless shades that it at first sight presents correspond to the intermediate stages lying between these two extremes. The private property of the labourer in his means of production is the foundation of petty industry, whether agricultural, manufacturing or both; petty industry, again, is an essential condition for the development of social production and of the free individuality of the labourer himself. Of course, this petty mode of production exists also under slavery, serfdom, and other states of dependence. But it flourishes, it lets loose its whole energy, it attains its adequate classical form, only where the labourer is the private owner of his own means of labour set in action by himself: the peasant of the land which he cultivates, the artisan of the tool which he handles as a virtuoso. This mode of production presupposes parcelling of the soil, and scattering of the other means of production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, so also it excludes co-

¹ The present article is chapter XXXII, one of the eight chapters of Part VIII, entitled "The So-Called Primitive Accumulation," of the first volume of *Capital*.—Ed.

operation, division of labour within each separate process of production, the control over, and the productive application of, the forces of Nature by society, and the free development of the social productive powers. It is compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow and more or less primitive bounds. To perpetuate it would be, as Pecqueur rightly says, "to decree universal mediocrity." At a certain stage of development it brings forth the material agencies for its own dissolution. From that moment new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society; but the old social organization fetters them and keeps them down. It must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, the transformation of the individualized and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, of the pigmy property of the many into the huge property of the few, the expropriation of the great mass of the people from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labour, this fearful and painful expropriation of the mass of the people forms the prelude to the history of capital. It comprises a series of forcible methods, of which we have passed in review only those that have been epoch-making as methods of the primitive accumulation of capital. The expropriation of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless Vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious. Self-earned private property, that is based, so to say, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent labouring-individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by capitalistic private property, which rests on exploitation of the nominally free labour of others, i.e., on wage labour.¹

As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old society from top to bottom, as soon as the labourers are turned into proletarians, their means of labour into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, then the further socialization of labour and further transformation of the land and other means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common means of production, as

¹ "We are facing a situation that is entirely new for society... we endeavour to separate every form of property from every form of labour." Sismondi, *Nouveaux Principes de l'Economie Politique*, Vol. II, p. 434. [Note by Marx.]

well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalist production itself by the centralization of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour-process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economizing of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialized labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with this, the international character of the capitalist *régime*. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.

The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: *i.e.*, on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production.

The transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into capitalist private property is, naturally, a process incomparably more protracted, violent, and difficult than

the transformation of capitalist private property, already practically resting on socialized production, into socialized property. In the former case, we had the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; in the latter, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people.¹

¹ The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.... Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie to-day, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.... The lower middle class: the small manufacturer, the shop-keeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class ... they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei*, London, 1847, pp. 9 and 11. [Note by Marx.]

Frederick Engels
MARX'S CAPITAL¹

I

As long as there have been capitalists and workers on earth no book has appeared which is of as much importance for the workers as the one before us. The relation between capital and labour, the axis on which our entire present system of society turns, is here treated scientifically for the first time and with a thoroughness and acuity such as was possible only for a German. Valuable as the writings of an Owen, Saint-Simon or Fourier are and will remain—it was reserved for a German to climb to the height from which the whole field of modern social relations can be seen clearly and in full view just as the lower mountain scenery is seen by an observer standing on the topmost peak.

Political economy up to now has taught us that labour is the source of all wealth and the measure of all values, so that two objects whose production has cost the same labour time possess the same value and must also be exchanged for each other, since on the average only equal values are exchangeable for one another. At the same time, however, it teaches that there exists a kind of stored up labour, which it calls capital; that this capital, owing to the auxiliary sources contained in it, raises the productivity of living labour a hundred and a thousand fold, and in return claims a certain compensation which is termed profit or gain. As we all know, this occurs in reality in such a way that the profits of stored up, dead labour become ever more massive, the capitals of the capitalists become ever more colossal, while the wages of living labour become constantly less and the mass of the workers living solely on wages becomes ever more numerous and poverty-

¹ These two articles were written in the beginning of March 1868, and originally printed in the *Demokratisches Wochenblatt*, Leipzig, of March 21 and 28, 1868. They were intended to acquaint German workers with the contents of the first volume of *Capital*, which had been published a short time before.—Ed.

stricken. How is this contradiction to be solved? How can there remain a profit for the capitalist if the worker receives in compensation the full value of the labour he adds to his product? And this should be the case, nevertheless, since only equal values are exchanged. On the other hand, how can equal values be exchanged, how can the worker receive the full value of his product, if, as is admitted by many economists, this product is divided between him and the capitalists? Economics up to now has been helpless in the face of the contradiction, and writes or stutters embarrassed phrases which say nothing. Even the previous socialist critics of economics have not been able to do more than to emphasize the contradiction; no one resolved it, until now at last Marx has traced the process by which this profit arises right to its birthplace and has thereby made everything clear.

In tracing the development of capital, Marx starts out from the simple, notoriously obvious fact that the capitalists turn their capital to account by exchange: they buy commodities for their money and afterwards sell them for more money than they cost. For example, a capitalist buys cotton for 1,000 thalers¹ and resells it for 1,100, thus "earning" 100 thalers. This excess of 100 thalers over the original capital Marx calls *surplus value*. What is the origin of this surplus value? According to the economists' assumption, only equal values are exchanged and in the sphere of abstract theory this is correct. Hence the purchase of cotton and its subsequent sale can just as little yield surplus value as the exchange of a silver thaler for thirty silver groschen² and the re-exchange of the small coins for a silver thaler, a process by which one becomes neither richer nor poorer. But surplus value can just as little arise from sellers selling commodities above their value, or purchasers buying them below their value, because each one is in turn buyer and seller and this would therefore again balance. Just as little can it arise from buyers and sellers reciprocally overreaching each other, for this would create no new or surplus value, but only divide the existing capital differently between the capitalists. In spite of the fact that the capitalist buys the commodities at their value and sells them at their value, he gets more value out than he puts in. How does this happen?

¹ *Thaler*—a silver coin worth approximately three shillings, which was in circulation in Germany and Western Europe until the end of the nineteenth century.—*Ed.*

² *Silver groschen*—a small silver coin, 1/30 of a thaler, in circulation in Prussia until the seventies of the last century.—*Ed.*

The capitalist finds on the market under present social conditions *one commodity* which has the peculiar property that *its use is a source of new value, is a creation of new value*. This commodity is *labour power*.

What is the value of labour power? The value of every commodity is measured by the labour required for its production. Labour power exists in the form of the living worker who requires a definite amount of means of subsistence for his existence as well as for the maintenance of his family, which ensures the continuance of labour power even after his death. The labour time necessary for producing these means of subsistence represents therefore the value of the labour power. The capitalist pays this value weekly and purchases for that the use of one week's labour of the worker. So far Messieurs the economists will be pretty well in agreement with us as to the value of labour power.

The capitalist now sets his worker to work. In a certain period of time the worker will have performed as much labour as was represented by his weekly wages. Supposing that the weekly wage of a worker represents three labour days, then if the worker begins on Monday, he has by Wednesday evening *replaced for the capitalist the full value of the wage paid*. But does he then stop working? Not at all. The capitalist has bought his *week's* labour and the worker must go on working also during the last three days of the week. This *surplus labour* of the worker, over and above the time necessary to replace his wages, is the *source of surplus value*, of profit, of the continually growing accumulation of capital.

Do not say it is an arbitrary assumption that the worker reproduces in three days the wages he has received and works the remaining three days for the capitalist. Whether he takes exactly three days to replace his wages, or two or four, is to be sure quite immaterial here and varies according to circumstances; the main point is that the capitalist, besides the labour he pays for, also extracts labour that he *does not pay for*, and this is no arbitrary assumption, for the day the capitalist only extracts from the worker as much labour in the long run as he paid him in wages, on that day he would shut down his workshop, since indeed his whole profit would come to nought.

Here we have the solution of all those contradictions. The origin of surplus value (of which the capitalist's profit forms an important part) is now quite clear and natural. The value of the labour power is paid for, but this value is far less than that which a capitalist manages to extract from the labour power, and it is just

the difference, the *unpaid labour*, which constitutes the share of the capitalist, or more accurately, of the capitalist class. For even the profit that the cotton dealer made on his cotton in the above example must consist of unpaid labour, if cotton prices have not risen. The trader must have sold to a cotton manufacturer, who is able to extract a profit for himself from his product besides the 100 thalers, and therefore divides with him the unpaid labour he has pocketed. In general it is this unpaid labour which maintains all the non-working members of society. The state and municipal taxes, as far as they affect the capitalist class, are paid from it, as also the ground rent of the landowners, etc. On it rests the whole existing social system.

It would however be absurd to assume that unpaid labour arose only under present conditions where production is carried on by capitalists on the one hand and wage workers on the other. On the contrary, the oppressed class at all times has had to perform unpaid labour. During the whole long period when slavery was the prevailing form of the organization of labour, the slaves had to perform much more labour than was returned to them in the form of means of subsistence. The same was the case under the rule of serfdom and right up to the abolition of peasant *corvée* labour; here in fact the difference stands out palpably between the time during which the peasant works for his own maintenance and the surplus labour for the feudal lord, precisely because the latter is carried out separately from the former. The form has now been changed, but the substance remains and as long as "a part of society possesses the monopoly of the means of production, the labourer, free or not free, must add to the working time necessary for his own maintenance an extra working time in order to produce the means of subsistence for the owners of the means of production."¹

II

In the previous article we saw that every worker employed by a capitalist performs two kinds of labour: during one part of his working time he replaces the wages advanced to him by the capitalist, and this part of his labour Marx terms the *necessary labour*. But afterwards he has to go on working and during that time he produces *surplus value* for the capitalist, an important part of which constitutes profit. That part of the labour is called surplus labour.

¹ *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 218.—Ed.

Let us assume that the worker works three days of the week to replace his wages and three days to produce surplus value for the capitalist. Putting it otherwise, it means that, with a twelve-hour working day, he works six hours daily for his wages and six hours for the production of surplus value. One can only get six days out of the week, or at most seven even by including Sunday, but one can extract six, eight, ten, twelve, fifteen or even more hours of labour out of every single day. The worker sells the capitalist a working day for his day's wages. But, *what is a working day?* Eight hours or eighteen?

It is to the capitalist's interest to make the working day as long as possible. The longer it is, the more surplus value it produces. The worker correctly feels that every hour of labour which he performs over and above the replacement of the wage is unjustly extorted from him; he experiences in his own person what it means to work excessive hours. The capitalist fights for his profit, the worker for his health, for a few hours of daily rest, to be able to occupy himself as a human being in other ways as well, besides working, sleeping and eating. It may be remarked in passing that it does not depend at all upon the good will of the individual capitalists whether they desire to embark on this struggle or not, since competition compels even the most philanthropic among them to join with his colleagues and to make a working time as long as theirs the rule.

The struggle for the fixing of the working day has lasted from the first historical appearance of free workers on the scene up to the present day. In various trades, different traditional working days prevail; but in reality they are seldom adhered to. Only where the law fixes the working day and supervises its observance can one really say that there exists a normal working day. And up to now this is the case almost solely in the factory districts of England. Here the ten-hour working day (ten and a half hours on five days, seven and a half hours on Saturday) has been fixed for all women and for youths of thirteen to eighteen, and since the men cannot work without them, they also come under the ten-hour working day. This law has been won by English factory workers by years of endurance, through the most persistent, stubborn struggle with the factory owners, through freedom of the press, the right of association and assembly, as well as through adroit utilization of the divisions in the ruling class itself. It has become the palladium of the English workers, it has gradually become extended to all branches of large-scale industry and last year to almost

all trades, at least to all those employing women and children. The present work contains most exhaustive material on the history of this legislative regulation of the working day in England. The next "North German Reichstag"¹ will also have factory regulations to discuss and therefore the regulation of factory labour. We expect that none of the deputies elected by German workers will proceed to discuss this bill without previously making themselves thoroughly conversant with Marx's book. *There is much to be achieved there.* The divisions within the ruling classes are more favourable to the workers than they ever were in England, because *universal suffrage compels the ruling classes to court the favour of the workers.* Under these circumstances, four or five representatives of the proletariat are a *power*, if they know how to use their position, if above all they know what is at issue, which the bourgeois do not know. And for this purpose, Marx's book gives them all the material in ready form.

We will pass over a number of other very fine investigations of more theoretical interest and will halt only at the final chapter [part] which deals with the accumulation of capital. Here it is first shown that the capitalist mode of production, *i.e.*, that effected by capitalists on the one hand and by wage workers on the other, not only continually produces anew the capital of the capitalist, but also continually produces anew the poverty of the workers at the same time. Thereby it is ensured that there always exist anew, on the one hand, capitalists who are the owners of all means of subsistence, raw materials and instruments of labour, and, on the other hand, the great mass of workers who are compelled to sell their labour power to these capitalists for an amount of the means of subsistence which at best just suffices to maintain them in a condition capable of working and to bring up a new generation of able-bodied proletarians. But capital does not merely reproduce itself: it is continually increased and multiplied—hence its power over the propertyless class of workers. And just as it itself is reproduced on an ever greater scale, so the modern capitalist mode of production reproduces the class of propertyless workers also on an ever greater scale and in ever greater numbers. "... accumulation [of capital] reproduces the capital-relation on a progressive scale, more capitalists or larger capitalists at this pole, more wage workers at that.... Accumulation of capital is, therefore, increase of the

¹ A representative body of the "North German Confederation," which came into existence after the victory of Prussia over Austria in 1866.—Ed.

proletariat."¹ Since, however, owing to the progress of machinery, owing to improved agriculture, etc., fewer and fewer workers are necessary in order to produce the same quantity of products, since this perfecting, that is, this making the workers superfluous, grows more rapidly than the growing capital itself, what becomes of this ever-increasing number of workers? They form an industrial reserve army, which is paid *below* the value of its labour and is irregularly employed or comes under the care of public Poor Law institutions during times of bad or moderate business, but which is indispensable to the capitalist class at times when business is especially lively, as is palpably evident in England—but which *under all circumstances* serves to break the power of resistance of the regularly employed workers and to keep their wages down. "The greater the social wealth... the greater is the [relative surplus population or]² industrial reserve army.... But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active [regularly employed] labour army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated [permanent] surplus population [or strata of workers],² whose misery is in inverse ratio to its torment of labour. The more extensive, finally, the Lazarus-layers of the working class, and the industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. *This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation.*"³

These, strictly scientifically proved—and the official economists take great care not to make even an attempt at a refutation—are some of the chief laws of the modern, capitalist social system. But does this tell the whole story? By no means. Just as sharply as he stresses the bad sides of capitalist production does Marx also clearly prove that this social form was necessary to develop the productive forces of society to a level which will make possible an equal development worthy of human beings for *all* members of society. All earlier forms of society were too poor for this. Capitalist production for the first time creates the wealth and the productive forces necessary for this, but at the same time it also creates, in the numerous and oppressed workers, the social class which is more and more compelled to claim the utilization of this wealth and these productive forces for the whole of society—instead of, as today, for a monopolist class.

¹ *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 627.—Ed.

² Insertions in brackets by Engels.—Ed.

³ *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 659-60.—Ed.

Frederick Engels

**FROM THE PREFACE TO MARX'S *CAPITAL*,
VOLUME II¹**

... But what did Marx say about surplus value that is new? How is it that Marx's theory of surplus value struck home like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky, and that in all modern countries, too, while the theories of all his socialist predecessors, including Rodbertus,² vanished without effect?

The history of chemistry offers an illustration which explains this:

Until almost the end of last century, the phlogistic theory prevailed, as we know. It assumed that the essence of all combustion consisted in the separation from the burning substance of another, hypothetical substance, an absolute combustible, named phlogiston. This theory sufficed for the explanation of most of the chemical phenomena then known, although not without considerable forcing in many cases. But in 1774, Priestley discovered a kind of air which he found to be so pure, or so free from phlogiston, that common air seemed adulterated in comparison with it. He called it dephlogisticated air. Shortly after him, Scheele obtained the same kind of air in Sweden, and demonstrated its presence in the atmosphere. He also found that this air disappeared, whenever a substance was burned in it or in ordinary air, and therefore he called it fire-air. "From these facts he drew the conclusion that the compound arising from the union of phlogiston with one of the components of the air" (that is to say, by combustion) "was nothing but fire or heat, which escaped through the glass."³

¹ Written on May 5, 1885, and originally published the same year in the first edition of the second volume of *Capital*.—Ed.

² Johann Karl Rodbertus-Jagetzow (1805-75): Prussian landlord; theoretician of so-called state socialism.—Ed.

³ Roscoe-Schorlemmer: *Ausführliches Lehrbuch der Chemie*. Braunschweig 1877, I, pp. 13, 18. [Note by F. Engels.]

Priestley and Scheele had produced oxygen, but did not know what they had discovered. They "remained entangled in the" phlogistic "categories as they found them." The element, which was to upset the whole phlogistic concept and to revolutionize chemistry, remained barren in their hands. But Priestley had immediately communicated his discovery to Lavoisier in Paris, and Lavoisier, by means of this new fact, now examined all phlogistic chemistry. He first discovered that the new kind of air was a new chemical element, and that in combustion it was not a case of the mysterious phlogiston *departing* from the burning substance, but of this new element *combining* with the substance. Thus he placed all chemistry, which in its phlogistic form had stood on its head, on its feet for the first time. And although he did not produce oxygen independently of the others and at the same time as they, as he claimed later on, he nevertheless is the real *discoverer* of oxygen as compared with the other two, who had merely *produced* it without any suspicion of *what* it was they had produced.

Marx stands in the same relation to his predecessors in the theory of surplus value as Lavoisier to Priestley and Scheele. The *existence* of that part of a product's value which we now call surplus value had been ascertained long before Marx. What it consists of had also been stated, more or less distinctly, *viz.*, of the product of labour for which its appropriator has not paid any equivalent. But they got no further. Some of them—the classical bourgeois economists—investigated at most the proportion in which the product of labour is divided between the labourer and the owner of the means of production. Others—the socialists—found this division unjust and looked for utopian means of abolishing this injustice. Both remained in thrall to the economic categories as they had found them.

Then Marx came forward. And he did so in direct opposition to all his predecessors. Where they had seen a *solution*, he saw only a *problem*. He saw that here there was neither dephlogisticated air, nor fire-air, but oxygen, that it was not a matter of simply recording an economic fact or of the conflict of this fact with eternal justice and true morality, but concerned a fact destined to revolutionize the whole of political economy and offering a key to the understanding of all capitalist production—to the one who knew how to use it. With this fact as a starting point he examined all the categories he found at hand, just as Lavoisier, with oxygen as a starting point, had examined the categories of phlogistic chemistry he had found at hand. In order to know what

surplus value was, he had to find out what value was. Ricardo's theory of value itself had to be subjected to criticism first of all. Thus Marx investigated labour in regard to its value-creating quality, and for the first time established *what* labour produces value, and why and how it does this, and that value is nothing but coagulated labour of *this* kind—a point which Rodbertus never grasped to the end of his days. Marx then examined the relation of commodities to money, demonstrating how and why, thanks to their immanent property of value, commodities and commodity exchange must produce the antagonism of commodities and money. His theory of money, founded on this basis, is the first exhaustive, and now tacitly generally accepted one. He investigated the transformation of money into capital, demonstrating that this transformation is based on the purchase and sale of labour power. By substituting labour power, the value-producing property, for labour, he solved with one stroke one of the difficulties upon which the Ricardian school was wrecked, *viz.*, the impossibility of harmonizing the mutual exchange of capital and labour with the Ricardian law of value determination by labour. By establishing the distinction between constant and variable capital, he was first enabled to trace the real course of the process of surplus value formation in the utmost detail, and thus to explain it—something which none of his predecessors had accomplished. Thus he established a distinction within capital itself with which neither Rodbertus nor the bourgeois economists had been able to do anything, but which, nevertheless, furnished the key for the solution of the most complicated economic problems, as is most strikingly proved once again by this Volume II, and still more by Volume III, as will be shown. He analysed surplus value itself further, finding its two forms, absolute and relative surplus value. And he showed the different but in each case decisive role that they had played in the historical development of capitalist production. On the basis of surplus value he developed the first rational theory we have of wages, and gave for the first time the basic features of the history of capitalist accumulation and a portrayal of its historical tendency....

Karl Marx

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

PREFACE¹

I examine the system of bourgeois political economy in the following order: *capital, landed property, wage labour; the state, foreign trade, world market*. Under the first three headings, I investigate the economic conditions of life of the three great classes into which modern bourgeois society is divided; the interconnection of the three other headings is obvious at a glance. The first section of the first book, which deals with capital, consists of the following chapters: 1. Commodities; 2. Money or simple circulation; 3. Capital in general. The first two chapters form the contents of the present part. The total material lies before me in the form of monographs, which were written at periods widely separated one from another, for self-clarification, not for publication, and their elaboration in connected form according to the above plan will be dependent on external circumstances.

I am omitting a general introduction which I had projected because on closer reflection any anticipation of results yet to be proved appears to me to be disturbing, and the reader who desires to follow me must be resolved to ascend from the particular to the general. A few indications of the course of my own politico-economic studies may, on the other hand, appear not out of place here.

I was taking up law, which study, however, I only pursued as a subordinate subject along with philosophy and history. In the year 1842-43, as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, I experienced for the first time the embarrassment of having to take part in discussions on so-called material interests. The proceedings of the Rhenish Landtag on thefts of wood and parcelling of landed property, the official polemic which Herr von Schaper, then *Oberpräsident* of the Rhine Province, opened against the *Rheinische Zeitung* on the conditions of the Moselle peasantry, and finally debates on free

¹ This Preface was originally published in Berlin in 1859.—Ed.

trade and protective tariffs gave the first incentive to my occupation with economic questions. On the other hand, at that time when the good will "to go further" frequently outweighed specialized knowledge, a philosophically weakly tinged echo of French socialism and communism made itself audible in the *Rheinische Zeitung*. I declared myself against this bungling, but frankly confessed at the same time in a controversy with the *Allgemeine Augsburger Zeitung* that my previous studies did not permit me to venture for myself any judgment on the content of the French tendencies. Instead, I eagerly seized on the illusion of the managers of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, who thought that by a weaker attitude on the part of the paper they could secure a remission of the death sentence passed upon it, to effect my withdrawal from the public stage into the study.

The first work which I undertook for a solution of the doubts which assailed me was a critical review of the Hegelian philosophy of law, a work the introduction to which appeared in 1844 in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, published in Paris. My investigation led to the result that legal relations such as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life, the sum total of which Hegel, following the example of the Englishmen and Frenchmen of the eighteenth century, combines under the name of "civil society," that however the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy. The investigation of the latter, which I began in Paris, I continued in Brussels, whither I had emigrated in consequence of an expulsion order of M. Guizot. The general result at which I arrived and which, once won, served as a guiding thread for my studies, can be briefly formulated as follows: In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces

in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work before. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, æsthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production. No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore, mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always find that the task itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation. In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois modes of production as so many progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from the social conditions of life of the individuals; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation constitutes, therefore, the closing chapter of the prehistoric stage of human society.

Frederick Engels, with whom, since the appearance of his brilliant sketch on the criticism of the economic categories (in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*), I maintained a constant exchange of ideas by correspondence, had by another road (compare his *The Condition of the Working Class in England*) arrived

at the same result as I, and when in the spring of 1845 he also settled in Brussels, we resolved to work out together the opposition of our view to the ideological view of German philosophy, in fact, to settle accounts with our previous philosophical conscience. The resolve was carried out in the form of a criticism of post-Hegelian philosophy. The manuscript, two large octavo volumes, had long reached its place of publication in Westphalia when we received the news that altered circumstances did not allow of its being printed. We abandoned the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of the mice all the more willingly since we had achieved our main purpose—self-clarification. Of the scattered works in which we put our views before the public at that time, now from one aspect, now from another, I will mention only the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, jointly written by Engels and myself, and *Discours sur le libre échange* [*Discourse on Free Trade*] published by me. The decisive points of our view were first scientifically, although only polemically, indicated in my work published in 1847 and directed against Proudhon: *Misère de la Philosophie* [*The Poverty of Philosophy*], etc. A dissertation written in German on *Wage Labour*, in which I put together my lectures on this subject delivered in the Brussels *Deutscher Arbeiterverein* [German Workers' Society], was interrupted while being printed by the February Revolution and my consequent forced removal from Belgium.

The editing of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in 1848 and 1849, and the subsequent events, interrupted my economic studies which could only be resumed in the year 1850 in London. The enormous material for the history of political economy which is accumulated in the British Museum, the favourable vantage point afforded by London for the observation of bourgeois society, and finally the new stage of development into which the latter appeared to have entered with the discovery of gold in California and Australia, determined me to begin afresh from the very beginning and to work through the new material critically. These studies led partly of themselves into apparently quite remote subjects on which I had to dwell for a shorter or longer period. Especially, however, was the time at my disposal limited by the imperative necessity of earning my living. My contributions, during eight years now, to the first English-American newspaper, the *New York Tribune*, compelled an extraordinary scattering of my studies, since I occupied myself with newspaper correspondence proper only in exceptional cases. However, articles on striking economic events in England and on the Continent constituted so considerable a part of my contribu-

tions that I was compelled to make myself familiar with practical details which lie outside the sphere of the actual science of political economy.

This sketch of the course of my studies in the sphere of political economy is intended only to show that my views, however they may be judged and however little they may coincide with the interested prejudices of the ruling classes, are the result of conscientious investigation lasting many years. But at the entrance to science, as at the entrance to hell, the demand must be posted:

*Qui si convien lasciare ogni sospetto;
Ogni viltà convien che qui sia morta.*

[Here all mistrust must be abandoned
And here must perish every craven thought.]

Karl Marx

London, January 1859

Frederick Engels

**ON KARL MARX'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY¹**

I

In all scientific spheres, the Germans have long since demonstrated their equality with, and in most of them their superiority over, the remaining civilized nations. Only one science was not able to count on a single German name among its adepts, *viz.*, political economy. The reason is obvious. Political economy is the theoretical analysis of modern bourgeois society and therefore presupposes developed bourgeois conditions, conditions which in Germany, after the wars of the Reformation and the peasant wars, particularly after the Thirty Years' War, could not arise for centuries. The separation of Holland from the Empire forced Germany to the rear in world trade and from the outset reduced its industrial development to the scantiest proportions. While the Germans were slowly and laboriously recovering from the devastation of the civil wars, while they were using up all their civil energy, which had never been very great, in fruitless struggle against the customs barriers and idiotic trade regulations which every petty princeling and imperial baron imposed on the industry of his subjects, while the imperial towns with their guild mummery and patrician *hauteur* were falling into decay—Holland, England and France conquered the leading positions in world trade, amassed colony after colony and developed the manufacturing industry to the highest pitch, until finally England, owing to steam power which first imparted value to its coal and iron deposits, attained the foremost position in modern bourgeois development. So long, however, as a struggle had still to be waged against such ludicrously antiquated relics of the Middle Ages as up to 1830 laid fetters on the material bourgeois development of Germany, no German

¹ This review by Engels of Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) originally appeared in London in the German periodical *Das Volk* (*The People*), Nos. 14 and 16 of August 6 and 20, 1859.—Ed.

political economy was possible. Only with the establishment of the *Zollverein*¹ did the Germans arrive at a position in which they could at least *understand* political economy. From this time, in fact, began the importation of English and French political economy for the benefit of the German bourgeoisie. Presently the learned fraternity and the bureaucracy seized hold of the imported material and worked it up in a fashion not very creditable to the "German spirit." From the medley of industrial barons, traders, schoolmasters and bureaucrats engaged in authorship there arose a German economic literature which in its insipidity, shallowness, lack of thought, verbosity and plagiarism was paralleled only by the German novel. Among the people with practical aims, the protectionist school of the industrialists was the first to establish itself; and its authority, List, is still the best that German bourgeois-economic literature has produced, although the whole of his glorious work is copied from the Frenchman Ferrier, the theoretical originator of the Continental System.² In opposition to this tendency there arose in the 'forties the free trade school of the merchants in the Baltic provinces, who, with childish but self-interested faith, echoed the arguments of the English free traders. Finally, among the schoolmasters and bureaucrats who had to deal with the theoretical side of the subject, there were to be found dried-up, uncritical herbarium collectors like Herr Rau, speculating wiseacres like Herr Stein, who translated foreign propositions into undigested Hegelian language, or literary gleaners in the "cultural-historical" field, like Herr Riehl. The final outcome of this was *cameralistics*,³ a mush consisting of all sorts of extraneous matter, with a spattering of eclectic-economic sauce, such as would be useful knowledge for a young law school graduate in the employ of the state preparing for his final state board examination.

While thus the bourgeoisie, schoolmasters and bureaucracy in Germany were still labouring to learn the first elements of English-French economics by heart as unassailable dogmas and to attain

¹ *Zollverein* (Customs-Union): A German customs and commercial union was established on January 1, 1834, between Prussia and other German states. It did not include Austria.—*Ed.*

² The *Continental System* was the policy pursued by Napoleon I of prohibiting the import of English goods on the Continent. Instituted in 1806 by imperial decree, it was adhered to by Spain, Naples and Holland, and later also Prussia, Denmark, Russia, Austria and other countries.—*Ed.*

³ *Cameralistics*: The scientific subjects formerly required in Germany of a government administrative official.—*Ed.*

some degree of clarity about them, the German proletarian party appeared on the scene. *Its whole theoretical existence* proceeded from the study of political economy; and scientific, independent *German economics* dates from the moment of its appearance. This German economics is based essentially upon the *materialist conception of history*, the basic features of which are presented briefly in the preface to the above-named work. The main points of this preface¹ have already been printed in *Das Volk*, for which reason we referred to it. Not only for economics, but for all historical sciences (and all sciences which are not natural sciences are historical) a revolutionizing discovery was made with this proposition: "that the mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general"; that all the social and political relations, all religious and legal systems, all the theoretical outlooks which emerge in the course of history, are to be comprehended only when the material conditions of life of the respectively corresponding epochs are understood and the former are derived from these material conditions. "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being; but... their social being that determines their consciousness." The proposition is so simple that it must be self-evident to anyone who is not bemused by idealist delusions. But it involves highly revolutionary consequences, not only for theory but also for practice.

"At a certain stage of their development the material productive forces in society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work before. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of *social revolution*. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.... The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from the social conditions of life of the individuals; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism."

As we pursue our materialist thesis further and apply it to the present, the perspective of a tremendous revolution, indeed the most tremendous revolution of all time, therefore immediately unfolds itself before us.

On closer consideration, it is, however, immediately evident that this apparently simple proposition, that the consciousness of

¹ See p. 299 of this volume.—*Ed.*

men depends on their being and not *vice versa*, at once, and in its first consequences, runs directly counter to all idealism, even the most concealed. All traditional and customary outlooks on everything historical are negated by it. The whole traditional mode of political reasoning falls to the ground; patriotic noble-mindedness fights indignantly against such an unprincipled conception. The new mode of outlook, therefore, necessarily came into conflict, not only with the representatives of the bourgeoisie, but also with the mass of French socialists who would fain shake the world in its foundations by means of the magic formula: *liberté, égalité, fraternité!* But above all it aroused great wrath among the German vulgar-democratic vociferators. All the same they have by preference attempted to exploit the new ideas in plagiaristic fashion, but with rare misunderstanding.

The development of the materialist conception even in regard to a single historical example was a scientific work which would have demanded years of tranquil study, for it is obvious that nothing can be done here with mere phrases, that only a mass of critically sifted, completely mastered historical material can enable one to solve such a task. The February Revolution thrust our party on the political stage and thereby made it impossible for it to pursue purely scientific aims. Nevertheless, this basic outlook runs like a red thread through all the literary productions of the party. In all of them it is demonstrated in each particular case how every time the action originated from direct material impulses, not from the phrases that accompanied the action, and how, on the contrary, the political and juristic phrases were derived from the material impulses just as much as the political actions and their results.

When, after the defeat of the Revolution of 1848-49, a period began in which it became more and more impossible to influence Germany from without, our party surrendered the field of emigrational quarrels—for that remained the only possible activity—to vulgar democracy. While the latter indulged in intrigues to its heart's content, and squabbled today in order to make up the day after, and the day after that again washed all its dirty linen in view of everyone—while vulgar democracy went begging through the whole of America in order immediately afterwards to stage new scandals over the division of the few pence garnered—our party was glad once again to have some leisure for study. It had the great advantage of having a new scientific outlook as its theoretical basis, the working out of which kept it fully occupied; for this

reason alone it could never degenerate to such an extent as the "great men" among the emigrants.

The first fruit of these studies is the book under review.

II

In a publication like the one before us there can be no question of a merely desultory criticism of separate chapters taken from political economy, of the isolated treatment of this or that disputed economic question. Rather it is from the outset constructed so as to be a systematic summing up of the whole complex of economic science, an interconnected development of the laws of bourgeois production and bourgeois exchange. Since the economists are nothing but the interpreters of and apologists for these laws, this development is at the same time a criticism of the whole of economic literature.

Since Hegel's death hardly any attempt has been made to develop a science in its own inner interconnection. The official Hegelian school had appropriated from the dialectic of the master only the manipulation of the simplest tricks, which it applied to anything and everything, often with ludicrous clumsiness. For it the whole inheritance of Hegel was limited to a mere pattern by the help of which every theme could be correctly devised, and to a compilation of words and turns of speech which now had no other purpose than to be inserted at the right time where thought and positive knowledge failed them. Thus it came about that, as a Bonn professor said, these Hegelians understood nothing about anything, but could write about everything. This was certainly the case. Meanwhile, these gentlemen were, in spite of their self-conceit, so conscious of their weakness that they gave big problems the widest berth possible. The old pedantic science held the field by its superiority in positive knowledge. And when Feuerbach also declared speculative conceptions as untenable, Hegelianism, quietly fell asleep; and it seemed as if the old metaphysics, with its fixed categories, had begun to reign anew in science.

The thing had its natural cause. After the *régime* of the Hegelian Diadochi,¹ which had wound up with pure phrases, there natu-

¹ *Diadochi*: Alexander of Macedon's generals, whose internecine warfare after his death led to the disintegration of the empire. Engels here applies this term ironically to the official representatives of the Hegelian school in the German universities.—Ed.

rally followed an epoch in which the positive content of science again outweighed its formal side. But at the same time Germany immersed itself in natural science with quite extraordinary energy, which corresponded to the powerful bourgeois development after 1848. And as these sciences in which the speculative tendency never assumed any kind of importance became fashionable, there was a recrudescence of the old metaphysical manner of thinking, including the most extreme insipidities of Wolff.¹ Hegel fell into oblivion; and there developed the new natural-scientific materialism which was almost indistinguishable theoretically from that of the eighteenth century, and for the most part only enjoyed the advantage of having a richer natural-scientific material at its disposal, particularly in chemistry and physiology. The narrow, philistine mode of thought of pre-Kantian times one finds reproduced even to the most extreme triviality in Büchner and Vogt; and even Moleschott, who swears by Feuerbach, continually gets stuck in the most diverting fashion among the simplest of categories. The lumbering cart-horse of bourgeois workaday understanding naturally stopped dead in confusion before the ditch which separates essence from appearance, cause from effect. But if one goes gaily hunting over such badly broken ground as that of abstract thinking, one must not ride cart-horses.

Here, therefore, was another problem to be solved, one which had nothing to do with political economy as such. How was science to be treated? On the one hand there was the Hegelian dialectics in the wholly abstract, "speculative" form in which Hegel had bequeathed it; on the other hand there was the ordinary, essentially metaphysical Wolffian method which had again become fashionable and in which the bourgeois economists had written their fat, disjointed tomes. This latter method had been so annihilated theoretically by Kant and particularly by Hegel that only lassitude and the lack of any *simple* alternative method could make possible its continued existence in practice. On the other hand the Hegelian method was absolutely unusable in its *available* form. It was essentially idealistic, and the problem here was that of developing a world contemplation more materialistic than any previously advanced. That method took pure thinking as its start, and here one was to start from stubborn facts. A method which, according to its own admission, "came from nothing, through nothing, to nothing," was in this form completely out of place here. Neverthe-

¹ Christian Wolff (1809-64): German philosopher.—Ed.

less, of all the available logical material, it was the only thing which could be used, at least as a starting point. It had not been criticized, nor overcome. Not one of the opponents of the great dialectician had been able to make a breach in its proud structure; it fell into oblivion, because the Hegelian school had not the slightest notion what to do with it. It was, therefore, above all necessary to subject the Hegelian method to thoroughgoing criticism.

What distinguished Hegel's mode of thought from that of all other philosophers was the enormous historical sense upon which it was based. Abstract and idealist though it was in form, yet the development of his thoughts always proceeded in line with the development of world history and the latter was really meant to be only the test of the former. If, thereby, the real relation was inverted and stood on its head, nevertheless, the real content entered everywhere into the philosophy: all the more so since Hegel—in contrast to his disciples—did not parade ignorance, but was one of the finest intellects of all time. He was the first who attempted to show an evolution, an inner coherence, in history; and while today much in his *Philosophy of History* may seem peculiar to us, yet the grandeur of his fundamental outlook is admirable even today, whether one makes comparison with his predecessors, or with anyone who, since his time, has taken the liberty of reflecting in general concerning history. Everywhere, in his *Phenomenology*, *Æsthetics*, *History of Philosophy*, this magnificent conception of history penetrates, and everywhere this material is treated historically, in a definite, even if abstractly inverted, interconnection with history.

This epoch-making conception of history was the direct theoretical prerequisite for the new materialist outlook, and thereby provided a connecting point for the logical method, too. Since this forgotten dialectics had led to such results even from the standpoint of "pure thinking," and had, in addition, so easily settled accounts with all preceding logic and metaphysics, there must of necessity have been something more to it than sophistry and hair-splitting. But the criticism of this method, which all officially recognized philosophy had fought shy of and still does, was no trifle.

Marx was, and is, the only one who could undertake the work of extracting from the Hegelian logic the kernel which comprised Hegel's real discoveries in this sphere, and to construct the dialectical method, divested of its idealistic trappings, in the simple shape in which it becomes the only true form of development of thought. The working out of the method which forms the foundation of

Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* we consider a result of hardly less importance than the basic materialist outlook itself.

The criticism of economics, even according to the method secured, could still be exercised in two ways: historically or logically. Since in history, as in its literary reflection, development as a whole also proceeds from the most simple to the more complex relations, the historical development of the literature of political economy provided a natural guiding thread with which criticism could link up, and the economic categories as a whole would thereby appear in the same sequence as in the logical development. This form apparently has the advantage of greater clearness, since indeed it is the *actual* development that is followed, but as a matter of fact it would thereby at most become more popular. History often proceeds by leaps and zigzags and it would in this way have to be followed everywhere, whereby not only would much material of minor importance have to be incorporated, but there would be much interruption of the chain of thought; furthermore, the history of economics could not be written without that of bourgeois society and this would make the task endless, since all preliminary work is lacking. The logical method of treatment was, therefore, the only appropriate one. But this, as a matter of fact, is nothing else but the historical method; only divested of its historical form and disturbing fortuities. The chain of thought must begin with the same thing with which this history begins and its further course will be nothing else but the reflection of the historical course in abstract and theoretically consistent form; a corrected reflection but corrected according to laws furnished by the real course of history itself, in that each factor can be considered at its ripest point of development, in its classic form.

In this method we proceed from the first and simplest relation that historically and in fact confronts us; here, therefore, from the first economic relation to be found. We analyse this relation. Being a *relation* already implies that it has two sides, *related to each other*. Each of these sides is considered by itself; which brings us to the way in which they behave to each other, their interaction. Contradictions will result which demand a solution. But as we are not considering here an abstract process of thought taking place solely in our heads, but a real process which has actually taken place at some particular time, or is still taking place, these contradictions, too, will have developed in practice and will probably have found their solution. We shall trace the nature of this solution,

and shall discover that it has been brought about by the establishment of a new relation whose two opposite sides we shall now have to develop, and so on.

Political economy begins with *commodities*, begins from the moment when products are exchanged for one another—whether by individuals or by primitive communities. The product that appears in exchange is a commodity. It is, however, a commodity solely because a *relation* between two persons or communities attaches to the *thing*, the product, the relation between producer and consumer who are here no longer united in the same person. Here at once we have an example of a peculiar fact, which runs through the whole of economics and which has caused utter confusion in the minds of the bourgeois economists: economics deals not with things but with relations between persons, and, in the last resort, between classes; these relations are, however, always *attached to things* and *appear as things*. This interconnection, which in isolated cases it is true has dawned upon individual economists, was first discovered by Marx as obtaining for all political economy, whereby he made the most difficult questions so simple and clear that now even the bourgeois economists will be able to grasp them.

If now we consider commodities from their various aspects, commodities in their complete development and not as they first laboriously developed in the primitive barter between two primitive communities, they present themselves to us from the two points of view of use value and exchange value, and here we at once enter the sphere of economic dispute. Anyone who would like to have a striking illustration of the fact that the German dialectical method in its present state of elaboration is at least as superior to the old, shallow, garrulous metaphysical method as the railway is to the means of transport of the Middle Ages, should read in Adam Smith or any other official economist of reputation what a torment exchange value and use value were to these gentlemen, how difficult it was for them to keep them properly apart and comprehend each in its peculiar distinctness, and should then compare the simple, clear treatment by Marx.

After use value and exchange value have been developed, commodities are presented as the immediate unity of both, in the form in which they enter *the process of exchange*. What contradictions result here can afterwards be read on pp. 20, 21.¹ We only note

¹ Engels refers here to the German edition (Berlin 1859) of Marx's *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*.—Ed.

that these contradictions are not merely of abstract theoretical interest, but at the same time reflect the difficulties which emerge from the nature of the immediate exchange relations, of simple barter, reflect the impossibilities in which this first crude form of exchange necessarily terminates. The solution of these impossibilities is to be found in the fact that the property of representing the exchange value of all other commodities is transferred to a special commodity—*money*. Money or simple circulation is now developed in the second chapter, *viz.*, 1) money as the *measure of value*, in which connection the value measured in money, the *price*, receives its closer determination; 2) as *means of circulation* and 3) as the unity of both determinations, as *real money*, as the representative of all material bourgeois wealth. This closes the development of the first part, reserving the passing of money into capital for the second.

It is seen that with this method the logical development is by no means compelled to keep to the purely abstract sphere. On the contrary, this method requires historical illustrations, continual contact with reality. Such proofs are accordingly introduced in great variety, namely, references both to the actual course of history at different stages of social development and also to the economic literature in which the clear working out of the determinations of economic relations is pursued from the beginning. The criticism of individual more or less one-sided or confused modes of conception is then in essence already given in the logical development itself and can be briefly formulated.

In a third article we shall deal with the economic content of the book itself.¹

¹ This third article never appeared, and the MS. of it has not been found.—Ed.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

FROM LETTERS ON HISTORICAL MATERIALISM¹

MARX TO PAUL V. ANNENKOV²

Brussels, December 28, [1846]

...What is society, whatever its form may be? The product of men's reciprocal action. Are men free to choose this or that form of society for themselves? By no means. Assume a particular state of development in the productive faculties of man and you will get a particular form of commerce and consumption. Assume particular stages of development in production, commerce and consumption and you will have a particular form of social constitution, a particular organization of the family and of the social estates or classes, in a word, a particular civil society. Presuppose a particular civil society and you will get particular political conditions which are only the official expression of civil society. ...

It is superfluous to add that men are not free to choose their *productive forces*—which are the basis of all their history—for every productive force is an acquired force, the product of former activity. Thus productive forces are the result of practical human energy; but this energy is itself circumscribed by the conditions in which men find themselves, by the productive forces already acquired, by the social form which exists before they do, which they do not create, which is the product of the former generation. Because of the simple fact that every succeeding generation finds itself in possession of productive forces won by the previous gener-

¹ Marx's description of the essence of historical materialism contained in his Preface to his work *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (pp. 299-303 of this volume) is supplemented here by a series of excerpts from the letters of Marx and Engels dealing with the same group of questions. Engels' letters here referred to were written in reply to various inquiries he had received.—Ed.

² This letter was written in French.

P. V. Annenkov (1812-87): Liberal-minded Russian landed proprietor and publicist with whom Marx corresponded.—Ed.

ation, which serve it as the raw material for new production, connection arises in human history, a history of humanity takes shape, which has become all the more a history of humanity since the productive forces of man and therefore his social relations have been extended. Hence the necessary conclusion: the social history of men is never anything but the history of their individual development, whether they are conscious of it or not. Their material relations are the basis of all their relations. These material relations are only the necessary forms in which their material and individual activity is realized.

M. Proudhon mixes up ideas and things. Men never relinquish what they have won, but this does not mean that they never relinquish the social form in which they have acquired certain productive forces. On the contrary, in order that they may not be deprived of the result attained, and forfeit the fruits of civilization, they are obliged, from the moment when the mode of their intercourse [*Fr. commerce*] no longer corresponds to the productive forces acquired, to change all their traditional social forms.

I am using the [French] word *commerce* here in its widest sense, as we use *Verkehr* in German. For example: privileges, the institution of guilds and corporations, the regulatory *régime* of the Middle Ages, were social relations which alone corresponded to the acquired productive forces and to the social condition which had previously existed and from which these institutions had arisen. Under the protection of this *régime* of corporations and regulations, capital was accumulated, overseas trade was developed, colonies were founded. But the fruits of this would have been forfeited if men had tried to retain the forms under whose protection these fruits had ripened. Hence came two thunder claps—the Revolutions of 1640 and 1688. All the old economic forms, the social relations corresponding to them, the political conditions which were the official expression of the old civil society, were destroyed in England. Thus the economic forms in which men produce, consume, exchange, are *transitory and historical*. With newly acquired productive forces men change their mode of production and with the mode of production they change all the economic relations, which were merely the necessary conditions of this particular mode of production.

... Monsieur Proudhon has very well grasped the fact that men produce cloth, linen, silks, and what a great merit on his part to have grasped this simple matter! What Monsieur Proudhon has not grasped is that men, according to their faculties, also produce

the *social relations* amid which they prepare cloth and linen. Still less has Monsieur Proudhon understood that men, who fashion their social relations in accordance with their material productivity, also fashion *ideas* and *categories*, that is to say, the abstract ideal expressions of these same social relations. Thus the categories are no more eternal than the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products. For M. Proudhon, on the contrary, abstractions and categories are the primordial cause. According to him they, and not men, make history. The *abstraction*, the *category taken as such*, i.e., apart from men and their material activities, is of course immortal, unchangeable, impassive; it is only an entity of pure reason, which is only another way of saying that the abstraction as such is abstract. An admirable *tautology*!

Thus, regarded as categories, economic relations are for M. Proudhon eternal formulæ without origin or progress.

Let us put it in another way: M. Proudhon does not directly state that *bourgeois life* is for him an *eternal verity*; he states it indirectly by deifying the categories which express bourgeois relations in the form of thought. He takes the products of bourgeois society for spontaneous, eternal entities, endowed with a life of their own, as soon as they present themselves to his mind in the form of categories, in the form of thought. Thus he does not rise above the bourgeois horizon. As he is operating with bourgeois ideas, the eternal truth of which he presupposes, he seeks a synthesis, an equilibrium, for these ideas and does not see that the present method by which they reach equilibrium is the only possible one.

Indeed he does what all good bourgeois do. They all tell you that in principle, that is, as abstract ideas, competition, monopoly, etc., are the only basis of life, but that in practice they leave much to be desired. They all want competition without its tragic effects. They all want the impossible, namely, the conditions of bourgeois life without the necessary consequences of those conditions. None of them understands that the bourgeois form of production is historic and transitory, just as the feudal form was. This mistake arises from the fact that the bourgeois man is to them the only possible basis of every society; they cannot imagine a state of society in which men have ceased to be bourgeois.

M. Proudhon is therefore necessarily a *doctrinaire*. The historic movement which is turning the world upside down today reduces itself for him to the problem of discovering the correct equilibrium, the synthesis, of two bourgeois thoughts. And so the clever fellow

is able by his cunning to discover the hidden thought of God, the unity of two isolated thoughts—which are only isolated because M. Proudhon has isolated them from practical life, from present-day production, which is the union of the realities which they express. In place of the great historic movement arising from the conflict between the productive forces already acquired by men and their social relations, which no longer correspond to these productive forces; in place of the terrible wars which are being prepared between the different classes within each nation and between different nations; in place of the practical and violent action of the masses by which alone these conflicts can be resolved—in place of this vast, prolonged and complicated movement Monsieur Proudhon supplies the peristaltic motion of his own head. So it is the men of learning, the men who know how to purloin God's secret thoughts, who make history. The small fry have only to apply their revelations. You will now understand why M. Proudhon is the declared enemy of every political movement. For him the solution of present problems does not lie in public action but in the dialectical contortions of his head. Since to him the categories are the moving forces, it is not necessary to change practical life in order to change the categories. On the contrary, change the categories and the result will be the transformation of existing society.

In his desire to reconcile contradictions Monsieur Proudhon does not even ask himself if the very basis of those contradictions must not be overthrown. He is exactly like the political doctrinaire who will have it that the king, the chamber of deputies and the chamber of peers are integral parts of social life, eternal categories. All he is looking for is a new formula by which to establish an equilibrium between these forces (whose equilibrium depends precisely on the present movement in which one force is now the conqueror and now the slave of the other). Thus in the eighteenth century a host of mediocre minds was busy finding the true formula which would bring the social estates, king, nobility, parliament, etc., into equilibrium, and they woke up one morning to find that there was in fact no longer any king, nobility, parliament. The true equilibrium in this antagonism was the overthrow of all the social relations which served as a basis for these feudal institutions and their antagonisms.

Because M. Proudhon places eternal ideas, the categories of pure reason, on the one side and human beings and their practical life, which according to him is the application of these categories,

on the other, one finds in him from the beginning a *dualism* between life and ideas, soul and body, a dualism which recurs in many forms. You can see now that this antagonism is nothing but the incapacity of M. Proudhon to understand the profane origin and history of the categories, which he deifies. . . .

MARX TO JOSEPH WEYDEMEYER¹

London, March 5, 1852

... And now as to myself, no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society, nor yet the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists, the economic anatomy of the classes. What I did that was new was to prove: 1) that the *existence of classes* is only bound up with *particular historical phases in the development of production*; 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the *dictatorship of the proletariat*; 3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the *abolition of all classes* and to a classless society. . . .²

¹ Joseph Weydemeyer (1818-66): German Communist; journalist, friend of Marx. Emigrated to America in 1851.—Ed.

² In his book, *The State and Revolution*, Lenin, *Selected Works*, Two-Vol. ed., Vol. II, pp. 163-64, Lenin has devoted a separate section to the following explanation of this extract from Marx's letter:

"In these words Marx succeeded in expressing with striking clarity, first, the chief and radical difference between his doctrine and that of the foremost and most profound thinkers of the bourgeoisie; and, second, the essence of his doctrine of the state.

"It is often said and written that the core of Marx's theory is the class struggle; but this is not true. And from this error very often springs the opportunist distortion of Marxism, its falsification to make it acceptable to the bourgeoisie. For the doctrine of the class struggle was created *not* by Marx, but by the bourgeoisie *before* Marx, and generally speaking it is *acceptable* to the bourgeoisie. Those who recognize *only* the class struggle are not yet Marxists; they may be found to be still within the boundaries of bourgeois reasoning and bourgeois politics. To limit Marxism to the doctrine of the class struggle means curtailing Marxism, distorting it, reducing it to something which is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. Only he is a Marxist who *extends* the acceptance of the class struggle to the acceptance of the *dictatorship of the proletariat*. This is where the profound difference lies between a Marxist and an ordinary petty (and even big) bourgeois. This is the touchstone on which the *real* understanding and acceptance of Marxism should be tested. And it is not surprising that when the history of Europe brought the working class face to face with this question in a *practical* way, not only all the opportunists and reformists, but all the Kautskyites (people who vacillate between reformism and Marxism) proved to be miserable philistines and petty-bourgeois democrats who *repudiated* the dicta-

MARX TO ENGELS

September 25, 1857

... The history of the *army* brings out more clearly than anything else the correctness of our conception of the connection between the productive forces and social relations. In general, the army is important for economic development. For instance, it was in the army that the ancients first developed a complete wage system. Similarly among the Romans the *peculium castrense*¹ was the first legal form in which the right of others than fathers of families to moveable property was recognized. So also the guild system among the corporation of *fabri* [artisans]. Here too the first use of machinery on a large scale. Even the special value of metals and their use as money appears to have been originally based—as soon as Grimm's stone age was passed—on their military significance. The division of labour *within* one branch was also first carried out in the armies. The whole history of the forms of bourgeois society is very strikingly epitomized here. When you can find time you must work the thing out from this point of view...

torship of the proletariat. Kautsky's pamphlet, *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, published in August 1918, i.e., long after the first edition of the present pamphlet, is an example of petty-bourgeois distortion of Marxism and base renunciation of it *in practice*, while hypocritically recognizing it *in words*. (See my pamphlet, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, Petrograd and Moscow 1918.)

"Present-day opportunism in the person of its principal representative, the ex-Marxist K. Kautsky, fits in completely with Marx's characterization of the *bourgeois* position quoted above, for this opportunism limits the field of recognition of the class struggle to the realm of bourgeois relationships. (Within this realm, within its framework, not a single educated liberal will refuse to recognize the class struggle 'in principle'!) Opportunism *does not carry* the recognition of class struggle to the main point, to the period of *transition* from capitalism to Communism, to the period of the *overthrow* and complete abolition of the bourgeoisie. In reality, this period inevitably becomes a period of an unprecedentedly violent class struggle in unprecedentedly acute forms and, consequently, during this period the state must inevitably be a state that is democratic *in a new way* (for the proletariat and the propertyless in general) and dictatorial *in a new way* (against the bourgeoisie).

"To proceed. The essence of Marx's doctrine of the state is assimilated only by those who understand that the dictatorship of a *single* class is necessary not only for class society in general, not only for the *proletariat* which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but for the entire *historical period* which separates capitalism from 'classless society,' from Communism. The forms of bourgeois states are extremely varied, but in essence they are all the same: in one way or another, in the final analysis, all these states are inevitably the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*. The transition from capitalism to Communism will certainly create a great variety and abundance of political forms, but their essence will inevitably be the same: *the dictatorship of the proletariat*."—Ed.

¹ The separate property which the Roman soldier acquired in camp (as distinguished from family property).—Ed.

MARX TO ENGELS

July 7, 1866

... Is our theory that the *organization of labour is determined by the means of production* confirmed anywhere more brilliantly than in the human slaughter industry? It would really be worth while for you to write something about it (I have not the necessary knowledge) which I could insert under your name as an appendix to my book. Think this over. But if it is to be done it must be done for the first volume, where I deal with this subject *ex professo* [professionally]. You will understand what great pleasure it would give me if you were to appear as a direct collaborator also in my chief work (hitherto I have only done small things) instead of merely through quotations....

ENGELS TO CONRAD SCHMIDT¹

August 5, 1890

... In general the word *materialistic* serves many of the younger writers in Germany as a mere phrase with which anything and everything is labelled without further study, *i.e.*, they stick on this label and then think the question disposed of. But our conception of history is above all a guide to study, not a lever for construction after the manner of the Hegelians. All history must be studied afresh, the conditions of existence of the different formations of society must be individually examined before the attempt is made to deduce from them the political, civil-legal, æsthetic, philosophic, religious, etc., notions corresponding to them. Up to now but little has been done here because only a few people have got down to it seriously. In this field we can utilize heaps of help, it is immensely big, and anyone who will work seriously can achieve a lot and distinguish himself. But instead of this only too many of the younger Germans simply make use of the phrase historical materialism (and *everything* can be turned into a phrase) in order to get their own relatively scanty historical knowledge (for economic history is still in its cradle!) constructed into a neat system as quickly as possible and they then think themselves something very tremendous....

You, who have really done something, must have noticed your-

¹ Conrad Schmidt (1863-1932): German Social-Democrat.—Ed.

self how few of the young literary men who fasten themselves on to the Party give themselves the trouble to study economics, the history of economics, the history of trade, of industry, of agriculture, of the formations of society. How many know anything of Maurer¹ except his name! The conceit of the journalist must accomplish everything here, and the result corresponds. It often seems as if these gentlemen think anything is good enough for the workers. If these gentlemen only knew how Marx thought his best things were still not good enough for the workers and how he regarded it as a crime to offer the workers anything less than the very best!...

ENGELS TO JOSEPH BLOCH

London, September 21, 1890

... According to the materialist conception of history the determining element in history is *ultimately* the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. If therefore somebody twists this into the statement that the economic element is the *only* determining one, he transforms it into a meaningless, abstract and absurd phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure—political forms of the class struggle and its consequences, to wit, constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and then even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants: political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas, also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their *form*. There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid all the endless host of accidents (*i.e.*, of things and events, whose inner connection is so remote or so impossible to prove that we regard it as absent and can neglect it) the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary. Otherwise the application of the theory to any period of history one chose would be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the first degree.

We make our history ourselves, but in the first place under very

¹ *Georg Ludwig von Maurer* (1790-1872): German historian who investigated the social system of ancient and mediæval Germany. See also pp. 110-11 of this volume, note 13.—Ed.

definite presuppositions and conditions. Among these the economic ones are ultimately decisive. But the political ones, etc., and indeed even the traditions which haunt human minds also play a part, although not the decisive one. The Prussian state also arose and developed from historical, ultimately from economic causes. But it could scarcely be maintained without pedantry that among the many small states of North Germany, Brandenburg was specifically determined by economic necessity to become the great power embodying the economic, linguistic and, after the Reformation, also the religious difference between North and South—by economic necessity and not by other elements as well (above all by its entanglement with Poland, owing to the possession of Prussia, and hence with international political relations—which were indeed also decisive in the formation of the Austrian dynastic power). Without making oneself ridiculous it would be a difficult thing to explain in terms of economics the existence of every small state in Germany, past and present, or the origin of the High German consonant permutations, which the geographical wall of partition formed by the mountains from the Sudetic range to the Taunus widened to form a regular fissure across all Germany.

In the second place, however, history is made in such a way that the final result always arises from conflicts between many individual wills, of which each again has been made what it is by a host of particular conditions of life. Thus there are innumerable intersecting forces, an infinite series of parallelograms of forces which give rise to one resultant—the historical event. This again may itself be viewed as the product of a power which works as a whole, *unconsciously* and without volition. For what each individual wills is obstructed by everyone else, and what emerges is something that no one willed. Thus past history proceeds in the manner of a natural process and is also essentially subject to the same laws of motion. But from the fact that individual wills—of which each desires what he is impelled to by his physical constitution and external, in the last resort economic, circumstances (either his own personal circumstances or those of society in general)—do not attain what they want, but are merged into a collective mean, a common resultant, it must not be concluded that their value=0. On the contrary, each contributes to the resultant and is to this degree involved in it.

I would furthermore ask you to study this theory from its original sources and not at second-hand; it is really much easier. Marx hardly wrote anything in which it did not play a part. But

especially *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* is a most excellent example of its application. There are also many allusions in *Capital*. Then may I also direct you to my writings: *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* and *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*, in which I have given the most detailed account of historical materialism which, so far as I know, exists.

Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that younger writers sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it. We had to emphasize this main principle in opposition to our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place or the opportunity to allow the other elements involved in the interaction to come into their rights. But when it was a case of presenting a section of history, that is, of a practical application, the thing was different and there no error was possible. Unfortunately, however, it happens only too often that people think they have fully understood a new theory and can apply it without more ado from the moment they have mastered its main principles, and even those not always correctly. And I cannot exempt many of the more recent "Marxists" from this reproach, for the most amazing rubbish has been produced from this quarter too.

ENGELS TO CONRAD SCHMIDT

October 27, 1890

...The thing¹ is easiest to grasp from the point of view of the division of labour. Society gives rise to certain common functions which it cannot dispense with. The persons selected for these functions form a new branch of the division of labour *within society*. This gives them particular interests, distinct too from the interests of those who gave them their office; they make themselves independent of the latter and—the state is in being. And now the development is the same as it was with commodity trade and later with money trade: the new independent power, while having in the main to follow the movement of production, reacts, owing to its inherent independence, *i.e.*, the relative independence originally transferred to it and gradually further developed, in its turn upon the conditions and course of production. It is the interaction of two

¹ The preceding part of the letter deals with the relations between the money market, trade and production.—*Ed.*

unequal forces: on the one hand the economic movement, on the other the new political power, which strives for as much independence as possible, and which, having once been established, is also endowed with a movement of its own. On the whole, the economic movement gets its way, but it has also to suffer reactions from the political movement which it itself established and endowed with relative independence, from the movement of the state power on the one hand and of the opposition simultaneously engendered on the other. Just as the movement of the industrial market is, in the main and with the reservations already indicated, reflected in the money market and, of course, in *inverted* form, so the struggle between the classes already existing and already in conflict with one another is reflected in the struggle between government and opposition, but also in inverted form, no longer directly but indirectly, not as a class struggle but as a fight for political principles, and so distorted that it has taken us thousands of years to get behind it again.

The reaction of the state power upon economic development can be one of three kinds: it can run in the same direction, and then development is more rapid; it can oppose the line of development, in which case nowadays state power in every great nation will go to pieces in the long run; or it can cut off the economic development from certain paths, and prescribe certain others. This case ultimately reduces itself to one of the two previous ones. But it is obvious that in cases two and three the political power can do great damage to the economic development and result in the squandering of great masses of energy and material.

Then there is also the case of the conquest and brutal destruction of economic resources, by which, in certain circumstances, a whole local or national economic development could formerly be ruined. Nowadays such a case usually has the opposite effect, at least among great nations: in the long run the vanquished often gains more economically, politically and morally than the victor.

It is similar with law. As soon as the new division of labour which creates professional lawyers becomes necessary, another new and independent sphere is opened up which, for all its general dependence on production and trade, still has its own capacity for reacting upon these spheres as well. In a modern state, law must not only correspond to the general economic position and be its expression, but must also be an expression which is *consistent in itself*, and which does not, owing to inner contradictions, bite off its own nose. And in order to achieve this, the faithful reflection

of economic conditions suffers increasingly. All the more so the more rarely it happens that a code of law is the blunt, unmitigated, unadulterated expression of the domination of a class—this in itself would offend the “conception of justice.” Even in the *Code Napoléon* the pure, consistent conception of justice held by the revolutionary bourgeoisie of 1792-96 is already adulterated in many ways, and, in so far as it is embodied there, has daily to undergo all sorts of attenuations owing to the rising power of the proletariat. Which does not prevent the *Code Napoléon* from being the statute book which serves as a basis for every new code of law in every part of the world. Thus to a great extent the course of the “development of law” only consists, first, in the attempt to do away with the contradictions arising from the direct translation of economic relations into legal principles, and to establish a harmonious system of law, and then in the repeated breaches made in this system by the influence and pressure of further economic development, which involves it in further contradictions. (I am only speaking here of civil law for the moment.)

The reflection of economic relations as legal principles is necessarily also a topsy-turvy one: it happens without the person who is acting being conscious of it; the jurist imagines he is operating with *a priori* principles, whereas they are really only economic reflexes; so everything is upside down. And it seems to me obvious that this inversion, which, so long as it remains unrecognized, forms what we call *ideological conception*, reacts in its turn upon the economic basis and may, within certain limits, modify it. The basis of the law of inheritance—assuming that the stages reached in the development of the family are equal—is an economic one. But it would be difficult to prove, for instance, that the absolute liberty of the testator in England and the severe restrictions imposed upon him in France are only due in every detail to economic causes. Both react back, however, on the economic sphere to a very considerable extent, because they influence the distribution of property.

As to the realms of ideology which soar still higher in the air, religion, philosophy, etc., these have a prehistoric stock, found already in existence and taken over in the historic period, of what we should today call bunk. These various false conceptions of nature, of man's own being, of spirits, magic forces, etc., have for the most part only a negative economic basis; but the low economic development of the prehistoric period is supplemented and also partially conditioned and even caused by the false conceptions of nature. And even though economic necessity was the main driving

force of the progressive knowledge of nature and becomes ever more so, it would surely be pedantic to try and find economic causes for all this primitive nonsense. The history of science is the history of the gradual clearing away of this nonsense or of its replacement by fresh but always less absurd nonsense. The people who deal with this belong in their turn to special spheres in the division of labour and appear to themselves to be working in an independent field. And in so far as they form an independent group within the social division of labour, in so far do their productions, including their errors, react back as an influence upon the whole development of society, even on its economic development. But all the same they themselves are again under the dominating influence of economic development. In philosophy, for instance, this can be most readily proved in the bourgeois period. Hobbes was the first modern materialist (in the eighteenth century sense) but he was an absolutist in a period when absolute monarchy was at its height throughout the whole of Europe and when the fight of absolute monarchy versus the people was beginning in England. Locke, both in religion and politics, was the child of the class compromise of 1688. The English deists and their more consistent successors, the French materialists, were the true philosophers of the bourgeoisie, the French even of the bourgeois revolution. The German philistine runs through German philosophy from Kant to Hegel, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively. But the philosophy of every epoch, since it is a definite sphere in the division of labour, has as its presupposition certain definite intellectual material handed down to it by its predecessors, from which it takes its start. And that is why economically backward countries can still play first fiddle in philosophy: France in the eighteenth century compared with England, on whose philosophy the French based themselves, and later Germany in comparison with both. But in France as well as Germany philosophy and the general blossoming of literature at that time were also the result of a rising economic development. I consider the ultimate supremacy of economic development established in these spheres too, but it comes to pass within conditions imposed by the particular sphere itself: in philosophy, for instance, through the operation of economic influences (which again generally only act under political, etc., disguises) upon the existing philosophic material handed down by predecessors. Here economy creates nothing *a novo* [absolutely new], but it determines the way in which the existing material of thought is altered and further developed, and that too for the most part

indirectly, for it is the political, legal and moral reflexes which exercise the greatest direct influence upon philosophy.

About religion I have said the most necessary things in the last section on Feuerbach.

If therefore Barth supposes that we deny any and every reaction of the political, etc., reflexes of the economic movement upon the movement itself, he is simply tilting at windmills. He has only got to look at Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire*, which deals almost exclusively with the particular part played by political struggles and events; of course, within their general dependence upon economic conditions. Or *Capital*, the section on the working day, for instance, where legislation, which is surely a political act, has such a trenchant effect. Or the section on the history of the bourgeoisie. (Chapter XXIV.) Or why do we fight for the political dictatorship of the proletariat if political power is economically impotent? Force (that is, state power) is also an economic power.

But I have no time to criticize the book¹ now. I must first get Volume III out and besides I think that Bernstein, for instance, could deal with it quite effectively.

What these gentlemen all lack is dialectic. They never see anything but here cause and there effect. That this is a hollow abstraction, that such metaphysical polar opposites exist in the real world only during crises, while the whole vast process proceeds in the form of interaction (though of very unequal forces, the economic movement being by far the strongest, most elemental and most decisive) and that here everything is relative and nothing is absolute—this they never begin to see. Hegel has never existed for them. . . .

ENGELS TO FRANZ MEHRING²

July 14, 1893

... Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not

¹ The book referred to is *Die Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels und der Hegelianer bis auf Marx und Hartmann* [The Philosophy of History of Hegel and the Hegelians, down to Marx and Hartmann] by the idealist, Prof. Paul Barth.—Ed.

² Franz Mehring (1846-1919): a leader of the left wing of the German Social-Democratic Party and its historian.

The occasion for this letter was Mehring's article "On Historical Materialism" published as an appendix to his book, *Die Lessinglegende*. In this article, Mehring mentions the work of Barth referred to in note 1.—Ed.

be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives.

Because it is a process of thought he [Barth] derives both its form and its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors. He works with mere thought material which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, and does not investigate further for a more remote process independent of thought; indeed this is a matter of course to him, because, as all action is produced through the medium of thought, it also appears to him to be ultimately based upon thought.

The ideologist who deals with history (history is here simply meant to comprise all the spheres—political, juridical, philosophical, theological—belonging to society and not only to nature), the ideologist dealing with history, then, possesses in every sphere of science material which has formed itself independently out of the thought of previous generations and has gone through an independent series of developments in the brains of these successive generations. True, external facts belonging to its own or other spheres may have exercised a co-determining influence on this development, but the tacit presupposition is that these facts themselves are also only the fruits of a process of thought, and so we still remain within that realm of mere pure thought which has successfully digested the hardest facts.

It is above all this appearance of an independent history of state constitutions, of systems of law, of ideological conceptions in every separate domain, which dazzles most people.

If Luther and Calvin "overcome" the official Catholic religion or Hegel "overcomes" Fichte and Kant or if the constitutional Montesquieu is indirectly "overcome" by Rousseau with his "Social Contract," each of these events remains within the sphere of theology, philosophy or political science, represents a stage in the history of these particular spheres of thought and never passes outside the sphere of thought. And since the bourgeois illusion of the eternity and the finality of capitalist production has been added as well, even the victory of the physiocrats and Adam Smith over the mercantilists is accounted as a sheer victory of thought; not as the reflection in thought of changed economic facts but as the finally achieved correct understanding of actual conditions subsisting always and everywhere—in fact, if Richard Cœur-de-Lion and Philip Augustus had introduced free trade instead of getting mixed up in the crusades we should have been spared five hundred years of misery and stupidity.

This side of the matter, which I can only indicate here, we have all, I think, neglected more than it deserves. It is the old story: form is always neglected at first for content. As I say, I have done that too and the mistake has always struck me only later.

So I am not only far from reproaching you with this in any way, but as the older of the guilty parties I have no right to do so; on the contrary. But I would like all the same to draw your attention to this point for the future.

Hanging together with this is the fatuous notion of the ideologists that because we deny an independent historical development to the various ideological spheres which play a part in history we also deny them any effect upon history. The basis of this is the common undialectical conception of cause and effect as rigidly opposite poles, the total disregarding of interaction; these gentlemen often quite deliberately forget that once a historic element has been brought into the world by other elements, ultimately by economic facts, it also reacts and may react on its environment and even on the causes that have given rise to it. *E.g.*, Barth on the priesthood and religion on your page 475.¹

ENGELS TO HEINZ STARKENBURG

London, January 25, 1894

1. What we understand by the economic relations, which we regard as the determining basis of the history of society, is the method by which human beings in a given society produce their

¹ In the section of the article to which Engels refers, Mehring gives an extract from Barth's work, *The Philosophy of History of Hegel and the Hegelians, down to Marx and Hartmann*, as follows:

"In the East there was created everywhere by religion a specially privileged priesthood which was freed from physical labour and set apart for spiritual activity by the obligation of tribute laid on the other orders.

"While in Greek and Roman civilization the activity of the priests was seldom relegated to special organs, Christianity returned to the oriental differentiation, created a special order of priests which it equipped abundantly and thus set apart a part of the economic wealth as the material substrate for religious activity which quickly became a general mental activity."

This is the idealist view of the relation between economy and religion.

Then, by way of counterpoise, Mehring quotes a passage from Marx's *Capital* which reveals the material bases and the cause of the prominent role of the priests in ancient Egyptian economy: "The necessity for predicting the rise and fall of the Nile created Egyptian astronomy, and with it the dominion of the priests, as directors of agriculture." (*Capital*, Vol. I, p. 523.)—*Ed.*

means of subsistence and exchange the products among themselves (in so far as division of labour exists). Thus the *entire technique* of production and transport is here included. According to our conception this technique also determines the method of exchange and, further, the division of products and with it, after the dissolution of tribal society, also the division into classes, and hence the relations of lordship and servitude and with them the state, politics, law, etc. Further included in economic relations are the geographical basis¹ on which they operate and those remnants of earlier stages of economic development which have actually been transmitted and have survived—often only through tradition or *vis inertiae*; also of course the external milieu which surrounds this form of society.

If, as you say, technique largely depends on the state of science, science depends far more still on the *state* and the *requirements* of technique. If society has a technical need, that helps science forward more than ten universities. The whole of hydrostatics (Torricelli, etc.) was called forth by the necessity for regulating the mountain streams of Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. We have only known anything reasonable about electricity since its technical applicability was discovered. But unfortunately it has become the custom in Germany to write the history of the sciences as if they had fallen from the skies.

2. We regard economic conditions as the factor which ultimately determines historical development. But race is itself an economic factor. Here, however, two points must not be overlooked:

a) Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on economic development. But all these react upon one another and also upon the economic base. It is **not** that the economic position is the *cause and alone active*, while everything else only has a passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the basis of economic necessity, which *ultimately* always asserts itself. The state, for instance, exercises an influence by protective tariffs, free trade, good or bad fiscal system; and even the deadly inanition and impotence of the German philistine,

¹ By economic relations Engels here means, in substance, the entire complex of "the conditions of material life" of people, as is said with greater precision and concreteness in "Dialectical and Historical Materialism" by J. Stalin, p. 81 of this volume. According to Marxism-Leninism, economic relations, strictly construed, mean only the relations between people in the process of production, i.e., relations of production.—Ed.

arising from the miserable economic position of Germany from 1648 to 1830 and expressing itself at first in pietism, then in sentimentality and cringing servility to princes and nobles, was not without economic effect. It was one of the greatest hindrances to recovery and was not shaken until the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars made the chronic misery an acute one. So it is not, as people try here and there conveniently to imagine, that the economic position produces an automatic effect. No. Men make their history themselves only in a given environment which conditions it and on the basis of actual relations already existing, among which the economic relations, however much they may be influenced by the other—political and ideological—ones, are still ultimately the decisive ones, forming the red thread which runs through them and alone leads to understanding.

b) Men make their history themselves, but not as yet with a collective will according to a collective plan or even in a definitely delimited given society. Their efforts clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by *necessity*, which is supplemented by and appears under the forms of *accident*. The necessity which here asserts itself by means of accident is again ultimately economic necessity. This is where the so-called great men come in for treatment. That such and such a man and precisely that man arises at a particular time in a particular country is of course pure accident. But cut him out and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute will be found, good or bad, but in the long run he will be found. That Napoleon, just that particular Corsican, should have been the military dictator whom the French Republic, exhausted by its own war, had rendered necessary, was an accident; but that, if a Napoleon had been lacking, another would have filled the place, is proved by the fact that the man has always been found as soon as he became necessary: Cæsar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc. While Marx discovered the materialist conception of history, Thierry, Mignet, Guizot, and all the English historians up to 1850 are the proof that it was being striven for and the discovery of the same conception by Morgan¹ proves that the time was ripe for it and that it simply *had* to be discovered.

So with all the other accidents, and apparent accidents, of history. The further the particular sphere which we are investigating

¹ The work of the American savant, Lewis H. Morgan, *Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress, from Savagery, through Barbarism, to Civilization*, appeared in 1877. Engels says in his Preface to *The*

is removed from the economic sphere and approaches that of pure abstract ideology, the more shall we find it exhibiting accidents in its development; the more will its curve run in a zigzag. But if you plot the average axis of the curve, you will find that the axis of this curve will run more and more nearly parallel to the axis of the curve of economic development the longer the period considered and the wider the field dealt with.

In Germany the greatest hindrance to correct understanding is the irresponsible neglect by literature of economic history. It is so hard, not only to disaccustom oneself of the ideas of history drilled into one at school, but still more to rake up the necessary material for doing so. Who, for instance, has read old G. von Gülich, whose dry collection of material nevertheless contains so much stuff for the clarification of innumerable political facts!

For the rest, the fine example which Marx has given in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* should, I think, provide you fairly well with information on your questions, just because it is a practical example. I have also, I believe, already touched on most of the points in *Anti-Dühring* I, Chapters 9-11, and II, 2-4, as well as in III, 1, or Introduction, and also in the last section of *Feuerbach*.

Please do not weigh each word in the above too carefully, but keep the connection in mind; I regret that I have not the time to word what I am writing to you as exactly as I should be obliged to do for publication.

Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, [Eng. ed., Moscow, 1940, p. 6.]: "Morgan's great merit lies in having discovered and reconstructed this prehistoric foundation of our written history in its main features, and in having found in the groups based on sex of the North American Indians the key to the most important, hitherto insoluble, riddles of the earliest Greek, Roman and German history." But the scientific, economic substantiation of this discovery, from the point of view of dialectical and historical materialism, was supplied by Marx and Engels.—Ed.

Frederick Engels

ON HISTORICAL MATERIALISM¹

I am perfectly aware that the contents of this work will meet with objection from a considerable portion of the British public. But if we Continentals had taken the slightest notice of the prejudices of British "respectability," we should be even worse off than we are. This book defends what we call "historical materialism," and the word materialism grates upon the ears of the immense majority of British readers. "Agnosticism"² might be tolerated, but materialism is utterly inadmissible.

And yet the original home of all modern materialism, from the seventeenth century onwards, is England.

"Materialism is the natural-born son of Great Britain. Already the British schoolman, Duns Scotus, asked, 'whether it was impossible for matter to think?'

"In order to effect this miracle, he took refuge in God's omnipotence, i.e., he made theology preach materialism. Moreover, he was a nominalist. Nominalism,³ the first form of materialism, is chiefly found among the English schoolmen.

¹ This article of Engels', written in *English* in 1892, is a part of his Introduction to the English edition of his pamphlet, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. The beginning of this Introduction is to be found on p. 146 of this volume and the immediate continuation and remaining part appears here. It is given as a separate article with the title as above because it was published as such by Engels himself in the German organ, the *Neue Zeit*, 1892-93. Vol. I. See also p. 149, note 1.

Originally printed in London, in 1892, in the Introduction to *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. The same year the author's own German translation was published in the *Neue Zeit*, Jg. XI, Bd. I, Heft 1 and 2.—Ed.

² *Agnosticism* is derived from the Greek prefix *a*=not, and *gnosis*=knowing. This philosophic trend asserts that things (the objective world) are unknowable.—Ed.

³ *Nominalism* is derived from the Latin *nomen*=name and is a school of mediæval philosophy whose adherents maintained that concepts are only *names* of analogous *things*, that ideas, concepts, had no independent existence. In contrast to this first expression of materialism, another school—that of

"The real progenitor of English materialism is Bacon. To him natural philosophy is the only true philosophy, and physics based upon the experience of the senses is the chiefest part of natural philosophy. Anaxagoras and his homœomeriæ, Democritus and his atoms, he often quotes as his authorities. According to him the senses are infallible and the source of all knowledge. All science is based on experience, and consists in subjecting the data furnished by the senses to a rational method of investigation. Induction, analysis, comparison, observation, experiment, are the principal forms of such a rational method. Among the qualities inherent in matter, motion is the first and foremost, not only in the form of mechanical and mathematical motion, but chiefly in the form of an impulse, a vital spirit, a tension—or a 'qual,' to use a term of Jacob Böhme's¹—of matter.

"In Bacon, its first creator, materialism still occludes within itself the germs of a many-sided development. On the one hand, matter, surrounded by a sensuous, poetic glamour, seems to attract man's whole entity by winning smiles. On the other, the aphoristically formulated doctrine pullulates with inconsistencies imported from theology.

"In its further evolution, materialism becomes one-sided. Hobbes is the man who systematizes Baconian materialism. Knowledge based upon the senses loses its poetic blossom, it passes into the abstract experience of the mathematician; geometry is proclaimed as the queen of sciences. Materialism takes to misanthropy. If it is to overcome its opponent, misanthropic, fleshless spiritualism, and that on the latter's own ground, materialism has to chastise its own flesh and turn ascetic. Thus, from a sensual, it passes into an intellectual entity; but thus, too, it evolves all the consistency, regardless of consequences, characteristic of the intellect.

"Hobbes, as Bacon's continuator, argues thus: if all human knowledge is furnished by the senses, then our concepts and ideas are but the phantoms, divested of their sensual forms, of the real

Realism—took up the point of view that concepts are "real," i.e., exist not only as *reflections* of the real world in the minds of men but even *outside* of their minds, independent of the world of things and before things. Consequently, mediæval "Realism" expressed the standpoint of idealism.—Ed.

¹ "Qual" is a philosophical play upon words. Qual literally means torture, a pain which drives to action of some kind; at the same time the mystic Böhme puts into the German word something of the meaning of the Latin *qualitas*; his "qual" was the activating principle arising from, and promoting in its turn, the spontaneous development of the thing, relation, or person subject to it, in contradistinction to a pain inflicted from without. [Note by F. Engels to the English edition.]

world. Philosophy can but give names to these phantoms. One name may be applied to more than one of them. There may even be names of names. It would imply a contradiction if, on the one hand, we maintained that all ideas had their origin in the world of sensation, and, on the other, that a word was more than a word; that besides the beings known to us by our senses, beings which are one and all individuals, there existed also beings of a general, not individual, nature. An unbodily substance is the same absurdity as an unbodily body. Body, being, substance, are but different terms for the same reality. *It is impossible to separate thought from matter that thinks.* This matter is the substratum of all changes going on in the world. The world infinite is meaningless, unless it states that our mind is capable of performing an endless process of addition. Only material things being perceptible to us, we cannot know anything about the existence of God. My own existence alone is certain. Every human passion is a mechanical movement which has a beginning and an end. The objects of impulse are what we call good. Man is subject to the same laws as nature. Power and freedom are identical.

"Hobbes had systematized Bacon, without, however, furnishing a proof for Bacon's fundamental principle, the origin of all human knowledge from the world of sensation. It was Locke who, in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, supplied this proof.

"Hobbes had shattered the theistic¹ prejudices of Baconian materialism; Collins, Dodwall, Coward, Hartley, Priestley similarly shattered the last theological bars that still hemmed in Locke's sensationalism. At all events, for practical materialists, Deism² is but an easy-going way of getting rid of religion."³

Thus Karl Marx wrote about the British origin of modern materialism. If Englishmen nowadays do not exactly relish the compliment he paid their ancestors, more's the pity. It is none the less

¹ *Theistic*: pertaining to *theism*, a religious philosophy in which the existence of a personal deity, a creator of the universe, is recognized.—*Ed.*

² *Deism*: A philosophical trend which is hostile to positive religions with their cult of a personal deity but does not wholly reject the idea of a godhead: God remains the Prime Cause of everything, the force which gave the First Impulse. Unlike consistent materialists, who in fact are atheists, deists do not finally break with the idea of God. The God of the deists, who in their opinion is the creator of Nature, is circumscribed by her laws and cannot act arbitrarily or perform miracles in contravention of them. Deism has thus made it possible to recognize the conclusions of materialism in concealed and inconsistent form.—*Ed.*

³ Marx and Engels, *Die Heilige Familie*, Frankfurt a. M. 1845, pp. 201-04. [Note by F. Engels.]

undeniable that Bacon, Hobbes and Locke are the fathers of that brilliant school of French materialists which made the eighteenth century, in spite of all battles on land and sea won over Frenchmen by Germans and Englishmen, a pre-eminently French century, even before that crowning French Revolution, the results of which we outsiders, in England as well as in Germany, are still trying to acclimatize.

There is no denying it. About the middle of this century, what struck every cultivated foreigner who set up his residence in England, was what he was then bound to consider the religious bigotry and stupidity of the English respectable middle class. We, at that time, were all materialists, or, at least, very advanced free-thinkers, and to us it appeared inconceivable that almost all educated people in England should believe in all sorts of impossible miracles and that even geologists like Buckland and Mantell should contort the facts of their science so as not to clash too much with the myths of the book of Genesis; while, in order to find people who dared to use their own intellectual faculties with regard to religious matters, you had to go amongst the uneducated, the "great unwashed," as they were then called, the working people, especially the Owenite socialists.

But England has been "civilized" since then. The exhibition of 1851¹ sounded the knell of English insular exclusiveness. England became gradually internationalized, in diet, in manners, in ideas; so much so that I begin to wish that some English manners and customs had made as much headway on the Continent as other Continental habits have made here. Anyhow, the introduction and spread of salad oil (before 1851 known only to the aristocracy) has been accompanied by a fatal spread of Continental scepticism in matters religious, and it has come to this, that agnosticism, though not yet considered "the thing" quite as much as the Church of England, is yet very nearly on a par, as far as respectability goes, with Baptism, and decidedly ranks above the Salvation Army. And I cannot help believing that under these circumstances it will be consoling to many who sincerely regret and condemn this progress of infidelity to learn that these "new-fangled notions" are not of foreign origin, are not "made in Germany," like so many other articles of daily use, but are undoubtedly Old English, and that their British originators two hundred years ago went a good deal further than their descendants now dare to venture.

¹ In 1851 the first world's fair was held in London.—*Ed.*

What, indeed, is agnosticism but, to use an expressive Lancashire term, "shamefaced" materialism? The agnostic's conception of Nature is materialistic throughout. The entire natural world is governed by law, and absolutely excludes the intervention of action from without. But, he adds, we have no means either of ascertaining or of disproving the existence of some Supreme Being beyond the known universe. Now, this might hold good at the time when Laplace, to Napoleon's question, why in the great astronomer's *Mécanique céleste* the Creator was not even mentioned, proudly replied: "*Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse.*" But nowadays, in our evolutionary conception of the universe, there is absolutely no room for either a Creator or a Ruler; and to talk of a supreme Being shut out from the whole existing world, implies a contradiction in terms, and, as it seems to me, a gratuitous insult to the feelings of religious people.

Again, our agnostic admits that all our knowledge is based upon the information imparted to us by our senses. But, he adds, how do we know that our senses give us correct representations of the objects we perceive through them? And he proceeds to inform us that, whenever he speaks of objects or their qualities, he does in reality not mean these objects and qualities, of which he cannot know anything for certain, but merely the impressions which they have produced on his senses. Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation there was action. *Im Anfang war die Tat.*¹ And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, *so far*, agree with reality outside ourselves. And whenever we find ourselves face to face with a failure, then we generally are not long in making out the cause that made us fail; we find that the perception upon which we acted was either incomplete and superficial, or combined with

¹ From Goethe's *Faust*, Part I.—Ed.

the results of other perceptions in a way not warranted by them—what we call defective reasoning. So long as we take care to train and to use our senses properly, and to keep our action within the limits prescribed by perceptions properly made and properly used, so long we shall find that the result of our action proves the conformity of our perceptions with the objective nature of the things perceived. Not in one single instance, so far, have we been led to the conclusion that our sense-perceptions, scientifically controlled, induce in our minds ideas respecting the outer world that are, by their very nature, at variance with reality, or that there is an inherent incompatibility between the outer world and our sense-perceptions of it.

But then come the Neo-Kantian agnostics and say: We may correctly perceive the qualities of a thing, but we cannot by any sensible or mental process grasp the thing-in-itself. This "thing-in-itself" is beyond our ken. To this Hegel, long since, has replied: If you know all the qualities of a thing, you know the thing itself; nothing remains but the fact that the said thing exists without us; and when your senses have taught you that fact, you have grasped the last remnant of the thing-in-itself, Kant's celebrated unknowable *Ding an sich*. To which it may be added that in Kant's time our knowledge of natural objects was indeed so fragmentary that he might well suspect, behind the little we knew about each of them, a mysterious "thing-in-itself." But one after another these ungraspable things have been grasped, analysed, and, what is more, *reproduced* by the giant progress of science; and what we can produce, we certainly cannot consider as unknowable. To the chemistry of the first half of this century organic substances were such mysterious objects; now we learn to build them up one after another from their chemical elements without the aid of organic processes. Modern chemists declare that as soon as the chemical constitution of no matter what body is known, it can be built up from its elements. We are still far from knowing the constitution of the highest organic substances, the albuminous bodies; but there is no reason why we should not, if only after centuries, arrive at that knowledge and, armed with it, produce artificial albumen. But if we arrive at that, we shall at the same time have produced organic life, for life, from its lowest to its highest forms, is but the normal mode of existence of albuminous bodies.

As soon, however, as our agnostic has made these formal mental reservations, he talks and acts as the rank materialist he at bottom is. He may say that, as far as *we* know, matter and motion, or as it is now called, energy, can neither be created nor destroyed,

but that we have no proof of their not having been created at some time or other. But if you try to use this admission against him in any particular case, he will quickly put you out of court. If he admits the possibility of spiritualism *in abstracto*, he will have none of it *in concreto*. As far as we know and can know, he will tell you there is no Creator and no Ruler of the universe; as far as we are concerned, matter and energy can neither be created nor annihilated; for us, mind is a mode of energy, a function of the brain; all we know is that the material world is governed by immutable laws, and so forth. Thus, as far as he is a scientific man, as far as he *knows* anything, he is a materialist; outside his science, in spheres about which he knows nothing, he translates his ignorance into Greek and calls it agnosticism.

At all events, one thing seems clear: even if I were an agnostic, it is evident that I could not describe the conception of history sketched out in this little book as "historical agnosticism." Religious people would laugh at me, agnostics would indignantly ask, was I going to make fun of them? And thus I hope even British respectability will not be overshocked if I use, in English as well as in so many other languages, the term "historical materialism," to designate that view of the course of history which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggles of these classes against one another.

This indulgence will perhaps be accorded to me all the sooner if I show that historical materialism may be of advantage even to British respectability. I have mentioned the fact that, about forty or fifty years ago, any cultivated foreigner settling in England was struck by what he was then bound to consider the religious bigotry and stupidity of the English respectable middle class. I am now going to prove that the respectable English middle class of that time was not quite as stupid as it looked to the intelligent foreigner. Its religious leanings can be explained.

When Europe emerged from the Middle Ages, the rising middle class of the towns constituted its revolutionary element. It had conquered a recognized position within mediæval feudal organization, but this position, also, had become too narrow for its expansive power. The development of the middle class, the *bourgeoisie*, became incompatible with the maintenance of the feudal system; the feudal system, therefore, had to fall.

But the great international centre of feudalism was the Roman Catholic Church. It united the whole of feudalized Western Europe, in spite of all internal wars, into one grand political system, opposed as much to the schismatic Greeks as to the Mohammedan countries. It surrounded feudal institutions with the halo of divine consecration. It had organized its own hierarchy on the feudal model, and, lastly, it was itself by far the most powerful feudal lord, holding, as it did, fully one-third of the soil of the Catholic world. Before profane feudalism could be successfully attacked in each country and in detail, this, its sacred central organization, had to be destroyed.

Moreover, parallel with the rise of the middle class went on the great revival of science; astronomy, mechanics, physics, anatomy, physiology, were again cultivated. And the bourgeoisie, for the development of its industrial production, required a science which ascertained the physical properties of natural objects and the modes of action of the forces of Nature. Now up to then science had but been the humble handmaid of the Church, had not been allowed to overstep the limits set by faith, and for that reason had been no science at all. Science rebelled against the Church; the bourgeoisie could not do without science, and, therefore, had to join in the rebellion.

The above, though touching but two of the points where the rising middle class was bound to come into collision with the established religion, will be sufficient to show, first, that the class most directly interested in the struggle against the pretensions of the Roman Church was the bourgeoisie; and second, that every struggle against feudalism, at that time, had to take on a religious disguise, had to be directed against the Church in the first instance. But if the universities and the traders of the cities started the cry, it was sure to find, and did find, a strong echo in the masses of the country people, the peasants, who everywhere had to struggle for their very existence with their feudal lords, spiritual and temporal.

The long fight of the bourgeoisie against feudalism culminated in three great decisive battles.

The first was what is called the Protestant Reformation in Germany. The war-cry raised against the Church by Luther was responded to by two insurrections of a political nature: first, that of the lower nobility under Franz von Sickingen (1523), then the great Peasants' War, 1525. Both were defeated, chiefly in consequence of the indecision of the parties most interested, the burgh-

ers of the towns—an indecision into the causes of which we cannot here enter. From that moment the struggle degenerated into a fight between the local princes and the central power, and ended by blotting out Germany, for two hundred years, from the politically active nations of Europe. The Lutheran Reformation produced a new creed indeed, a religion adapted to absolute monarchy. No sooner were the peasants of Northeast Germany converted to Lutheranism than they were from freemen reduced to serfs.

But where Luther failed, Calvin won the day. Calvin's creed was one fit for the boldest of the bourgeoisie of his time. His predestination doctrine was the religious expression of the fact that in the commercial world of competition success or failure does not depend upon a man's activity or cleverness, but upon circumstances uncontrollable by him. It is not of him that willeth or of him that runneth, but of the mercy of unknown superior economic powers; and this was especially true at a period of economic revolution, when all old commercial routes and centres were replaced by new ones, when India and America were opened to the world, and when even the most sacred economic articles of faith—the value of gold and silver—began to totter and to break down. Calvin's church constitution was thoroughly democratic and republican; and where the kingdom of God was republicanized, could the kingdoms of this world remain subject to monarchs, bishops and lords? While German Lutheranism became a willing tool in the hands of princes, Calvinism founded a republic in Holland and active republican parties in England, and, above all, Scotland.

In Calvinism, the second great bourgeois upheaval found its doctrine ready cut and dried. This upheaval took place in England. The middle class of the towns brought it on, and the yeomanry of the country districts fought it out. Curiously enough, in all the three great bourgeois risings, the peasantry furnishes the army that has to do the fighting; and the peasantry is just the class that, the victory once gained, is most surely ruined by the economic consequences of that victory. A hundred years after Cromwell, the yeomanry of England had almost disappeared. Anyhow, had it not been for that yeomanry and for the *plebeian* element in the towns, the bourgeoisie alone would never have fought the matter out to the bitter end, and would never have brought Charles I to the scaffold. In order to secure even those conquests of the bourgeoisie that were ripe for gathering at the

time, the revolution had to be carried considerably further—exactly as in 1793 in France and 1848 in Germany. This seems, in fact, to be one of the laws of evolution of bourgeois society.

Well, upon this excess of revolutionary activity there necessarily followed the inevitable reaction which in its turn went beyond the point where it might have maintained itself. After a series of oscillations, the new centre of gravity was at last attained and became a new starting point. The grand period of English history, known to respectability under the name of "the Great Rebellion," and the struggles succeeding it, were brought to a close by the comparatively puny event entitled by Liberal historians "the Glorious Revolution."

The new starting point was a compromise between the rising middle class and the ex-feudal landowners. The latter, though called, as now, the aristocracy, had been long since on the way which led them to become what Louis Philippe in France became at a much later period, "the first bourgeois of the kingdom." Fortunately for England, the old feudal barons had killed one another during the Wars of the Roses. Their successors, though mostly scions of the old families, had been so much out of the direct line of descent that they constituted quite a new body, with habits and tendencies far more bourgeois than feudal. They fully understood the value of money, and at once began to increase their rents by turning hundreds of small farmers out and replacing them by sheep. Henry VIII, while squandering the Church lands, created fresh bourgeois landlords by wholesale; the innumerable confiscations of estates, regranted to absolute or relative upstarts, and continued during the whole of the seventeenth century, had the same result. Consequently, ever since Henry VII, the English "aristocracy," far from counteracting the development of industrial production, had, on the contrary, sought to indirectly profit thereby; and there had always been a section of the great landowners willing, from economical or political reasons, to co-operate with the leading men of the financial and industrial bourgeoisie. The compromise of 1689 was, therefore, easily accomplished. The political spoils of "pelf and place" were left to the great landowning families, provided the economic interests of the financial, manufacturing and commercial middle class were sufficiently attended to. And these economic interests were at that time powerful enough to determine the general policy of the nation. There might be squabbles about matters of detail, but, on the whole, the aristocratic oligarchy knew too well that its own

economic prosperity was irretrievably bound up with that of the industrial and commercial middle class.

From that time, the bourgeoisie was a humble, but still a recognized component of the ruling classes of England. With the rest of them, it had a common interest in keeping in subjection the great working mass of the nation. The merchant or manufacturer himself stood in the position of master, or, as it was until lately called, of "natural superior" to his clerks, his work-people, his domestic servants. His interest was to get as much and as good work out of them as he could; for this end they had to be trained to proper submission. He was himself religious; his religion had supplied the standard under which he had fought the king and the lords; he was not long in discovering the opportunities this same religion offered him for working upon the minds of his natural inferiors, and making them submissive to the behests of the masters it had pleased God to place over them. In short, the English bourgeoisie now had to take a part in keeping down the "lower orders," the great producing mass of the nation, and one of the means employed for that purpose was the influence of religion.

There was another fact that contributed to strengthen the religious leanings of the bourgeoisie. That was the rise of materialism in England. This new doctrine not only shocked the pious feelings of the middle class; it announced itself as a philosophy only fit for scholars and cultivated men of the world, in contrast to religion, which was good enough for the uneducated masses, including the bourgeoisie. With Hobbes it stepped on the stage as a defender of royal prerogative and omnipotence; it called upon absolute monarchy to keep down that *puer robustus sed malitiosus*, to wit, the people. Similarly, with the successors of Hobbes, with Bolingbroke, Shaftesbury, etc., the new deistic form of materialism remained an aristocratic, esoteric doctrine, and, therefore, hateful to the middle class both for its religious heresy and for its anti-bourgeois political connections. Accordingly, in opposition to the materialism and deism of the aristocracy, those Protestant sects which had furnished the flag and the fighting contingent against the Stuarts continued to furnish the main strength of the progressive middle class, and form even today the backbone of "the Great Liberal Party."

In the meantime materialism passed from England to France, where it met and coalesced with another materialistic school of philosophers, a branch of Cartesianism. In France, too, it re-

mained at first an exclusively aristocratic doctrine. But soon its revolutionary character asserted itself. The French materialists did not limit their criticism to matters of religious belief; they extended it to whatever scientific tradition or political institution they met with; and to prove the claim of their doctrine to universal application, they took the shortest cut, and boldly applied it to all subjects of knowledge in the giant work after which they were named—the *Encyclopédie*. Thus, in one or the other of its two forms—avowed materialism or deism—it became the creed of the whole cultured youth of France; so much so that, when the Great Revolution broke out, the doctrine hatched by English Royalists gave a theoretical flag to French Republicans and Terrorists, and furnished the text for the Declaration of the Rights of Man. The Great French Revolution was the third uprising of the bourgeoisie, but the first that had entirely cast off the religious cloak and was fought out on undisguised political lines; it was the first, too, that was really fought out up to the destruction of one of the combatants, the aristocracy, and the complete triumph of the other, the bourgeoisie. In England the continuity of pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary institutions, and the compromise between landlords and capitalists, found its expression in the continuity of judicial precedents and in the religious preservation of the feudal forms of the law. In France the Revolution constituted a complete breach with the traditions of the past; it cleared out the very last vestiges of feudalism, and created in the *Code Civil* a masterly adaptation of the old Roman law—that almost perfect expression of the juridical relations corresponding to the economic stage called by Marx the production of commodities—to modern capitalistic conditions; so masterly that this French revolutionary code still serves as a model for reforms of the law of property in all other countries, not excepting England. Let us, however, not forget that if English law continues to express the economic relations of capitalistic society in that barbarous feudal language which corresponds to the thing expressed, just as English spelling corresponds to English pronunciation—*vous écrivez Londres et vout prononcez Constantinople*, said a Frenchman—that same English law is the only one which has preserved through ages, and transmitted to America and the Colonies the best part of that old Germanic personal freedom, local self-government and independence from all interference but that of the law courts, which on the Continent has been lost during the period of absolute monarchy, and has nowhere been as yet fully recovered.

To return to our British bourgeois. The French Revolution gave him a splendid opportunity, with the help of the Continental monarchies, to destroy French maritime commerce, to annex French colonies, and to crush the last French pretensions to maritime rivalry. That was one reason why he fought it. Another was that the ways of this revolution went very much against his grain. Not only its "execrable" terrorism, but the very attempt to carry bourgeois rule to extremes. What should the British bourgeois do without his aristocracy, that taught him manners, such as they were, and invented fashions for him—that furnished officers for the army, which kept order at home, and the navy, which conquered colonial possessions and new markets abroad? There was indeed a progressive minority of the bourgeoisie, that minority whose interests were not so well attended to under the compromise; this section, composed chiefly of the less wealthy middle class, did sympathize with the revolution, but it was powerless in Parliament.

Thus, if materialism became the creed of the French Revolution, the God-fearing English bourgeois held all the faster to his religion. Had not the reign of terror in Paris proved what was the upshot, if the religious instincts of the masses were lost? The more materialism spread from France to neighbouring countries, and was reinforced by similar doctrinal currents, notably by German philosophy, the more, in fact, materialism and free-thought generally became, on the Continent, the necessary qualifications of a cultivated man, the more stubbornly the English middle class stuck to its manifold religious creeds. These creeds might differ from one another, but they were, all of them, distinctly religious, Christian creeds.

While the revolution ensured the political triumph of the bourgeoisie in France, in England Watt, Arkwright, Cartwright, and others, initiated an industrial revolution, which completely shifted the centre of gravity of economic power. The wealth of the bourgeoisie increased considerably faster than that of the landed aristocracy. Within the bourgeoisie itself, the financial aristocracy, the bankers, etc., were more and more pushed into the background by the manufacturers. The compromise of 1689, even after the gradual changes it had undergone in favour of the bourgeoisie, no longer corresponded to the relative position of the parties to it. The character of these parties, too, had changed; the bourgeoisie of 1830 was very different from that of the preceding century. The political power still left to the aristocracy, and used

by them to resist the pretensions of the new industrial bourgeoisie, became incompatible with the new economic interests. A fresh struggle with the aristocracy was necessary; it could end only in a victory of the new economic power. First, the Reform Act was pushed through, in spite of all resistance, under the impulse of the French Revolution of 1830. It gave to the bourgeoisie a recognized and powerful place in Parliament. Then the repeal of the Corn Laws,¹ which settled, once for all, the supremacy of the bourgeoisie, and especially of its most active portion, the manufacturers, over the landed aristocracy. This was the greatest victory of the bourgeoisie; it was, however, also the last it gained in its own exclusive interest. Whatever triumphs it obtained later on, it had to share with a new social power, first its ally, but soon its rival.

The industrial revolution had created a class of large manufacturing capitalists, but also a class—and a far more numerous one—of manufacturing work-people. This class gradually increased in numbers, in proportion as the industrial revolution seized upon one branch of manufacture after another, and in the same proportion it increased in power. This power it proved as early as 1824, by forcing a reluctant Parliament to repeal the acts forbidding combinations of workmen. During the Reform agitation, the workingmen constituted the Radical wing of the Reform Party; the Act of 1832 having excluded them from the suffrage, they formulated their demands in the People's Charter, and constituted themselves, in opposition to the great bourgeois Anti-Corn Law party, into an independent party, the Chartists, the first workingmen's party of modern times.

Then came the Continental revolutions of February and March 1848, in which the working people played such a prominent part, and, at least in Paris, put forward demands which were certainly inadmissible from the point of view of capitalist society. And then came the general reaction. First the defeat of the Chartists on the 10th April, 1848, then the crushing of the Paris workingmen's insurrection in June of the same year, then the disasters of 1849 in Italy, Hungary, South Germany, and at last the victory of Louis Bonaparte over Paris, 2nd December, 1851. For a time, at least, the bugbear of working-class pretensions was put down, but at what cost! If the British bourgeois had been convinced

¹ *Corn Laws*: Grain tariff. In 1842 the rates were reduced. In 1846 grain import restrictions were removed, and in 1849 grain tariffs were entirely abolished.—*Ed.*

before of the necessity of maintaining the common people in a religious mood, how much more must he feel that necessity after all these experiences? Regardless of the sneers of his Continental compeers, he continued to spend thousands and tens of thousands, year after year, upon the evangelization of the lower orders; not content with his own native religious machinery, he appealed to Brother Jonathan,¹ the greatest organizer in existence of religion as a trade, and imported from America revivalism, Moody and Sankey, and the like; and, finally, he accepted the dangerous aid of the Salvation Army, which revives the propaganda of early Christianity, appeals to the poor as the elect, fights capitalism in a religious way, and thus fosters an element of early Christian class antagonism, which one day may become troublesome to the well-to-do people who now find the ready money for it.

It seems a law of historical development that the bourgeoisie can in no European country get hold of political power—at least for any length of time—in the same exclusive way in which the feudal aristocracy kept hold of it during the Middle Ages. Even in France, where feudalism was completely extinguished, the bourgeoisie, as a whole, has held full possession of the government for very short periods only. During Louis Philippe's reign, 1830-48, a very small portion of the bourgeoisie ruled the kingdom; by far the larger part were excluded from the suffrage by the high qualification. Under the Second Republic, 1848-51, the whole bourgeoisie ruled, but for three years only; their incapacity brought on the Second Empire. It is only now, in the Third Republic, that the bourgeoisie as a whole has kept possession of the helm for more than twenty years; and it is already showing lively signs of decadence. A durable reign of the bourgeoisie has been possible only in countries like America, where feudalism was unknown, and society at the very beginning started from a bourgeois basis. And even in France and America, the successors of the bourgeoisie, the working people, are already knocking at the door.

In England, the bourgeoisie never held undivided sway. Even the victory of 1832 left the landed aristocracy in almost exclusive possession of all the leading government offices. The meekness with which the wealthy middle class submitted to this remained inconceivable to me until the great Liberal manufacturer, Mr. W. A. Forster, in a public speech implored the young men of Bradford to learn French, as a means to get on in the world, and quoted from his own experience how sheepish he looked

¹ *Brother Jonathan*: Earlier equivalent of Uncle Sam.—Ed.

when, as a Cabinet Minister, he had to move in society where French was, at least, as necessary as English! The fact was, the English middle class of that time were, as a rule, quite uneducated upstarts, and could not help leaving to the aristocracy those superior government places where other qualifications were required than mere insular narrowness and insular conceit, seasoned by business sharpness.¹ Even now the endless newspaper debates about middle-class education show that the English middle class does not yet consider itself good enough for the best education, and looks to something more modest. Thus, even after the repeal of the Corn Laws, it appeared a matter of course that the men who had carried the day, the Cobdens, Brights, Forsters, etc., should remain excluded from a share in the official government of the country, until twenty years afterwards a new Reform Act opened to them the door of the Cabinet. The English bourgeoisie is, up to the present day, so deeply penetrated by a sense of its social inferiority that it keeps up, at its own expense and that of the nation, an ornamental caste of drones to represent the nation worthily at all state functions; and it considers itself highly honoured whenever one of itself is found worthy of admission into this select and privileged body, manufactured, after all, by itself.

The industrial and commercial middle class had, therefore, not yet succeeded in driving the landed aristocracy completely from political power when another competitor, the working class, appeared on the stage. The reaction after the Chartist movement and the Continental revolutions, as well as the unparalleled exten-

¹ And even in business matters, the conceit of national chauvinism is but a sorry adviser. Up to quite recently, the average English manufacturer considered it derogatory for an Englishman to speak any language but his own, and felt rather proud than otherwise of the fact that "poor devils" of foreigners settled in England and took off his hands the trouble of disposing of his products abroad. He never noticed that these foreigners, mostly Germans, thus got command of a very large part of British foreign trade, imports and exports, and that the direct foreign trade of Englishmen became limited, almost entirely, to the colonies, China, the United States and South America. Nor did he notice that these Germans traded with other Germans abroad, who gradually organized a complete network of commercial colonies all over the world. But when Germany, about forty years ago, seriously began manufacturing for export, this network served her admirably in her transformation, in so short a time, from a corn exporting into a first-rate manufacturing country. Then, about ten years ago, the British manufacturer got frightened, and asked his ambassadors and consuls how it was that he could no longer keep his customers together. The unanimous answer was: 1) You don't learn your customer's language but expect him to speak your own; 2) You don't even try to suit your customer's wants, habits, and tastes, but expect him to conform to your English ones. [Note by F. Engels.]

sion of English trade from 1848-66 (ascribed vulgarly to Free Trade alone, but due far more to the colossal development of railways, ocean steamers and means of intercourse generally), had again driven the working class into the dependency of the Liberal party, of which they formed, as in pre-Chartist times, the radical wing. Their claims to the franchise, however, gradually became irresistible; while the Whig leaders of the Liberals "funked," Disraeli showed his superiority by making the Tories seize the favourable moment and introduce household suffrage in the boroughs, along with a redistribution of seats. Then followed the ballot; then in 1884 the extension of household suffrage to the counties and a fresh redistribution of seats by which electoral districts were to some extent equalized. All these measures considerably increased the electoral power of the working class, so much so that in at least 150 to 200 constituencies that class now furnishes the majority of voters. But parliamentary government is a capital school for teaching respect for tradition; if the middle class look with awe and veneration upon what Lord John Manners playfully called "our old nobility," the mass of the working people then looked up with respect and deference to what used to be designated as "their betters," the middle class. Indeed, the British workman, some fifteen years ago, was the model workman, whose respectful regard for the position of his master, and whose self-restraining modesty in claiming rights for himself, consoled our German economists of the *Katheder-Socialist*¹ school for the incurable communistic and revolutionary tendencies of their own working men at home.

But the English middle class—good men of business as they are—saw farther than the German professors. They had shared their power but reluctantly with the working class. They had learnt, during the Chartist years, what that *puer robustus sed malitiosus*, the people, is capable of. And since that time, they had been compelled to incorporate the better part of the People's Charter in the Statutes of the United Kingdom. Now, if ever, the people must be kept in order by moral means, and the first and foremost of all moral means of action upon the masses is and remains—religion. Hence the parsons' majorities on the School Boards, hence the increasing self-taxation of the bourgeoisie for the support of all sorts of revivalism, from ritualism to the Salvation Army.

¹ Professorial Socialist.—Ed.

And now came the triumph of British respectability over the free-thought and religious laxity of the Continental bourgeois. The workmen of France and Germany had become rebellious. They were thoroughly infected with socialism, and, for very good reasons, were not at all particular as to the legality of the means by which to secure their own ascendancy. The *puer robustus*, here, turned from day to day more *malitiosus*. Nothing remained to the French and German bourgeoisie as a last resource but to silently drop their free-thought, as a youngster, when seasickness creeps upon him, quietly drops the burning cigar he brought swaggeringly on board; one by one, the scoffers turned pious in outward behaviour, spoke with respect of the Church, its dogmas and rites, and even conformed with the latter as far as could not be helped. French bourgeois dined *maigre* on Fridays, and German ones sat out long Protestant sermons in their pews on Sundays. They had come to grief with materialism. "*Die Religion muss dem Volke erhalten werden*,"—religion must be kept alive for the people—that was the only and the last means to save society from utter ruin. Unfortunately for themselves, they did not find this out until they had done their level best to break up religion for ever. And now it was the turn of the British bourgeois to sneer and to say: "Why, you fools, I could have told you that two hundred years ago!"

However, I am afraid neither the religious stolidity of the British, nor the *post festum* conversion of the Continental bourgeois will stem the rising Proletarian tide. Tradition is a great retarding force, is the *vis inertiae* of history, but, being merely passive, is sure to be broken down; and thus religion will be no lasting safeguard to capitalist society. If our juridical, philosophical and religious ideas are the more or less remote offshoots of the economical relations prevailing in a given society, such ideas cannot, in the long run, withstand the effects of a complete change in these relations. And, unless we believe in supernatural revelation, we must admit that no religious tenets will ever suffice to prop up a tottering society.

In fact, in England too, the working people have begun to move again. They are, no doubt, shackled by traditions of various kinds. Bourgeois traditions, such as the widespread belief that there can be but two parties, Conservatives and Liberals, and that the working class must work out its salvation by and through the great Liberal Party. Workingmen's traditions, inherited from their first tentative efforts at independent action, such

as the exclusion, from ever so many old trade unions, of all applicants who have not gone through a regular apprenticeship; which means the breeding, by every such union, of its own blacklegs. But for all that the English working class is moving, as even Professor Brentano has sorrowfully had to report to his brother *Katheder-Socialists*. It moves, like all things in England, with a slow and measured step, with hesitation here, with more or less unfruitful, tentative attempts there; it moves now and then with an over-cautious mistrust of the name of socialism, while it gradually absorbs the substance; and the movement spreads and seizes one layer of the workers after another. It has now shaken out of their torpor the unskilled labourers of the East End of London, and we all know what a splendid impulse these fresh forces have given it in return. And if the pace of the movement is not up to the impatience of some people, let them not forget that it is the working class which keeps alive the finest qualities of the English character, and that, if a step in advance is once gained in England, it is, as a rule, never lost afterwards. If the sons of the old Chartists, for reasons explained above, were not quite up to the mark, the grandsons bid fair to be worthy of their forefathers.

But the triumph of the European working class does not depend upon England alone. It can only be secured by the co-operation of, at least, England, France and Germany. In both the latter countries the working-class movement is well ahead of England. In Germany it is even within measurable distance of success. The progress it has there made during the last twenty-five years is unparalleled. It advances with ever-increasing velocity. If the German middle class has shown itself lamentably deficient in political capacity, discipline, courage, energy and perseverance, the German working class has given ample proof of all these qualities. Four hundred years ago, Germany was the starting point of the first upheaval of the European middle class; as things are now, is it outside the limits of possibility that Germany will be the scene, too, of the first great victory of the European proletariat?

April 20, 1892

F. Engels

Karl Marx

THESES ON FEUERBACH¹

(Jotted down in Brussels in the spring of 1845)

I

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the thing [*Gegenstand*], reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the *object* [*Objekt*] or of *contemplation* [*Anschauung*] but not as *human sensuous activity, practice*, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the *active* side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really differentiated from the thought-objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as *objective* [*gegenständliche*] activity. Hence, in the *Essence of Christianity*, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-Jew form of appearance. Hence he does not grasp the significance of “revolutionary,” of practical-critical, activity.

II

The question whether objective [*gegenständliche*] truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, *i.e.*, the reality and power, the this-sidedness [*Diesseitigkeit*] of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

¹ The text of these theses is that given by Engels in 1888 in the appendix to his *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*. It contains certain editorial changes introduced by him into Marx's original German text published in the *Marx-Engels Archiv*, Bd. I, S. 448, Frankfurt am Main, 1926.—Ed.

III

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men that change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine necessarily arrives at dividing society into two parts, of which one is superior to society (in Robert Owen, for example).

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing practice.

IV

Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-alienation, the duplication of the world into a religious, preconceived world and a real one. His work consists in the dissolution of the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be done. For the fact that the secular foundation lifts itself above itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm is really only to be explained by the self-cleavage and self-contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must itself, therefore, first be understood, in its contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionized in practice. Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be criticized in theory and revolutionized in practice.

V

Feuerbach, not satisfied with *abstract thinking*, appeals to *sensuous contemplation*; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity.

VI

Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the *ensemble* of the social relations.

Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:

1. To abstract from the historical process and to fix the reli-

gious sentiment as something-for itself and to presuppose an abstract—*isolated*—human individual.

2. The human essence, therefore, can with him be comprehended only as “genus,” as an internal, dumb generality which merely *naturally* unites the many individuals.

VII

Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the “religious sentiment” is itself a *social product*, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs in reality to a particular form of society.

VIII

Social life is essentially *practical*. All mysteries which mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.

IX

The highest point attained by *contemplative* materialism, *i.e.*, materialism which does not understand sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals in “civil society.”¹

X

The standpoint of the old materialism is “*civil*” society; the standpoint of the new is *human* society, or socialized humanity.

XI

The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point however is to *change* it.

¹ For the term “civil society,” see p. 300 of this volume.—Ed.

Frederick Engels

LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE OUTCOME OF CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY¹

FOREWORD

In the Preface to the *Critique of Political Economy*, published in Berlin, 1859, Karl Marx relates² how the two of us in Brussels in the year 1845 set about working out in common "the opposition of our view"—the materialist conception of history which was worked out especially by Marx—"to the ideological view of German philosophy, in fact to settle accounts with our previous philosophical conscience. The resolve was carried out in the form of a criticism of post-Hegelian philosophy. The manuscript, two large octavo volumes, had long reached its place of publication in Westphalia when we received the news that altered circumstances did not allow of its being printed. We abandoned the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of the mice all the more willingly since we had achieved our main purpose—self-clarification."

Since then more than forty years have elapsed and Marx died without either of us having had an opportunity of returning to the subject. We have expressed ourselves in various places regarding our relation to Hegel, but nowhere in a comprehensive, connected account. To Feuerbach, who after all in many respects forms an intermediate link between Hegelian philosophy and our conception, we never returned.

In the meantime the Marxist world outlook has found representatives far beyond the boundaries of Germany and Europe and in all the languages of the civilized world. On the other hand, classical German philosophy is experiencing a kind of re-birth abroad, especially in England and Scandinavia, and even in Germany itself people appear to be getting tired of the pauper's broth of eclecticism which is ladled out in the universities there under the name of philosophy.

¹ Written in 1886 and first published the same year in Nos. 4 and 5 of the *Neue Zeit*. As a separate publication it first appeared in 1888 in Stuttgart.—*Ed.*

² See p. 302 of this volume.—*Ed.*

In these circumstances a short, connected account of our relation to the Hegelian philosophy, of how we proceeded from as well as of how we separated from it, appeared to me to be required more and more. Equally, a full acknowledgement of the influence which Feuerbach, more than any other post-Hegelian philosopher, had upon us during our period of storm and stress, appeared to me to be an undischarged debt of honour. I therefore willingly seized the opportunity when the editors of the *Neue Zeit* asked me for a critical review of Starcke's book on Feuerbach. My contribution was published in that journal in the fourth and fifth numbers of 1886 and appears here in revised form as a separate publication.

Before sending these lines to press I have once again ferreted out and looked over the old manuscript of 1845-46.¹ The section dealing with Feuerbach is incomplete. The completed portion consists of an exposition of the materialist conception of history which proves only how incomplete our knowledge of economic history still was at that time. It contains no criticism of Feuerbach's doctrine itself; for the present purpose, therefore, it was unusable. On the other hand, in an old notebook of Marx's I have found the eleven theses on Feuerbach, printed here as an appendix. These are notes hurriedly scribbled down for later elaboration, absolutely not intended for publication, but they are invaluable as the first document in which is deposited the brilliant germ of the new world outlook.

Frederick Engels

London, February 21, 1888

¹ This MS. has now been published in full (with the exception of a few chapters which have been lost) by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow, under the title: *Die deutsche Ideologie* in *Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 5. English translation:—*The German Ideology*—(Parts I & III), International Publishers, New York 1939.—Ed.

LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE OUTCOME OF CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

I

The volume¹ before us carries us back to a period which, although in time no more than a full generation behind us, has become as foreign to the present generation in Germany as if it were already a hundred years old. Yet it was the period of Germany's preparation for the Revolution of 1848, and all that has happened since then in our country has been merely the continuation of 1848, merely the execution of the last will and testament of the revolution.

Just as in France in the eighteenth century, so in Germany in the nineteenth, a philosophical revolution ushered in the political collapse. But how different the two appeared! The French were in open combat against all official science, against the Church and often also against the state; their writings were printed across the frontier, in England or Holland, while they themselves were often in jeopardy of imprisonment in the Bastille. On the other hand, the Germans were professors, state-appointed instructors of youth; their writings were recognized textbooks, and the terminating system of the whole development—the Hegelian system—was even raised, in some degree, to the rank of a royal Prussian philosophy of state! Was it possible that a revolution could hide behind these professors, behind their obscure, pedantic phrases, their wearisome, ponderous sentences? Were not precisely those people who were then regarded as the representatives of the revolution, the liberals, the bitterest opponents of this brain-confusing philosophy? But what neither the government nor the liberals were able to see was seen by at least one man as early as 1833, and this man was indeed none other than Heinrich Heine.²

¹ *Ludwig Feuerbach*, by C. N. Starcke, Ph.D., Stuttgart, Ferd. Enke, 1885. [Note by F. Engels.]

² Engels most likely refers to the articles *On Germany* written by the famous German poet Heine in which he expounded the history of religion and philosophy in Germany.—Ed.

Let us take an example. No philosophical proposition has earned more gratitude from narrow-minded governments and wrath from equally narrow-minded liberals than Hegel's famous statement: "All that is real is rational; and all that is rational is real." That was tangibly a sanctification of things that be, a philosophical benediction bestowed upon despotism, police-government, Star Chamber proceedings and censorship. That is how Frederick William III and his subjects understood it. But according to Hegel certainly not everything that exists is also real, without further qualification. For Hegel the attribute of reality belongs only to that which at the same time is necessary: "In the course of its development reality proves to be necessity." A particular governmental act—Hegel himself cites the example of "a certain tax regulation"—is therefore for him by no means real without qualification. That which is necessary, however, proves itself in the last resort to be also rational; and, applied to the Prussian state of that time, the Hegelian proposition therefore merely means: this state is rational, corresponds to reason, in so far as it is necessary; and if it nevertheless appears to us to be evil, but still, in spite of its evil character, continues to exist, then the evil character of the government is justified and explained by the corresponding evil character of its subjects. The Prussians of that day had the government that they deserved.

Now, according to Hegel, reality is, however, in no way an attribute predicable of any given state of affairs, social or political, in all circumstances and at all times. On the contrary. The Roman Republic was real, but so was the Roman Empire, which superseded it. In 1789 the French monarchy had become so unreal, that is to say, so robbed of all necessity, so irrational, that it had to be destroyed by the Great Revolution—of which Hegel always speaks with the greatest enthusiasm. In this case the monarchy was the unreal and the revolution was the real. And so, in the course of development, all that was previously real becomes unreal loses its necessity, its right of existence, its rationality. And in the place of moribund reality comes a new, viable reality—peacefully if the old has enough intelligence to go to its death without a struggle; forcibly if it resists this necessity. Thus the Hegelian proposition turns into its opposite through Hegelian dialectics itself: All that is real in the sphere of human history becomes irrational in the process of time, is therefore irrational already by its destination, is tainted beforehand with irrationality; and everything which is rational in the minds of men is destined to become real, however much it may

contradict the apparent reality of existing conditions. In accordance with all the rules of the Hegelian method of thought, the proposition of the rationality of everything which is real resolves itself into the other proposition: All that exists deserves to perish.¹

But precisely here lay the true significance and the revolutionary character of the Hegelian philosophy (to which, as the close of the whole movement since Kant, we must here confine ourselves), that it once and for all dealt the deathblow to the finality of all products of human thought and action. Truth, the cognition of which is the business of philosophy, became in the hands of Hegel no longer an aggregate of finished dogmatic statements, which, once discovered, had merely to be learned by heart. Truth lay now in the process of cognition itself, in the long historical development of science, which mounts from lower to ever higher levels of knowledge without ever reaching, by discovering so-called absolute truth,² a point at which it can proceed no further and where it would have nothing more to do than to fold its hands and admire the absolute truth to which it had attained. And what holds good for the realm of philosophic knowledge holds good also for that of every other kind of knowledge and also for practical affairs. Just as knowledge is unable to reach a perfected termination in a perfect, ideal condition of humanity, so is history unable to do so; a perfect society, a perfect "state," are things which can only exist in imagination. On the contrary, all successive historical situations are only transitory stages in the endless course of development of human society from the lower to the higher. Each stage is necessary, and therefore justified for the time and conditions to which it owes its origin. But in the newer and higher conditions which gradually develop in its own bosom, each loses its validity and justification. It must give way to a higher stage which will also in its turn decay and perish. Just as the bourgeoisie by large-scale industry, competition and the world market dissolves in practice all stable, time-honoured institutions, so this dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth and of absolute states of humanity corresponding to it. For it [dialectical philosophy] nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in

¹ Adapted from Goethe's *Faust* (Part I, Scene 3).—*Ed.*

² Engels here has in view the metaphysical conception of absolute truth as completed, exhaustive knowledge, immutable for all time. See also Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Chap. II, Sec. 5: Absolute and Relative Truth.—*Ed.*

everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain. It has, of course, also a conservative side: it recognizes that definite stages of knowledge and society are justified for their time and circumstances; but only so far. The conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its revolutionary character is absolute—the only absolute dialectical philosophy admits.

It is not necessary, here, to go into the question of whether this mode of outlook is thoroughly in accord with the present position of natural science, which predicts a possible end for the earth, and for its habitability a fairly certain one; which therefore recognizes that for the history of humanity also there is not only an ascending but also a descending branch. At any rate we still find ourselves a considerable distance from the turning point at which the historical course of society becomes one of descent, and we cannot expect Hegelian philosophy to be concerned with a subject which natural science, in its time, had not at all placed upon the agenda as yet!

But what must, in fact, be said here is this: that in Hegel the views developed above are not so sharply delineated. It is a necessary conclusion from his method, but one which he himself never drew with such explicitness. And this, indeed, for the simple reason that he was compelled to make a system and, in accordance with all the traditional requirements, a system of philosophy must conclude with some sort of absolute truth. Therefore, however much Hegel, especially in his *Logic*, emphasized that this eternal truth is nothing but the logical, *i.e.*, the historical, process itself, he nevertheless finds himself compelled to supply this process with an end, just because he has to bring his system to a termination at some point or other. In his *Logic* he can make this end a beginning again, since here the point of conclusion, the absolute idea—which is only absolute in so far as he has absolutely nothing to say about it—"alienates," *i.e.*, transforms, itself into nature and comes to itself again later in the mind, *i.e.*, in thought and in history. But at the end of the whole philosophy a similar return to the beginning is possible only in one way, namely, by putting as the end of all history the arrival of mankind at the cognition of this self-same absolute idea, and by explaining that this cognition of the absolute idea is reached in Hegelian philosophy. In this way, however, the whole dogmatic content of the

Hegelian system is declared to be absolute truth, in contradiction to his dialectical method, which dissolves all dogmatism. Thus the revolutionary side becomes smothered beneath the overgrowth of the conservative side. And what applies to philosophical cognition applies also to historical practice. Mankind, which, in the person of Hegel, has reached the point of working out the absolute idea, must also in practice have gotten so far that it can carry out this absolute idea in reality. Hence the practical political demands of the absolute idea on contemporaries may not be stretched too far. And so we find at the conclusion of the *Philosophy of Law* that the absolute idea is to be realized in that monarchy based on estates which Frederick William III so persistently but vainly promised to his subjects, *i.e.*, in a limited, moderate, indirect rule of the possessing classes suited to the petty-bourgeois German conditions of that time. Herewith also the necessity of the nobility is demonstrated to us in a speculative fashion.

The inner necessities of the system are therefore of themselves sufficient to explain why a thoroughly revolutionary method of thinking produced an extremely tame political conclusion. As a matter of fact the specific form of this conclusion springs from this, that Hegel was a German, and like his contemporary Goethe had a bit of the philistine's queue dangling behind. Each of them was an Olympian Zeus in his own sphere, yet neither of them ever quite freed himself from German philistinism.

But all this did not prevent the Hegelian system from covering an incomparably greater domain than any earlier system, nor from developing in this domain a wealth of thought which is astounding even today. The phenomenology of mind (which one may call a parallel of the embryology and palæontology of the mind, a development of individual consciousness through its different stages, couched in the form of an abbreviated recapitulation of the stages through which the consciousness of man has passed in the course of history), logic, natural philosophy, philosophy of mind, and the latter worked out in its separate, historical sub-divisions: philosophy of history, of law, of religion, history of philosophy, æsthetics, etc.—in all these different historical fields Hegel laboured to discover and demonstrate the pervading thread of development. And as he was not only a creative genius but also a man of encyclopædic erudition, he played an epoch-making role in every sphere. It is self-evident that owing to the needs of the "system" he very often had to resort to those forced constructions about which his pigmy opponents make such a terrible fuss even

today. But these constructions are only the frame and scaffolding of his work. If one does not loiter here needlessly, but presses on farther into the immense building, one finds innumerable treasures which today still possess undiminished value. With all philosophers it is precisely the "system" which is perishable; and for the simple reason that it springs from an imperishable need of the human mind—the need to overcome all contradictions. But if all contradictions are once and for all disposed of, we shall have arrived at so-called absolute truth: world history will be at an end. And yet it has to continue, although there is nothing left for it to do—a new, insoluble contradiction. As soon as we have once realized—and in the long run no one has helped us to realize it more than Hegel himself—that the task of philosophy thus stated means nothing but the task that a single philosopher should accomplish that which can only be accomplished by the entire human race in its progressive development—as soon as we realize that, there is an end of all philosophy in the hitherto accepted sense of the word. One leaves alone "absolute truth," which is unattainable along this path or by any single individual; instead, one pursues attainable relative truths along the path of the positive sciences, and the summation of their results by means of dialectical thinking. At any rate, with Hegel philosophy comes to an end: on the one hand, because in his system he comprehended its whole development in the most splendid fashion; and on the other hand, because, even if unconsciously, he showed us the way out of the labyrinth of systems to real positive knowledge of the world.

One can imagine what a tremendous effect this Hegelian system must have produced in the philosophy-tinged atmosphere of Germany. It was a triumphal procession which lasted for decades and which by no means came to a standstill on the death of Hegel. On the contrary, it was precisely from 1830 to 1840 that Hegelianism reigned most exclusively, and to a greater or lesser extent infected even its opponents. It was precisely in this period that Hegelian views, consciously or unconsciously, most extensively permeated the most diversified sciences and leavened even popular literature and the daily press, from which the average "educated consciousness" derived its mental pabulum. But this victory along the whole front was only the prelude to an internal struggle.

As we have seen, the doctrine of Hegel, taken as a whole, left plenty of room for giving shelter to the most diverse practical party views. And in the theoretical Germany of that time, two

things above all were practical: religion and politics. Whoever placed the chief emphasis on the Hegelian *system* could be fairly conservative in both spheres; whoever regarded the dialectical *method* as the main thing could belong to the most extreme opposition, both in politics and religion. Hegel himself, despite the fairly frequent outbursts of revolutionary wrath in his works, seemed on the whole to be more inclined to the conservative side. Indeed, his system had cost him much more "hard mental plugging" than his method. Towards the end of the 'thirties, the cleavage in the school became more and more apparent. The Left wing, the so-called Young Hegelians, in their fight with the pietist orthodox and the feudal reactionaries, abandoned bit by bit that philosophical-aristocratic reserve in regard to the burning questions of the day which up to that time had secured state toleration and even protection for their teachings. And when, in 1840, orthodox pietism and absolutist feudal reaction ascended the throne with Frederick William IV, open partisanship became unavoidable. The fight was still carried on with philosophical weapons, but no longer for abstract philosophical aims. It turned directly on the destruction of traditional religion and of the existing state. And while in the *Deutsche Jahrbücher*¹ the practical ends were still predominantly put forward in philosophical disguise, in the *Rheinische Zeitung* of 1842 the Young Hegelian school revealed itself directly as the philosophy of the aspiring radical bourgeoisie and still used the meagre cloak of philosophy only to deceive the censorship.

At that time, however, politics was a very thorny field, and hence the main fight came to be directed against religion; this fight, particularly since 1840, was indirectly also political. Strauss' *Life of Jesus*, published in 1835, had provided the first impulse. The theory therein developed of the formation of the gospel myths was combated later by Bruno Bauer with proof that a whole series of evangelical stories had been fabricated by the authors themselves. The controversy between these two was carried out in the philosophical disguise of a battle between "self-consciousness" and "substance." The question whether the miracle stories of the gospels came into being through an unconscious-traditional myth-creation within the bosom of the community or whether they were fabricated by the evangelists themselves was magnified into the question whether, in world history, "substance" or "self-consciousness" was the decisive operative force. Finally came Stirner, the

¹ The *Deutsche Jahrbücher* were magazines published by the Left Hegelians A. Ruge and T. Echemeyer in 1838-43.—Ed.

prophet of contemporary anarchism—Bakunin has taken a great deal from him—and capped the sovereign “self-consciousness” by his sovereign “ego.”¹

We will not go further into this side of the decomposition process of the Hegelian school. More important for us is the following: the main body of the most determined Young Hegelians was, by the practical necessities of its fight against positive religion, driven back to Anglo-French materialism.² This brought them into conflict with their school system. While materialism conceives nature as the sole reality, nature in the Hegelian system represents merely the “alienation” of the absolute idea, so to say, a degradation of the idea. At all events, thinking and its thought-product, the idea, is here the primary, nature the derived element, which only exists at all by the condescension of the idea. And in this contradiction they floundered as well or as ill as they could.

Then came Feuerbach’s *Essence of Christianity*. With one blow it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much—in spite of all critical reservations—he was influenced by it, one may read in *The Holy Family*.³

¹ Engels refers to Max Stirner’s (pseudonym for Kaspar Schmidt) *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* [*The Ego and His Own*], which appeared in 1845. Marx and Engels criticized it in their *German Ideology*.—Ed.

² In the seventeenth century in Great Britain and in the eighteenth century in France, natural science and materialistic philosophy developed greatly in connection with the development of the bourgeois method of production in these countries. (Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and others were representatives of English materialism.) In France the materialist philosophers of the eighteenth century (Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach, etc.)—representatives of the revolutionary bourgeoisie—conducted a relentless struggle against serfdom in institutions and ideas, making use of the lessons of the English Revolution while being disciples and continuers of English materialism in philosophy.—Ed.

³ The full title of this book of Marx and Engels is: *The Holy Family or a Criticism of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Co.* “*The Holy Family*” is a facetious nickname for the Bauer brothers, philosophers, and their

Even the shortcomings of the book contributed to its immediate effect. Its literary, sometimes even highflown, style secured for it a large public and was at any rate refreshing after long years of abstract and abstruse Hegelianizing. The same is true of its extravagant deification of love, which, coming after the now intolerable sovereign rule of "pure reason," had its excuse, if not justification. But what we must not forget is that it was precisely these two weaknesses of Feuerbach that "true socialism," which had been spreading like a plague in "educated" Germany since 1844, took as its starting point, putting literary phrases in the place of scientific knowledge, the liberation of mankind by means of "love" in place of the emancipation of the proletariat through the economic transformation of production—in short, losing itself in the nauseous fine writing and ecstasies of love typified by Herr Karl Grün.¹

Another thing we must not forget is this: the Hegelian school was broken up, but Hegelian philosophy was not overcome through criticism; Strauss and Bauer each took one of its sides and set it polemically against the other. Feuerbach broke through the system and simply discarded it. But a philosophy is not disposed of by the mere assertion that it is false. And so powerful a work as Hegelian philosophy—which had exercised so enormous an influence on the intellectual development of the nation—could not be disposed of by simply being ignored. It had to be "sublated" in its own sense, that is, in the sense that while its form had to be annihilated through criticism, the new content which had been won through it had to be saved. How this was brought about we shall see below.

But in the meantime the Revolution of 1848 thrust the whole of philosophy aside as unceremoniously as Feuerbach had himself thrust aside Hegel. And in the process Feuerbach himself was also pushed into the background.

followers. These gentlemen preached a criticism which stood above all reality, which stood above parties and politics, which rejected all practical activity, and which only 'critically' contemplated the surrounding world and the events going on within it. These gentlemen, the Bauers, superciliously regarded the proletariat as an uncritical mass. Marx and Engels vigorously opposed this absurd and harmful trend. On behalf of a real human personality—the worker, trampled down by the ruling classes and the state—they demanded, not contemplation, but a struggle for a better order of society. They, of course, regarded the proletariat as the power that was capable of waging this struggle and that was interested in it." (Lenin, *Marx-Engels-Marxism*, "Frederick Engels," p. 54, Moscow 1937.)—Ed.

¹ For a characterization of German "true socialism," see the *Communist Manifesto*, pp. 134-38 of this volume.—Ed.

II

The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being. From the very early times when men, still completely ignorant of the structure of their own bodies, under the stimulus of dream apparitions¹ came to believe that their thinking and sensation were not activities of their bodies, but of a distinct soul which inhabits the body and leaves it at death—from this time men have been driven to reflect about the relation between this soul and the outside world. If upon death it took leave of the body and lived on, there was no occasion to invent yet another distinct death for it. Thus arose the idea of its immortality, which at that stage of development appeared not at all as a consolation but as a fate against which it was no use fighting, and often enough, as among the Greeks, as a positive misfortune. Not religious desire for consolation, but the quandary arising from the common universal ignorance of what to do with this soul (once its existence had been accepted) after the death of the body—led in a general way to the tedious notion of personal immortality. In an exactly similar manner the first gods arose through the personification of natural forces. And these gods in the further development of religions assumed more and more an extra-mundane form, until finally by a process of abstraction, I might almost say of distillation, occurring naturally in the course of man's intellectual development, out of the many more or less limited and mutually limiting gods there arose in the minds of men the idea of the one exclusive god of the monotheistic religions.

Thus the question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature—the paramount question of the whole of philosophy—has, no less than all religion, its roots in the narrow-minded and ignorant notions of savagery. But this question could for the first time be put forward in its whole acuteness, could achieve its full significance, only after European society had awakened from the long hibernation of the Christian Middle Ages. The question of the position of thinking in relation to being, a question which, by the way, had played a great part also in the scholasti-

¹ Among savages and lower barbarians the idea is still universal that the human forms which appear in dreams are souls which have temporarily left their bodies; the real man is therefore held responsible for acts committed by his dream apparition against the dreamer. Thus Imthurn found this belief current, for example, among the Indians of Guiana in 1884. [Note by F. Engels.]

cism of the Middle Ages, the question: which is primary, spirit or nature—that question, in relation to the Church, was sharpened into this: “Did God create the world or has the world been in existence eternally?”

The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other—and among the philosophers, Hegel, for example, this creation often becomes still more intricate and impossible than in Christianity—comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism.

These two expressions, idealism and materialism, originally signify nothing else but this; and here also they are not used in any other sense. What confusion arises when some other meaning is put into them will be seen below.

But the question of the relation of thinking and being has yet another side: in what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality? In philosophical language this question is called the question of the identity of thinking and being, and the overwhelming majority of philosophers give an affirmative answer to this question. With Hegel, for example, its affirmation is self-evident; for what we perceive in the real world is precisely its thought-content—that which makes the world a gradual realization of the absolute idea, which absolute idea has existed somewhere from eternity, independent of the world and before the world. But it is manifest without more ado that thought can know a content which is from the outset a thought-content. It is equally manifest that what is here to be proved is already tacitly contained in the premises. But that in no way prevents Hegel from drawing the further conclusion from his proof of the identity of thinking and being that his philosophy, because it is correct for his own thinking, is therefore the only correct one, and that the identity of thinking and being must prove its validity by mankind immediately translating his philosophy from theory into practice and transforming the whole world according to Hegelian principles. This is an illusion which he shares with well-nigh all philosophers.

In addition there is yet a set of different philosophers—those who question the possibility of any cognition, or at least of an

exhaustive cognition, of the world. To them, among the moderns, belong Hume and Kant, and they have played a very important role in philosophical development. What is decisive in the refutation of this view has already been said by Hegel—in so far as this was possible from an idealist standpoint. The materialistic additions made by Feuerbach are more ingenious than profound. The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets is practice, *viz.*, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible¹ “thing-in-itself.” The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained such “things-in-themselves” until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the “thing-in-itself” became a thing for us, as, for instance, alizarin, the colouring matter of the madder, which we no longer trouble to grow in the madder roots in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar. For three hundred years the Copernican solar system was a hypothesis with a hundred, a thousand or ten thousand chances to one in its favour, but still always a hypothesis. But when Leverrier, by means of the data provided by this system, not only deduced the necessity of the existence of an unknown planet, but also calculated the position in the heavens which this planet must necessarily occupy, and when Galle really found this planet,² the Copernican system was proved. If, nevertheless, the Neo-Kantians are attempting to resurrect the Kantian conception in Germany and the agnostics that of Hume in England (where in fact it never became extinct), this is—in view of their theoretical and practical refutation accomplished long ago—scientifically a regression and practically merely a shamefaced way of surreptitiously accepting materialism, while denying it before the world.³

¹ Or ungraspable (*unfassbaren*). See Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Vol. XI, p. 165.—Ed.

² The planet referred to is Neptune.—Ed.

³ “The principal feature of Kant’s philosophy,” wrote Lenin, “is the reconciliation of materialism with idealism, a compromise between the two, the combination within one system of heterogeneous and contrary philosophical trends. When Kant assumes that something outside us, a thing-in-itself, corresponds to our ideas, he is a materialist. When he declares this thing-in-itself to be unknowable, transcendental, other-sided, he is an idealist. Recognizing experience, sensations, as the only source of our knowledge, Kant is directing his philosophy towards sensationalism, and *via* sensationalism, under

But during this long period from Descartes to Hegel and from Hobbes to Feuerbach, the philosophers were by no means impelled, as they thought they were, solely by the force of pure reason. On the contrary, what really pushed them forward was the powerful and ever more rapidly onrushing progress of natural science and industry. Among the materialists this was plain on the surface, but the idealist systems also filled themselves more and more with a materialist content and attempted pantheistically¹ to reconcile the antithesis between mind and matter. Thus, ultimately, the Hegelian system represents merely a materialism idealistically turned upside down in method and content.

It is, therefore, comprehensible that Starcke in his characterization of Feuerbach first of all investigates the latter's position in regard to this fundamental question of the relation of thinking and being. After a short introduction, in which the views of the preceding philosophers, particularly since Kant, are described in unnecessarily ponderous philosophical language, and in which Hegel, by an all too formalistic adherence to certain passages of his works, gets far less than his due, there follows a detailed description of the course of development of Feuerbach's "metaphysics" itself, as this course was reconstructed out of the sequence of those writings of this philosopher which have a bearing here. This description is industriously and lucidly elaborated, only, like the whole book, it is loaded with a ballast of philosophical phraseology by no means everywhere unavoidable, which is the more disturbing in its effect the less the author keeps to the manner of expression of one and the same school, or even of Feuerbach himself, and the more he interjects expressions of very different tendencies—especially of the tendencies now rampant and calling themselves philosophical.

The course of evolution of Feuerbach is that of a Hegelian—a never quite orthodox Hegelian, it is true—into a materialist; an evolution which at a definite stage necessitates a complete rupture with the idealist system of his predecessor. With irresistible force Feuerbach is finally forced to the realization that the Hegelian pre-

certain conditions, towards materialism. Recognizing the apriority of space, time, causality, etc., Kant is directing his philosophy towards idealism. Both consistent materialists and consistent idealists (as well as the "pure" agnostics, the Humeans) have mercilessly criticized Kant for this inconsistency." (Lenin, "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism," *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Vol. XI, pp. 257-58.)

See also *supra*, Engels, *On Historical Materialism*, pp. 333-51 of this volume.—Ed.

¹ *Pantheism*: World outlook which identifies God with nature.—Ed.

mundane existence of the "absolute idea," the "pre-existence of the logical categories"¹ before the world existed, is nothing more than the fantastic survival of the belief in the existence of an extra-mundane creator; that the material, sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality; and that our consciousness and thinking, however supra-sensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter. This is, of course, pure materialism. But, having got so far, Feuerbach stops short. He cannot overcome the customary philosophical prejudice, prejudice not against the thing but against the name materialism. He says: "To me materialism is the foundation of the edifice of human essence and knowledge, but to me it is not what it is to the physiologist, to the natural scientist in the narrower sense, for example, Moleschott, and necessarily so indeed from their standpoint and profession, the building itself. Backwards I fully agree with the materialists; but not forwards."

Here Feuerbach lumps together the materialism that is a general world outlook resting upon a definite conception of the relation between matter and mind, and the special form in which this world outlook was expressed at a definite stage of historical development, viz., in the eighteenth century. More than that, he confuses it with the shallow and vulgarized form in which the materialism of the eighteenth century continues to exist today in the minds of naturalists and physicians, the form which was preached on their tours in the 'fifties by Büchner, Vogt and Moleschott. But just as idealism underwent a series of stages of development, so also did materialism. With each epoch-making discovery even in the sphere of natural science it has to change its form; and after history also was subjected to materialistic treatment, here also a new avenue of development has opened.

The materialism of the last century was predominantly mechanical, because at that time, of all natural sciences, only mechanics and indeed only the mechanics of solid bodies—celestial and terrestrial—in short, the mechanics of gravity, had come to any definite close. Chemistry at that time existed only in its infantile, phlogistic form.² Biology still lay in swaddling clothes; vegeta-

¹ In his *Logic*, Hegel classifies the principal abstract conceptions as follows: being, becoming, quality, quantity, measure, essence, appearance, possibility, accident, necessity, reality, etc. These conceptions are called "logical categories."—Ed.

² See Engels, Preface to *Capital*, Volume II, pp. 296-97 of this volume.—Ed.

ble and animal organisms had been only roughly examined and were explained as the result of purely mechanical causes. As the animal was to Descartes, so was man a machine to the materialists of the eighteenth century. This exclusive application of the standards of mechanics to processes of a chemical and organic nature—in which processes, it is true, the laws of mechanics are also valid, but are pushed into the background by other and higher laws—constitutes the first specific but at that time inevitable limitation of classical French materialism.

The second specific limitation of this materialism lay in its inability to comprehend the universe as a process—as matter developing in a historical process. This was in accordance with the level of the natural science of that time, and with the metaphysical, *i.e.*, anti-dialectical manner of philosophizing connected with it. Nature, it was known, was in eternal motion. But according to the ideas of that time, this motion turned, also eternally, in a circle and therefore never moved from the spot; it produced the same results over and over again. This conception was at that time inevitable. The Kantian theory of the origin of the solar system¹ had been put forward but recently and was still regarded merely as a curiosity. The history of the development of the earth, geology, was still totally unknown, and the conception that the animate natural beings of today are the result of a long sequence of development from the simple to the complex could not at that time scientifically be put forward at all. The unhistorical view of nature was therefore inevitable. We have the less reason to reproach the philosophers of the eighteenth century on this account since the same thing is found in Hegel. According to him, nature, as a mere “alienation” of the idea, is incapable of development in time—capable only of extending its manifoldness in space, so that it displays simultaneously and alongside of one another all the stages of development comprised in it, and is condemned to an eternal repetition of the same process. This absurdity of a development in space, but outside of time—the fundamental condition of all development—Hegel imposes upon nature just at the very time when geology, embryology, the physiology of plants and animals, and organic chemistry were being built up, and when everywhere on the basis of these new sciences brilliant foreshadowings of the later theory of evolution were appearing (*e.g.*, Goethe and Lamarck). But the system demanded

¹ The theory which holds that the sun and the planets originated from incandescent rotating nebulous masses.—*Ed.*

it; hence the method, for the sake of the system, had to become untrue to itself.

This same unhistorical conception prevailed also in the domain of history. Here the struggle against the remnants of the Middle Ages blurred the view. The Middle Ages were regarded as a mere interruption of history by a thousand years of universal barbarism. The great progress made in the Middle Ages—the extension of the area of European culture, the bringing into existence there next to each other of great nations, capable of survival, and finally the enormous technical progress of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—all this was not seen. Consequently a rational insight into the great historical interconnections was made impossible, and history served at best as a collection of examples and illustrations for the use of philosophers.

The vulgarizing pedlars, who in Germany in the 'fifties busied themselves with materialism, by no means overcame this limitation of their teachers. All the advances of natural science which had been made in the meantime served them only as new proofs against the existence of a creator of the world; and, in truth, it was quite outside their scope to develop the theory any further. Though idealism was at the end of its tether and was dealt a deathblow by the Revolution of 1848, it had the satisfaction of seeing that materialism had for the moment fallen lower still. Feuerbach was unquestionably right when he refused to take responsibility for this materialism; only he should not have confounded the doctrines of these itinerant preachers with materialism in general.

Here, however, there are two things to be pointed out. First, even during Feuerbach's lifetime, natural science was still involved in a process of violent fermentation—which only during the last fifteen years has reached a clarifying, relative conclusion. New scientific data were acquired to a hitherto unheard-of extent, but the establishing of interrelations, and thereby the bringing of order into this chaos of discoveries following closely upon each other's heels, has only quite recently become possible. It is true that Feuerbach had lived to see all three of the decisive discoveries—that of the cell, the transformation of energy and the theory of evolution named after Darwin. But how could the lonely philosopher, living in rural solitude, be able sufficiently to follow scientific developments in order to appreciate at their full value discoveries which scientists themselves at that time either contested or did not adequately know how to make use of? The

blame for this falls solely upon the wretched conditions in Germany, in consequence of which cobweb-spinning eclectic flea-crackers had taken possession of the chairs of philosophy, while Feuerbach, who towered above them all, had to rusticate and grow sour in a little village. It is therefore not Feuerbach's fault that the historical conception of nature, which had now become possible and which removed all the one-sidedness of French materialism, remained inaccessible to him.

Secondly, Feuerbach is quite correct in asserting that exclusively natural-scientific materialism is indeed "the foundation of the edifice of human knowledge, but not the building itself." For we live not only in nature but also in human society, and this also no less than nature has its history of development and its science. It was therefore a question of bringing the science of society (*i.e.*, the sum total of the so-called historical and philosophical sciences) into harmony with the materialist foundation, and of reconstructing it thereupon. But it did not fall to Feuerbach's lot to do this. In spite of the "foundation," he remained here bound by the traditional idealist fetters, a fact which he recognizes in these words: "Backwards I agree with the materialists; but not forwards!" But it was Feuerbach himself who did not go "forward" here, in the social domain, who did not get beyond his standpoint of 1840 or 1844. And this indeed was again chiefly due to this reclusion which compelled him, who, of all philosophers, was the most inclined to social intercourse, to produce thoughts out of his solitary head instead of in amicable and hostile encounters with other men of his own calibre. Later we shall see in detail how much he remained an idealist in this sphere.

It need only be added here that Starcke looks for Feuerbach's idealism in the wrong place. "Feuerbach is an idealist; he believes in the progress of mankind." (P. 19.) "The foundation, the substructure of the whole, remains nevertheless idealism. Realism for us is nothing more than a protection against wrong paths, while we follow our ideal trends. Are not compassion, love and enthusiasm for truth and justice ideal forces?" (P. VIII.)

In the first place, idealism here means nothing but the pursuit of ideal aims. But these necessarily have to do at the most with Kantian idealism and its "categorical imperative";¹ however Kant

¹ *Categorical imperative* (literally—unconditional command): In Kantian philosophy this term designates the highest moral law, formulated as follows:—"Act only on such a maxim as you can will that it should become a universal

himself called his philosophy "transcendental idealism," by no means because he dealt therein also with moral ideals, but for quite other reasons, as Starcke will remember. The superstition that philosophical idealism is pivoted round a belief in moral, i.e., social, ideals arose outside philosophy, among the German philistines who learned by heart from Schiller's poems the few morsels of philosophical culture they needed. No one has criticized more severely the impotent "categorical imperative" of Kant—impotent because it demands the impossible, and therefore never attains to any reality—no one has more cruelly derided the philistine sentimental enthusiasm for unrealizable ideals purveyed by Schiller than the complete idealist Hegel. (See, for example, his *Phenomenology*.)

In the second place, we cannot get away from the fact that everything that sets men acting must find its way through their brains—even eating and drinking, which begins as a consequence of the sensation of hunger or thirst transmitted through the brain, and ends as a result of the sensation of satisfaction likewise transmitted through the brain. The influences of the external world upon man express themselves in his brain, are reflected therein as feelings, thoughts, instincts, volitions—in short, as "ideal tendencies," and in this form become "ideal powers." If, then, a man is to be deemed an idealist because he follows "ideal tendencies" and admits that "ideal powers" have an influence over him—then every person who is at all normally developed is a born idealist and how, in that case, can there still be any materialists?

In the third place, the conviction that humanity, at least at the present moment, moves on the whole in a progressive direction has absolutely nothing to do with the antithesis between materialism and idealism. The French materialists equally with the deists Voltaire and Rousseau held this conviction to an almost fanatical degree, and often made the greatest personal sacrifices for it. If ever anybody dedicated his whole life to the "enthusiasm for truth and justice"—using this phrase in the good sense—it was Diderot. If, therefore, Starcke declares all this to be idealism, this merely proves that the word materialism has lost all meaning

law." This "eternal," "immutable" moral law is derived, according to Kant, not from experience but before all experience and independently of it, *a priori*—by "pure reason." In reality this "eternal law" was merely an expression of bourgeois class morality at a definite stage of historical development.—*Ed.*

for him here—as has also the whole antithesis between the two standpoints.

The fact is that Starcke, although perhaps unconsciously, in this makes an unpardonable concession to the traditional philistine prejudice against the word materialism resulting from its long-continued defamation by the priests. By the word materialism the philistine understands gluttony, drunkenness, lust of the eye, lust of the flesh, arrogance, cupidity, avarice, miserliness, profit-hunting and stock-exchange swindling—in short, all the filthy vices in which he himself indulges in private. By the word idealism he understands the belief in virtue, universal philanthropy and in a general way a “better world,” of which he boasts before others but in which he himself at the utmost believes only so long as he is having the blues or is going through the bankruptcy consequent upon his customary “materialist” excesses. It is then that he sings his favourite song, “What is man?—Half beast! Half angel!”

For the rest, Starcke takes great pains to defend Feuerbach against the attacks and doctrines of the vociferous lecturers who today go by the name of philosophers in Germany. For people who are interested in this afterbirth of German classical philosophy this is a matter of importance; for Starcke himself it may have appeared necessary. We, however, will spare the reader this.

III

The real idealism of Feuerbach becomes evident as soon as we come to his philosophy of religion and ethics. He by no means wishes to abolish religion: he wants to perfect it. Philosophy itself must be absorbed in religion. “The periods of humanity are distinguished only by religious changes. A historical movement is fundamental only when it is rooted in the hearts of men. The heart is not a form of religion, so that the latter should exist also in the heart; the heart is the essence of religion.” (Quoted by Starcke, p. 168.) According to Feuerbach, religion is the relation between human beings based on the affections, the relation based on the heart, which until now has sought its truth in a fantastic image of reality—in the mediation of one or many gods, the fantastic images of human qualities—but now finds it directly and without any intermediary in the love between the “I” and the “Thou.” Thus, finally, with Feuerbach sex love becomes one of the

highest forms, if not the highest form, of the practice of his new religion.

Now relations between man and man, based on affection, and especially between the sexes, have existed as long as mankind has. Sex love in particular has undergone a development and won a place during the last eight hundred years which has made it a compulsory pivotal point of all poetry during this period. The existing positive religions have limited themselves to the bestowal of a higher consecration upon state-regulated sex love (*i.e.*, upon the marriage laws) and they could all disappear tomorrow without changing in the slightest the practice of love and friendship. The Christian religion in France was, as a matter of fact, so completely swept away in the years 1793-98 that even Napoleon could not re-introduce it without opposition and difficulty; and this without any need for a substitute, in Feuerbach's sense, making itself felt in the interval.

Feuerbach's idealism consists here in this: he does not simply accept mutual relations based on reciprocal inclination between human beings, such as sex love, friendship, compassion, self-sacrifice, etc., as what they are in themselves—without associating them with any particular religion which to him, too, belongs to the past; but instead he asserts that they will come to their full realization for the first time as soon as they are consecrated by the name of religion. The chief thing for him is not that these purely human relations exist, but that they shall be conceived of as the new, true religion. They are to have full value only after they have been marked with a religious stamp. Religion is derived from *religare* and meant originally "a bond." Therefore, every bond between two men is a religion. Such etymological tricks are the last resort of idealist philosophy. Not what the word has meant according to the historical development of its actual use, but what it ought to mean according to its derivation is what counts. And so sex love and the intercourse between the sexes is apotheosized to a "religion," merely in order that the word religion, which is so dear to idealistic memories, may not disappear from the language. The Parisian reformers of the Louis Blanc¹ trend used to speak in precisely the same way in the 'forties. They likewise could conceive of a man without religion only as a monster, and used to say: "*Donc, l'athéisme c'est votre religion!*" ["Well, then, atheism is your religion!"] If Feuerbach wishes to establish a true religion upon the basis of an essentially

¹ See p. 141 of this volume, note 1, by Engels.—Ed.

materialist conception of nature, that is the same as regarding modern chemistry as true alchemy. If religion can exist without its god, alchemy can exist without its philosopher's stone. By the way, there exists a very close connection between alchemy and religion. The philosopher's stone has many god-like properties and the Egyptian-Greek alchemists of the first two centuries of our era had a hand in the development of Christian doctrines, as the data given by Kopp and Berthelot have proved.

Feuerbach's assertion that "the periods of humanity are distinguished only by religious changes" is decidedly false. Great historical turning points have been *accompanied* by religious changes only so far as the three world religions which have existed up to the present—Buddhism, Christianity and Islam—are concerned. The old tribal and national religions, which arose spontaneously, did not proselytize and lost all their power of resistance as soon as the independence of the tribe or people was lost. For the Germans it was sufficient to have simple contact with the decaying Roman Empire and with its newly adopted Christian world religion which fitted its economic, political and ideological conditions. Only with these world religions, arisen more or less artificially, particularly Christianity and Islam, do we find that general historical movements acquire a religious imprint. Even in regard to Christianity the religious stamp in revolutions of really universal significance is restricted to the first stages of the struggle for the emancipation of the bourgeoisie—from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century—and is to be accounted for not as Feuerbach thinks by the hearts of men and their religious needs but by the entire previous history of the Middle Ages, which knew no other form of ideology than precisely religion and theology. But when the bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century was strengthened enough likewise to possess an ideology of its own, suited to its own class standpoint, it made its great and conclusive revolution, the French, appealing exclusively to juristic and political ideas, and troubling itself with religion only in so far as this stood in its way. But it never occurred to it to put a new religion in place of the old. Everyone knows how Robespierre failed in his attempt.¹

The possibility of purely human sentiments in our intercourse with other human beings has nowadays been sufficiently curtailed by the society in which we must live, which is based upon class

¹ The reference is to Robespierre's attempt to set up a religion of the "highest being"—Reason.—Ed.

antagonism and class rule. We have therefore no reason to curtail it still more by exalting these sentiments to a religion. And similarly the understanding of the great historical class struggles has already been sufficiently obscured by current historiography, particularly in Germany, so that there is also no need for us to make such an understanding totally impossible by transforming the history of these struggles into a mere appendix of ecclesiastical history. Already here it becomes evident how far today we have moved beyond Feuerbach. His "finest passages" in glorification of his new religion of love are totally unreadable today.

The only religion which Feuerbach examines seriously is Christianity, the world religion of the Occident based upon monotheism. He proves that the Christian god is only a fantastic reflection, a mirror-image, of man. Now, this god is, however, himself the product of a tedious process of abstraction, the concentrated quintessence of the numerous earlier tribal and national gods. And man, whose image this god is, is therefore also not a real man, but likewise the quintessence of the numerous real men, man in the abstract, therefore himself again a mental image. Feuerbach who, on every page, preaches sensuousness, absorption in the concrete, in actuality, becomes thoroughly abstract as soon as he begins to talk of any other than mere sex relations between human beings.

Of these relations only one aspect appeals to him: morality. And here Feuerbach's astonishing poverty when compared with Hegel again becomes striking. The latter's ethics, or doctrine of moral conduct, is the philosophy of law and embraces: 1) abstract right; 2) morality; 3) moral conduct, under which again are comprised: the family, civil society and the state. Here the content is as realistic as the form is idealistic. Besides morality the whole sphere of law, economy, politics is here included. With Feuerbach it is just the reverse. In form he is realistic since he takes his start from man; but there is absolutely no mention of the world in which this man lives; hence this man remains always the same abstract man who occupied the field in the philosophy of religion. For this man is not born of woman; he issues, as from a chrysalis, from the god of the monotheistic religions. He therefore does not live in a real world historically created and historically determined. It is true, he has intercourse with other men; however each one of them is just as much an abstraction as he himself is. In his philosophy of religion we still had men and women, but in his ethics even this last distinction

disappears altogether. Feuerbach, to be sure, at long intervals makes such statements as: "Man thinks differently in a palace and in a hut." "If because of hunger, of misery, you have no stuff in your body, you likewise have no stuff for morality in your head, in your mind or heart." "Politics must become our religion," etc. But Feuerbach is absolutely incapable of achieving anything with these maxims. They remain mere phrases and even Starcke has to admit that for Feuerbach politics constituted an impassable frontier and the "science of society, sociology, was *terra incognita* to him."

He appears just as superficial, in comparison with Hegel, in his treatment of the antithesis of good and evil. "One believes one is saying something great," Hegel remarks, "if one says that 'man is naturally good.' But one forgets that one says something far greater when one says 'man is naturally evil.'" According to Hegel, evil is the form in which the motive force of historical development presents itself. This, indeed, contains the twofold significance that while, on the one hand, each new advance necessarily appears as a sacrilege against things hallowed, as a rebellion against conditions which, however old and moribund, have still been sanctified by custom; on the other hand, it is precisely the wicked passions of man—greed and lust for power—which, since the emergence of class antagonisms, serve as levers of historical development—a fact of which the history of feudalism and of the bourgeoisie, for example, constitutes a single continual proof. But it does not occur to Feuerbach to investigate the historical role of moral evil. To him history is altogether an uncanny domain in which he feels ill at ease. Even his dictum: "Man as he sprang originally from nature was only a mere creature of nature, not a man. Man is a product of men, of culture, of history"—with him even this dictum remains absolutely sterile.

What Feuerbach has to tell us about morals can, therefore, only be extremely meagre. The urge towards happiness is innate in man, and must therefore form the basis of all morals. But the urge towards happiness is subject to a double correction. First, by the natural consequences of our actions: after the debauch come the "blues," and habitual excess is followed by illness. Secondly, by its social consequences: if we do not respect the similar urge of other people towards happiness they will defend themselves, and so interfere with our own urge towards happiness. Consequently, in order to satisfy our urge, we must be in a position to appreciate rightly the results of our conduct and must

likewise allow others an equal right to seek happiness. Rational self-restraint with regard to ourselves, and love—again and again love!—in our intercourse with others—these are the basic laws of Feuerbach's morality; from them all others are derived. And neither the most spirited utterances of Feuerbach nor the strongest eulogies of Starcke can hide the tenuity and banality of these few propositions.

Only very exceptionally, and by no means to his and other people's profit, can an individual satisfy his urge towards happiness by preoccupation with himself. Rather it requires preoccupation with the outside world, means to satisfy his needs, that is to say, means of subsistence, an individual of the opposite sex, books, conversation, argument, activities, objects for use and working up. Feuerbach's morality either presupposes that these means and objects of satisfaction are given to every individual as a matter of course, or else it offers only inapplicable good advice and is therefore not worth a brass farthing to people who are without these means. And Feuerbach himself states this in plain terms: "Man thinks differently in a palace and in a hut. If because of hunger, of misery, you have no stuff in your body you likewise have no stuff for morality in your head, in your mind or heart."

Do matters fare any better in regard to the equal right of others to satisfy their urge towards happiness? Feuerbach posed this claim as absolute, as holding good for all times and circumstances. But since when has it been valid? Was there ever in antiquity between slaves and masters, or in the Middle Ages between serfs and barons, any talk about an equal right to the pursuit of happiness? Was not the urge towards happiness of the oppressed class sacrificed ruthlessly and "by right of law" to that of the ruling class? Yes, that was indeed immoral; nowadays, however, equality of rights is recognized—recognized in words, since the bourgeoisie, in its fight against feudalism and in the development of capitalist production, was compelled to abolish all privileges of estate, *i.e.*, personal privileges, and to introduce the equality of all individuals before the law, first in the sphere of private law, then gradually also in the sphere of public law. But the urge towards happiness thrives only to a trivial extent on ideal rights. To the greatest extent of all it thrives on material means; and capitalist production takes care to ensure that the great majority of those with equal rights shall get only what is essential for bare existence. Capitalist production has therefore little more respect, if indeed any more, for the equal right to the

pursuit of happiness of the majority than had slavery or serfdom. And are we better off in regard to the mental means to happiness, the educational means? Is not "the schoolmaster of Sadowa"¹ himself a mythical person?

More than that. According to Feuerbach's theory of morals the Stock Exchange is the highest temple of moral conduct provided only that one always speculates correctly. If my urge towards happiness leads me to the Stock Exchange, and if there I correctly gauge the consequences of my actions so that only agreeable results and no disadvantages ensue, that is, if I always win, then I am fulfilling Feuerbach's precept. Moreover, I do not thereby interfere with the equal right of another person to pursue his happiness; for that other man went to the Exchange just as voluntarily as I did and in concluding the speculative transaction with me he has followed his urge towards happiness as I have followed mine. Should he lose his money, then by that very fact his activity is proved to have been immoral, because of his bad reckoning, and since I have given him the punishment he deserves, I can even slap my chest proudly, like a modern Rhadamanthus.² Love, too, rules on the Stock Exchange, in so far as it is not simply a sentimental figure of speech, for each finds in others the satisfaction of his own urge towards happiness, which is just what love ought to achieve and how it acts in practice. And if I gamble with correct prevision of the consequences of my operations, and therefore with success, I fulfil all the strictest injunctions of Feuerbachian morality—and become a rich man into the bargain. In other words, Feuerbach's morality is cut exactly to the pattern of modern capitalist society, little as Feuerbach himself might imagine or desire it.

But love!—yes, with Feuerbach love is everywhere and at all times the wonder-working god who should help to surmount all difficulties of practical life—and at that in a society which is split into classes with diametrically opposite interests. At this point the last relic of its revolutionary character disappears from philosophy, leaving only the old cant: Love one another—fall into each other's arms regardless of distinctions of sex or estate—a universal orgy of reconciliation!

¹ The victory of Königgrätz (Sadowa) won by Prussia over Austria in 1866 was called by German bourgeois writers a victory of the Prussian schoolmaster, i.e., of the Prussian educational system.—Ed.

² *Rhadamanthus*: According to Greek mythology, Rhadamanthus was appointed judge in hell because of his sense of justice.—Ed.

In short, the Feuerbachian theory of morals fares like all its predecessors. It is designed to suit all periods, all peoples and all conditions, and precisely for that reason it is never and nowhere applicable. It remains, as regards the real world, as powerless as Kant's categorical imperative. In reality every class, even every profession, has its own morality, and even this it violates whenever it can do so with impunity. And love, which is to unite all, manifests itself in wars, altercations, lawsuits, domestic broils, divorces and every possible exploitation of one by another.

Now how was it possible that the powerful impetus given by Feuerbach turned out to be so unfruitful for himself? For the simple reason that Feuerbach himself never contrives to escape from the realm of abstraction—for which he has a deadly hatred—into that of living reality. He clings fiercely to nature and man; but nature and man remain mere words with him. He is incapable of telling us anything definite either about real nature or real men. But from the abstract man of Feuerbach one arrives at real living men only when one considers them as participants in history. And that is what Feuerbach resisted, and therefore the year 1848, which he did not understand, signified for him merely the final break with the real world, retirement into solitude. The blame for this again chiefly falls on the conditions then obtaining in Germany, which condemned him to rot away miserably.

But the step which Feuerbach did not take had nevertheless to be taken. The cult of abstract man, which formed the kernel of Feuerbach's new religion, had to be replaced by the science of real men and of their historical development. This further development of Feuerbach's standpoint beyond Feuerbach himself was inaugurated by Marx in 1845 in *The Holy Family*.

IV

Strauss, Bauer, Stirner, Feuerbach—these were the offshoots of Hegelian philosophy, in so far as they did not abandon the field of philosophy. Strauss, after his *Life of Jesus* and *Dogmatics*, produced only literary studies in philosophy and ecclesiastical history after the fashion of Renan. Bauer only achieved something in the field of the history of the origin of Christianity, though what he did here was important. Stirner remained a curiosity, even after Bakunin blended him with Proudhon and labelled the blend "anarchism." Feuerbach alone was of significance as a philosopher. But not only did philosophy—claimed to soar above all special

sciences and to be the science of sciences connecting them—remain for him an impassable barrier, an inviolable holy thing, but as a philosopher, too, he stopped halfway; the lower half of him was materialist, the upper half idealist. He was incapable of disposing of Hegel through criticism; he simply threw him aside as useless, while he himself, compared with the encyclopædic wealth of the Hegelian system, achieved nothing positive beyond a grandiloquent religion of love and a meagre, impotent system of morals.

Out of the dissolution of the Hegelian school, however, there developed still another tendency, the only one which has borne real fruit. And this tendency is essentially connected with the name of Marx.¹

The separation from Hegelian philosophy was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world—nature and history—just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from pre-conceived idealist fancies. It was decided relentlessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic connection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently—at least in its basic features—in all domains of knowledge concerned.

Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, one started out from his revolutionary side, described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist—unknown where—from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the *Logic* and which are all includ-

¹ Here I may be permitted to make a personal explanation. Lately repeated reference has been made to my share in this theory, and so I can hardly avoid saying a few words here to settle this point. I cannot deny that both before and during my forty years' collaboration with Marx I had a certain independent share in laying the foundations of the theory, and more particularly in its elaboration. But the greater part of its leading basic principles, especially in the realm of economics and history, and, above all, their final clear formulation, belong to Marx. What I contributed—at any rate with the exception of a few special studies—Marx could very well have done without me. What Marx accomplished I would not have achieved. Marx stood higher, saw farther, and took a wider and quicker view than all the rest of us. Marx was a genius: we others were at best talented. Without him the theory would not be by far what it is today. It therefore rightly bears his name. [Note by F. Engels.]

ed in it. Then it "alienates" itself by changing into nature, where, without consciousness of itself, disguised as the necessity of nature, it goes through a new development and finally comes again to self-consciousness in man. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history from the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history, *i.e.*, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogressions, is only a miserable copy of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological reversal had to be done away with. We comprehended the concepts in our heads once more materialistically—as images of real things instead of regarding the real things as images of this or that stage of development of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion—both of the external world and of human thought—two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously in the form of external necessity in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of the concept itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was placed upon its head; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing before, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen.¹

In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which had prevented its consistent execution by Hegel. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made *things*, but as a complex of *processes*, in which the things apparently stable no

¹ See *Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit, dargestellt von einem Handarbeiter* [The Nature of Human Brainwork, Described by an Artisan]. Another critique of pure and practical reason. Hamburg, Meissner, 1869. [Note by F. Engels.]

less than their mind-images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentality and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end—this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of investigation are two different things. If, however, investigation always proceeds from this standpoint, the demand for final solutions and eternal truths ceases once for all; one is always conscious of the necessary limitation of all acquired knowledge, of the fact that it is conditioned by the circumstances in which it was acquired. On the other hand, one no longer permits oneself to be imposed upon by the antitheses, insuperable for the still common old metaphysics, between true and false, good and bad, identical and different, necessary and accidental. One knows that these antitheses have only a relative validity; that that which is recognized now as true has also its latent false side which will later manifest itself, just as that which is now regarded as false has also its true side by virtue of which it could previously be regarded as true. One knows that what is maintained to be necessary is composed of sheer accidents and that the so-called accidental is the form behind which necessity hides itself—and so on.

The old method of investigation and thought which Hegel calls "metaphysical," which preferred to investigate *things* as given, as fixed and stable, a method the relics of which still strongly haunt people's minds, had a good deal of historical justification in its day. It was necessary first to examine things before it was possible to examine processes. One had first to know what a particular thing was before one could observe the changes it was undergoing. And such was the case with natural science. The old metaphysics, which accepted things as finished objects, arose from a natural science which investigated dead and living things as finished objects. But when this investigation had progressed so far that it became possible to take the decisive step forward of transition to the systematic investigation of the changes which these things undergo in nature itself, then the last hour of the old metaphysics struck in the realm of philosophy also. And in fact, while natural science up to the end of the last century was predominantly a *collecting* science, a science of finished things, in our century it is essentially a *classifying* science, a science of the processes, of the origin and

development of these things and of the interconnection which binds all these natural processes into one great whole. Physiology, which investigates the processes occurring in plant and animal organisms; embryology, which deals with the development of individual organisms from germ to maturity; geology, which investigates the gradual formation of the earth's surface—all these are the offspring of our century.

But, above all, there are three great discoveries which have enabled our knowledge of the interconnection of natural processes to advance by leaps and bounds: first, the discovery of the cell as the unit from whose multiplication and differentiation the whole plant and animal body develops—so that not only is the development and growth of all higher organisms recognized to proceed according to a single general law, but also, in the capacity of the cell to change, the way is pointed out by which organisms can change their species and thus go through a more than individual development. Second, the transformation of energy, which has demonstrated to us that all the so-called forces operative in the first instance in inorganic nature—mechanical force and its complement, so-called potential energy, heat, radiation (light or radiant heat), electricity, magnetism and chemical energy—are different forms of manifestation of universal motion, which pass into one another in definite proportions so that in place of a certain quantity of the one which disappears, a certain quantity of another makes its appearance and thus the whole motion of nature is reduced to this incessant process of transformation from one form into another. Finally, the proof which Darwin first developed in connected form that the stock of organic products of nature environing us today, including mankind, is the result of a long process of evolution from a few originally unicellular germs, and that these again have arisen from protoplasm or albumen, which came into existence by chemical means.

Thanks to these three great discoveries and the other immense advances in natural science, we have now arrived at the point where we can demonstrate as a whole the interconnection between the processes in nature not only in particular spheres but also the interconnection of these particular spheres themselves, and so can present in an approximately systematic form a comprehensive view of the interconnection in nature by means of the facts provided by empirical natural science itself. To furnish this comprehensive view was formerly the task of so-called natural philosophy. It could do this only by putting in place of the real but

as yet unknown interconnections ideal, imaginary ones, filling out the missing facts by figments of the mind and bridging the actual gaps merely in imagination. In the course of this procedure it conceived many brilliant ideas and foreshadowed many later discoveries, but it also produced a considerable amount of nonsense, which indeed could not have been otherwise. Today, when one needs to comprehend the results of natural scientific investigation only dialectically, *i.e.*, in the sense of their own interconnection, in order to arrive at a "system of nature" sufficient for our time; when the dialectical character of this interconnection is forcing itself against their will even into the metaphysically-trained minds of the natural scientists, today this natural philosophy is finally disposed of. Every attempt at resurrecting it would be not only superfluous but a *step backwards*.

But what is true of nature, which is hereby recognized also as a historical process of development, is also true of the history of society in all its branches and of the totality of all sciences which occupy themselves with things human (and divine). Here, too, the philosophy of history, of law, of religion, etc., has consisted in the substitution of an interconnection fabricated in the mind of the philosopher for the actual interconnection to be demonstrated in the events; and in the comprehension of history as a whole as well as in its separate parts, as the gradual realization of ideas—and, indeed, naturally always the pet ideas of the philosopher himself. According to this, history worked unconsciously but of necessity towards a certain ideal goal set in advance—as, for example, according to Hegel, towards the realization of his absolute idea—and the unalterable trend towards this absolute idea formed the inner interconnection in the events of history. A new mysterious providence—unconscious or gradually coming into consciousness—was thus put in the place of the real, still unknown interconnection. Here, therefore, just as in the realm of nature, it was necessary to do away with these fabricated, artificial interconnections by the discovery of the real ones—a task which ultimately amounts to the discovery of the general laws of motion which assert themselves as the ruling ones in the history of human society.

In one point, however, the history of the development of society proves to be essentially different from that of nature. In nature—in so far as we ignore man's reaction upon nature—there are only blind unconscious agencies acting upon one another out of whose interplay the general law comes into operation.

Nothing of all that happens—whether in the innumerable apparent accidents observable upon the surface of things, or in the ultimate results which confirm the regularity inherent in these accidents—is attained as a consciously desired aim. In the history of society, on the other hand, the actors are all endowed with consciousness, are men acting with deliberation or passion, working towards definite goals; nothing happens without a conscious purpose, without an intended aim. But this distinction, important as it is for historical investigation, particularly of single epochs and events, cannot alter the fact that the course of history is governed by inner general laws. For here, also, on the whole, in spite of the consciously desired aims of all individuals, accident apparently reigns on the surface. That which is willed happens but rarely; in the majority of instances the numerous desired ends cross and conflict with one another, or these ends themselves are from the outset incapable of realization or the means of attaining them are insufficient. Thus the conflict of innumerable individual wills and individual actions in the domain of history produces a state of affairs entirely analogous to that in the realm of unconscious nature. The ends of the actions are intended, but the results which actually follow from these actions are not intended; or when they do seem to correspond to the end intended, they ultimately have consequences quite other than those intended. Historical events thus appear on the whole to be likewise governed by chance. But where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is always governed by inner, hidden laws and it is only a matter of discovering these laws.

Men make their own history, whatever its outcome may be, in that each person follows his own consciously desired end, and it is precisely the resultant of these many wills operating in different directions and of their manifold effects upon the outer world that constitutes history. Thus it is also a question of what the many individuals desire. The will is determined by passion or deliberation. But the levers which immediately determine passion or deliberation are of very different kinds. Partly they may be external objects, partly ideal motives, ambition, "enthusiasm for truth and justice," personal hatred or even purely individual whims of all kinds. But, on the one hand, we have seen that the many individual wills active in history for the most part produce results quite other than those they intended—often quite the opposite; that their motives therefore in relation to the total result are likewise of only secondary importance. On the other hand, the further

question arises: What driving forces in turn stand behind these motives? What are the historical causes which transform themselves into these motives in the brains of the actors?

The old materialism never put this question to itself. Its conception of history, in so far as it has one at all, is therefore essentially pragmatic; it judges everything according to the motives of the action; it divides men in their historical activity into noble and ignoble and then finds that as a rule the noble are defrauded and the ignoble are victorious. Hence it follows for the old materialism that nothing very edifying is to be got from the study of history, and for us that in the realm of history the old materialism becomes untrue to itself because it takes the ideal driving forces which operate there as ultimate causes, instead of investigating what is behind them, what are the driving forces of these driving forces. The inconsistency does not lie in the fact that *ideal* driving forces are recognized, but in the investigation not being carried further back behind these into their motive causes. On the other hand, the philosophy of history, particularly as represented by Hegel, recognizes that the ostensible and also the really operating motives of men who figure in history are by no means the ultimate causes of historical events; that behind these motives are other motive forces, which have to be discovered. But it does not seek these forces in history itself, it imports them rather from outside, from out of philosophical ideology, into history. Hegel, for example, instead of explaining the history of ancient Greece out of its own inner interconnections, simply maintains that it is nothing more than the working out of "types of beautiful individuality," the realization of a "work of art" as such. He says much in this connection about the old Greeks that is fine and profound but that does not prevent us today from refusing to be put off with such an explanation, which is a mere manner of speech.

When, therefore, it is a question of investigating the driving forces which—consciously or unconsciously, and indeed very often unconsciously—lie behind the motives of men in their historical actions and which constitute the real ultimate driving forces of history, then it is not a question so much of the motives of single individuals, however eminent, as of those motives which set in motion great masses, whole peoples, and again whole classes of the people in each people; and this, too, not momentarily, for the transient flaring up of a straw-fire which quickly dies down, but for a lasting action resulting in a great historical transformation. To ascertain the driving causes which here in the minds of acting

masses and their leaders—the so-called great men—are reflected as conscious motives, clearly or unclearly, directly or in ideological, even glorified form—that is the only path which can put us on the track of the laws holding sway both in history as a whole, and at particular periods and in particular lands. Everything which sets men in motion must go through their minds; but what form it will take in the mind will depend very much upon the circumstances. The workers have by no means become reconciled to capitalist machine industry, even though they no longer simply break the machines to pieces as they still did in 1848 on the Rhine.

But while in all earlier periods the investigation of these driving causes of history was almost impossible—on account of the complicated and concealed interconnections between them and their effects—our present period has so far simplified these interconnections that the riddle could be solved. Since the establishment of large-scale industry, *i.e.*, at least since the European peace of 1815, it has been no longer a secret to any man in England that the whole political struggle there has turned on the claims to supremacy of two classes: the landed aristocracy and the middle class. In France, with the return of the Bourbons, the same fact was perceived; the historians of the Restoration period, from Thierry to Guizot, Mignet and Thiers, speak of it everywhere as the key to the understanding of all French history since the Middle Ages. And since 1830 the working class, the proletariat, has been recognized in both countries as a third competitor for power. Conditions had become so simplified that one would have had to close one's eyes deliberately not to see in the fight of these three great classes and in the conflict of their interests the driving force of modern history—at least in the two most advanced countries.

But how did these classes come into existence? If it was possible at first glance still to ascribe the origin of the great, formerly feudal landed property—at least in the first instance—to political causes, to taking possession by force, this could no longer be done in regard to the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Here the origin and development of two great classes was seen to lie clearly and palpably in purely economic causes. And it was just as clear that in the struggle between landed property and the bourgeoisie, no less than in the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, it was a question, first and foremost, of economic interests, to the furtherance of which political power was intended to serve merely as a means. Bourgeoisie and proletariat both arose in consequence of a transformation of the economic conditions, more precisely, of

the mode of production. The transition, first from guild handicrafts to manufacture, and then from manufacture to large-scale industry, with steam and mechanical power, had caused the development of these two classes. At a certain stage the new forces of production set in motion by the bourgeoisie—in the first place the division of labour and the combination of many detail labourers [*Teilarbeiter*] in one general manufactory—and the conditions and requirements of exchange, developed through these productive forces, became incompatible with the existing order of production historically established and sanctified by law, that is to say, incompatible with the privileges of the guild and the numerous other personal and local privileges (which were only so many fetters to the unprivileged) of the feudal order of society. The forces of production represented by the bourgeoisie rebelled against the order of production represented by the feudal landlords and the guildmasters. The result is known: the feudal fetters were smashed, gradually in England, at one blow in France. In Germany the process is not yet finished. But just as, at a definite stage of its development, manufacture came into conflict with the feudal order of production, so now big industry has already come into conflict with the bourgeois order of production established in its place. Tied down by this order, by the narrow limits of the capitalist mode of production, big industry produces on the one hand an ever-increasing proletarianization of the great mass of the people, and on the other hand an ever greater mass of unsaleable products. Overproduction and mass misery, each the cause of the other—that is the absurd contradiction which is its outcome, and which of necessity calls for the liberation of the productive forces by means of a change in the mode of production.

In modern history at least it is therefore proved that all political struggles are class struggles, and all class struggles for emancipation in the last resort, despite their necessarily political form—for every class struggle is a political struggle—turn ultimately on the question of *economic* emancipation. Therefore, here at least, the state—the political order—is the subordinate, and civil society—the realm of economic relations—the decisive element. The traditional conception, to which Hegel, too, pays homage, saw in the state the determining element, and in civil society the element determined by it. Appearances correspond to this. As all the driving forces of the actions of any individual person must pass through his brain, and transform themselves into motives of his will in order to set him into action, so also all the needs of civil

society—no matter which class happens to be the ruling one—must pass through the will of the state in order to secure general validity in the form of laws. That is the formal aspect of the matter—the one which is self-evident. The question arises, however, what is the content of this merely formal will—of the individual as well as of the state—and whence is this content derived? Why is just this willed and not something else? If we inquire into this we discover that in modern history the will of the state is, on the whole, determined by the changing needs of civil society, by the supremacy of this or that class, in the last resort, by the development of the productive forces and relations of exchange.

But if even in our modern era, with its gigantic means of production and communication, the state is not an independent domain with an independent development, but one whose stock as well as development is to be explained in the last resort by the economic conditions of life of society, then this must be still more true of all earlier times when the production of the material life of man was not yet carried on with these abundant auxiliary means, and when, therefore, the necessity of such production must have exercised a still greater mastery over men. If the state even today, in the era of big industry and of railways, is on the whole only a reflex, in comprehensive form, of the economic needs of the class controlling production, then this must have been much more so in an epoch when each generation of men was forced to spend a far greater part of its aggregate lifetime in satisfying material needs, and was therefore much more dependent on them than we are today. An examination of the history of earlier periods, as soon as it is seriously undertaken from this angle, most abundantly confirms this. But, of course, this cannot be gone into here.

If the state and public law are determined by economic relations, so, too, of course is private law, which indeed in essence only sanctions the existing economic relations between individuals which are normal in the given circumstances. The form in which this happens can, however, vary considerably. It is possible, as happened in England, in harmony with the whole national development, to retain in the main the forms of the old feudal laws while giving them a bourgeois content; in fact, directly giving a bourgeois meaning to the old feudal name. But, also, as happened in western continental Europe, Roman Law, the first world law of a commodity-producing society, with its unsurpassably fine elaboration of all the essential legal relations of simple commodity

owners (of buyers and sellers, debtors and creditors, contracts, obligations, etc.) can be taken as the foundation. In which case, for the benefit of a still petty-bourgeois and semi-feudal society, it can be reduced to the level of such a society either simply through judicial practice (the common law) or, with the help of allegedly enlightened, moralizing jurists a special law code can be worked out from it to correspond with such social level—a code which in these circumstances will be a bad one also from the legal standpoint (e.g., the Prussian *Landrecht*). In which case, however, after a great bourgeois revolution, it is also possible for such a classic law code of bourgeois society as the French *Code Civil*¹ to be worked out upon the basis of this same Roman Law. If, therefore, bourgeois legal regulations merely express the economic life-conditions of society in legal form, then they can do so well or ill according to circumstances.

The state presents itself to us as the first ideological power over mankind. Society creates for itself an organ for the safeguarding of its general interests against internal and external attacks. This organ is the state power. Hardly come into being, this organ makes itself independent in regard to society; and, indeed, the more so, the more it becomes the organ of a particular class, the more it directly enforces the supremacy of that class. The fight of the oppressed class against the ruling class becomes necessarily a political fight, a fight first of all against the political dominance of this class. The consciousness of the interconnection between this political struggle and its economic roots becomes dulled and can be lost altogether. While this is not wholly the case with the participants, it almost always happens with the historians. Of the ancient sources on the struggles within the Roman Republic only Appian tells us clearly and distinctly what was at issue in the last resort—namely, landed property.

But once the state has become an independent power in regard to society, it produces forthwith a further ideology. It is indeed among professional politicians, theorists of public law and jurists of private law that the connection with economic facts gets completely lost. Since in each particular case the economic facts must assume the form of juristic motives in order to receive legal sanction; and since, in so doing, consideration of course has to be given to the whole legal system already in operation, the consequence is that the juristic form is made everything and the eco-

¹ *Code Civil*: The civil law code issued under Napoleon I, which became a model for legislation in other countries.—Ed.

conomic content nothing. Public law and private law are treated as independent spheres, each having its own independent historical development, each being capable of and needing a systematic presentation by the consistent elimination of all inner contradictions.

Still higher ideologies, that is, such as are still further removed from the material, economic basis, take the form of philosophy and religion. Here the interconnection between the ideas and their material condition of existence becomes more and more complicated, more and more obscured by intermediate links. But the interconnection exists. Just as the whole Renaissance period, from the middle of the fifteenth century, was an essential product of the towns and therefore of the burghers, so also was the subsequently newly awakened philosophy. Its content was in essence only the philosophical expression of the thoughts corresponding to the development of the small and middle bourgeoisie into a big bourgeoisie. Among last century's Englishmen and Frenchmen who in many cases were just as much political economists as philosophers, this is clearly evident; and we have proved it above in regard to the Hegelian school.

We will now in addition deal only briefly with religion, since the latter stands furthest away from material life and seems to be most alien to it. Religion arose in very primitive times from erroneous; primitive ideas of men about their own nature and that of the external world surrounding them. Every ideology, however, once it has arisen, develops in connection with the given concept-material, and develops this material further; otherwise it would not be an ideology, that is, occupation with thoughts as with independent entities, developing independently and subject only to their own laws. That the material life conditions of the persons inside whose heads this thought process goes on in the last resort determine the course of this process remains of necessity unknown to these persons, for otherwise there would be an end to all ideology. These original religious notions, therefore, which in the main are common to each group of kindred peoples, develop, after the separation of the group, in a manner peculiar to each people, according to the conditions of life falling to their lot. For a number of groups of peoples; and particularly for the Aryans (so-called Indo-Europeans) this process has been shown in detail by comparative mythology. The gods thus fashioned within each people were national gods, whose domain extended no farther than the national territory which they were to protect; on the other side of

its boundaries other gods held undisputed sway. They could continue to exist, in imagination, only as long as the nation existed; they fell with its fall. The Roman world empire, the economic conditions of whose origin we do not need to examine here, brought about this downfall of the old nationalities. The old national gods decayed, even those of the Romans, which themselves also were patterned to suit only the narrow confines of the city of Rome. The need to complement the world empire by means of a world religion was clearly revealed in the attempts made to provide in Rome recognition and altars for all the foreign gods to the slightest degree respectable alongside of the indigenous ones. But a new world religion is not to be made in this fashion, by imperial decree. The new world religion, Christianity, had already quietly come into being, out of a mixture of generalized Oriental, particularly Jewish, theology and vulgarized Greek, particularly Stoic, philosophy. What it originally looked like has to be first laboriously discovered again, since its official form, as it has been handed down to us, is merely that in which it became a state religion, to which purpose it was adapted by the Council of Nicæa. The fact that already after 250 years it became the state religion suffices to show that it was the religion in correspondence with the conditions of the time. In the Middle Ages, in the same measure as feudalism developed, Christianity grew into the religious counterpart to it, with a corresponding feudal hierarchy. And when the burghers began to thrive, there developed, in opposition to feudal Catholicism, the Protestant heresy, which first appeared in Southern France, among the Albigenses,¹ at the time the cities there reached the highest point of their florescence. The Middle Ages had attached to theology all the other forms of ideology—philosophy, politics, jurisprudence—and made them sub-divisions of theology. It thereby constrained every social and political movement to take on a theological form. The minds of the masses were fed with religion to the exclusion of all else; it was therefore necessary to put forward their own interests in a religious guise in order to produce an impetuous movement. And just as the burghers from the beginning brought into being an appendage of propertyless urban plebeians, day-labourers and servants of all kinds, belonging to no recognized social estate, precursors of the later proletariat, so likewise heresy soon became divided into a burgher-moderate heresy and a ple-

¹ *Albigenses*: A religious sect which during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries directed a movement against the Roman Catholic church. The name is derived from the town of Albi, in the south of France.—Ed.

beian-revolutionary one, the latter an abomination to the bourgeois heretics themselves.

The ineradicability of the Protestant heresy corresponded to the invincibility of the rising bourgeoisie. When this bourgeoisie had become sufficiently strengthened, its struggle against the feudal nobility, which till then had been predominantly local, began to assume national dimensions. The first great action occurred in Germany—the so-called Reformation. The bourgeoisie was neither powerful enough nor sufficiently developed to be able to unite under its banner the rest of the rebellious estates—the plebeians of the towns, the lower nobility and the peasants on the land. At first the nobles were defeated; the peasants rose in a revolt which forms the peak of the whole revolutionary struggle; the cities left them in the lurch, and thus the revolution succumbed to the armies of the secular princes who reaped the whole profit.¹ Thenceforward Germany disappears for three centuries from the ranks of countries playing an independent active part in history. But beside the German Luther appeared the Frenchman Calvin. With true French acuity he put the bourgeois character of the Reformation in the forefront, republicanized and democratized the church. While the Lutheran reformation in Germany degenerated and reduced the country to rack and ruin, the Calvinist reformation served as a banner for the republicans in Geneva, in Holland and in Scotland, freed Holland from Spain and from the German empire and provided the ideological costume for the second act of the bourgeois revolution which was taking place in England. Here Calvinism justified itself as the true religious disguise of the interests of the bourgeoisie of that time, and on this account did not reach full acceptance when the revolution ended in 1689 in a compromise between one part of the nobility and the bourgeoisie. The English state church was re-established; but not in its earlier form of a Catholicism which had the king for its pope, being, instead, strongly Calvinized. The old state church had celebrated the merry Catholic Sunday and had fought against the dull Calvinist one. The new bourgeois church introduced the latter, which adorns England to this day.

In France, the Calvinist minority was suppressed in 1685 and either Catholicized or driven out of the country. But what was the good? Already at that time the free-thinker Pierre Bayle was at work, and in 1694 Voltaire was born. The forcible measures of

¹ See Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany*.—Ed.

Louis XIV only made it easier for the French bourgeoisie to carry through its revolution in the irreligious and exclusively political form which alone was suited to a developed bourgeoisie. Instead of Protestants, free-thinkers took their seats in the national assemblies. Thereby Christianity entered into its final stage. It had become incapable for the future of serving any progressive class as the ideological garb of its aspirations. It became more and more the exclusive possession of the ruling classes and these apply it as a mere means of government, to keep the lower classes within bounds. Moreover, each of the different classes uses its own appropriate religion: the landed nobility—Catholic Jesuitism or Protestant orthodoxy; the liberal and radical bourgeoisie—rationalism; and it makes little difference whether these gentlemen themselves believe in their respective religions or not.

We see, therefore: religion, once formed, always contains traditional material, just as in all ideological domains tradition forms a great conservative force. But the transformations which this material undergoes spring from class relations, that is to say, out of the economic relations of the persons who execute these transformations. And here that is sufficient.

In the above it could only be a question of giving a general sketch of the Marxist conception of history, at most with a few illustrations as well. The proof must be derived from history itself; and in this regard I may be permitted to say that it has been sufficiently furnished in other writings. This conception, however, puts an end to philosophy in the realm of history, just as the dialectical conception of nature made all natural philosophy both unnecessary and impossible. It is no longer a question anywhere of inventing interconnections from out of our brains, but of discovering them in the facts. For philosophy, which has been expelled from nature and history, there remains only the realm of pure thought, so far as it is left: the theory of the laws of the thought process itself, logic and dialectics.

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
With the Revolution of 1848, "educated" Germany said farewell to theory and went over to the field of practice. Small production and manufacture, based upon manual labour, were superseded by really large-scale industry. Germany again appeared on the world market. The new little German empire¹ abolished at

¹ This term is applied to the German empire (without Austria) that arose in 1871 under Prussia's hegemony.—Ed.

least the most crying of the abuses with which this development had been obstructed by the system of petty states, the relics of feudalism, and bureaucratic economy. But to the same degree, that speculation abandoned the philosopher's study in order to set up its temple in the Stock Exchange, educated Germany lost the great aptitude for theory which had been the glory of Germany in the days of its deepest political humiliation—the aptitude for purely scientific investigation, irrespective of whether the result obtained was practically applicable or not, whether likely to meet with the approval or disapproval of the police authorities. Official German natural science, it is true, maintained its position in the front rank, particularly in the field of specialized research. But already the American journal *Science* remarks with truth that the decisive advances in the sphere of the comprehensive correlation of particular facts and their generalization into laws are now being made much more in England, instead of, as formerly, in Germany. And in the sphere of the historical sciences, philosophy included, the old fearless zeal for theory has now disappeared completely, along with classical philosophy. Inane eclecticism and an anxious concern for career and income, descending to the most vulgar place-hunting, occupy its place. The official representatives of these sciences have become the undisguised ideologists of the bourgeoisie and the existing state—but at a time when both stand in open antagonism to the working class.

Only among the working class does the German aptitude for theory remain unimpaired. Here it cannot be exterminated. Here there is no concern for careers, for profit-making, or for gracious patronage from above. On the contrary, the more ruthlessly and disinterestedly science proceeds the more it finds itself in harmony with the interests and aspirations of the workers. The new tendency, which recognized that the key to the understanding of the whole history of society lies in the history of the development of labour, from the outset addressed itself by preference to the working class and here found the response which it neither sought nor expected from officially recognized science. The German working-class movement is the inheritor of German classical philosophy.

APPENDIX



*Paul Lafargue*¹

REMINISCENCES OF MARX²

1

The first time I ever saw Karl Marx was in February 1865. The International had been founded on September 28, 1864, at a meeting in St. Martin's Hall. I came from Paris to bring him news of the progress made there by the young organization. Monsieur Tolain, now a senator of the bourgeois republic and one of its representatives at the Berlin Conference, had given me a letter of introduction.

I was twenty-four years old. Never in my life shall I forget the impression made on me by that first visit. Marx was in poor health at the time, and was hard at work upon the first volume of *Capital* (published only two years later, in 1867). He was afraid he might be unable to finish it, and he gladly received young people, "for," he used to say, "I must train men who will continue the communist propaganda after I am gone."

Karl Marx was one of those rare men who are fitted for the front rank both in science and in public life. So intimately did he combine these two fields that we shall never understand him unless we regard him simultaneously as man of science and as socialist fighter. While he was of opinion that every science must be cultivated for its own sake and that when we undertake scientific research we should not trouble ourselves about the possible consequences, nevertheless, he held that the man of learning, if he does not wish to degrade himself, must never cease to participate in public affairs—must not be content to shut himself up in his study or his laboratory, like a maggot in a cheese, without mixing in the life and the social and political struggles of his contemporaries.

¹ *Paul Lafargue* (1842-1911): French Socialist leader; one of the founders of the French Socialist Party.—*Ed.*

² These reminiscences were first published in German in the *Neue Zeit*, 1890-91, 1st part, from which text the present translation was made.—*Ed.*

"Science must not be a selfish pleasure. Those who are so lucky as to be able to devote themselves to scientific pursuits should be the first to put their knowledge at the service of mankind." One of his favourite sayings was, "Work for the world."

Though he deeply sympathized with the suffering of the working class, what had led him to the communist standpoint was not any sentimental consideration, but the study of history and political economy. He maintained that every unprejudiced mind, uninfluenced by private interests and not blinded by class prejudices, must perforce come to the same conclusion. But if he studied the economic and political development of human society without any preconceived notions, he wrote only with the definite intention of spreading the results of his studies, and with the firm determination to provide a scientific foundation for the socialist movement, which down to his day had been lost in utopian mists. As far as public activity was concerned, he took part in this only in order to work on behalf of the triumph of the working class, whose historic mission it is to establish communism as soon as it has attained to the political and economic leadership of society. In like manner the mission of the bourgeoisie as soon as it rose to power was to break the feudal bonds which hampered the development of agriculture and industry; to inaugurate free intercourse for commodities and human beings, and free contract between employers and workers; to centralize the means of production and exchange; and thus, without being aware of it, to prepare the material and intellectual elements of the future communist society.

Marx did not restrict his activities to the land of his birth. "I am a citizen of the world," he would say, "and exercise my activity wherever I may be." In actual fact, he played a prominent part in the revolutionary movements that developed in the countries (France, Belgium, England) to which events and political persecutions drove him.

But at my first visit, when I saw him in his study in Maitland Park Road, he appeared before me, not as the indefatigable and unequalled socialist agitator, but as the man of learning. From all parts of the civilized world, party comrades flocked to that room in order to consult the master of socialist thought. It has since become historical. Anyone who wants to realize the intimate aspects of Marx's intellectual life must become acquainted with it. It was situated on the first floor, well lighted by a broad window overlooking the park. Along the walls, on both sides of the fireplace and opposite the window, were crowded bookcases,

on the top of which packets of newspapers and manuscripts were piled up to the ceiling. Facing the fireplace, on one side of the window, stood two tables, likewise loaded with miscellaneous papers, newspapers, and books. In the middle of the room, where the light was best, was a small and plain writing table, three feet by two, and a wooden armchair. Between this chair and one of the bookcases, facing the window, was a leather-covered sofa on which Marx would occasionally lie down to rest. On the mantelpiece were more books, interspersed with cigars, matches, tobacco jars, paperweights, and photographs of his daughters, his wife, Wilhelm Wolff and Frederick Engels. Marx was a heavy smoker. "*Capital* will not bring in enough money to pay for the cigars I smoked when I was writing it," he told me. But he was still more spendthrift in his use of matches. So often did he forget his pipe or his cigar that he had constantly to be relighting it, and would use up a box of matches in an incredibly short time.

He would never allow anyone to arrange (really, to disarrange) his books and papers. The prevailing disorder was only apparent. In actual fact, everything was in its proper place, and without searching he could put his hand on any book or manuscript he wanted. Even when conversing, he would often stop to show a relevant passage or figure in the book itself. He was at one with his study, where the books and papers were as obedient to his will as were his own limbs.

He took no account of external symmetry when arranging his books. Quarto and octavo volumes and pamphlets were placed side by side; he arranged his books not according to size but according to contents. To him books were intellectual tools, not luxuries. "They are my slaves," he would say, "and must serve my will." He had scant respect for their format, their binding, the beauty of paper or printing; he would turn down the corners of the pages, underline passages, and cover the margins with pencil marks. He did not make notes in his books, but could not refrain from a question mark or a note of exclamation when an author kicked over the traces. His system of underlining enabled him to re-find with great ease any desired passage. He had the habit, at intervals of some years, of re-reading his notebooks and the marked passages in the books he had read, in order to refresh his memory—which was extraordinarily vigorous and accurate. From early youth he had trained it in accordance with Hegel's advice of memorizing verses in an unfamiliar tongue.

He knew Heine and Goethe by heart, and would often quote

them in conversation. He read the poets constantly, selecting them from all the European literatures. Year after year he would read Aeschylus again in the original Greek, regarding this author and Shakespeare as the two greatest dramatic geniuses the world has ever known. He had made an exhaustive study of Shakespeare, for whom he had an unbounded admiration, and whose most insignificant characters even were familiar to him. There was a veritable Shakespeare cult in the Marx family, and the three daughters knew much of Shakespeare by heart. Shortly after 1848, when Marx wished to perfect his knowledge of English (which he could already read well), he sought out and classified all of Shakespeare's characteristic expressions; and he did the same with some of the polemical writings of William Cobbet, for whom he had a great esteem. Dante and Burns were among his favourite poets, and it was always a delight to him to hear his daughters recite the satirical poems or sing the love songs of the Scotch poet.

Cuvier, an indefatigable worker and one of the great masters of science, when director of the Paris Museum, had a number of workrooms installed for his personal use. Each of these rooms was devoted to a particular branch of study, and for this purpose was equipped with the necessary books, instruments, anatomical accessories, etc. When wearied by some particular occupation, Cuvier would move on to the next room, finding that a change of mental work was just as good as a rest. Marx was just as untiring a worker as Cuvier, but he had not, like him, the means for the provision of several workrooms. He rested himself by pacing up and down the room, so that between door and window the carpet had been worn threadbare along a track as sharply defined as a footpath through a meadow. Sometimes he would lie down on the sofa and read a novel; he often had two or three novels going at the same time, reading them by turns—for, like Darwin, he was a great novel-reader. He had a preference for eighteenth-century novels, and was especially fond of Fielding's *Tom Jones*. The modern novelists who pleased him best were Paul de Kock, Charles Lever, the elder Dumas and Walter Scott, whose *Old Mortality* he considered a masterpiece. He had a predilection for tales of adventure and humorous stories. The greatest masters of romance were for him Cervantes and Balzac. He considered *Don Quixote* the epic of the decay of chivalry, whose virtues in the newly rising bourgeois world became absurdities and follies. His admiration for Balzac was so profound that he had planned to write a criticism of *La Comédie Humaine* as soon as he should have

finished his economic studies. Marx looked upon Balzac not merely as the historian of the society of his time, but as a prophetic creator of character types which still existed only in embryo during the reign of Louis Philippe, and which only reached full development under Napoleon III, after Balzac's death.

Marx could read all the leading European languages, and could write in three (German, French and English) in a way that aroused the admiration of all who were well acquainted with these tongues; he was fond of saying, "A foreign language is a weapon in the struggle of life." He had a great talent for languages, and this was inherited by his daughters. He was already fifty years old when he began to learn Russian. Although the dead and living languages already known to him had no close etymological relation to Russian, he had made such progress in six months as to be able to enjoy reading in the original the works of the Russian poets and authors whom he especially prized: Pushkin, Gogol and Schedrin. His reason for learning Russian was that he might be able to read the reports of certain official investigations which the government had suppressed because the revelations they contained were so appalling. Some devoted friends had managed to procure copies for Marx, who was certainly the only economist of Western Europe who had cognizance of them.

Besides the reading of poetry and novels, Marx had recourse to another and very remarkable means of mental relaxation, *viz.*, mathematics, of which he was exceedingly fond. Algebra even gave him moral consolation; and he would take refuge in it during the most painful moments of a storm-tossed life. In the days of his wife's last illness, he found it impossible to go on in the usual way with his scientific work, and his only escape from the thought of her sufferings was to immerse himself in mathematics. At this period of spiritual agony he wrote an essay upon infinitesimal calculus, which, according to the reports of mathematicians who know it, is of the first importance, and is to be published in his collected works. In higher mathematics he could trace the dialectical movement in its most logical and at the same time in its simplest form. According to his way of thinking, a science was only really developed when it had reached a point where it could make use of mathematics.

Marx's library, comprising more than a thousand volumes laboriously collected in the course of a lifetime of research, was insufficient for his needs; and for many years he was a regular attendant at the British Museum Reading Room, whose catalogue

he greatly prized. Even his opponents are compelled to admit that he was a man of profound and wide erudition; and this not merely in his own speciality of economics, but also in the history, philosophy and literature of all countries.

Although he invariably went to bed very late, he was always afoot between eight and nine in the morning. Having drunk a cup of black coffee and read his newspapers, he would go to his study and work there till two or three next morning—breaking off only for meals, and, the weather permitting, for a walk on Hampstead Heath. In the course of the day he slept for an hour or two on the sofa. As a young man, he had had the habit of spending whole nights at work. For Marx, work had become a passion, and one so absorbing that it was apt to make him forget his meals. Not infrequently he had to be summoned again and again before he would come down to the dining room; and hardly had he finished the last mouthful before he was on his way back to his desk. He was a poor eater, and even suffered from lack of appetite, which he tried to combat by the stimulus of highly seasoned food, such as ham, smoked fish, caviar and pickles. His stomach had to pay for the colossal activity of his brain, to which, indeed, all his body was sacrificed. Thinking was his supreme enjoyment. I have often heard him quote from Hegel, the master of the philosophy of his youthful days, the saying: "Even the criminal thought of a scoundrel is grander and more sublime than the wonders of the heavens."

He must undoubtedly have had a very strong constitution, for otherwise he could never have endured so unusual a way of living or such exhausting intellectual labours. He was, in fact, very powerfully built. A man above the average height, he had broad shoulders and a deep chest, and his limbs were well proportioned on the whole, though his legs were rather too short for his body (as is often the case among members of the Jewish race). If he had practised gymnastics in his youth, he would have become an extremely powerful man. The only physical exercise he took regularly was walking. He could walk for hours, and even climb hills, talking and smoking the whole time, without showing a sign of fatigue. It may be said that he did his work while walking in his study. Only for short intervals would he sit down at his desk in order to commit to paper what he had thought out while pacing the floor. He was fond, too, of conversing while thus engaged in walking, only pausing in his walk from time to time, when the discussion became lively or the conversation especially important.

For years it was my custom to join him in his evening strolls on Hampstead Heath, and it was during these walks through the fields that I acquired through him my education in economics. Without noticing it himself, he developed in these talks with me the whole of the first volume of *Capital*, little by little, as he was writing it at the time. As soon as I got home I would, to the best of my ability, jot down the substance of what I had heard, but at first I found it very difficult to follow Marx's profound and complicated thought-process. Unfortunately I lost these invaluable notes, for after the Commune my papers in Paris and Bordeaux were seized and burnt by the police. Especially do I regret the loss of the notes made one evening when Marx, with a characteristic abundance of proofs and reflections, had been expounding his brilliant theory of the development of human society. It was as if a veil had been lifted from my eyes. For the first time I clearly grasped the logic of universal history, and became able to refer to their material causes the phenomena of the evolution of society and ideas—phenomena which to outward appearance are so contradictory. I was dazzled by it, and this impression lasted for years. The theory had the same effect upon the Madrid socialists when I expounded it to the best of my poor abilities. It is the greatest of all Marx's theories, and unquestionably one of the greatest ever formulated by the human mind.

Marx's brain was armed with an incredible number of facts from history and natural science and philosophical theories, and he was amazingly skilled in making use of all this knowledge and observation which he had gathered during lengthy intellectual labour. At any time, and upon any conceivable topic, he could supply the most adequate answer anyone could possibly desire to any inquiry, an answer always accompanied by philosophical reflections of general significance. His brain resembled a warship which lies in harbour under full steam, being ready at a moment's notice to set forth into any of the seas of thought. Indubitably, *Capital* discloses to us a mind remarkable for its energy and rich in knowledge. But for me, as for all who have known Marx well, neither *Capital* nor any of his other writings exhibit the full extent of his knowledge or the full grandeur of his genius. The man towered high above his writings.

I worked with Marx. I was nothing more than the writer to whom he dictated, but this gave me the opportunity of observing how he thought and wrote. For him, work was at once easy and difficult. It was easy because, whatever the theme, the opposite

facts and reflections surged up in his mind in abundance at the first impulse; but this very abundance made the complete exposition of his ideas laborious and difficult.

Vico wrote: "Only for God, who knows all, is the thing a substance; for man, who knows externals merely, it is nothing more than a surface." Marx grasped things after the manner of the God of Vico; he did not see the surface only, but penetrated into the depths, examining all the constituent parts in their mutual interactions, isolating each of these parts and tracing the history of its development. Then he passed on from the thing to its environment, watching the effect of each upon the other. He went back to the origin of the object of study, considering the transformations, the evolutions and revolutions through which it had passed, and tracing finally even the remotest of its effects. He never saw a thing as a thing by itself and for itself, not connected with its setting, but saw an extremely complicated world in constant motion. His aim was to expound all the life of this world, in its manifold and incessantly changing actions and reactions. The writers of the school of Flaubert and De Goncourt complain of the difficulty of giving an accurate account of what we see; and yet that which they wish to describe is nothing more than the surface of which Vico spoke, nothing more than the impression they receive. Their literary task is child's play compared with that undertaken by Marx. He needed quite exceptional powers of thought to comprehend the reality; and not less exceptional talent for exposition, if he was to make intelligible to others what he saw and wanted them to see. He was never content with what he wrote, altering it again and again, and he always felt that the presentation remained inadequate to the idea. One of Balzac's psychological studies, *Le chef d'œuvre inconnu* [*The Unknown Masterpiece*], which has been pitifully plagiarized by Zola, made a deep impression on him because it was in part a description of his own feelings. A talented painter is so tortured by the urge to reproduce exactly the picture which has formed itself in his brain that he touches and retouches his canvas incessantly, to produce at last nothing more than a shapeless mass of colours, which nevertheless to his prejudiced eye seems a perfect reproduction of reality.

Marx united both the qualities essential to a brilliant thinker. He was incomparable in his power of dissecting an object into its constituent parts; and he was a master in the art of reconstituting this object, in all its details and in its various forms of development, and also in the art of discovering its inner connections. His

method of demonstration did not consist in playing with abstractions as he has been accused of doing by economists who are incapable of thinking; he did not employ the device of the geometers who, after taking their definitions from the surrounding world, go on to deduce conclusions in utter disregard of reality. We do not find in *Capital* a unique definition, or a unique formula; what we find is a series of highly subtle analyses which bring out the most fleeting *nuances* and the finest distinctions. He starts out by establishing the obvious fact that the wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails consists of an enormous accumulation of commodities; commodities, concrete objects and not mathematical abstractions, are the elements, or cells, out of which capitalist wealth is built up. Marx now takes firm hold of the commodity, twists it in every direction, turns it inside out, and elicits its secrets from it one after another—secrets of which the official economists have never had an inkling, and which are none the less more numerous and more profound than the mysteries of the Catholic faith. Having studied the commodity from every angle, he goes on to consider its relationships to other commodities, as shown in exchange; then he passes to its production, and to the historical prerequisites of its production. He contemplates the forms of appearance of the commodity, and shows how it passes from one form into another, how one form necessarily gives rise to another. The logical sequence of development of the phenomena is displayed with such consummate art that we might imagine Marx to have invented it; and yet it issues from reality, and is a reproduction of the actual dialectic of the commodity.

Marx always worked with extreme conscientiousness. He never gave facts or figures which he could not substantiate by the best authorities. In this matter he was not content with second-hand sources, but went always to the fountain head, however much trouble it might entail. Even for the verification of some subsidiary item he would pay a special visit to the British Museum. That is why his critics have never been able to convict him of inadvertence or to supply proof that any of his demonstrations were based on facts which could not stand severe examination. His habit of consulting original sources led him to read the least known authors, who were quoted only by him. *Capital* contains such a number of quotations from unknown writers that it might be supposed they were introduced to make a parade of learning. But Marx was moved by a very different impulse. He

said: "I mete out historical justice, and render to each man his due." He considered it his duty to name the author, however insignificant and obscure, who had first expressed a thought, or had expressed it more precisely than any one else.

His literary conscience was no less strict than his scientific conscience. Not merely would he never rely on a fact about which he was not quite sure, but he would not speak on a topic at all unless he had made a thorough study of it. He would not publish anything until he had worked over it again and again, until what he had written obtained a satisfactory form. He could not bear the thought of appearing before the public in incomplete form. It would have been most distressing to him to show one of his manuscripts before he had put the finishing touches to it. This feeling was so strong in him that he said to me one day he would rather burn his manuscripts than leave them behind unfinished. His method of work often involved him in tasks the magnitude of which is hardly to be conceived by the readers of his books. For instance, in order to write the twenty-odd pages of *Capital* dealing with English factory legislation he had worked through a whole library of blue-books containing the reports of special commissions of enquiry and of the English and Scotch factory inspectors. As the numerous pencil marks show, he read them from cover to cover. He regarded these reports as among the most important and significant of the documents available for the study of the capitalist mode of production; and he had so high an opinion of the men who had made them that he doubted whether it would be possible to find in any other European nation "men as competent, as unbiased, and as free from respect of persons as are the English factory inspectors." This remarkable tribute will be found in the Preface to the first volume of *Capital*.

Marx drew an abundance of facts from these blue-books—which many of the members of the House of Commons and the House of Lords (among whom they were circulated) used only as targets in order to ascertain the power of their weapons by counting the number of pages the bullets would penetrate. Others sold them by weight as waste paper. That was the best use they could make of them, for it enabled Marx to get his copies cheap from a wastepaper dealer in Long Acre to whom he went occasionally to rummage among his waste books and papers. According to Professor Beesly, Marx was the man who made the best use of these English official enquiries, and was indeed the man who had made them known to the world. But Beesly did not know

that as long ago as 1845 Engels had taken many extracts from the British blue-books for his treatise on *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*.

2

Those who would know the man's heart and love it, that heart which beat so warmly beneath the outer wrappings of the scholar, had to see Marx when his books and manuscripts had been thrust aside—in the bosom of his family, and on Sunday evenings in the circle of his friends. At such times he was a most delightful companion, sparkling with wit and bubbling over with humour, one who enjoyed a hearty laugh. His dark eyes would twinkle merrily beneath his bushy eyebrows when he listened to some bright sally or apt rejoinder.

He was a gentle, tender and considerate father. A favourite phrase of his was: "Children must educate their parents." His daughters loved him ardently, and in the relationship between him and them there was never a trace of paternal authority. He never ordered them about, being content to ask them to do him a favour, or to beg them not to do something which he would rather they left undone. Yet seldom was a father's counsel more listened to than his. His daughters looked on him as their friend and behaved to him as to a playmate. They did not address him as "Father," but as "Moor"—a nickname which had been given him because of his dark complexion and his ebony locks and beard. On the other hand even before 1848, when he was not yet thirty, to his fellow members of the Communist League he was "Father Marx."

He would spend hours playing with his children. They remember to this day the sea-fights and burning of whole fleets of paper boats, which he made for them and which he would then—amid jubilation—set fire to in a large bucket of water. On Sundays the girls would not allow him to work; he was theirs for the whole day. When the weather was fine, the whole family would go for a walk in the country, stopping at a wayside inn for a modest luncheon of bread and cheese with ginger beer. When the girls were still quite small, he would shorten the miles for them by telling them stories without end, fantastic fairy tales invented as he went along and spun out to fit the length of the walk, so that his hearers forgot their fatigue. Marx had an incomparably rich poetic imagination; his first literary efforts had been poems.

His wife treasured these youthful versés, but would not let anyone see them. Marx's parents had intended their son to become a man of letters or a university professor. In their view he degraded himself by devoting himself to socialist agitation and by occupying himself with the study of political economy (a subject then little esteemed in Germany).

Marx once promised his daughters that he would write them a play about the Gracchi. Unfortunately this scheme never ripened. It would have been interesting to see what "the knight of the class war," as he was called, would have made of the theme—a terrible and splendid episode in the class struggles of the ancient world. This was but one of many plans that were never carried out. For instance, he intended to write a work on logic, and another on the history of philosophy, the latter having been his favourite study in his youth. He would have needed to live to a hundred to have a chance of writing all the books he had planned, and of presenting to the world a portion of the wealth with which his mind was stored.

Throughout his whole life, his wife was a companion in the truest, fullest sense of the word. They had known one another in childhood, and had grown up together. Marx was only seventeen when they were betrothed. They had to wait nine years before they married, in 1843, but thenceforward they were never separated until Frau Marx died, not long before her husband. Although born and brought up in a noble German family, no one could have had a more lively sense of equality than she. For her, social differences and distinctions did not exist. In her house, at her table, workmen in their working clothes were welcomed with as much politeness and cordiality as dukes or princes would have been. Many workers from all lands enjoyed her hospitality, and I am sure that none of those whom she received with such simple and unfeigned kindness ever dreamed that their hostess was descended in the female line from the Dukes of Argyll, or that her brother had been Minister of State to the king of Prussia. Nor were these things of any moment to her. She had left all that to follow her Karl; and she never regretted what she had done, not even in the days of their greatest want.

She had a serene and cheerful temperament. Her letters to her friends, effortless outpourings of her facile pen, were the masterly productions of a lively and original mind. Her correspondents regarded the days on which these letters arrived as days of rejoicing. Johann Philipp Becker has published a

number of them. Heine, the ruthless satirist, dreaded Marx's mockery, but he had a great admiration for the keen and sensitive intelligence of Frau Marx. When the pair stayed in Paris, he was a constant guest at their house. Marx had so much respect for his wife's intelligence and critical sense that (as he told me in 1866) he submitted all his manuscripts to her, and greatly valued her judgment. She made the copy of his writings that was sent to press.

Frau Marx had many children. Three of them died quite young, during the phase of privation through which the family passed after the Revolution of 1848, when they were refugees in London living in two small rooms in Dean Street, Soho Square. I got to know only the three daughters of the family. When, in 1865, I was introduced to Marx, the youngest (now Mrs. Aveling) was a delightful child, more like a boy than a girl. Marx was wont to say that his wife had made a blunder about the sex when she gave Eleanor to the world. The two other daughters formed the most charming and harmonious contrast that can be conceived. The elder (now Madame Longuet) was of a swarthy complexion like her father, with dark eyes and raven locks; the younger (now Madame Lafargue) took after her mother, having a fair skin, rosy cheeks, and a wealth of curly hair, with a golden sheen, as if it concealed the setting sun.

In addition to those already named, there was another important member of the Marx family, Fräulein Helene Demuth. Of peasant birth, she had become a servant when quite young, almost a child, to Jenny von Westphalen long before the latter married Karl Marx. When the marriage took place, Helene would not part from Frau Marx, but followed the fortunes of the Marx family with the most self-sacrificing devotion. She accompanied Marx and his wife in all their wanderings through Europe, and shared their various expulsions. The practical spirit of the household, she knew how to make the best of the most difficult situations. It was thanks to her orderliness, thrift and mother-wit that the family never had to endure the worst extremity of destitution. A mistress of all domestic arts, she acted as cook and housemaid, she dressed the children and also cut out the children's clothes, stitching them with Frau Marx's help. She was simultaneously housekeeper and major-domo. The children loved her like a mother; and she, returning their love, wielded a mother's influence over them. Both Marx and his wife regarded her as a dear friend. Marx played chess with her, and frequently got the worst of the encounter. Helene's love for the Marx

family was uncritical; everything they did was right, and could not be anything but good; anyone who criticized Marx had to reckon with her. All who were drawn into intimate relations with the family she took under her motherly protection; she had, so to say, adopted the whole family. Having survived Marx and his wife, she has now transferred her attentive care to Engels' household. She had made Engels' acquaintance in youth, and was as fond of him as of the Marx family.

Besides, Engels was, so to say, also a member of the Marx family. The girls spoke of him as their second father. He was Marx's *alter ego*. In Germany for many years their names were invariably coupled together, and history will always record their names together in its pages. In our modern age, Marx and Engels realized the ideal of friendship portrayed by the writers of classical antiquity. They had become acquainted in youth, had undergone a parallel development, had lived in the most intimate community of thought and feeling, had participated in the same revolutionary agitation, and had worked side by side as long as they could remain together. Presumably they would have done so throughout life, had not circumstances forced them apart for twenty years. After the defeat of the Revolution of 1848, Engels had to go to Manchester, while Marx was compelled to stay in London. None the less they continued to share their intellectual life by means of an exchange of letters. Almost daily they wrote to one another about political and scientific happenings, and about the work on which they were engaged. As soon as Engels could free himself from his work in Manchester, he hastened to set up house in London, only ten minutes' walk from his beloved Marx. From 1870 till Marx's death in 1883, hardly a day passed on which they did not see one another, either at the one house or the other.

There was always great rejoicing in the Marx household when Engels announced his intention of coming over from Manchester. The coming visit was a topic of conversation for days in advance and on the day of his arrival Marx was so impatient that he could not work. At length came the hour of reunion, and then the two friends would spend the whole night together, smoking and drinking, and talking of all that had happened since their last meeting.

Marx valued Engels' opinion more than that of anyone else. Engels was the man he deemed capable of being his collaborator. In fact, Engels was for him a whole public. To convince Engels, to win Engels over to an idea, no labour seemed to Marx excessive. For instance, I have known him to re-read entire volumes in

search of facts required to change Engels' opinion concerning some minor detail (I cannot now recall what it was) in the political and religious war of the Albigenses. To win Engels over to his point of view was a triumph for him.

Marx was proud of Engels. He recounted to me with pleasure all his friend's moral and intellectual merits; and he made a special journey to Manchester in order to show Engels to me. He admired the remarkable versatility of Engels' scientific knowledge; and he was uneasy at the possibility of any accident that might befall him. "I am always terrified lest he should be thrown on one of his mad cross-country gallops," said Marx to me one day.

Marx was as good a friend as he was a loving husband and father. His wife, his daughters, Helene Demuth and Frederick Engels were beings worthy of the love of such a man as himself.

3

Marx, who had begun as one of the leaders of the radical bourgeoisie, found himself forsaken by his associates when his opposition became too sharply defined, and treated as an enemy as soon as he became a socialist. A hue and cry was raised against him, he was vilified and calumniated, and then was driven out of Germany; thereafter a conspiracy of silence was organized against him and his works. His *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*—which showed that of all the historians and men of politics of the year 1848 Marx was the only one who understood the true nature of the causes and effects of the *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851, and the only one who elucidated them—was completely ignored. Not a single bourgeois journal made any mention of the work, despite its timeliness. *The Poverty of Philosophy* (an answer to Proudhon's *The Philosophy of Poverty*) and *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* were likewise ignored. Only the foundation of the International Working Men's Association and the publication of the first volume of *Capital* broke this conspiracy of silence which had lasted some fifteen years. Marx could no longer be ignored; the International grew, and filled the world with the fame of its deeds. Although Marx kept himself in the background and let others appear as the chief actors, the identity of the stage director was soon discovered. In Germany, the Social-Democratic Party was founded, and became a power which Bismarck courted before he attacked it. Schweitzer,

a follower of Lassalle, published a series of articles (Marx thought them worthy of note) which made *Capital* known to working-class readers. The Congress of the International adopted a resolution moved by Johann Philipp Becker recommending the book to international socialists as the bible of the working class.

After the rising of March 18, 1871, which it was claimed was the handiwork of the International, and after the defeat of the Commune (which the General Council of the International defended against the onslaughts of the bourgeois press of all lands), the name of Marx became world famous. He was now universally recognized as the invincible theoretician of scientific Socialism, and as the organizer of the first international labour movement. *Capital* was now the textbook of socialists in every country; all socialist and labour journals popularized his theories; and during a great strike in New York extracts from this work were published in America as leaflets in order to inspire the workers to hold firm and to prove to them the justice of their demands. *Capital* was translated from the German into the other principal European languages, viz., Russian, French and English. Extracts from the book appeared in German, Italian, French, Spanish and Dutch. Whenever, in Europe or America, opponents have tried to refute Marx's theories, socialist economists have been able to find an effective answer. Today, in very truth, *Capital* is what the above-mentioned congress of the International declared it to be, the bible of the working class.

But Marx's active participation in the international socialist movement left him too little time for his scientific work; and further fatal blows were struck at this work by the death of his wife and that of his eldest daughter, Madame Longuet.

Marx and his wife were greatly attached to each other. Her beauty had been his joy and his pride; her gentleness and her devotion had made it far easier for him to bear the misery inseparable from his troubled life as a revolutionary socialist. The sufferings which brought Frau Marx to the grave were destined also to shorten the life of her husband. During her long and painful illness, Marx was worn out—mentally by distress, and physically by sleeplessness and by lack of fresh air and exercise. These were predisposing causes of the pneumonia he contracted, which almost made an end of him.

On December 2, 1881, Frau Marx died as she had lived, a communist and materialist. Death had no terrors for her. When she felt that it was close at hand, she said: "Karl, my strength

is broken." These were her last articulate words. On December 5, she was buried in unconsecrated ground in Highgate cemetery. In accordance with her lifelong sentiments and those of her husband, the funeral was kept as private as possible, and only a few intimate friends accompanied the body to its last resting place. At the graveside Frederick Engels spoke as follows:

"My friends! The high-minded woman whom we are burying here was born at Salzwedel, in the year 1814. Soon afterwards her father, Baron von Westphalen, was transferred to Treves as Councillor of State, and there became an intimate friend of the Marx family. The children grew up together. The two, so highly-gifted by nature, found one another. When Marx entered the university, they had already made up their minds to join their lives.

"They were married in 1843, after the suppression of the first *Rheinische Zeitung*, which Marx had edited for a time. Ever since, Jenny Marx has not merely shared the fortunes, the labours and the struggle of her husband, but has taken part in them with the fullest understanding and the most glowing enthusiasm.

"The young couple went to Paris, for an exile which was at first voluntary, but only too soon became a real one. The Prussian government extended its persecution of Marx even there. With regret I have to add that no less a man than Alexander von Humboldt lent himself to being active in the procurement of the expulsion order against Marx. The family was driven to Brussels. Then came the February Revolution. During the ensuing disturbances that also broke out in Brussels the Belgian government was not content with arresting Marx, but thought fit, without time or reason, to throw his wife into prison as well.

"The revolutionary advance, begun in 1848, collapsed already in the following year. Further exile ensued, at first in Paris, and then, owing to a renewed intervention of the French government, in London. This time for Jenny Marx it was indeed exile with all its terrors. Nevertheless she bore up against the material difficulties, owing to which she saw her two boys and her baby girl sink into the grave. But it was a terrible blow to her that the government and the bourgeois opposition, from the vulgar-liberals to the democrats, made common cause in a great conspiracy against her husband; that they bespattered him with the most mean, most detestable calumnies; that the whole press closed its columns against him, so that for the time being he stood defenceless against the onslaught of foes whom he and his wife could not but despise. And this state of affairs lasted very long.

"But it did not last forever. The European proletariat once more secured conditions of existence in which a certain amount of independent mobility became possible. The International was founded. The class struggle of the workers spread from land to land, and Karl Marx, her husband, fought as the foremost of the foremost. Now began a period in which she received compensation for many of the grievous troubles of the past. She saw the calumnies which had been showered on Marx scattered like chaff before the wind; she saw his doctrines, which the reactionaries of all shades of opinion, from the feudalists to the democrats, had so much exerted themselves to suppress, being preached from the housetops in all civilized countries and in all literary languages. She saw the proletarian movement, which to her was bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh, shaking the foundations of the old world, from Russia to America, and pressing forward ever more certain of victory despite the most strenuous opposition. One of her last joys was to note the striking proof of inexhaustible energy recently given by our German workers in the last elections to the Reichstag.

"What such a woman, with so keen and critical an understanding, with so much political tact, so much energy and passion, with so much devotion for her comrades-in-arms in the labour movement, has done during the last forty years has not become public knowledge, has not been recorded in the annals of the contemporary press. It is known only to those who have lived through it all. But this much I am sure of, that the wives of the refugees from the Commune will often think of her, and that many of us will sadly miss her bold and clever advice—bold but never boastful, clever but never dishonourable.

"I need not speak of her personal qualities. Her friends know them, and will not forget them. If there was ever a woman whose supreme delight it was to make others happy, it was she."

After his wife's death, Marx's life was nothing more than a sequence of stoically endured physical and moral sufferings, which were intensified when a year later his eldest daughter, Madame Longuet, died suddenly. He was broken, and never recovered. The end came on March 14, 1883, in his sixty-fifth year, when he fell asleep, sitting at his work table.

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*Wilhelm Liebknecht*¹

FROM REMINISCENCES OF MARX²

1. FIRST MEETING WITH MARX

Our friendship—with Marx's two oldest daughters, one six and the other seven at that time—began a few days after I had arrived in London in the summer of 1850 from Switzerland, and, in fact, from one of the prisons of "Free Switzerland," having been shipped through France with a deportation ticket. I met the Marx family at a summer outing of the *Kommunistische Arbeiterbildungsverein* somewhere near London, I don't remember whether in Greenwich or Hampton Court. "Père Marx," whom I saw for the first time, immediately undertook a severe examination of me, looked me sharply in the eyes and scrutinized my head fairly closely—an operation to which I was already accustomed from friend Gustav Struve, who, because he obstinately persisted in doubting my "moral backbone," especially liked to make me the victim of his phrenological studies. However, the examination passed off successfully; I withstood the look of the lion's head with the coal-black lion's mane; the examination turned into lively cheerful conversation. Soon we were in the midst of unrestrained merry-making—Marx one of the most unrestrained of all—and I at once became acquainted with Frau Marx, with Lenchen, the family's faithful help around the house ever since she was a girl, and with the children.

From that day I was at home in Marx's house and I never missed a day with the family, which at that time lived in Dean Street, one of the streets off Oxford Street, while I took up my

¹ *Wilhelm Liebknecht* (1826-1900): One of the founders and leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party.—*Ed.*

² We reprint here excerpts from his reminiscences of Marx, which were originally published in Nuremberg in a separate edition in 1896. The titles of the excerpts here given follow the Russian edition.—*Ed.*

quarters in nearby Church Street. I am firmly convinced that my intercourse with this family saved me from going under in the wretched life led by us fugitives.

2. FIRST CONVERSATION

My first more lengthy conversation with Marx took place the day after our encounter at the above-mentioned country outing of the Communist Workers' Educational Union. Then there had naturally been no opportunity for any detailed talk and Marx had invited me to come the following day to the meeting place of the Union, at which Engels would probably also be present. I came a little before the appointed time; Marx was not yet there, but I found several old acquaintances and was in the midst of a lively conversation when Marx clapped me on the shoulder in very friendly greeting. Engels, he said, was downstairs in the "private parlour," where we would be more alone. I did not know what a "private parlour" was, and I had an inkling that I was now to face the "big" examination; however, I followed him trustingly. Marx, who made the same sympathetic impression on me as the day before, possessed the quality of inspiring confidence. He took me by the arm and led me into the private parlour, *i.e.*, the private room of the landlord—or was it a landlady?—where Engels, who had already provided himself with a pewter pot full of dark brown stout, immediately received me with some merry jest. In a moment we had ordered some "stuff" to eat and drink from Amy (or "Emma" as she had been rechristened in German by the refugees, on account of the similarity of sound), the nimble waitress,—among us refugees the stomach question played an important role. In a moment the beer arrived and we sat down, I on one side of the table, Marx and Engels opposite me. With the massive mahogany table, the shining pewter mugs, the foaming stout, the prospect of a genuine English beefsteak and trimmings, the long clay pipes which begged to be smoked—it was all so comfortable that I was vividly reminded of a picture in the English illustrations to "Boz." But all the same it was an *examination*! But why shouldn't it turn out all right? The conversation came more and more into swing. I soon noticed that my examiners had already made inquiries about me. A rather big essay on the *June Battle*, which I had written in the summer of 1848 when the impression left by the tragedy that implied a turn in world history was still fresh, had been read by Marx and Engels and had drawn

their attention to me. I had not had any personal contact with them before my meeting with Engels in Geneva the year before. Of Marx, I knew only the articles in the Paris *Jahrbücher* and *The Poverty of Philosophy*; of Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. I, who had been a Communist since 1846, had been able to procure the *Communist Manifesto* only shortly before my meeting with Engels after the campaign for a Reich Constitution, although I had naturally heard of it before and knew the contents; the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* I only very rarely got a sight of, for during the eleven months of its appearance I was either abroad or in prison or in the chaotic life of storm and stress led by the volunteers.

Both of my examiners suspected me of petty-bourgeois "democracy" and of being a "South German sentimental dreamer," and many judgments which I pronounced on men and things met with very sharp criticism.... On the whole, the examination passed off not unfavourably and the conversation gradually assumed a wider scope. Soon we were in the sphere of *natural science*, and Marx made fun of the victorious reaction in Europe, which imagined that it had stifled the revolution and did not suspect that natural science was preparing a new revolution. King Steam, who had revolutionized the world in the previous century, was coming to the end of his reign, and another, incomparably greater, revolutionist would take his place, the *electric spark*. And then Marx related to me, full of fire and enthusiasm, that for the last few days a model of an electric machine which pulled a railway train has been exhibited in Regent Street. "Now the problem has been solved—the consequences are unpredictable. The economic revolution must be followed by a political one, for the latter is only the expression of the former." Marx's conception of the world, and especially what later came to be termed the *materialist conception of history*, was so clearly expressed in the manner in which he discussed this progress of science and mechanics that certain doubts which I had hitherto entertained melted away like snow in the sunshine of spring. That evening I never went home at all—we spoke and joked and drank until late the next morning, and the sun was already high in the heavens when I went to bed. But not for long; I could not sleep. My head was too full of everything that I had heard. My thoughts, roving hither and thither, drove me out again and I hurried to Regent Street in order to see the model, this modern Trojan horse, which bourgeois society in suicidal fascination had introduced with rejoicing into

their Ilion, as once the Trojan men and women had done with theirs, and which would bring about their certain destruction.

A dense crowd indicated the show window behind which the model was exhibited. I elbowed my way through and, true enough, there was the locomotive and the train—and both of them were running merrily around.

That was in the year 1850, at the beginning of July. . . .

3. MARX AS TEACHER AND EDUCATOR OF REVOLUTIONISTS

"Moor" (Marx), with his advantage of five or six years over us "young fellows," was conscious of the whole superiority of his ripened manhood, and took every opportunity of testing us, and especially me. With his colossal reading and marvellous memory he could easily make it hot for us. How he rejoiced when he enticed a "fresher" into difficult waters and proved to him "*in corpore vili*" ["in his own base person"] the miserable character of our universities and of academic education in general.

But he *educated* also, in regular fashion. I can say of him in a double respect, in the wider and the narrower sense of the words, that *he was my teacher*. And one had to follow him in *every* sphere. I will say nothing of economics. In the Pope's palace one does not speak of the Pope. I will say something later about the lectures on economics in the Communist League. Marx was at home in both modern and ancient languages. I was a philologist and it gave him a childish pleasure when he could put before me some difficult passage from Aristotle or Aeschylus which I could not immediately understand. How he scolded me one day because I did not know—*Spanish*! In a moment he had pulled out *Don Quixote* from a heap of books and proceeded at once to give me a lesson. From Diez' comparative grammar of the romance languages I already knew the basic features of the grammar and word construction and so I got on quite well under Moor's excellent guidance and his careful assistance when I faltered or came to a standstill. And how patient he was in teaching, he who otherwise was so stormily impatient! Only the entrance of a visitor put an end to the lesson. Every day I was examined and had to translate from *Don Quixote* or some other Spanish book—until my ability appeared sufficiently proven.

Marx was an excellent linguist; true, more of the modern than of the ancient languages. He had the closest knowledge of Grimm's German grammar, and he was more familiar with the

German dictionary of the brothers Grimm—as much of it as had appeared—than I, the philologist, was. He wrote English and French like an Englishman or Frenchman, though it is true he was not quite up to par in speaking. His articles for the *New York Tribune*¹ are in classical English, his *Poverty of Philosophy*, written in reply to Proudhon's *Philosophy of Poverty*, is in classical French—the French friend whom he got to read through the manuscript for the press found very little to correct.

Since Marx knew the *essence* of language, and had busied himself with its origin, development and structure, he did not find it hard to learn languages. In London, he also learned Russian, and during the Crimean War he even had the intention of learning Arabic and Turkish, but this idea was not carried out. Like anyone who really desires to master a language, he laid chief stress on reading. One who has a good memory—and Marx had a rare memory which never let anything go—quickly acquires by much reading the vocabulary and phraseology of a language. Its practical use is then easily learned.

In 1850 and 1851, Marx gave a *Course of Lectures on Economics*. He decided on it reluctantly; it was only after he had given a few private lessons to a small circle of friends that he allowed himself after all to be persuaded by us to give instruction to a larger circle. In this course, which was a great pleasure for all who had the good fortune to take part in it, Marx already completely unfolded the basic features of his system as it is to be found in *Capital*. In a crowded hall of the Communist League, or the "Communist Workers' Educational Union," which was then still situated in Great Windmill Street—in the same hall where two and a half years before the *Communist Manifesto* had been decided on—Marx demonstrated his remarkable talent for popularization. Nobody hated vulgarization more than he did, that is to say, the falsification of science, depriving it of profundity and spirit. No one, however, possessed in a higher degree the capacity of expressing himself clearly. Clarity of speech is the fruit of clarity of thought; clear thinking necessarily results in a clear form of expression.

Marx proceeded methodically. He stated a proposition, as briefly as possible, and then explained it in a rather long exposition, taking the greatest care not to use any expression which would not be understood by the workers. Then he called for ques-

¹ The *New York Daily Tribune*.—Ed.

tions. If none were put he began to question the audience and did this with such pedagogical skill that not a single gap or misunderstanding escaped his notice. I learned, on expressing my admiration of his skill, that Marx had already delivered lectures on political economy in the Workers' Society at Brussels. In any case he had the makings of an excellent teacher. In teaching he used to use a blackboard on which he would write out the formulæ—including those familiar to all of us from the beginning of *Capital*.

It was a great pity that the course only lasted half a year, or even less. Elements that Marx did not like filtered into the Communist League. After the flood of emigration had subsided, the League dwindled and took on a rather sectarian character—the old followers of Weitling and Cabet began to come to the fore again and Marx, for whom such a small sphere of activity was inadequate and who had more important things to do than to sweep away old cobwebs, kept away from the Communist League....

4. MARX'S STYLE

Marx is said to have had no "style," or a very bad one. That is said by those who do not know what style is—smooth-tongued orators and phrasemongers who have not understood Marx and are incapable of understanding him, incapable of following the flights of his intellect to the highest peaks of science and passion and to the profoundest depths of human suffering and human depravity. If Buffon's phrase, "the style is the man," holds good of anyone, it holds good of Marx—*Marx's style is Marx himself*. A man who was so thoroughly truthful as he was, who knew no other cult than that of truth, who unhesitatingly would jettison propositions, however laboriously arrived at and dearly cherished, as soon as he was convinced that they were incorrect, could not but show himself in his writings as he was. Incapable of hypocrisy, incapable of pretence or pose, he always was *himself* in his writings as in his life. It is true that the style of a person of so many-sided, so comprehensive and varied a nature cannot be so uniform, unvaried or even monotone as in the case of persons of less composite, of less comprehensive nature. The Marx of *Capital*, the Marx of *The Eighteenth Brumaire* and the Marx of *Herr Vogt* are three different persons, and yet with all their diversity they are one and the same Marx—in their trinity still a unity—the unity of a great personality which expresses itself differently in different spheres and yet always remains the same. To be sure, the

style of *Capital* is difficult—but can it be said that the subject dealt with is easy? The style is not merely the man, it is also the *matter*, it must adapt itself to the matter. There is no royal road to science, each must laboriously struggle and climb even if he has the best of guides. To complain of difficult, abstruse or even ponderous style in *Capital* is merely to acknowledge one's own mental laziness or incapacity to think.

Is *The Eighteenth Brumaire* incomprehensible? Is the arrow incomprehensible which flies straight to its goal and buries itself in the flesh? Is the spear incomprehensible which, flung with a sure hand, strikes the enemy right in the heart? The words of *The Eighteenth Brumaire* are arrows, are spears—it is a style which brands and kills. If hatred, if contempt, if glowing love of freedom have ever been expressed in burning, destroying, elevating words it is in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, which combines the indignation and severity of a Tacitus with the deadly satire of a Juvenal and the holy wrath of a Dante. The style is here what it originally was in the hands of the Romans, a *stilus*, a sharp steel implement for writing and for *stabbing*. The style is a dagger employed for striking with certainty to the heart.

And in *Herr Vogt*—the sparkling humour—the joy, reminiscent of Shakespeare, at having discovered a Falstaff and in him an inexhaustible mine for furnishing an arsenal of *mockery*!

However, I will not speak further here of Marx's style. Marx's style is indeed Marx. He has been reproached with having attempted to compress the greatest possible content in the smallest possible space, but that is precisely Marx.

Marx attached extraordinary value to pure, correct expression and had picked Goethe, Lessing, Shakespeare, Dante and Cervantes, whom he read almost every day, as the greatest masters. He showed the most painstaking conscientiousness in regard to purity and correctness of speech. I remember how once, during my early days in London, he gave me a lecture because I had said in one of my writings: "*die stattgehabte Versammlung*."¹ I pleaded current usage in excuse, which only drew Marx's wrath: "Those miserable German *Gymnasien*," he burst forth, "where you don't learn any German, those miserable German universities," etc. I defended myself as best I could, quoting even examples from classics, however—I never again spoke of a "*stattgehabte*" or "*stattgefunden*" event and dissuaded many from this habit.

¹ "The meeting which took place"; according to correct German, he should have used a relative clause instead of the past participle.—Ed.

Marx was a severe purist—he often searched long and laboriously for the correct expression. He hated superfluous foreign words and if, nevertheless, he frequently used foreign words himself—where the subject did not require it—his long stay abroad, especially in England, must be borne in mind; also—and this is highly essential—the kinship between German and English, which easily leads to confusion. Thus, for instance, in *Capital* (German ed.) Marx speaks of “zusammengehuden” people, having in mind the English “huddled together,” which has nothing in common with our “huden” except in etymology and means “thrown together” higgledy-piggledy. But what an infinite wealth of original, genuine German word formations and word constructions we find in Marx who, in spite of the fact that two-thirds of his life was spent abroad, performed great service for our German language, and belongs to its most eminent masters and creators. . . .

Marx's attitude as a *teacher* toward us “young fellows,” also expressed itself in another way. He demanded *much*. As soon as he discovered a gap in our knowledge, he insisted strongly that it be filled, suggesting the necessary measures for that purpose. If one was alone with him, one went through a regular examination. And his examinations were no joke. Marx was not to be deceived into taking a sheep for a goat. And if he noticed that it all bore no fruit, then his friendship also came to an end. *It was an honour for us* to be “schoolmastered” by him. I was never with him without learning; and it was thanks to Marx and his family that I did not go to the dogs in this hard struggle for existence, for bare physical life, or, rather, against starving to death, since in London people led a life of starvation for years—it was thanks to them that I did not succumb in this desperate contest for a piece of bread or a few potatoes.

At that time it was only a tiny minority in the working class that had risen to socialism; and among the Socialists themselves those who were Socialists in the scientific sense of Marx—in the sense of the *Communist Manifesto*—were only a minority. The mass of the workers, in so far as they had at all awakened to political life, floundered in the fog of sentimental democratic wishes and phrases, such as characterized the movement of 48 and its prelude and afterpiece. To Marx the applause of the multitude, popularity, was proof that one was on the wrong path, and his favourite quotation was the proud verse of Dante:

“Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti.”

[“Follow your own course, and let people talk.”]

How often he quoted this verse to us, which also comes at the conclusion of the Preface to *Capital*. . .

If he hated popularity, he felt a holy wrath against popularity-seeking. Honey-tongued speakers were an abomination to him and woe to those who indulged in phrasemongering. Then he was inexorable. "*Phraseur*" ["phrasemonger"] was in his mouth the most severe reproach possible, and once he had someone down as a *phraseur* he was through with him. Logical thinking and clear expression of our thoughts was what he instilled into us "young fellows" on every occasion, and he compelled us to study.

At about that time the magnificent Reading Room of the British Museum, with its inexhaustible book treasures, was completed, and to this place, where he used to spend every day, Marx would drive us. Learn! Learn! That was the categorical imperative which he often enough shouted at us, and which was also evident from his example, and indeed from the mere sight of this ever powerfully working intellect.

While other refugees made plans for the overthrow of the world and day by day and evening after evening intoxicated themselves with the hashish draught of thinking that "tomorrow it will begin," we, the "incendiaries," the "bandits," the "scum of humanity,"¹ sat in the British Museum and endeavoured to educate ourselves and to prepare arms and ammunition for the future struggles.

Frequently we had nothing to eat, but that did not prevent us from going to the Museum—there at any rate we had comfortable chairs to sit on and pleasant warmth in winter—which was lacking at home, if we had anything that could be called a home.

Marx was a stern teacher; he not only forced us to learn but he also satisfied himself as to whether we had learned. . . .

As a teacher, Marx had the rare quality of being strict without being discouraging.

And Marx had still another excellent quality as a teacher; he compelled us to exercise *self-criticism* and did not tolerate that one should rest satisfied with what had been achieved. With the whip of his mockery he cruelly lashed the easy-going flesh of contemplative speculation. . . .

¹ Such were the expressions used by Karl Vogt, an agent of Napoleon III, in describing Marx and adherents of Marxism.—Ed.

5. MARX AS POLITICIAN, SCIENTIST AND MAN

For Marx politics was a *study*. Empty political talk and talk-ers he hated like poison. And in fact, can one imagine anything more stupid? *History* is the product of all the forces acting in mankind and in nature, the product of human thought, of human passions, of human needs. Politics however is, *theoretically*, the *knowledge* of these millions and billions of factors working at the "loom of time," and, *practically*, the *action* determined by this knowledge. Politics is therefore a *science* and an *applied science* at that.

How furious Marx could become when he spoke of the empty-heads who settle matters with a few stereotyped phrases and who, taking their more or less confused desires and notions for facts, decide the fate of the world at the café table, in newspapers, or public meetings and parliaments! It is fortunate that the world does not take any notice of them. The "empty-heads" included at times much famed "celebrities."

In this matter Marx not only criticized but himself served as a model. Especially in his writings on recent developments in France and on the *coup d'état* of Napoleon, and in his letters to the *New York Tribune*, he has provided classical examples of the writing of political history.

Here is a comparison which forces itself upon me. The *coup d'état* of Bonaparte, which Marx dealt with in his *Eighteenth Brumaire*, was also made the subject of a famous piece of writing by Victor Hugo, the greatest of the French romantics and artists in phraseology. What a contrast between these two works and these two men! On the one hand, the monstrous phrase and the monster of phrases; on the other hand, the facts, methodically arranged—the cool deliberate man of science and the angry man of politics, angry but never disturbed in his judgment by his anger.

On the one hand, fleeting, shimmering foam, outbreaks of pathetic rhetoric, grotesque caricatures; on the other hand, every word a well-aimed arrow, every sentence a stunning impeachment, bristling with facts, the naked truth convincing by its very nakedness—no indignation, but the establishment and branding of what is. Victor Hugo's *Napoléon le Petit* passed rapidly through ten editions and is today *forgotten*. And Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* will still be read with admiration thousands of years hence. Victor Hugo's *Napoléon le Petit* was a lampoon; Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* is a work of history which for the future historian of civilization—and the future will know no other world history

than the history of civilization—will be as indispensable as Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War is for us.

As I have already explained on another occasion, only in England could Marx become what he did become. In an economically so undeveloped a country as Germany was until the middle of this century, Marx could not have arrived at his critique of bourgeois economy and at a knowledge of capitalist production any more than this economically undeveloped Germany could have had the political institutions of economically developed England. Marx was as much dependent on his environment and the conditions in which he lived as any other human being, and without this environment and without these conditions he would not have become what he is. No one has proved that better than he has himself.

To observe such a mind while conditions operate upon it and while it penetrates deeper and deeper into nature and society—that in itself is a great intellectual enjoyment, and I can never congratulate myself highly enough on the good fortune which led me as an inexperienced young fellow, thirsting for knowledge, to Marx and brought me under his influence and schooling.

And in view of the many-sidedness, indeed one could say all-sidedness of this universal mind—that is, a mind embracing the universe, penetrating into all essential particulars, despising nothing as unessential and insignificant—this schooling was necessarily also a many-sided one.

Marx was one of the first to grasp the significance of Darwin's investigations. Already prior to 1859, the year of the publication of the *Origin of the Species*—by a remarkable coincidence also of Marx's *Critique of Political Economy*—Marx had recognized the epoch-making significance of Darwin who, far removed from the noise and bustle of the big city, was preparing on his peaceful country estate a revolution similar to the one Marx himself was preparing in the stormswept centre of the world—only that the lever was applied at another point.

Particularly in the sphere of natural science—including physics and chemistry—and of history, Marx followed every new phenomenon, noted every progress; and Moleschott, Liebig, Huxley—whose “popular lectures” we conscientiously attended—were names as often occurring in our circle as Ricardo, Adam Smith, MacCulloch and the Scottish and Italian political economists. And when Darwin drew the conclusions of his investigations and made them public, we talked for months of nothing else but Darwin and the revolutionizing power of his scientific achievements.

I lay stress on this because certain "radical" enemies have spread the story that Marx out of jealousy recognized the merits of Darwin only very reluctantly and to a very limited extent.

Marx was the biggest-hearted and most just of men, where it was a question of appreciating the merits of others. He was too big for envy and jealousy as he was for vanity. But for false greatness and artificial renown, rife with incapacity and meanness, he had a deadly hatred—as for everything false and falsified.

Marx was one of the few men among the big, little and mediocre personalities known to me who was not vain. He was too big for that, and too strong—and perhaps also too proud. He never posed and was always himself. He was as incapable as any child of wearing a mask or disguising himself. Except where it was necessary for social or political reasons, he expressed his thoughts and feelings in full and without reservations, and they were to be seen in his face. And if it was necessary to keep anything back, he exhibited what I might almost call a childish awkwardness which often amused his friends.

There never was a more truthful person than Marx—he was the very embodiment of truth. One glance at him showed one at once where one stood. In our "civilized" society with its permanent state of war one cannot of course always tell the truth—that would mean to deliver oneself into the hands of the enemy or to become a social outlaw—but if one often cannot tell the truth one need not for that reason tell an untruth. I cannot always say in words what I am feeling and thinking, but that does not mean that I must or should say what I do *not* feel and think. The one is wisdom, the other is hypocrisy. And Marx was never hypocritical. He was simply incapable of it—exactly like an unspoiled child. Indeed, his wife often called him "my big child." And no one has understood him and known him better than she—not even Engels. It is a fact that when he happened to be in "society"—in quotation marks—where great attention was paid to externals and one had to exercise restraint, our "Moor" was in fact a big child and he could become embarrassed and red like a *little* child.

Persons who acted were an abomination to him. I still remember how he laughingly related to us his first encounter with *Louis Blanc*. It happened when he was still in Dean Street, in the little apartment which really consisted of only two rooms, the front room, the parlour, serving as a room for visitors and for work, while the rear one served for everything else. Louis Blanc had announced himself to Lenchen, who led him into the front room

while Marx hastily dressed in the other; the connecting door, however, was ajar and through the crack a farcical play was to be seen. The great historian and politician was a very little man, hardly taller than an eight-year-old boy, but nevertheless terribly vain. After a glance around in the proletarian drawing room, he discovered in one corner the extremely primitive mirror, before which he immediately took up his position. He threw himself into an attitude, drawing up his dwarfish stature to the fullest possible extent—he wore shoes with the highest heels I have ever seen—and, regarding himself self-complacently, began to posture like a March hare in love and to rehearse as imposing an attitude as possible. Frau Marx, who was also a witness to the comic scene, could hardly keep from bursting out laughing. When his toilet was finished, Marx announced his arrival with a powerful cough, so that this fop of a people's tribune could take a step back from the mirror and meet the incomer with a stylish bow. Certainly with Marx nothing was to be gained by posing and acting. And so "small Louis"—as he was called by the Paris workers, to distinguish him from Louis Bonaparte—was soon behaving as naturally as he could....

To see that most people are actors requires no long study in physiognomy. One needs merely to examine their photographs....

I know of no bad photograph of Marx. They all portray him naturally because he always behaved naturally. Of course, the photographs are not all of the same value. The features that characterize Marx the man are not always equally pronounced. Physical or mental discomfort or indisposition, or the predominance of some particular thought or emotion may introduce alien traits into one's facial expression. While *all* pictures of Marx are good, the best, in my judgment, is the one published in this volume—an excellent reproduction.

6. MARX AT WORK

"Genius is an infinite capacity for taking pains," as someone has said, and while this is perhaps not quite correct it is certainly so at least to a very great extent.

There is no genius without extraordinary capacity for work and extraordinary performance of work. The so-called genius who knows nothing of either is only an iridescent soap bubble or a bill of exchange drawn on castles in the air. But where above-average capacity for work and performance of work is to

be found, there we have genius. I have met many who were considered, by themselves and sometimes also by others, to be geniuses, but who had no capacity for work—they were mere dawdlers with the gift of the gab and much talent for self-advertisement. All the really eminent men I have known were extremely diligent and worked very hard. This holds good of Marx to the fullest extent. He worked like a Trojan, and since he was often prevented from working during the day—especially during his first period as a refugee—he had recourse to working at night. When we came home late in the evening from a session or meeting, he regularly sat down to work for a few hours. But the few hours lengthened more and more, and in the end he worked almost the whole night through and slept in the morning. His wife seriously remonstrated, but he declared laughingly that his constitution required it. I myself had been accustomed even at the *gymnasium* to do the more difficult work late in the evening or during the night, when my mind was keenest, and therefore I did not regard the matter in the same light as Frau Marx. But she was right. In spite of his unusually powerful constitution, Marx at the end of the 'fifties already began to complain of all sorts of disturbances in his bodily functions. A doctor had to be consulted. The result was a categorical *bán on night work*; also much physical exercise, walks and rides were prescribed. At that time I used to walk a good deal with Marx in the neighbourhood of London, especially on the hills to the north. He recovered very quickly, for in fact he had a constitution that was excellently fit for great exertion. However, hardly did he feel himself well again before he gradually slipped once more into the habit of working at night, until another crisis took place, forcing him to adopt a more reasonable mode of life—but always only so long as that was dictated by necessity. The crises became more violent—a liver complaint developed and malignant ulcers made their appearance. Gradually his iron constitution was undermined. I am convinced, and this was also the verdict of the doctors who treated him at the end, that if Marx could have made up his mind to lead a natural life, that is, one corresponding to the requirements of his body, or, we may say, in accordance with the rules of hygiene, he would still be living today. Only in his last years—when it was already too late—did he refrain from working at night, and then he worked so much the more during the day. He worked whenever it was at all possible. Even when he went for a walk he had his notebook with him and made

entries every moment. And his work was never superficial. There is work and work. He always worked intensively, thoroughly. His daughter Eleanor gave me a history table which he had drawn up for himself to be used in connection with some note of minor importance. Certainly to Marx nothing was of minor importance, and this table for his own immediate practical use was drawn up with as much diligence and care as if it were intended for publication.

Marx worked with an endurance which often filled me with astonishment. He did not know what fatigue was. He had to collapse, and even then he did not betray any signs of exhaustion.

If the value of a man is to be reckoned by the work he performs—as the value of things is by the amount of labour embodied in them—then, even from *this* standpoint, Marx is of so high a value that only a few among the giants of the intellect can be put on an even plane with him.

And what has *bourgeois society* given him in remuneration of this enormous total of work? On *Capital* he worked for forty years—and how he worked! He worked as only a Marx could work. And I do not exaggerate when I say that the worst paid day labourer in Germany has received more in wages during the forty years than Marx received as “honorarium”—literally, a payment of honour—for one of the two greatest scientific creations of this century, the other being the works of Darwin.

Science has no market value. And could one really expect bourgeois society to pay a respectable price for drawing up its *own death warrant*?

7. MARX AND CHILDREN

Marx, like all persons of a strong and healthy nature, was extraordinarily fond of children. He was not merely the most tender of fathers, who could be a child with his children for hours together; he also felt himself magnetically drawn to strange children he came across, especially such as were poor and helpless. Hundreds of times, when wandering through poverty-stricken districts, he would suddenly tear himself away from us in order to stroke the hair and press a penny or halfpenny into the little hand of some child sitting in rags at a doorway. He was suspicious of beggars, for in London begging has become a regular trade—and indeed one lined with gold, although its income is only in copper. Accordingly he did not allow himself to be humbugged for long by mendicants, men or women, to whom in

the beginning he never used to refuse a gift—as long as he had something to give. He was even furious with those who had levied toll on him by their artful exhibition of some make-believe disease and poverty, because he regarded the exploitation of human sympathy as particularly mean and as robbing the poor. But if a beggar approached Marx with a whimpering child he was irretrievably lost, were rascality depicted ever so plainly on the beggar's face. He could never resist the beseeching eyes of a child.

Bodily weakness and helplessness always aroused his sympathy. A man who beat his wife—and wife-beating was then very much the fashion in London—he would gladly have had flogged to the point of death. Owing to his impulsive nature, on such occasions he not infrequently got both himself and us into trouble. One evening I was riding with him on the top of an omnibus towards Hampstead Road when in front of a gin palace at a halting place we noticed a crowd out of which came the piercing sound of a woman's voice shrieking: "Murder! Murder!" Quick as lightning, Marx sprang down and I after him. I wanted to hold him back—I might as well have tried to stop a bullet with my bare hand. In a moment we were in the midst of the throng; and the wave of human beings closed behind us. "What is the matter?" What the matter was became apparent soon enough. A drunken woman had had a quarrel with her husband, the latter wanted to get her home, she resisted and raised an outcry like one possessed. So far, so good. There was no reason for our intervention—that we saw. But that the quarrelling pair also saw. They immediately made peace and turned on us, while the crowd round about us drew closer and closer and took up a threatening attitude against "those damned foreigners." The woman especially made a furious onslaught on Marx, aiming at his magnificent glossy black beard. I tried to calm the storm—in vain. And if two sturdy constables had not opportunely appeared on the scene of battle we would have had to pay dear for our philanthropic attempt at intervention. We were glad to come out of it with a whole skin and to be seated once more on an omnibus taking us home. Thereafter Marx was somewhat more cautious in such attempts at intervention.

One had to see Marx with his children in order to get a complete idea of the emotional depth and the childlike nature of this hero of science. In his minutes of leisure or on walks, he lugged them about, played the maddest, merriest games with them—in brief, was a child among children. On Hampstead Heath we sometimes played "cavalry." I would take one of the little daughters on

my shoulders, Marx the other, and then we would vie with one another in trotting and jumping—on occasion there was also a skirmish between the mounted riders. For the girls were as unrestrained as boys and could also stand a bump or two without crying.

The society of children was a necessity for Marx—they were a means of recreation and refreshment to him. And when his own children were grown up or dead, his grandchildren took their place. Little Jenny, who in the beginning of the 'seventies married Longuet, one of the Commune refugees, brought Marx several boys into the house—wild youngsters. The eldest especially, Jean or Johnny, was his grandfather's favourite. He could do what he liked with Marx and he knew it. One day, when I was on a visit in London, Johnny, whom his parents had sent over from Paris—as occurred several times every year—hit upon the brilliant idea of converting "Moor" into an *omnibus*, on the box of which, that is to say, Marx's shoulders, he seated himself, while Engels and I were appointed to be omnibus horses. After we were properly harnessed, a wild chase—or rather a furious drive—ensued in the little garden behind Marx's cottage in Maitland Park Road. Or perhaps it was in Engels' house at Regent's Park. The average London houses are all so much alike that they can easily be confused, especially their gardens. A few square yards of gravel and grass, both so thickly covered with a layer of London "blacks" or "black snow" (the soot particles flying around) that one cannot distinguish where *grass* begins and *gravel* ends—that is a London "garden."

And now they started off, gee up! With international cries in German, English and French—Go on! *Plus vite! Hurra!* "Moor" had to trot so that the sweat ran down his face, and if Engels or I tried to slacken the pace at all, the whip of the relentless driver immediately descended on our backs: You naughty horse! *en avant!* And so on, until Marx could not go on any more. Then negotiations were begun with Johnny and an armistice was concluded.

8. LENCHEN

Ever since Marx's household was established, Lenchen, in the words of one of the daughters, became "the soul of the house" and, in the highest, noblest sense of the word—the maid-of-all-work. Was there anything she did not have to do? Was there anything she did not do joyfully? I need only recall her many trips to that mysterious, much berated and yet much cultivated,

benevolent relative, the "uncle" with the three brass balls. And always she was cheerful, smiling, ready to help. Yet she could also be angry, and "Moor's" enemies she hated with a fierce hatred.

If Frau Marx was not well, Lenchen acted as mother—and also on other occasions she was a second mother to the children. She had a will of her own too—a strong, firm will. Whatever she deemed necessary was done.

Lenchen exercised, as I have said, a sort of dictatorship—to formulate the relationship precisely, I might say: Lenchen was the dictator in the house, Frau Marx the ruler. And Marx submitted like a lamb to this dictatorship. It has been said that no one is a great man in the eyes of his valet. Marx was certainly not one in Lenchen's eyes. She would have sacrificed herself for him, she would have given her life for him and Frau Marx and any of the children a hundred times over if it had been necessary or possible—she *did* indeed give her life—but Marx could not impress *her*. She knew him with all his moods and weaknesses and she twisted him round her little finger. However irritable his mood, however much he stormed and raged so that everyone else was only too glad to steer clear of him, Lenchen boldly bearded the lion in his den, and if he growled she read him such a lecture that the lion became as tame as a lamb.

9. WALKS WITH MARX

Our trips to Hampstead Heath! Were I to live to be a thousand, I would never forget them. Hampstead "Heath" lies beyond Primrose Hill and, like it, is well known to the world outside London through Dickens' *Pickwick Papers*. It is today still very largely heath, that is to say, hilly country, not built upon, with prickly gorse bushes and clumps of trees. It has miniature mountains and valleys where everyone can roam and sport at will without fear of trespassing, *i.e.*, of entering without authorization upon private property, of being stopped by some guardian of the holy property and made to pay a fine. Hampstead Heath is still a favourite place for the Londoners' excursions, and on a fine Sunday it is black with men's and gay with women's apparel. The ladies take special delight in putting the patience of the, in any case very patient, donkeys and hack horses to the test. Forty years ago, Hampstead Heath was very much larger and more natural, more primordial than it is today. A Sunday on Hampstead Heath was one of our greatest pleasures. The children would talk of it

the whole week beforehand and we grown-ups, old and young, would also eagerly look forward to it. The very journey there was a festival. The girls were excellent walkers, lissom and untiring as cats. From Dean Street where the Marxes lived—a few doors away from Church Street where I had made my anchorage—it was a good hour and a quarter, and as a rule we started out by eleven o'clock in the morning. True, we often started later, for early rising is not the custom in London and it always took some time before everything was ready, the children looked after and the basket properly packed.

That basket! It stands, or rather hangs, before my mind's eye as really, as vividly, as alluringly, as appetizingly as if I had seen it on Lenchen's arm only yesterday.

For the basket was our provision store, and when one has a strong and healthy stomach and very often not the necessary small change in one's pocket (big money was at that time entirely out of the question), the food problem plays a very outstanding role. And our good Lenchen, who kept a sympathetic heart in her breast for us starving and therefore ever-hungry guests, knew this very well. A mighty roast of veal was the traditional *pièce de résistance* for a Sunday on Hampstead Heath. A basket of unusual dimensions for London, rescued by Lenchen from the old days at Treves, served as a receptacle, as a sort of tabernacle, for the holy of holies. Along with the roast there was tea with sugar, and occasionally some fruit. Bread and cheese we would buy on the Heath, where, as in Berlin coffee gardens, crockery and boiling water and milk could be obtained and everyone, according to his desire and means, could—and can—buy bread, cheese, butter and beer, together with the shrimps, watercress and periwinkles featured by the place.

The trek itself was usually accomplished in the following order. I went in front as vanguard accompanied by the two girls—sometimes relating stories, and sometimes doing free gymnastic exercises or hunting for wild flowers, which at that time were not so rare as they are now. Behind us came some friends. Then came the main body of the army: Marx with his wife and perhaps some Sunday visitors who claimed a certain amount of attention. And behind these came Lenchen with the hungriest of the guests, who helped her to carry the basket. If there was more company present it was distributed among the various columns of the army. I need hardly say that the order of march or battle array could be varied according to mood or needs.

Arrived at the Heath, we would first of all look for a spot where we could pitch camp, taking into account the prospects of obtaining tea and beer.

After they had refreshed themselves with food and drink, the picnickers sought out the most comfortable place for sitting and camping, and—provided a nap was not given the preference—the Sunday newspapers bought on the way were fished out of our pockets and we would begin to read and talk politics—while the children, who quickly found playmates, played hide-and-seek among the gorse bushes.

But we had to introduce some variety into our life of ease and so races were held, and sometimes there was wrestling, aiming with stones or other sports. One Sunday we discovered a horse-chestnut tree with ripe fruit near our camping place. "Let's see who can bring down the most," someone shouted and with shouts of hurrah we set to work. "Moor" was like a madman, and certainly bringing down chestnuts was not his strong point. But he was indefatigable—as we all were. The bombardment only ceased when the last chestnut had been secured amid wild cries of triumph. Marx could not use his right arm for eight days afterwards, and I was in no better shape.

The greatest "treat" of all was a ride for all on the donkeys. What uproarious laughter and merry-making there was! And what comical scenes! How Marx amused himself—and us! He amused *us* in two ways: both by his more than primitive equestrian skill and also by the fanaticism with which he asserted his virtuosity in this art. His virtuosity consisted in the fact that as a student he had once taken riding lessons—Engels asserted that he had never taken more than three—and that once in a blue moon when he visited Manchester, he went out riding with Engels on a venerable Rosinante that was probably a great-grandchild of the gentle, lamblike mare which Old Fritz¹ once presented to the worthy Gellert.

Our return home from Hampstead Heath was always very jolly, although pleasure in retrospect does not evoke such joyful thoughts as in anticipation. We were saved from melancholy—although we certainly had only too good grounds for it—by our sardonic humour. The woes of the refugee did not exist for us—if anyone began to complain he was reminded in the most emphatic fashion of his social obligations.

The order of march on the way back was different from that

¹ Frederick II of Prussia.—Ed.

on the way out. The children, tired out from running about, formed the rearguard together with Lenchen who, being lighter of foot and load since the basket was emptied, was now able to take charge of them. Usually we struck up a song, only rarely political songs, mainly folk songs, especially sentimental songs and—this is no fable—"patriotic" songs from the "Fatherland," such as "*O Strassburg, O Strassburg, du wunderschöne Stadt!*" which was a great favourite. Or the children would sing Negro songs to us, and even dance if their legs had recovered somewhat from their fatigue. During the march, it was as taboo to talk politics as it was to mention our woes as refugees. On the other hand, we spoke much of literature and art, and then Marx had an opportunity of showing his extraordinary memory. He would recite long passages from the Divine Comedy, of which he knew almost the whole by heart, and scenes from Shakespeare, in which case his wife, who also had an excellent knowledge of Shakespeare, would often take turns with him. . . .

From the end of the 'fifties we lived in the north of London, in Kentish Town and Haverstock Hill, and then our favourite walks were on the hills and fields between and behind Hampstead and Highgate. Here we could look for flowers and identify plants, a special treat for town children, in whom the cold seething ocean of stones of the great city produces a passionate hunger for the greenery of nature. What a joy it was for us when in the course of our wanderings we discovered a little pond overshadowed by trees and I was able to point out to the children their first living "wild" forget-me-nots. Our joy was still greater when we came to a luxuriant, dark-green velvet meadow, on which we ventured after carefully reconnoitring the ground, in defiance of warnings against "trespassing," and discovered some wild hyacinths among other spring flowers in a wind-protected spot. . . .

10. MARX'S ILLNESS AND DEATH¹

About Moor's stay in Mustapha (Algiers) I cannot say much more than that the weather was awful, that Moor found there a very clever and amiable doctor and that everyone in the hotel was attentive and friendly to him.

During the autumn and winter of 1881-82, Moor was at first with Jenny in Argenteuil, near Paris. There we met and remained together for a few weeks. Then he travelled to the south of France

¹ A letter from Tussy (Marx's youngest daughter, Eleanor).—Ed.

and to Algiers, but came back very ill. He passed the autumn and winter of 1882-83 in Ventnor (on the Isle of Wight), returning in January 1883, after Jenny's death—January 8.

Now about *Karlsbad*. We visited it for the first time in 1874. Moor had been sent there on account of a liver complaint and insomnia. In the following year, 1875, his first stay having done him a great deal of good, he went there alone. The next year, *i.e.*, 1876, I accompanied him again because he said that he had missed me very much the year before. In Karlsbad he took his cure with great conscientiousness and did exactly what was prescribed for him. We made many friends there. As a travelling companion, Moor was delightful. Always in good spirits, he was ever ready to enjoy anything, whether it was beautiful scenery or a glass of beer. And thanks to his extensive knowledge of history he was able to make every place we came to even more alive in the past than it actually was in the present.

I believe that various things have already been written about Moor's stay in Karlsbad. Among other things I heard of a longish article, I cannot remember now in which paper it appeared; perhaps M.O. in D. could tell you something more about it. He spoke to me about a very good article.

In 1874 we saw you in Leipzig. Then on our way home we made a detour to Bingen, which Moor wanted to show me because he had been there on his honeymoon with my mother. Besides that we also went to Dresden, Berlin, Prague, Hamburg and Nuremberg during these two journeys.

In 1877, Moor should have gone back to Karlsbad. However, it was reported to us that the German and Austrian governments intended to deport him, and since the journey was too long and expensive to let it come to a deportation, he did not go to Karlsbad any more—which was anything but to his benefit, for he always felt rejuvenated after the cure.

We went to Berlin chiefly in order to visit a faithful friend of my father's, my dear uncle Edgar von Westphalen. We stayed only a couple of days. To Moor's joy we heard later that on the third day—exactly an hour after we had left—the police paid a visit to our hotel.

In the autumn of 1880—when our dear mother was already so ill that she could only rarely rise from her sickbed—Moor had a serious attack of pleurisy. His condition had become so dangerous because he had always been neglecting his illness. The doctor (our excellent friend Donkin) regarded the case as almost hopeless. It was a terrible time. In the large front room lay our mother, in the

little room behind was Moor. And the two of them, who were so used to one another, so close to one another, could not be together in the same room.

Our good old Lenchen (you know what she was to us) and I had to look after both of them. The doctor said that our care saved Moor's life. Be that as it may, I only know that neither Helen (Lenchen) nor I ever went to bed for three weeks. We were up and about day and night, and when we were absolutely exhausted, we took turns in resting for an hour.

Moor once more got the better of his illness. I shall never forget the morning when he felt himself strong enough to go into mother's room. They were young again together—she a loving maid and he a loving youth, both starting out in life together—and not an old man devastated by illness and an old, dying woman, taking leave of one another for life.

Moor got better and, though he was not yet strong, still he appeared to be getting strong.

Then mother died—on December 2, 1881; her last words—remarkably enough, in English—were addressed to her "Karl." When our dear General (Engels) came, he said—and at the time his words almost moved me to anger—"Moor is also dead."

And it actually was so.

With mother's life that of Moor went too. He struggled hard to keep going, for he was a fighter to the last—but he was a broken man. His general state of health became worse and worse. If he had been more selfish he would have let things take their course. However for him there was something which stood above everything else—that was *his devotion to the cause*. He *wanted to complete his great work* and therefore he agreed to undertake another voyage of recovery.

In the spring of 1882 he went to Paris and Argenteuil,¹ where I met him, and we passed some really happy days together with Jenny and her children. Moor then travelled to the south of France and finally to Algiers.

During this whole stay in Algiers, Nice and Cannes he was dogged by bad weather. He wrote me long letters from Algiers. Many of them I have lost, because at his request I sent them on to Jenny and she gave me very few of them back.

When Moor finally came home again he was very ill; and

¹ This is the journey spoken of at the beginning of this letter. [Note by W. Liebknecht.]

now we began to fear the worst. On the advice of his doctor he spent the autumn and winter at Ventnor, on the Isle of Wight. I must mention here that at that time, at Moor's request, I spent three months in Italy with Jenny's eldest son, Jean (Johnny). In the spring of 1883 I went to Moor and took Johnny with me—his special favourite among his grandchildren. I had to go back because I had to give my lessons.

And now came the last dreadful blow: the news of Jenny's death. Jenny, the first born, Moor's favourite daughter, died suddenly (on January 8). We had received letters from Moor—I have them now before me—in which he wrote that Jenny's health was better and we (Helen and I) did not need to be anxious. We received the telegram announcing her death an hour later than the letter in which Moor wrote the above. I went immediately to Ventnor. I have gone through many sad hours in my life, but none was so sad as this. I felt that I was bringing my father his death warrant. On the long anxious journey, I racked my brains thinking how to impart the news to him. I did not need to impart it, my face betrayed me—Moor said at once, "Our Jenny is dead!" and then he asked me to go immediately to Paris and help with the children. I wanted to remain with *him*—but he would not suffer any contradiction. I had hardly been half an hour in Ventnor when I was already on my sad return trip to London in order to set out immediately for Paris. I did what Moor wished on account of the children.

I will not speak of my journey home; I can only recall that time with a shudder—such mental agony, such torture—but no more of that. Suffice it to say—I came back and Moor returned home—to *die*.

And now a word about our mother. She was dying for months and suffered all the terrible tortures which cancer brings with it. Yet her good spirits, her inexhaustible wit, which you know very well, never deserted her for an instant. She inquired as impatiently as a child for the results of the elections then being held in Germany (1881), and how she rejoiced at our victories! She remained cheerful up to her death and tried to relieve our anxiety about her by joking. Yes, in spite of her frightful suffering, she joked—she *laughed*—she laughed at the doctor and all of us because we were so serious. She remained fully conscious until almost the last moment, and when she could not speak any more—her last words were addressed to "Karl"—she pressed our hands—and tried to smile.

As far as Moor is concerned, you know that he went from his bedroom into his study, in Maitland Park, sat in his armchair and tranquilly went to sleep.

This armchair the "General" kept until his death and I have it now.

If you write about Moor, don't forget Lenchen. I know you will not forget mother—Helen was to a certain extent the axis around which everything in the house turned. The best, truest friend. Therefore be sure not to forget Helen, if you write about Moor.

* * *

Now, since you wish it, a little more about Moor's stay in the south. We—he and I—spent a few weeks at the beginning of 1882 with Jenny in Argenteuil. In March and April, Moor was in Algiers, in May in Monte Carlo, Nice and Cannes. Towards the end of June and during the whole of July he was again with Jenny, and Lenchen was also in Argenteuil at the time. From Argenteuil Moor went with Laura to Switzerland, Vevey, etc. Towards the end of September or at the beginning of October he returned to England and immediately went to Ventnor where Johnny and I visited him.

And now a few notes on your questions. Our little Edgar (Musch) was born in 1847—but I am not quite sure—and he died at the end of 1855. "Little Fawkes"¹ (Föxchen) Heinrich was born on November 5, 1849, and died when about two years old. My little sister Francisca, born in 1851, died while still a baby, about eleven months old.

* * *

And now as to your question about our good Helen, or "Nymy," as we called her in the end, because Johnny Longuet called her that, I don't know why, when he was still a baby. Lenchen came to my grandmother von Westphalen as a little child of about eight or nine years old, and she grew up with Moor, mother and Edgar von Westphalen. Helen always remained very tenderly attached to the old Westphalens. And Moor also. He never tired of telling us of the old Baron von Westphalen, of his wonderful knowledge of Shakespeare and Homer. He could repeat whole rhapsodies of Homer word for word, from

¹ He got the name Fawkes from the hero of the "Gunpowder plot," Guido (Guy) Fawkes, whose anniversary, November 5, is still noisily celebrated or, more correctly, execrated in England every year. [Note by W. Liebknecht.]

beginning to end, and he knew most of Shakespeare's plays by heart, both in English and German. Moor's father, on the other hand—whom Moor greatly admired—was a real "Frenchman" of the eighteenth century. He knew his Voltaire and Rousseau by heart, as old Westphalen knew his Homer and Shakespeare. And Moor undoubtedly owed his remarkable versatility to a large extent to these "hereditary" influences.

But to return to Helen. Whether she came to my parents before or after they went to Paris—which occurred very soon after their marriage) I cannot say. I only know that my grandmother sent the young girl to our mother "as the best that she could send her—faithful, dear Lenchen." And faithful, dear Lenchen stayed with my parents, and her younger sister Marianne also came later on. You will hardly recall *her* because it was after your time. . . .

11. WANT AND PRIVATION

Innumerable lies have been spread about Marx—including the false statement that he lived in riotous luxury while the common herd of refugees around him went hungry and starved. I do not consider myself justified in entering here into details, but I can say this much: what these diaries have once again brought freshly and vividly before my eyes was no isolated case of need such as could happen to anyone, especially in a foreign country where persons or places to turn to for aid are lacking; Marx and his family experienced for years the misery of the life of refugees in its most acute form. There can have been but few refugees who suffered more than Marx and his family. And even later on, when the income was larger and more regular, the Marx family was not spared worries over their daily bread. During whole years—and the worst was then already over—the pound sterling which Marx was paid each week for his articles to the *New York Tribune* was his only certain source of income. . . .

12. MARX'S GRAVE

Marx's *family grave*, it should more correctly be called. It is situated in Highgate Cemetery, in the north of London, on a hill which overlooks the giant city.

Marx did not want a "memorial." To have desired to put up any other memorial to the creator of the *Communist Manifesto* and of *Capital* than that which he had built himself would have

been an insult to the great dead. In the minds and hearts of millions of workers, who have "united" at his call, he not only has erected to himself a memorial more lasting than bronze, but has also created the living soil in which what he taught and desired will become—and in part has already become—a consummated deed.

We Social-Democrats have no saints and no saints' tombs; but millions think with gratitude and veneration of the man who rests in this cemetery in the north of London. And thousands of years hence, when the savagery and narrow-mindedness which the efforts of the working class for its emancipation encounter today have become a scarcely credible tale of the past, free and noble men will still stand at this graveside and with bared heads whisper to their children:

"Here lies Karl Marx!"

Here lies Karl Marx and *his family*. A simple marble slab, bordered with ivy, lies like a pillow at the head of the grave, which is enclosed by marble blocks; and on the slab the inscription:

Jenny von Westphalen

The beloved wife of

Karl Marx

Born 12th February 1814

Died 2nd December 1881

and Karl Marx

Born May 5, 1818; died March 14, 1883

and Harry Longuet

Their grandson

Born July 4, 1878; died March 20, 1883

and Helene Demuth

Born January 1, 1823; died November 4, 1890.

The family grave does *not* contain the whole family; that is, in respect to the members no longer alive. The three children who died in London are buried in other London cemeteries—one of them, Edgar ("Musch"), *for certain*, the other two probably in the cemetery of Whitfield Chapel in Tottenham Court Road. And Jenny Marx, the favourite daughter, rests in Argenteuil, near Paris, where death snatched her from her happy family.

But if not all of the dead children and grandchildren have found a place in the family grave, still it holds one who belonged to the family, although not by bonds of blood: "faithful Lenchen," *Helene Demuth*.

That she should rest in the family grave had been decided already by Frau Marx, and after her by Marx. And Engels, the faithful Eckhart, faithful as Lenchen herself, carried out this duty together with the surviving children, as he would have done just the same on his own initiative.

What Marx's children thought of Lenchen, how tenderly they were attached to her, how deeply they revered her memory, can be seen from the letters of Marx's youngest daughter published elsewhere.¹

And when on my way home *via* Paris, after my last visit to London, I was revelling in old London reminiscences with "Lörchen" at *Draveil*, where Lafargue and his wife Laura Marx had fashioned themselves an enviable country home, and I spoke of my intention of writing this memorial booklet, she also said to me, just as Tussy had done in the letter reproduced above and afterwards also by word of mouth: "Don't you forget Lenchen!"

Well, I have not forgotten Lenchen and shall not forget her. Was she not indeed a *friend* to me for forty years? Was she not indeed in my London refugee period often also my "*providence*?" How often she helped me out with sixpence when my pockets were empty and there was not too low a tide in Marx's house—for if the tide was low there, there was nothing to be got from Lenchen! And how often, when *my* skill as a tailor did not suffice, did she artistically repair some indispensable article of clothing, which—on financial grounds—could not be replaced within any foreseeable period of time, so as to make it wearable again for some weeks!

When I saw Lenchen for the first time, she was twenty-seven years old and, while no beauty, she was pretty, shapely and had very attractive features. She had no lack of admirers and had repeated opportunities of making a good match. Nevertheless, without having made any vow, this faithful soul considered it a matter of course that she should remain with "Moor" and "Frau Marx" and the children.

She remained—and the years of her youth passed away. She remained during want and privation, in good fortune and in bad.

¹ For one of these letters see above, section 10, p. 439.—*Ed.*

Her first rest came when death had mown down both the woman and the man to whom she had linked her fate. She found rest with Engels, and while staying with him she died—forgetful of self to the last. And now she rests in the family grave.

* * *

Friend Motteler, the "Red Postmaster," who now lives in Hampstead, not far from Highgate, gives the following description of the grave:

"Marx's grave is set round with white marble; the small slab with names and dates in black lettering is of the same material. Spanish grass, wood ivy, which I brought back from Switzerland on one occasion, and a few small rose bushes form its simple adornment, mostly overgrown by wild grasses, as is usual here in bordered graves. My way usually takes me twice a week through Highgate Cemetery by Marx's grave; then I remove the grass if the overgrowth is excessive. A good deal gets withered during hot summers, as the two last have been (this year, when it rained so much on the Continent, there was a drought in England the like of which no one remembers, and in the parks, too the grass is completely withered). Even with Lessner's help, it was not possible for me to protect the grave from the effects of the burning sun and so we had after all, of course in agreement with the Avelings, who on account of the enormous distance can only seldom come here, to entrust it to the regular care of the cemetery gardener."